History, economics and development: A critical Heideggerian exploration by MICHAEL LOUIS FITZGERALD
HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND DEVELOPMENT:
A CRITICAL HEIDEGGERIAN EXPLORATION
MICHAEL LOUIS FITZGERALD
(B.A. Hons., University of Toronto; M.A., Carleton University; 
B.A., Carleton University)
A THESIS SUBMITTED
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY




Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Foreword  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Chapter 1: Philosophy between Positivism and Historicism  . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
The Challenge to Philosophy: Positivism and Historicism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
The Response from Philosophy: The Struggle for Meaningfulness . . . . . . . . . . .38
Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58
Chapter 2: Historicist and Positivist Economics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61
The Historical Context of Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75
Historicist Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80
Positivist Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .108
Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .138
Chapter 3: Positivist and Historicist
International Development  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146
Positivist Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .160
Historicist Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .214
Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .233
iii
Chapter 4: Heidegger’s Appropriation of the Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .238
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .238
Theoretical Completeness and the Concrete Individual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .243
Destructing the Theoretical Attitude with Formal Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .260
Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .287
Chapter 5: Mortal Finitude and Meaning
in Being and Time  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .288
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .288
Structural incompleteness and skillful making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .293
Dynamic incompleteness and insightful doing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .326
Chapter 6: Formal Indications to the Subject of Development  . . . . . . . . . .369
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .369
The subject of development  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .378
Making sense of development  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .386
The Problem of Meaning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .398
Formally indicating the subject of development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .406
Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .431
Bibliography  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .434
Appendix I: Terminology and Lexicon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .470
About the terminology used in this text  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .470
Lexicon of Heidegger’s terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .474
iv
Acknowledgements
Many people and institutions have contributed to making this thesis possible. 
First, I am extremely grateful to the National University of Singapore and the 
Department of Philosophy, for their financial and administrative support. Second, I 
have been fortunate enough to benefit from the Canadian system of higher education, 
with its great tolerance for the process of self-discovery in education. For that, I thank 
Carleton University, York University, and the University of Toronto. I also wish to 
thank World University Service of Canada for facilitating my initial first-hand 
experience of the world of development. 
Second, I would like to thank Saranindra Nath Tagore for supervising my 
thesis, and the members of my committee, Alan Chan and Anh Tuan Nuyen, for their 
comments on my work. I am also particularly grateful to Mark D’Cruz for his interest 
and support throughout this endeavour. My fellow graduate students at NUS provided 
many opportunities for stimulating discussions, a social context in which to pursue my 
studies, and insight into Singaporean society. I would particularly like to thank Edmond 
Eh, Tony See, Karen, Chin Leong, Jude Chua, Wang Jinyi and Nageeb Gounjaria. John 
Holbo and Mike Pelczar provided many an oasis in the philosophical desert.
I would also like to thank, belatedly, my M.A. supervisor, Jay Drydyk, who in 
every way made me a better philosopher, and Graeme Nicholson for being my first 
guide in reading Heidegger, and for his interest in this project at a very early stage.
My friends have always been incredibly supportive, despite their dismay at my 
recurrent distance from home. Their interest in my project has gone unrequited for 
several years now, for which I can only apologize.
My sister, Katherine, and my brother, Liam, have provided great support. I 
thank them especially for their affectionate tolerance for my peripatetic lifestyle over 
the last ten years, and for all their logistical assistance.
My parents, Patrick and Brigid, have gone well beyond the call of parental 
duty in all that they have contributed to this project. Not only have they given me 
emotional, moral and financial support, but they made our life overseas manageable in a 
great number of ways. They have always been my first interlocutors, and have 
continued to lend their considerable insight to the final stages of this project. It would 
be a far poorer thesis without it.
Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to my wife, Saira, who has put up with 
Heidegger for far too long. Her interest in this project, her determination that I would 
get it done, and the many hours she devoted to reading, commenting on, and discussing 
my work have been integral to its actualization. She co-constitutes me as the author of 
this text, and her influence is in every line. She co-constitutes me in every other way, as 
well. Without her love and support, I would never have been able to accomplish this. 
She has kept me intellectually honest, has been unstinting in her efforts to get me to see 
vwhat my project was about, and has ensured that I attain the clarity of expression 
necessary to articulate my thoughts.
For whatever inadequacies this text has, I remain solely responsible.
vi
This thesis addresses a fundamental incoherence in contemporary 
development thinking that occludes the meaning of development itself. This 
incoherence stems from the centrality of economics in mainstream development 
thinking, and has its origin in the dominance of positivism that arose in the 19th 
century. It shows itself in various dichotomies found in development thinking: between 
developed and underdeveloped; between developedness and underdevelopment; and 
between self-developing and developing others. The mainstream conception presents 
an ideal of developedness that is operationalized in development practice through 
policies aiming to reform socio-economic structures of the underdeveloped. This 
abstract conception is presented as the inevitable outcome of general or universal laws 
governing social change, the domain of which is most often considered to be the 
economic.
These dichotomies also provide the basis for contemporary critiques of the 
mainstream, which argue that it fails to acknowledge what is at issue in development, 
namely the particular, historically concrete actuality of each society. The most recent 
trenchant critique is postdevelopment, which argues that mainstream development 
thinking simply attempts to universalize the experience of Western countries through 
the Westernization of others. The postdevelopmentalists argue that the historical 
specificity of the West contains no lessons for non-Western countries, which must seek 
their own paths to development however they conceive it.
The postdevelopmentalists reiterate arguments of 19th and early 20th century 
historicism, directed against both the Enlightenment legacy of universal history and 
post-Hegelian positivistic attempts to reduce history to the determinateness of causal 
laws. Historicism argued that positivism was itself a historically particular conception 
of knowledge, and that the attempt to explain history by general laws disregarded the 
uniqueness of the historical. However, historicism’s historicization of history, 
knowledge and humanity entailed a sceptical relativism, in which there is no 
determinateness to human historical existence. Thus, both positivism and historicism 
problematize meaning. Positivism ultimately entails that the singular or the individual 
has no meaning or value, whereas historicism ultimately entails that meaning is 
subjectivized and historically relativized.
Heidegger’s thinking addresses this same incoherence as it appeared in the 
philosophical debates of his time. Thus, his response suggests a way to approach 
development more coherently. Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutical approach 
to the human situation aims to show how concretely individual life can be expressed in 
a way that is neither objectivist nor subjectivist. In Heidegger’s analytic, the singularity 
of the human situation shows itself primarily in being with others. Through an 
intertwined set of directing concepts, called “formal indications”, Heidegger seeks to 
show how the happening of life is always grasped in and as co-happening, and thus how 
meaningfulness is always co-constituted.
Summary
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This thesis seeks to show how a phenomenological-hermeneutical approach to 
the question of development can bring into relief the co-happening of the developing by 
which we are co-constituted. It aims to bring to light how we can be freed for our 
possibilities in becoming who and how we already are, in a way that avoids both the 
implication of expert trusteeship found in positivist development and the implication of 
cultural relativism found in historicist development.
Foreword
Looking back from the Year 2007In accord with the basic character of its being, 
philosophical research is something a “time”, as long 
as it is not merely concerned with it as a matter of 
education, can never borrow from another time. Such 
research also is something that—and this is how it 
needs to understand itself and the nature of what it can 
possibly achieve in human being-situate—will never 
want to step forward with the claim that it be allowed 
to and is able to relieve future times of the burden of 
having to worry about radical questioning.
— Martin Heidegger, 
“Phenomenological 
Interpretations to Aristotle”
Why a Phenomenological Hermeneutics of Development?1
This Foreword provides further clarification about the project undertaken in 
this thesis, namely, showing how Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics is 
significant for understanding international development. To a large extent, it is a 
retrospective on the inquiry that constitutes the thesis, as it was written more than one 
year after the latter. As well, in the interval between the two, I was engaged in 
development work in Tanzania, and thus had the opportunity to experience how the 
situation of having enacted the previous inquiry changed my understanding of the 
endeavour of development. What is presented here is therefore not a summary of the 
thesis, but rather a subsequent consideration of how Heidegger’s phenomenological 
hermeneutics offers a way to approach the phenomenon of development that takes into 
account the engagement in development as itself constitutive of that phenomenon, and 
1. Adapted from “A Phenomenological Hermeneutics of Development”, presented at the 
Catholic University of Eastern Africa’s Philosophy of Development Conference in Nairobi, 
Kenya on 14 September 2006 (to be published in The Philosophy of Development, eds. Paul 
Shimiyu, David Lutz and George Ndemo, Catholic University of Eastern Africa 
Publications, Nairobi, forthcoming). I am grateful for CUEA’s permission to reproduce this 
material here.viii
ixthus suggests how such engagement can be understood as a situation of thinking the 
unprecedented. The analysis of Heidegger’s thinking in relation to development should 
also be taken as an argument for the centrality of philosophical inquiry in development 
thinking, which the dominance of the social sciences, particularly economics, has 
largely obscured.
The conceptual consequences of this dominance are examined in the first part 
of the thesis, in the form of two predominant conceptions of development, the 
mainstream or “positivist” and the anti-development or “historicist”, to show how 
neither gives an adequate account of the relationship between development and 
freedom, because neither properly accounts for how understanding development both 
constitutes, and is constituted by, development. That is, neither properly accounts for 
how such understanding is both immanent in its historical context yet transcends it. 
Positivist development negates the historical context in which, and as which, 
development happens, in favour of the notion of a linear, universal series of stages of 
history or social change, and thus holds that knowledge about development transcends 
every historical context. Historicist development, on the other hand, regards 
development as determined by the historically singular and hence incommensurable 
contexts in which it occurs, and thus regards understanding of development as 
immanent in such contexts. In both, development is theoretically objectified in a way 
that forestalls the possibility of transformation in the concept of development itself. 
Thus, both conceptions preclude the possibility of the unprecedented in development. 
Yet arguably it is unprecedentedness, rather than predetermined standards or given 
historical traditions, that constitutes the freedom of development.
The second part of the thesis argues that a phenomenological hermeneutic 
approach to development is a way to grasp how the possibility of the unprecedented is 
xconstitutive of historical singularity, and thus to grasp how “the history we ourselves 
“are”” (J pg. 74) is both constituted by historical context and involves understanding it. 
Such understanding is an enactment of possibilities, and thus transforms the historical 
context. It is the possibility of transformation in how development is understood that 
constitutes the freedom of development. But as such transformation in thinking, it 
cannot be known in advance, and thus cannot be grasped as a (theoretical) object. 
Instead, it needs to be approached as a phenomenon in the phenomenological sense, 
which includes how it appears or how we have access to it. Phenomenological inquiry 
does not presuppose the “content” of what is to be elucidated in the inquiry, nor does it 
presuppose that the inquiry is separate from the phenomenon it inquires into. Rather, 
inquiry is understood to constitutively belong to the phenomenon and thus to disclose it 
in the inquiry, as a concrete enactment or actualisation of the phenomenon. Such an 
approach, I suggest, is a way to understand how development always involves the 
transformation of the concept of development itself, and thus to approach the meaning 
of development in a way that neither determines it in advance, nor binds it to the past.
Heidegger’s aim in his phenomenological decade (1917-1927) was to 
elucidate the question of the meaning of being through a phenomenological 
hermeneutical inquiry into the being of the human situation. Of crucial significance in 
Heidegger’s analytic is his argument that such inquiry is an enactment that belongs to 
the phenomenon of the human situation itself, and that this phenomenon is 
characterised by its historical singularity. Hence such inquiry cannot be theoretical. Nor 
can it directly specify the phenomenon. Instead, it can only specify it in an indirect way, 
through the method that Heidegger calls “formal indication”. For this reason, the 
enactment of the inquiry belongs to the phenomenon, and therefore transforms the 
phenomenon into which it inquires. In such transformation, the concepts whereby the 
xiphenomenon is grasped and expressed undergo transformation as well, as they are 
concretized in the inquiry. It is this transformation that suggests a way to think the 
unprecedented, so as to grasp development not as the intentional reproduction of an 
extant historical trajectory that for some reason has failed to manifest itself elsewhere, 
but as the creative reappropriation of the traditions that both constitute us and through 
which we understand them as our traditions.
A phenomenological hermeneutical approach to the phenomenon of 
development is more appropriate than theoretical approaches, for it neither presupposes 
a definition of development (e.g., by reference to values, indicators or other supposedly 
objective standards), nor does it isolate the inquiry from its “object”. The situatedness 
of the inquiry itself suggests how the historically singular context can be articulated in 
the way it determines the inquiry that arises from it, and how such inquiry, in making 
that context explicit, allows for the possibility of disclosing the unprecedented.
Elucidating a phenomenon involves elucidating the access to it, which 
includes the foreconceptions and method by which it is elucidated. The categories in 
terms of which the phenomenon is understood and expressed originate in the encounter 
of the phenomenon, rather than pre-existing it. Furthermore, in the elucidation that 
makes the implicit understanding of the phenomenon explicit in concrete expression, 
the concepts undergo transformation. Understanding is transformed in interpretation 
because the realisation of the possibilities it involves transforms the situation from 
which understanding arises.
What neither positivism nor historicism are able to articulate is the very 
happening of development, because neither approach in itself involves or enacts such 
happening. Both conceptions theoretically objectify development as a process, whether 
universal (positivism) or as one arising from the particular historical context 
xii(historicism). But this notion always involves the idea of definite start- and endpoints, 
and thus cannot grasp development as a happening or event in which conceptualisation 
itself changes. Phenomenological hermeneutics, in contrast, involves a way of access 
that allows the phenomenon to show itself from itself in the enactment of the 
elucidation, which must hence always be contextualised concretely. Nevertheless, this 
way of access can be formally indicated, i.e., conceptualised in a way that does not 
prescribe or presuppose the material or concrete content, but points to the enactment 
itself. Formal indication, then, holds the content in abeyance until it is enacted. In the 
enactment, formally indicative concepts are “deformalised” into concepts that articulate 
and grasp the phenomenon concretely. The phenomenon of development involves and 
is constituted by such concretisation itself, as the way in which the understanding of it 
arises from the context and yet is directed “back” towards it.
Phenomenologically elucidated, then, “development” does not mean a set of 
characteristics (of an object or an objective process) specifiable in advance, as the 
positivist and historicist conceptions entail. Approached phenomenologically, the 
meaning of development lies in the way the approach to it allows it to show itself, i.e., 
is constitutive of how it comes about, which cannot be known in advance. Such an 
approach suggests that “we will know it when we see it” (or even “when we are it”), not 
because we simply retrospectively deem whatever happens to be development, but 
because we have a foreconception or intuition arising from our historical situation of 
what development could be. We will know it when we see it, because seeing it is part of 
knowing it, and vice versa. How we can see it cannot be specified in advance, nor 
prescribed, because this depends on who we are. Yet, correlatively, being who we are 
depends on how we are able to understand ourselves in grasping our possibilities.
xiiiThus, the phenomenological approach to development involves elucidating 
how the understanding of development belongs to development itself, and equally how 
development is constituted in and by such understanding. Because understanding 
ourselves depends on who we are, it is always historically singular. But such singularity 
only happens in the expression of that understanding, which transforms the situation in 
belonging to it. This is the sense of the unprecedented that positivist and historicist 
conceptions of development purport to articulate, but always preclude by attempting to 
determine it. Phenomenological hermeneutics indicates that the possibility of the 
unprecedented can be grasped and articulated precisely as possibility, not as some 
actuality either present elsewhere or in the past, because the very approach holds open 
the possible as the sense that we continually enact in striving to understand who we are 
and how we have become.
Introduction
Development as Freedom, or Freedom in Development?We at the World Bank believe that the disadvantaged of 
the world should be seen not as objects of charity but as 
assets in the fight against poverty.
— James D. Wolfensohn, The 
World Bank Annual Report 
2004
Development is indeed a momentous engagement with 
freedom’s possibilities.
— Amartya Sen, Development as 
Freedom
Human freedom now no longer means freedom as a 
property of man, but man as a possibility of freedom.
— Martin Heidegger, The 
Essence of Human Freedom
In this thesis, I pursue the central question about development that Cowen and 
Shenton pose in Doctrines of Development: how is free development possible in a 
world constrained by necessity?1 How is it possible to develop freely if development 
can only be understood as a constructivist response to the conditions of the past, or if 
the past is appealed to as a “palliative of the present”,2 i.e., as holding the cure for the 
ills that development itself has wrought (DoD 168-169)? Such conceptions of 
development, they argue, have their origin in the positivist reinterpretation of the 
organic idea of development (found, for example, in Romanticism) as a counterpoint to 
the modern idea of progress (DoD ix-x, 6-7), a reinterpretation that sought to reconcile 
the two. This gave rise to a conception of development in which socioeconomic 
conditions are taken to be the external constraint preventing development. People are 
1. Michael P. Cowen and Robert W. Shenton, Doctrines of Development, Routledge, London, 
1996, pp. 449-450 (hereafter DoD followed by page number).
2. M.P. Cowen and R.W. Shenton, “The Renewed Search for Social Trusteeship: Cohen and 
Fitch on Social Justice and the City”, Journal of Historical Sociology, vol. 11, no. 1, 1988, 
pg. 122.1
2seen as unable to develop themselves in such historically determined conditions, which 
do not allow them to actualize their potential for production and improvement. The 
positivist view holds that, for development to occur, an agent to act on such people’s 
behalf—a trustee—is required that, by altering their conditions, can enable them to 
develop themselves. Yet this view manifests a contradiction, for how can such an 
agent’s actions properly be oriented to the self-development of others? That is, how is 
the basis for such self-development to be ascertained, if not by those people 
themselves? And if they cannot determine this basis because of their external 
constraints, then in what sense is any basis for such development justifiable, since it is 
not determined from their own development (which has not yet occurred), but rather 
from elsewhere, i.e., from those who have developed? 
Although this would suggest that the positivist conception of development is 
simply an imposition of concepts and values that pertain only to the developed, the 
positivist developer maintains that human nature is universal and thus that there are 
general laws governing all development. But with this conception, positivism implies 
that agency, intention, and purpose are in fact of no consequence in determining the end 
or goal of development, since it can be determined without reference to these. Yet 
without such reference, the meaning of development becomes problematic, because it 
ceases to be intelligible as a way in which we encounter our conditions. 
Against the positivist assimilation of progress and history into development, 
the 19th-century historicists argued that development can only be understood as 
historically individual. All eras, these thinkers argued, are constituted as the eras they 
are by their own individual development, which has nothing to do with linear, universal 
progress. The idea of progress entails that different eras can be arranged both in a 
chronological-causal sequence, and in a hierarchically comparative classificatory 
3scheme, which reduces the individuality and the meaning of different eras to their 
instrumental role in giving rise to the present, thereby devaluing other historical eras. 
This in turn implied a reductio ad absurdum, since the present could not itself then be 
understood as a source of intrinsic value, since it, too, must simply be instrumental for a 
more advanced future era. In asserting the equal value of all historical eras, the 
historicists historicized both history and human being. But this led to the aporia of 
historical relativism, since it denied that there was any basis for judgment about the 
moral value of different eras, and thus of determining whether what happens or is 
undertaken in the name of development is in fact constitutive of a culture’s 
individuality.
The debate between positivism and historicism should be understood as a 
debate about the source of possibilities for different eras, and by extension, different 
cultures. Yet both positions equally entail that development cannot properly be free, i.e., 
self-determined rather than determined by historical conditions. The question then 
becomes, does free development have any meaning? If development is constrained by 
general laws of history or progress, or by historical individuality, how can it ever be 
free? That is, can any society or country ever determine its own possibilities?
On the question of how free development can be understood as a possibility, 
Cowen and Shenton have little to say. One of the aims of this thesis is (paraphrasing 
Heidegger) to put Heidegger’s works in the service of Cowen and Shenton by working 
out how free development might be understood in the light of our historicalness. 
Heidegger’s phenomenological approach to the human situation, or to human “being-
situate” [Da-sein],3 seeks to address precisely the aporia found in development 
thinking, which has its roots in positivist and historicist aporias and their inflection into 
3. See Appendix I for an explanation of this translation.
4economic thought. Heidegger found this aporia evident in his philosophical 
predecessors, i.e., Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, Lask and Husserl. His 
phenomenological appropriation of Dilthey, as a way of expressing concrete 
individuality, sought to show how being-historical is a concretion of being-possible, 
and thus to show the relation between possibility and history (not the past). An 
examination of how Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics articulates the 
relation between science, history and human existence shows how such an approach is 
fundamental to re-thinking international development. Both mainstream development 
thinking and the current critiques of it, I argue, are problematic because they rest on 
objectifying conceptions of development that elide how such thinking, whether 
positivist or historicist, belong to and are constitutive of development.
Current conceptions conflate a number of different notions, as Cowen and 
Shenton have argued in Doctrines of Development: (i) the conflation of the intent to 
develop with development as an immanent process; (ii) the conflation of development 
with progress; (iii) the conflation of the intent to develop with an agency capable of 
acting so as to bring development about for another; and (iv) the conflation of the 
immanent process with the state of developedness (or being developed) itself (DoD 3-
4).
The first conflation fails to recognize that the immanent process of 
development is the basis for the intent to develop. The idea that the intent to develop 
can be brought to bear on a situation where development has not occurred raises the 
question of whether this can, in fact, be development. The second conflation fails to 
recognize the heterogeneity of the concepts of development and progress in terms of 
continuity and discontinuity. The pre-modern concept of development involved the 
biological or phusiological notion of decline and decay as inherent in the appearance of 
5the new, whether in organisms or in societies. Progress, in contrast, was conceived as “a 
linear unfolding of the universal potential for human improvement that need not be 
recurrent, finite or reversible” (DoD 14). Progress meant the continuous accumulation 
of scientific and moral knowledge, whereas development implied its loss and 
disappearance. Yet the social transformations brought about by industrialization were 
accompanied by the rapid destruction of ways of life and consequent social disorder. 
The increase in scientific and technical knowledge and its application to material 
production manifested discontinuity rather than continuity. In the face of this, 
development was reformulated as a counterpoint to progress so as to provide continuity 
with the past through intention, Cowen and Shenton argue. In contemporary times, 
however, it has come to be identified with progress, and identification that manifests the 
problem of the legitimacy of development that intends destruction.4
Whilst I agree with much of Cowen and Shenton’s analysis of the positivist 
origins of contemporary conceptions of development, their immanent critique pays 
little attention to the historicist critique of both positivism and universal history that 
became prominent in 19th-century Germany.5 Historicism rejected the notion of 
progress as a universal cumulative process, and argued that each culture and historical 
era had to be understood in its own terms, as a coherent unity expressing its own 
internal principle. For the historicists, as Ranke put it, “every epoch is immediate to 
God”.6 Although they acknowledged progress in the material realm, in which one thing 
leads to another, the historicist conception of history challenged the necessity at the 
4. As Cowen and Shenton point out, the destructive or negative aspects of development are a 
necessary part of the process, as for instance with the destructiveness of capitalist 
development (DoD ix).
5. Herbert Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany 1831-1933, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1984, pg. 34.
6. Leopold von Ranke, “On the Epochs of Modern History”, trans. W.A. Iggers and K. von 
Moltke, in German Essays on History, ed. R. Sältzer, Continuum, New York, 1991, pg. 84.
6heart of positivism. However, the cultural and social relativism historicism implied 
problematized the basis on which the development of individual historical eras was to 
be determined as development.
Positivism and historicism in 19th-century Germany also challenged the 
discipline of philosophy, and gave rise to a number of responses from philosophers 
concerned to defend the autonomy of their discipline. The responses found in the work 
of Dilthey, Husserl, and the Baden school of neo-Kantianism (Windelband, Rickert, and 
Lask), were the philosophical motivation for Heidegger’s phenomenological 
hermeneutics. Heidegger’s aim was to overcome both the aporias of historicism and 
neo-Kantian transcendental value philosophy, and the residual Cartesianism in Dilthey 
and Husserl, by way of a phenomenological critique of the theoretical attitude. 
Heidegger argued that the theoretical attitude is unable to grasp the historicalness of the 
human situation because it presupposes an ahistorical subject. Grasping the human 
situation in its concrete individuality, he argued, requires a hermeneutical approach that 
is also phenomenological, i.e., one that brings into relief the interpretative condition of 
human being as always situational, through phenomenological analysis—or 
“destruction”—itself.
Heidegger’s phenomenological approach to the human situation is not anti-
scientific, however. Unlike many postmodernists, Heidegger does not argue that the 
positive sciences are simply historically or culturally determined worldviews. His 
argument against the foundationalism accorded to science is that we cannot grasp the 
human situation through such disciplines, because they already presuppose an 
understanding of the human being as a theoretical knower. In positing their objects, they 
likewise posit the subject that investigates them. This applies equally to the human and 
the natural sciences. The objectification of a domain of beings, whether the 
7spatiotemporal entities of physics, the organic entities of biology, the collectivities of 
sociology or the abstract exchangers of neoclassical economics, involves a 
subjectification of the being that inquires into them, whether such inquiry is through 
experimentation, statistical data-gathering, or descriptive observation.
Nevertheless, Heidegger maintains that such inquiries are genuine and 
legitimate. What he questions is the notion that they are able to give an account of our 
way of being, because human being is not an object or an instance of something. Of 
course, human beings can be investigated as objects or instances, and this is precisely 
what the positive sciences do. For example, physiology investigates the human body, 
anthropology investigates human cultures, economics investigates the economic 
behaviour of humans, and so on. But in doing so, they are unable to grasp the 
singularity of being human, the individuum that has traditionally been held to be 
ineffabile. This is the question that motivates Heidegger’s thinking: how to find a way 
to express our concrete, historical, situational singularity? His approach to the question 
draws from Husserl, Dilthey, Rickert and Lask, combining the insights of each into a 
phenomenology (Husserl) that allows the hermeneutic historicality (Dilthey) of 
singularity to show itself in its heterothetical situationality (Rickert) brought to 
expression by way of a productive logic (Lask) of originariness. In his various attempts 
to express this, however, he found that the language of the philosophical tradition itself 
was an obstacle, for it constantly elides the expression of the singular by subsuming it 
as a particular instance under general or formal concepts. For that reason, Heidegger 
sought to articulate his analytic of the human situation in a nonobjectifying way, by 
finding forms of expression that in themselves would prohibit their immediate 
identification with familiar concepts. In its most “scholastic” form, found in Being and 
8Time, he attempts this by destructing the familiar grammatical functions of words to an 
unprecedented degree, which makes reading that text “a strange lexical experience”.7
Nevertheless, this is not idiosyncrasy on Heidegger’s part, and even less a 
strategy for achieving philosophical fame (or notoriety). But all too often the temptation 
when reading Heidegger is to try and “translate” his “neologisms” into more familiar 
terms. For example, Da-sein is often taken simply as Heidegger’s term of art for 
“human” (fostered, in no small part, by the failure of successive generations of English-
language Heidegger scholars to translate this term8), being-with-one-another is taken as 
Heidegger’s term for “the social”, and so on. The desire to map Heidegger’s formal 
indications onto concepts we are more familiar with often results in reading his texts as 
contributions to familiar debates, such as anti-representationalism in the philosophy of 
mind. This tendency, however, misconstrues the motivations for his thinking and the 
transformation in thinking that is involved in his approach. As is often the case with 
phenomenology, Heidegger’s texts get read as if they were presenting a philosophical 
system, and are evaluated on that basis. For Heidegger, however, phenomenology is an 
approach, a “how” of research (SZ 27), that aims to bring the phenomena it investigates 
to light in the approach itself, rather than as a result of it. That is, it demonstrates what it 
seeks to articulate; and it must be carried out or enacted in order to achieve this. Thus, a 
phenomenological text such as Being and Time cannot be understood in terms of what it 
7. Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 1993, pg. 397 (hereafter GBT followed by page number).
8. Thomas Sheehan, “A paradigm shift in Heidegger research”, Continental Philosophy 
Review, vol. 34, 2001, pp. 193-194.
9reports, because the what is not fundamental.9 Yet this is precisely reversed when we 
try to interpret Heidegger’s language by way of familiar concepts.
This danger is even more prevalent in an endeavour such as the one undertaken 
here. It is all too easy to appropriate Heidegger’s concepts and “apply” them to a 
domain such as development by mapping them on to the usual terms of debates in that 
domain. For example, it is possible to read Being and Time as a critique of the 
scientifically-oriented approach to development. Much of what that text says seems in 
accord with the notion that development is just a form of scientism applied to the 
“Third World”. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology then gets taken as an argument for 
the singularity and uniqueness of different cultural forms, and thus as a repudiation of 
the notion that the “West” can prescribe to another culture how it should (or must) 
become. Reading Heidegger in this way ends up by turning his thinking into yet another 
postmodernist defence of cultural relativism, a position that ultimately seems sterile.10 
The issue with such readings is not that they have to disregard key aspects of 
Heidegger’s analytic of the human situation, such as being-toward-death and 
conscience, as inapplicable to cultures, which are not mortal or finite in Heidegger’s 
formally indicative sense. Rather, it is that they disregard the very sense of Heidegger’s 
method or approach, which is intended precisely to ward off such conceptual 
translations and “applications”.
9. Heidegger’s awareness of this is evident in his determination that his collected works not be 
produced as critical editions, with all the usual textual apparatus such as explanatory 
essays, indices, footnotes, and so on. Only by avoiding this, he felt, could the original intent 
of the texts (a large number of which are actually lecture-course manuscripts or transcripts) 
be in some way preserved, by forcing the reader to engage with the movement in thinking 
that was enacted in the lecture-courses themselves. 
10. I speak from my own experience of having tried to pursue that approach. The aspect of 
development that made it untenable was the domain of economics. Unless this domain is 
engaged with at a fundamental level, a phenomenology of development turns into a critique 
of modernity, and thus becomes a postmodernist critique of modernity in toto. Only the 
constant reminder that Heidegger does leave room for the positive sciences enabled me to 
go beyond that critique. Cf. Robert C. Scharff, “What postmodernists don’t get”.
10In this thesis, then, my aim is to read Heidegger in the methodological, 
formally indicative way that, arguably, he intends his analytic. Therefore, it centres on 
his articulation of the kinetic tension in our way of being, between universality and 
singularity, necessity and possibility, and transcendence and immanence. Heidegger 
argues that the “self” cannot be properly understood as a substance or a thing, but only 
as a way of being. At heart it is a happening of becoming our possibilities out of the 
apriori necessity of alreadiness. Being-a-self, or “selving” [Selbstsein] (SZ 41, 113), is 
not opposed to being-with-one-another as the individual is opposed to the social or 
collective. Rather, they are correlated. The concrete, existentiell moments that 
constitute me do not come from some “interior” dimension or realm, but from the world 
around me in which I am with others. There is no interiority to the self, because the self 
is not self-contained. My characteristics, habits, skills and abilities are all “generic”; 
they are always shared by others. The mistaken tendency found in both the positive 
sciences and the philosophical tradition is to take such characteristics as properties 
predicated of an entity which, in its difference from those properties, constitutes the true 
individual. In this conception, the self is hypostatized or reified as that which has 
properties. But such a self therefore cannot be identified or defined other than by the 
property of possessing properties. For Heidegger, this view of the self is central both to 
the modern “philosophy of consciousness” in its various forms (save that of Leibniz, 
perhaps) and to the natural sciences that arose concurrently with modern philosophy.
Heidegger’s critique of the presuppositions of the theoretical attitude allows us 
to re-think the meaning of development in a non-theoretical way, and thus to bring into 
relief the way that developing is always a co-developing. That is, the idea that 
development can be done by an agent for others is shown to rest on a theoretical 
separation of “developer” and “developee”, a separation that makes development itself 
11incomprehensible. A phenomenology of development, I suggest, does not provide us 
with a new paradigm for putting development into practice, but rather allows the praxis 
that “transconstitutes” us to inform our understanding of the meaning of development.
The thesis proceeds as follows. In chapter 1, I examine the positivist 
conception of history and the historicist response to this, the challenge these positions 
presented to philosophy, and the problematization of meaning implicit in them. I then 
look briefly at the philosophical responses to historicism and positivism from 
Heidegger’s predecessors. In chapter 2, I examine the debate between positivism and 
historicism found in economic thought, particularly in the 19th century. Historicist 
economics was prominent in Germany until the early 20th century, although it has its 
roots in aspects of economic inquiry that began in the Renaissance. Positivist 
economics can be said to have begun with Adam Smith, and dominates present-day 
economics. In chapter 3, I look at the positivism of mainstream development thinking, 
for which I take the World Bank to be an exemplar. I also look at Amartya Sen’s 
concept of development as freedom, to show that this, too, retains a positivistic bias 
against history. The chapter concludes with a brief look at postdevelopment as a 
historicist critique of the mainstream. In chapters 4 and 5, I examine the method and 
topic of Heidegger’s analytic of being-situate, which seeks to show how understanding 
our concrete singularity itself depends on the kinetic tension between necessity and 
possibility that enables being-historical. The central aspect of Heidegger’s argument is 
that being-historical is not separate from our understanding of historicalness. Rather, 
they are hermeneutically related. Furthermore, the discursivity of understanding entails 
that being-a-self is equioriginary with being-with-one-another. Thus, Heidegger 
destructs the traditional dichotomies of individual and society, history and the a priori, 
and transcendence and immanence, through a phenomenological demonstration of how 
12these belong together. Chapter 6 brings these phenomenological insights to bear upon 
the question of development. What I aim to show is that a phenomenological 
destruction of the dichotomies on which the current conception of development 
depends allows us to understand development not as a question of technical production 
of a generalized or universalized form of society, but rather as the transconstitution of 
historically singular ways of being-selves and being-with-one-another, whereby coming 
to understand who and how we are is first made possible by transcendence of our own 
historically singular situations. Such transcendence, or ways of being directed towards 
ourselves, however, is only possible insofar as we come to find ourselves in the 
communication and contest about the traditions we are immanent in. Development is 
one form of this communication and contest. Phenomenologically, then, development 
no longer appears as the technical transcendence of history, but rather as the provisional 
self-interpretation of the meaning of being developed. That is, development thinking 
has to be understood not as a theoretical attitude towards an objective process, but as 
belonging itself to the contest over historical meaning. Fundamentally, development has 
to be seen as a way in which the freedom to be our possibilities is understood and 
expressed, rather than as the application of a theoretical analysis that aims to establish a 
determinate historical trajectory on the basis of purported historical necessity.
Chapter 1: Philosophy between Positivism and 
HistoricismIntroduction
This chapter looks at the intellectual situation of the 19th century in which 
conflicting notions arose about how history is properly investigated and accounted for, 
and the significance of this for the meaning of social change. The shift away from 
Absolute Idealism after the death of Hegel in 1831 combined with the establishment of 
autonomous programs of inquiry in the natural and historical sciences—particularly in 
Germany—posed a challenge to philosophy’s claim to disciplinary autonomy, and its 
role in contributing to understanding human existence. This challenge brought about 
the “profound identity-crisis which has persisted up until the present day” for 
philosophical inquiry.1
I focus on Germany, for three main reasons. First, the issue of constructive 
intent in state-building was more urgent for Germans than for the French or British, 
because until 1871 Germany was a nation without a state. Second, and partly as a result 
of this situation, historical research was first systematized in Germany, through the 
efforts of scholars such as Niebuhr, Ranke, and Droysen, who established methods and 
techniques of historiographical research. These made it possible to claim that the 
historical sciences could achieve objectively valid knowledge, and thus to contest the 
claim that only the natural sciences could be objectively valid. These claims also 
involved contesting the status of the legitimacy of philosophy with regard to inquiry 
into history and nature. Third, because of its political situation until the late 19th 
1. Herbert Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany 1831-1933, trans. E. Matthews, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1984, pg. 5.13
14century, “the capitalist transformation of German society itself was both a late and a 
rapid process directed from above”.2 Indeed, according to Berman, it was in Germany 
that there first arose the identification of a society as “socially, economically and 
politically ‘underdeveloped’ ”.3 For these reasons, economics in Germany had a 
different intent from the formal-deductive political economy dominant in Britain and 
France (as found in Ricardo and J.S. Mill, for example). The former was predominantly 
concerned with the administration of economic behaviour in the endeavour of state-
making, whereas the latter was fundamentally concerned with the logic of production 
and distribution in increasing wealth.4
Thus, the question of the relation of positivism, historicism and philosophy 
with regard to the meaningfulness of history, development and progress was a central 
issue in 19th century Germany, and gave rise to ways of understanding development 
that have yet to be recognized in contemporary mainstream international development 
thinking. Heidegger’s response to the “crisis of historicism” in his phenomenological 
decade (1919-1928) shows the confluence of these factors.5 Heidegger is centrally 
concerned with the influential philosophical trends and schools of thought of the time, 
and therefore there is little discussion of the economic and the political in his texts of 
2. Joel S. Kahn, “Towards a History of the Critique of Economics: The Nineteenth-Century 
German Origin of the Ethnographer’s Dilemma”, Man, vol. 25, no. 2, 1990, pg. 235. Kahn 
therefore suggests that “Germany can usefully be characterized as the first of the ‘Newly 
Industrialised Countries’ rather than the last of the old” (ibid.).
3. Marshall Berman, All that is Solid Melts into Air, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1988, pg. 43.
4. Cf. Keith Tribe, “Oeconomic History”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 
36, 2005, pp. 589, 593; David P. Levine, “Political Economy and the Idea of 
Development”, Review of Political Economy, vol. 13, no. 4, 2001, pg. 525.
5. Alan Megill argues that the “crisis of historicism” was centrally a crisis for theology and 
religion in its confrontation with the critical methods of historical research (“Why was 
There a Crisis of Historicism?”, History and Theory, vol. 36, no. 3, 1997, pp. 416-429). The 
influence of theology on Heidegger’s thinking will not be examined here. For details, see 
Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 1993, ch. 2 (hereafter GBT followed by page number) and Jeffrey Andrew 
Barash, Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning, Nijhoff/Kluwer, 
Boston, 1988, ch. 4.
15this period. Nevertheless, his hermeneutic transformation of phenomenology clarifies 
the conflict between positivism, historicism and philosophy in a way that is suggestive 
for how to understand the relation between history and social change.
This chapter focusses on the rise of positivism and historicism in the 19th 
century, and the challenge they posed to the autonomy of philosophy. First I give an 
outline of the positivist view of knowledge and history. Then I turn to the historicist 
critique of this conception. In order to understand historicism, it is also useful to look 
back at the 18th century, and Herder’s critique of the Enlightenment idea of universal 
history. Finally, I discuss in brief the philosophical responses to the positivist and 
historicist challenges to philosophy that occasioned Heidegger’s rethinking of the issue 
as a problem of “fundamental ontology”, i.e., the meaningfulness of the human 
situation.6
The Challenge to Philosophy: Positivism and Historicism
The 19th century challenge to philosophy arose from empirical methods and 
theory-formation in the natural sciences and in the human historical sciences, which 
allowed these disciplines each to claim methodological priority in the search for truth.7 
Particularly with the establishment of historical science, philosophy came increasingly 
to be regarded as having no object-domain proper to itself, and hence its status as a 
discipline was called into question. I call these two main challenges to philosophy 
“positivism” and “historicism”.8 With regard to these positions, the demarcation of the 
6. Heidegger’s appropriation of Dilthey, Rickert, Lask and Husserl will be examined in 
chapter 4.
7. Cf. Barash, op. cit., pp. 17-18; Schnädelbach, op. cit., pp. 49-51.
8. My use of these terms is explained below. It should be noted here that historicism 
originated in the Historical School’s positivist critique of Enlightenment and Idealist 
philosophies of history (cf. Schnädelbach, op. cit., pg. 35).
16sciences needs to be made clear. For positivism, insofar as history was a science it had 
to conform to the requirements of scientific knowledge in general, i.e., as empirical and 
governed by general laws or causes. Thus, history was considered to be a social science, 
although other social sciences (such as economics) were regarded as ahistorical. For 
historicists, on the other hand, the social sciences (again, such as economics) were 
considered to be historical and historicized. For thorough-going historicists, even the 
natural sciences were considered to be historically contextual.
Apart from the question of whether historical science requires a methodology 
distinct from that of the natural and social sciences, one of the fundamental differences 
between the positivist and historicist approaches to history has to do with the question 
of social change and progress, and in particular whether there is development of history 
as well as, or instead of, development in history. For positivists, history was considered 
to be progressive, in the sense of comprising successive states of society that constitute 
a “trajectory” rather than a cycle or “orbit”.9 Progress was considered to be a general 
historical law.10 Furthermore, through progress successive historical eras were 
considered to have the possibility of improving on their predecessors.11 However, 
progress was not simply identified with improvement, as in the 17th and 18th century 
notion of progress.12 For this reason, positivism associated development and progress 
by subsuming the latter under the former.13
9. Cf. John Stuart Mill, The System of Logic, 8th edition (1872), Longman, Green, and Co., 
London, 1925 [1872], Bk. VI, Ch. 10, at <http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/
mill/sol/sol.b06.c10.html>
10. Cf. Hajo Holborn, “The History of Ideas”, American Historical Review, vol. 73, no.3, 1968, 
pp. 683-695, at <www.historians.org/info/AHA_History/hholborn.cfm?pv=y> on 20 July 
2005.
11. As found in Saint-Simon’s and Comte’s characterization of the stages of history as 
theological, metaphysical, and positive.
12. Cf. J.S. Mill, op. cit. In this text, however, Mill is somewhat equivocal in his use of the 
term.
13. A view that is prominent in mainstream development thinking today (see ch. 3).
17Historicists, on the other hand, agreed with the notion of development in 
history, but denied the notion of moral progress, i.e., the idea that history itself is 
developmental or progressive in the sense of improvement. For historicists, the idea that 
successive eras could be evaluated in terms of moral progress was repugnant, since it in 
effect denied the intrinsic value of a past era, seeing it only as instrumentally valuable 
in leading to the present.14
What both positions share, however, is the attempt to grasp the continuity of 
human being with the natural and the historical world, positivism by the naturalization 
of history and human being, historicism by the historicization of nature and human 
being. Both were ways in which the transcendence of reality and the immanence of the 
knower were to be reconciled or overcome. 
Positivism
I use “positivism” in the sense it came to have in Germany, rather than the 
sense that was attributed to Comte (who, it should be noted, did not use the term, calling 
his system “positive philosophy” instead). In this sense it came to refer to 
any view that restricted knowledge to what could be attained using the methods of 
observation, induction, and mathematical analysis found, paradigmatically, in the 
empirical science of nature.15
In Germany, Comte’s philosophy was not particularly influential, partly because of an 
indigenous anti-metaphysical reaction to Hegel’s Absolute Idealism, and partly because 
14. Cf. Schnädelbach, op. cit., pg. 43. 
15. Steven Galt Crowell, “The Early Decades: Positivism, Neo-Kantianism, Dilthey” in The 
Columbia History of Western Philosophy, ed. R. Popkin, Columbia University Press, New 
York, 1999, pg. 668. Other terms that are often used as near synonyms are “naturalism” and 
“scientism” (cf. Charles E. Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1995, ch. 1). It should be noted here that Comte’s 
positivism differs in several important respects from what later came to be identified as the 
central tenets of positivism, particularly the claim that (natural) scientific methodology has 
exclusive claim to objective knowledge (cf. Robert C. Scharff, “Comte, Philosophy, and the 
Question of Its History”, Philosophical Topics, vol. 19, no. 2, 1991, pp. 177-204, and 
“Comte and Heidegger on the Historicity of Science”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 
vol. 203, no. 1, 1998, pp. 29-49).
18many natural scientists and historians avoided philosophy.16 In philosophy, there was 
also the movement “back to Kant” by such thinkers as Lotze, which to some extent 
forestalled reception of Comte.17 Mill’s System of Logic, however, was influential.18 
But the German political-academic climate after the failed revolution of 1848 was not 
conducive to the sociopolitical tendencies of positivism, either in the form of the 
“sociology” that Comte proposed “as a tool for predicting social developments and for 
controlling unruly elements in society” or in the less radical, liberal-reformist version of 
Mill, and thus positivism had less influence on social sciences such as economics.19
Thus, in Germany, “positivism” came to refer generally to positions which 
held that knowledge is acquired only through empirical observation of facts (often 
conceived in terms of sense-data) and the explanation of the relations between them in 
terms of laws or causes. Mathematical analysis is one of the main tools for explaining 
such laws and relations, and mathematics itself is considered to belong to the positive 
sciences. For positivists, then, there is no methodological or epistemological 
discontinuity between the natural and the human sciences. What is most at issue in 
terms of development, as we will see, is the positivist conception of the human 
sciences, particularly logic, economics and history. These were considered to involve 
the same empirical method and search for general laws as the natural sciences. For 
Comte and Mill, history was to be explained in terms of the laws of human nature. For 
example, Mill argued that history did not provide what he called a “law of nature”, but 
only an “empirical law” (or inductive generalizations). Thus, in order to determine the 
16. W.M. Simon, European Positivism in the Nineteenth Century, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1963, pp. 238-239. See also Schnädelbach, op. cit., pg. 67.
17. Simon, op. cit., pg. 239; a notable exception to this was Dilthey, who in his earlier thought 
took an interest in Comte’s thinking (ibid., pg. 245). Cf. also David Sullivan, “Hermann 
Lotze”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2005 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, at 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/hermann-lotze/>.
18. Cf. Schnädelbach, op. cit., pg. 85.
19. Crowell, “The Early Decades”, op. cit., pp. 668-669.
19law of progress, it was necessary to connect the empirical laws with the laws of 
psychology and ethology (or character formation).20
In Mill’s System of Logic the positivist position is clearly expressed. Of all the 
sciences, only “those which relate to man himself” remain in the state of being 
“abandoned to the uncertainties of vague and popular discussion”.21 The natural or 
physical sciences, Mill argued, were either well established or on their way to being so, 
and this was particularly true of those concerning “the physical nature of man as an 
organised being”.22 But with the study of “the laws of Mind, and, in even greater 
degree, those of Society”, not only had they not yet been established, there was “still a 
controversy whether they are capable of becoming subjects of science in the strictest 
sense of the term”.23 Thus, Mill’s aim in Book VI, entitled “The Logic of the Moral 
Sciences”, was to address this situation “by generalising the methods successfully 
followed in the former inquiries, and adapting them to the latter”. It is only by doing so, 
he argued, that “we may hope to remove this blot on the face of science”.24
Although the positivist approach to history received some attention, it was the 
reduction of the science of the mind to empirical psychology (i.e., psychologism) and 
the attempt to make this the foundation of all the human sciences, as Mill advocated, 
that provided a central motivation for Dilthey’s descriptive psychology, neo-Kantian 
transcendental philosophy of value, and Husserl’s phenomenology. Although anti-
metaphysical, these philosophical positions resisted the naturalization of philosophy.25 
Yet the results of the positive sciences, particularly in applied disciplines such as optics, 
20. J.S. Mill, op. cit.





25. Crowell, op. cit, pg. 668.
20had undermined Hegel’s claim that philosophy was the absolute, systematic science 
which subsumed all other forms of investigation, whether of natural or human 
phenomena.26 Thus Windelband recognized that “philosophy itself can no longer 
establish any substantive conclusions”.27
The development of new techniques of experimentation allowed the natural 
sciences to extend their knowledge through empirical research rather than purely 
theoretical inquiry, and thus to provide empirical bases for the development of theories. 
It also gave rise to the idea that, as Wilhelm von Humboldt argued, 
scientific knowledge should be treated as something which has not yet been com-
pletely discovered and which will never be entirely discovered, and that it should be 
unremittingly pursued as such.28
Research became central to the discovery of scientific truth and the determination of the 
laws of nature. Science came to be understood as “research-science”, and was 
characterized in procedural terms. This also involved a change in the concept of 
experience that qualified as scientific, which was also understood procedurally, rather 
than as related to a system or body of knowledge.29 The prominence given to research 
was central to Humboldt’s conception of the university and, in conjunction with 
teaching, was to be the guiding purpose of the 19th century German university system 
that he helped to establish.30
26. Bambach, op. cit., pg. 22. Chemistry should also be mentioned here. (Cf. Eric Hobsbawm, 
The Age of Revolution, Abacus, London, 2001, pp. 341-2 and The Age of Capital, Abacus, 
London, 1999, pp. 300-301.)
27. Wilhelm Windelband, “Rectorial Address, Strasbourg, 1894”, trans. G. Oakes, History and 
Theory, vol. 19, no. 2, 1980, pg. 185.
28. Quoted in Schnädelbach, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
29. Ibid., pg. 83. On the transformation of the concept of experience, see also Alan W. 
Richardson, “Conceiving, Experiencing, and Conceiving Experiencing: Neo-Kantianism 
and the History of the Concept of Experience”, Topoi, vol. 22, 2003, pp. 55-67.
30. Cf. Schnädelbach, op. cit., pp. 21-27. The Humboldt university become the international 
university model (Keith Tribe, Historical Schools of Economics: German and English, 
Keele Economics Research Papers, Keele University, February 2002, pg. 2).
21In the human or social sciences, too, there were developments that subverted 
philosophy’s claim to preeminence. One was the widening application of mathematical 
and statistical techniques to social phenomena, such as Quételet’s analysis of the 
statistical distribution of human features, Cournot’s analysis of supply and demand, the 
cost-benefit analyses of the engineers at the École des Ponts et Chaussées, and von 
Thünen’s analysis of farm location as a maximization problem,31 each of which 
contributed to the idea that with sufficient data and the right methods of analysis, firm 
predictions could be made about social and economic behaviour.
Another development was the establishment of political economy as an 
independent discipline, the aim of which was to determine the laws of economic 
behaviour, either through empirical induction or through axiomatic deduction.32 The 
discoveries of political economy of great significance were the autonomous sphere of 
economic activity (still “economy” and not yet “the economy”) and power as something 
that pervaded society.33 In the hands of British liberal reformers, this was to result in “a 
society that was not subject to the laws of the state, but, on the contrary, subjected the 
state to its own laws”.34 Moral and political philosophy alone were no longer 
considered either to establish or to articulate the principles of social behaviour. Political 
economy also offered a way to understand social change that relied neither on purpose 
nor moral progress. The historical stages of social development from hunter/gatherer to 
31. Cf. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, pg. 344 and The Age of Capitalism, pg. 306; Roger 
Backhouse, The Penguin History of Economics, Penguin, London, 2002, pp. 143-147; Ian 
Hacking, “How should we do the history of statistics?”, The Foucault Effect, ed. G. 
Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991, pp. 181-195; 
Martin Fichman and Edmund P. Fowler, “Scientific Paradigms and Urban Development: 
Alternative Models”, Cosmos and History, vol. 1, no. 1, 2005, pg. 108.
32. Cf. Backhouse, op. cit., pg. 132; Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, op. cit., pg. 343; Karl 
Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Beacon Press, Boston, 1957, ch. 10. However, political 
economy was much less prevalent in Germany than in France and Britain. See below, 
chapter 2.
33. Cf. Tribe, “Oeconomic History”, op. cit., pg. 593.
34. Polanyi, op. cit., pg. 111.
22capitalist market society could now be explained solely in terms of the laws of 
economic behaviour, in particular the idea of self-interest, or the human desire to better 
one’s condition, combined with the logic of exchange and the division of labour. And 
whereas this view of human behaviour was axiomatic for the political economists, the 
appearance of the market society was taken to provide empirical evidence for it.
This non-teleological sense of historical evolution also appeared in disciplines, 
such as law and philology, the latter which was the second social science to be 
established.35 However, whereas political economy purported to explain social change 
by reference to eternal and immutable laws of human behaviour, “those of philology 
were fundamentally historical, or rather evolutionary”.36 That is, language was 
understood to be subject to unintended change through time, a process amenable to 
explanation “by general linguistic laws, analogous to scientific ones”.37 As Humboldt 
argued, although languages appear historically, they are not human creations.38
The positivism of political economy, experimental psychology and other 
human sciences challenged philosophy’s claims to areas of inquiry that had only 
recently begun to establish themselves as independent disciplines, such as moral 
philosophy and rational psychology. The basis on which they did so was the same as 
that on which the natural sciences challenged the claim to truth of the philosophy of 
nature: appeal to empirical methods over philosophical speculation.39 Nevertheless, 
none of these disciplines by themselves represented the challenge to philosophy that 
developments in the science of history did. 
35. Cf. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, op. cit., pg. 346.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., pg. 347.
38. Cf. Robert M. Burns, “Classical Historicism:Introduction” in Robert M. Burns and Hugh 
Rayment-Pickard, eds., Philosophies of History, Blackwell, London, 2000, pg. 61.
23Positivism and progress
One way of understanding the difference between the positivist and the 
historicist approach to cultural phenomena is in terms of continuity and change. Having 
determined general or universal laws of economic behaviour, say, positivism could then 
give an account of continuity between different historical eras. The economic history of 
eras prior to the discovery of these economic laws was then understood as the result of 
responses to economic conditions that were not properly understood. However 
successful such responses were, they were purely fortuitous. The discovery of 
economic laws, in contrast, made it possible for present-day scholars to explain that 
history. It also made it possible to judge contemporary policy in terms of whether it 
“violated” such laws. However, if laws of economic behaviour were indeed universal, 
then explanation of economic change became problematic. In particular, what needed 
to be explained was how the modern market-based economy had come into existence in 
the absence of knowledge of the laws of economic behaviour. The usual approach is by 
way of appeal to history as demonstrating the “natural order” of progress, i.e., the 
necessary stages of economic progress. For example, Adam Smith makes this explicit 
in The Wealth of Nations, Book III, Chapter I, entitled “Of the Natural Progress of 
39. Ricardo’s economics was a formal-deductive rather than an empirical-inductive discipline. 
The empirical approach was advocated by the historical schools of economics in England 
and Germany (less so in France). Yet these schools did not undertake historical inquiries 
simply to inductively determine general laws of economic behaviour, and thus did not 
subscribe to the positivistic outlook of other social sciences. Instead, their aim was to try to 
understand the particular social conditions, including but not limited to economic 
phenomena, that had led to their contemporary situation, in order to determine what 
economic policy was appropriate for the present. Thus, historical economics is historicist 
rather than positivist, whereas classical and neoclassical economics are predominantly 
formalist. Only in the 1920s did the empirical analysis of economic data become 
widespread, eventually to develop into econometrics. This, however, has not had the result 
of empirical confirmation of economic theory. (Cf. Backhouse, op. cit., pp. 227, 240-243). 
Nevertheless, contemporary economic theory is generally regarded as positivist, in the 
sense that it purports to abstract from empirical observations so as to generate models that 
can then be empirically tested (cf. Lawrence A. Boland, “Current Views on Economic 
Positivism” in David Greenaway, Michael Bleaney and Ian Stewart, eds., Companion to 
Contemporary Economic Thought, Routledge, London, 1991, pp. 88-104).
24Opulence”. However, the problem with such an appeal to history is that it does not 
provide the kind of explanation that economics requires, i.e., it doesn’t explain, in terms 
of economic principles themselves, why the modern economic system developed, nor 
why this system has predominantly failed to appear in other societies.
Historicism
Historicism was a response, in the 18th century form of Romanticism initially, 
to the abstract individualism and universalism of the Enlightenment, and later in its 
19th century form to both the “panlogism” of Absolute Idealism and to the positivist 
argument that the methods of the natural sciences are the only valid scientific method. 
In the 18th century, Herder had argued against the Enlightenment notion of universal 
history in favour of cultural pluralism, and as 19th century scholars sought to make 
sense of past eras, they came to argue that cultural and social meanings were contextual 
and thus historically specific. To understand different societies, it was argued, required 
that they be understood in terms of their own values, meanings, etc. This was of course 
applied to the question of the German nation as well, thus involving historians in the 
issue of nation-building.
“Historicism” is a problematic term, since it has been used in a number of 
often contradictory ways. For instance, Karl Popper used it in The Poverty of 
Historicism “to designate ‘an approach to the social sciences which assumes that 
historical prediction is their principal aim’...and which attempts to discover ‘patterns’ 
or ‘laws’ of historical evolution”.40 This more accurately describes positivist history, as 
found, for example, in the work of the English historian Henry Thomas Buckle.41 
Schnädelbach argues that “[a]t best, historicism is characterized as a position which 
40. Bambach, op. cit., pg. 4 n. 5. Bambach’s quotation is from Karl Popper, The Poverty of 
Historicism, Routledge, London, 1957, pg. 3.
25makes history into a principle”. He distinguishes three senses of “historicism”: the 
positivist sense of factual observation and scientific objectivity; the relativist sense that 
views all cultural phenomena as historically contextual and therefore rejects claims to 
absolute validity;42 and the “more comprehensive” sense, which 
is the view that all cultural phenomena are to be regarded, to be understood, and to 
be explained as historical. It is an essentially culturalist position, which is opposed 
to naturalism. The world of human life, according to this view, is not nature, but the 
product of human action: hence it also has a history, which itself should not be con-
ceived of as a process of merely natural development.43
Historicism in this sense conflicts with the naturalistic and positivistic claims to the 
methodological priority of the natural sciences. For historicism in this sense (which is 
how I will generally use the term here), science is simply another form of cultural 
expression, historically contextualized like all others. Historicism in this sense also 
poses a challenge to philosophy, because it questions the notion of the a priori. The 
response to this challenge was a major issue in the philosophical trends that informed 
Heidegger’s thinking. It is this sense, too, that informs the postdevelopment critique of 
mainstream development thinking.
Iggers argues that historicism
41. Burns, op. cit., pg. 58; Eric Hobsbawm, On History, The New Press, New York, 1997, pg. 
144; John R. Hinde, “Review of Eckhardt Fuchs, Henry Thomas Buckle: 
Geschichtschreiben und Positivismus in England und Deutschland”, Cromohs, 1997, at 
<http://www.cromohs.unifi.it/2_97/hinde.html> on 5 May 2005. Buckle can be seen as an 
exemplar of positivist historiography, about whom Dilthey writes: “When Comte, John 
Stuart Mill, and Buckle made a new attempt to solve the riddle of the historical world by 
borrowing principles and methods from the natural sciences, the Historical School could 
only protest ineffectually against their impoverished, superficial, but analytically refined 
results...” (Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Works Vol. I: Introduction to the Human Sciences, ed. 
R.A Makkreel and F. Rodi, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989, pp. 48-49); 
“[Buckle] wants to transform history into an exact science, like natural history; he wants to 
demonstrate what is law-governed in historical events and thereby put himself in the 
position of predicting them.” (Wilhelm Dilthey, “History and Science (1862)”, trans. R.J. 
Betanzos, in Selected Works Vol. IV: Hermeneutics and the Study of History, ed. R.A 
Makkreel and F. Rodi, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996, pg. 262). Droysen takes 
the same view: “He purposes to raise History to a science by showing how to demonstrate 
historical facts out of general laws.” (J.G. Droysen, “The Elevation of History to the Rank 
of a Science” in Droysen, op. cit., pg. 63).
42. Schnädelbach, op. cit., pg. 35-36.
43. Ibid., pg. 36.
26signified a historical orientation which recognized individuality in its “concrete 
temporal-spatiality”...distinct from a fact-oriented empiricism as well as from the 
system-building philosophy of history in the Hegelian manner...which ignores fac-
tuality.44
In approaching individuality in this way, historicism is “closely bound up with a certain 
form of epistemological idealism” that implies “that history always deals with thought, 
that is with meanings, which must be understood”.45 These assumptions, he argues, 
were central to the theory of historical knowledge that the German Historical School 
developed.
Herder and the Critique of Universal History
In German thought, the culturalist sense of historicism is perhaps most clearly 
articulated first by Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) in the late 18th century, in 
response to the Enlightenment conception of universal history.46 Herder questioned 
both the idea of the self as a self-contained, essentially timeless and ahistorical observer 
of its own historical and cultural situation, and the progressive sense of the 
Enlightenment idea of universal history, which viewed historical eras and different 
cultures as stages in the progress of humanity, which progress itself made such 
understanding possible. Kant, for example, had claimed that
what appears to be complicated and accidental in individuals, may yet be under-
stood as a steady, progressive, though slow, evolution of the original endowments of 
the entire species.47
The application of scientific methods such as statistical analysis to social and historical 
phenomena showed “that they occur according to stable natural laws”.48 Philosophy’s 
44. George G. Iggers, “Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term”, op. cit., pg. 130.
45. Ibid., pp. 130-131.
46. Cf. Burns, op. cit., pg. 59-60. Heidegger makes the same suggestion (ZBP pp. 113-114). 
The work of Giambattista Vico, who had expressed such ideas earlier in the 18th century, 
was not widely known.
47. Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent”, trans. T.M. 
Greene and H. Hudson, in R. Sältzer, ed., German Essays on History, Continuum, New 
York, 1991, pg. 3.
48. Ibid.
27role was therefore “to attempt to discover an end of nature in this senseless march of 
human events”,49 i.e., to discover the purpose of history in the events in history, where 
such purpose was not part of individual intention. For Kant, this teleological principle 
of history was not something that could be known the way the laws of nature could be, 
yet had to be subscribed to in order for history to be intelligible at all.50 On the basis of 
the essential characteristics of human being as determined by philosophy (which 
progress itself had made possible), history could be understood as the ordered unfolding 
of a plan that would bring about humanity’s intellectual, moral, and political perfection:
The history of mankind could be viewed on the whole as the realization of a hidden 
plan of nature in order to bring about an internally—and for this purpose also exter-
nally—perfect constitution; since this is the only state in which nature can develop 
all faculties of mankind.51
The task of philosophy, then, was to assist nature by writing “a general world history” 
that presented it as a system. This was not intended “to displace the work on true 
empirical history by this idea of a universal history which contains a principle a 
priori”,52 but to provide an ideal for making sense of the contingent events of history.
The historicists objected to this constructivist intent of the philosophy of 
history or universal history, for two reasons.53 First, it implied that each historical era 
was just a means for history to unfold its purpose. A particular historical era had only 
instrumental value as the condition for the next, higher stage, a determination that 
49. Ibid., pg. 4.
50. This became central in Lotze, and through him, for the Baden neo-Kantians, such as 
Windelband and Rickert. In the light of the development of methods of historical research 
in the 19th century, these thinkers argued that historical science could be put on an equal 
footing with natural science, in a way not possible in Kant’s time. Dilthey, too, aimed at a 
critique of historical reason, but in order to replace Kant’s critique of pure reason, not 
simply to supplement it. (Cf. Paul Hamilton, Historicism, Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 72-
73.)
51. Kant, op. cit., pg. 12. 
52. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
53. Two sense of “philosophy of history” must be distinguished here. First is the attempt to 
unify the systematic and the historical as found, for example, in Hegel. Second is the idea 
that there needs to be, and can be, a total view of the object-domain and the methodologies 
and practices whereby it is investigated. (Cf. Schnädelbach, op. cit., pp. 40-50.)
28applied equally to the contemporary era. This entailed the same moral evaluation of the 
individual as the species. Second, it implied that only now, as a result of progress, had 
humanity developed sufficiently to comprehend the purpose of history. Although not 
yet perfect, humanity was thought to have evolved to a point where it could contribute 
to unfolding the purpose of history. Herder argued that this aspect of universal history 
depended on a conception of human being as transcendent to history, and thus capable 
of assigning to itself responsibility for itself:
Not only has the philosopher exalted human reason to an independency on the 
senses and organs, and the possession of an original simple power; but even the 
common man imagines in the dream of life, that he has become everything that he is 
of himself.54
For Herder, as for the historicists, this contradicted the presupposition of universal 
history itself, i.e., that humanity is a product of history. Being historical is not a matter 
of acquiring knowledge about the past, he argued, but the fundamental condition of 
being who we are at present. If history is responsible for our current stage of evolution, 
then it is inconsistent to hold that we have now evolved so as to be completely self-
determining and thus independent of history. For Herder, the notion of history itself 
depends on comprehending each individual as part of the chain whereby humanity is 
constituted as historical:
In this lies the principle of the history of mankind, without which no such history 
could exist. Did man receive everything from himself, and develop everything inde-
pendently of external circumstances, we might have a history of an individual 
indeed, but not of the species. But...the history of mankind is necessarily a whole, 
that is a chain of socialness and plastic tradition, from the first link to the last.
There is an education, therefore, of the human species; since everyone becomes a 
man only by means of education, and the whole species lives solely in this chain of 
individuals.55
Humanity’s education “must spring from imitation and exercise, by means of 
which the model passes into the copy”,56 and the models for any particular era’s 
54. Johann Gottfried von Herder, “Philosophy of History”, trans. T. Churchill, in Sältzer, op. 
cit., pg. 16.
55. Ibid., pg. 17.
29education are embodied in history itself, as tradition. In the application of tradition 
through the “powers to receive what is communicated or communicable”57 lies the 
moral value of the particular individual and era. Insofar as we realize the lessons of 
history by appropriating tradition, we live up to the potential of our education. And 
since this is equally possible for each era, culture or nation, none can be regarded as 
superior to another in terms of its moral evolution: “the difference between enlightened 
and unenlightened, cultivated and uncultivated nations, is not specific; it is only in 
degree”.58 That is, eras or cultures might differ in terms of what can be actualized or 
cultivated; the way such actualization happens is the same. Any comparison between 
nations can only be made on the basis of how well each appropriates the tradition that is 
its inheritance:
If we take the idea of European cultivation for our standard, this is to be found only 
in Europe; and if we establish arbitrary distinctions between cultivation and the 
enlightening of the mind, neither of which, if it be genuine, can exist independently 
of the other, we are losing ourselves still more in the clouds.59
Universal history asserted the supreme value of the individual as a product of 
history’s purpose, but such assertion itself served to devalue the individual. Only by 
recognizing that history is a connected whole does it become possible to recognize the 
worth of each individual, who both constitutes history and is constituted by it. The 
assertion that the contemporary era was superior in value to those that preceded it in 
fact devalued its individuality, by making it just one more link in the chain of history. 
Only the recognition that each era equally inherits and actualizes its tradition makes 
comprehensible the notion that some cultures do so to a superior degree (typically, the 
56. Ibid., pg. 18.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., pg. 19.
59. Ibid.
30Greeks, the Germans). In understanding that we are inheritors of tradition, Herder 
argued, we could come to understand that
whatever is God’s purpose with regard to the human species upon earth remains 
evident even in the most perplexing parts of its history. All the works of God have 
this property, that, although they belong to a whole, which no eye can scan, each is 
in itself a whole, and bears the divine characters of its destination....What every 
man...attains, or can attain, must be the end of the species: and what is this? Human-
ity and happiness, on this spot, in this degree, as this link, and no other, of the chain 
of improvement, that extends through the whole kind.60
In contrast to universal history, historicism valued and aimed to express the 
concrete individuality of each historical era. But this was also the problem of 
historicism. For if cultural attainment is individual, then this includes the systems of 
knowledge a culture or era manifests. The development of the natural and human 
sciences had been taken by Enlightenment philosophers as evidence of the progress of 
humanity and thus the purposiveness of history. But if history means the appropriation 
of tradition, and traditions are individual, then these sciences themselves have to be 
seen as particular to the traditions in which they arise. They are culturally or historically 
immanent, not transcendent, ways of knowing. This implies that the basis on which 
cultures are to be compared and evaluated are themselves culturally specific, and thus 
cannot be used to demonstrate that a culture or era actualizes its tradition to a greater 
degree than others. Historicism’s aporia was the notion of cultural comparison itself.
19th century historicism
In response to the positivist conception of history, historiographers drew upon 
the Romantic conception of history. Historicism was first expressed in the work of 
Johann Gustav Droysen (1808-1884), who viewed the science of history as a science 
that investigates historical events and periods through interpreting and understanding 
them as coherent totalities.61 Droysen followed Ranke in holding that historical inquiry 
60. Ibid., pg. 20.
31concerns the singular and unique, rather than a particular instance of a general 
occurrence or event. The understanding of such singularity involves understanding its 
context, and is therefore hermeneutic, rather than naturalistic. Furthermore, the subject 
matter of the science of history properly includes every human creation. Finally, 
although events, societies, and eras are understood in their individuality, and thus as 
equal, historical inquiry must also take into account the dynamics of change whereby 
one era gives rise to another, although not general laws of change, which again reduce 
the individual to an instance.
The positivist conception of historical inquiry as “ordering” history by general 
laws, historicists argued, in effect made history unintelligible. What demarcates the 
historical as historical is its uniqueness or singularity, and to view historical events as 
instances of general kinds of events and thus subsumable under general laws is to 
ignore how the historical actually appears. History cannot be ordered, the historicists 
argued, but has to be understood in its singularity.
Historical understanding must also address the questions of development and 
progress, for two reasons. First, a historical era is constituted not just by its constant 
change but also by the way this involves “ascent” and “addition”, as Droysen put it:
The restless movement in the world of phenomena causes us to apprehend things as 
in a constant development, this transition on the part of some seeming merely to 
repeat itself periodically, in case of others to supplement the repetition with ascent, 
addition, ceaseless growth, the system continually making, so to speak, “a contribu-
tion to itself.” In those phenomena in which we discover an advance of this kind, we 
take the successive character, the element of time, as the determining thing. These 
we grasp and bring together as history.62
History involves development, understood as individual cultural expression within 
history. But secondly, historical understanding also requires that we take each historical 
61. George G. Iggers, “Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term”, Journal of the 
History of Ideas, vol. 56, no. 1, 1995, pg. 132.
62. Johann Gustav Droysen, “Outline of the Principles of History”, trans. E.B. Andrews, in 
Sältzer, op. cit., pp. 103-104.
32era as it is in itself, rather than as a link in the chain that has given rise to the present. 
Positivism seeks to explain the succession of historical eras up to the present 
(essentially in causal terms). Such eras are significant only insofar as they are 
precursors of the present. The historicists argued that this was to radically misconstrue 
the sense of the historical and thus the significance of previous historical eras. If 
previous eras are only significant as precursors, then there is no justification for 
valorizing the present, since this, too, is just a precursor of future eras. Thus all 
historical eras simply become means to an end that can never be attained. No historical 
era, including the present, could be taken to be an end in itself or such that “its 
worth...rests in its own existence”.63 Thus, the historicists denied that moral progress 
could simply be identified with historical progress and that such a conception enabled 
us to understand the historical. Although not denying moral progress, they argued that 
such teleological conceptions of history are unable to grasp the sense of the historical as 
unique and individual.
Historiography
In historiography, the 19th century saw the introduction of new methods of 
amassing evidence and critically evaluating it, which in some respects fit with the 
positivist trend, but also involved the rejection of the philosophical ideal of universal 
history. In 1811, Niebuhr introduced techniques of source criticism into the science of 
63. Leopold Von Ranke, “On the Epochs of Modern History”, trans. W.A. Iggers and K von 
Moltke, in R. Sältzer, op. cit., pg. 84. Ranke also counts as a positivist historian because of 
his emphasis on facts. In Being and Time Heidegger quotes Count Yorck: “Ranke is a great 
eye-piece, for whom that which has vanished cannot turn into actualities” (SZ 400), 
suggesting that Ranke’s aim was not to bring the coherence of the past to life, but merely to 
gaze upon it. Dilthey himself is more forgiving: “Though Ranke seems to confront things 
with a naive joy in narration, his historiography can, nevertheless, only be understood by 
tracing the various sources of systematic thought which converged in his education.” 
(Wilhelm Dilthey, “The Construction of the Historical World in the Human Studies”, W. 
Dilthey Selected Writings, ed. and trans. H.P. Rickman, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1976, pg. 188.)
33history, through which “the historian learned how light could be extracted even from 
legendary material, even from scraps and survivals once rejected as simply untrue”.64 
Wilhelm von Humboldt’s (1767-1835) investigation of languages emphasized that they 
are historical and exist essentially through the reappropriation and transmission of 
meaning.65 Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), who was a colleague of Hegel’s in Berlin, 
introduced and developed methods and standards of source criticism that established 
history as an academic discipline. In the Preface to his first book, published in 1824, he 
wrote that “[t]he present attempt...merely wants to show how, essentially, things 
happened”. In order to do so, “[s]trict presentation of facts...is undoubtedly the supreme 
law”.66 This strict adherence to the presentation of facts indicated an acceptance “of the 
first part of the positivist programme, the collection of facts” but “declined the second, 
the discovery of laws”, Collingwood argued.67 Iggers points out that the documents that 
were subject to source criticism “had to be examined within the historical and cultural 
framework of the age and nation of which they formed a part”.68 For Ranke,
every individual as well as each of the great supraindividual institutions...consti-
tuted a concrete meaningful whole which fit into the broader economy of the divine 
will. The purpose of historical study was therefore not exhausted by the narrative 
reconstruction of a factual past but consisted in grasping the overarching coherence 
into which this past fit.69
The science of history in 19th century Germany, as it became independent from 
64. Herbert Butterfield, “Historiography”, The Dictionary of the History of Ideas Vol. 2, ed. P.P. 
Wiener, Scribner, New York, 1974, pg. 491, at <etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/
dhi.cgi?id=dv2-53> on 5 May 2005.
65. Cf. Burns, op. cit., pg. 61.
66. Leopold von Ranke, “Preface to the First Edition of Histories of the Latin and Germanic 
Nations (October 1824)”, trans. W.A. Iggers and Konrad von Moltke, in Sältzer, op. cit., pp. 
89-90.
67. Robin G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, pg. 
131. However, Collingwood’s view that the Historical School’s emphasis on facts meant 
that they regarded them as “ascertained by a separate act of cognition or process of 
research” and that these were to be considered in isolation fails to recognize the importance 
of historical context to these historians.
68. George G. Iggers, “Historicism”, The Dictionary of the History of Ideas Vol. 2, ed. P.P. 
Wiener, Scribner, New York, 1974, pg. 459, at <etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/
dhi.cgi?id=dv2-52> on 5 May 2005.
34philosophy, thus manifested two contradictory tendencies, both of which can be 
considered as part of “historical consciousness” (as Heidegger refers to it; cf. K 149). 
On the one hand, the positivist tendency argued for inductive generalization from 
history, i.e., the determination of laws of history. On the other hand, Ranke’s insistence 
that the historian must focus on the documents and the facts stressed the singularity of 
the historical. The question that arose, then, was to what extent the historian could 
simply report on the “objective facts” of history, without interpreting how these cohered 
in a greater unity. The rejection of positivist generalization thus opened the way to the 
historicist, or historical-hermeneutical approach of Droysen, which was significant for 
Dilthey. But it also raised the spectre of relativism, which would be a central concern of 
the philosophical responses to historicism.
Hermeneutics and historical understanding
For the historicists, the question was how history can be taken as an object 
when we ourselves are part of it. How is historical objectivity possible? This question is 
intensified because not only the historian but historiography too belongs to history, 
which problematizes the appeal to methodology as a basis for objectivity. If the present 
belongs to the continuum of history, then so do the scientific and scholarly methods of 
the present. As historically contextual, how can they be shown to attain objective 
knowledge? What would such showing consist in?
Unlike the empiricism of the natural sciences, with the human historical 
sciences, the problem is precisely the effect of theory on what is studied. The way we 
69. Ibid., pg. 131. Ranke’s view of the coherence of history may have had more to do with his 
religious beliefs than with epistemological idealism, however. As Allan Megill points out, 
there is no discussion in Iggers of the importance of religion and theology to the 19th 
century German historians (Megill, op. cit., pp. 419-420, 423 n. 19). See also Lothar 
Kettenacker, “Review of Ranke. The Meaning of History, by Leonard Kreiger”, History and 
Theory vol. 17, no. 3, 1978, pg. 390; Robert M. Burns, op. cit., pg. 70.
35understand the present depends on our understanding of the past, and the latter depends 
on what we understand the correct method to be. The methodological issue, in turn, 
depends on the theory of historiography. The theories of the positivist and critical 
historians held that history is an object that we discover “out there”, and can be known 
objectively through positive and critical methods. For the historicists, however, these 
theories were self-contradictory, because they denied the very basis on which we can 
understand history. Droysen, for example, agreed that history is an empirical science, 
and thus
The data for historical investigation are not past things, for these have disappeared, 
but things that are still present here and now, whether recollections of what was 
done, or remnants of things that have existed and of events that have occurred.70
Nevertheless, the historical has a different character from the beings “present here and 
now” that the natural sciences study. Although historiography does not study past 
things, what it does study is present as belonging to the past.71 “Still, ideally, its past 
character is yet present in it”, existing as “quickened traces” in the mind:72 
The mind illuminates its present with the vision and knowledge of past events, 
which yet have neither existence nor duration save in and through the mind itself.73
Although the recollections and remnants are the past in the present, the 
historian is the present that has this past.74 It is only on this twofold basis that the study 
of history is possible: the past is in the present in the form of recollections and 
70. Johann Gustav Droysen, Outline of the Principles of History, trans. E.B. Andrews, Howard 
Fertig, New York, 1967 [1893], pg. 11.
71. Heidegger repeats this point in SZ §§73, 76.
72. Droysen, op. cit.
73. Ibid., pg. 12. The notion of the non-existence of past events or the historical, purified of its 
idealism, bears an obvious affinity to Lask’s distinction between validities and existents. 
Lask argues that validities, one of which is being, do not exist, but rather “hold” or are 
“valid of” existents. For both Lask and Heidegger, then, being does not exist. However, 
whereas Lask took validity to be the ultimate category, Heidegger argues that validity can 
only be understood as grounded in intentionality. Cf. Steven Galt Crowell, “Emil Lask: 
Aletheiology as Ontology”, Kant-Studien, vol. 87, 1996, pp. 69-88. I examine Lask’s 
influence on Heidegger further in chapter 4.
74. Which Heidegger will thematize as the historicalness [Geschichtlichkeit] of being-situate.
36remnants, and the present has the past in the existence of the historian herself. Thus, not 
only does history affect the present, but the present affects history. This is the basis on 
which historiography is possible, which neither an empirically generalizing approach 
nor a formal-logical approach to historiography can account for. 
The method that historicists such as Droysen turned to was hermeneutics, 
originally a method of interpretation of scripture. Scriptural hermeneutics was 
concerned with understanding textual meaning, which required that words be 
understood in their textual context. Because words get their meaning from that context, 
however, texts could only be understood by seeing the whole (the meaning of the text) 
in terms of its parts (the meaning of words) and seeing the parts in terms of the whole. 
Neither text nor words solely determines the meaning of the other. Droysen, and later 
Dilthey, adopted this hermeneutical approach as a way to understand history that does 
not separate the knower from the known, but rather sees them as co-determining.75 The 
understanding of history that the historian develops through investigation changes the 
historian’s self-understanding, thus changing the way in which history is understood, 
and so on. In historical hermeneutics, history and historian form a dynamic whole. As 
Dilthey argued, history and the historian are continuous.
Historicism and development
In contrast to positivism, historicism gives an account of change as a 
consequence of human creativity. Yet, by insisting on the individuality of the historical, 
understanding continuity becomes problematic. If every cultural formation is 
constituted as singular, including that of the present, then how is it possible for us to 
understand previous eras? The historicist answer was to appeal to some kind of 
75. Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, “The Development of Hermeneutics”, in Selected Writings, op. cit., 
pp. 246-263.
37providential or organic coherence in history, such that each cultural formation could be 
seen as giving rise to the next. The problem for historicism was how it can be 
determined that there is such an order.
Historical Stages
As an aside, there is some confusion in the literature on historicism regarding 
the notion of historical stages. This notion is in fact characteristic of positivism, rather 
than historicism, and can be found in precursors to positivism such as Montesquieu and 
the Scottish Historians such as Hume, Ferguson and Smith.76 The matter is 
complicated, however, by the fact that the notion of historical stages is also found in the 
philosophy of history, most famously that of Hegel. Hegel’s philosophy of history was 
rejected by Ranke because of its speculative determination of history rather than close 
attention to historical evidence, yet it was influential on historicists such as Droysen. 
However, historicists and historicist economists, like the Romantics (such as Herder) 
before them, did not subscribe to the teleological notion of progress. Thus, although 
they recognized and asserted the differences between historical eras and cultures, they 
did not see these as forming a progressive sequence giving rise to the present. Thus, 
Roscher’s view that different economic categories and forms pertain to different 
historical eras was an argument against the view of Smith and the classical political 
economists, which regarded these earlier forms as precursors to, or nascent forms of, 
the market system of capitalism.
76. Cf. Andrew Skinner, “Introduction” in Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations Bks. I-III, 
Penguin, London, 1986, pp. 29-32; Backhouse, op. cit., pp. 110-111.
38The Response from Philosophy: The Struggle for Meaningfulness
The philosophical responses to the positivist and historicist challenge are 
marked by an opposite tendency from the latter, for its identity-crisis engendered 
reflection on philosophy itself as an integral part of 19th century German philosophy. 
This tendency is evident in the positions to be examined here, each of which involved a 
response to positivism and/or historicism. To some extent, the division is not so clear-
cut, as some positions can be seen as continuous with their “opponents”, for example, 
neo-Kantianism and positivism, and Dilthey and historicism. My aim here is simply to 
give a brief description of the ways in which these positions, which were influential on 
Heidegger, were concerned with the challenges of positivism and historicism. The 
Baden neo-Kantians wanted to demarcate the natural and historical sciences in a way 
that conceptually justified both, whilst also preserving this task for philosophy. 
Dilthey’s aim was to establish the sciences based on a critique of historical reason. 
Husserl, who did not engage with the problem of historical reality until late in his 
career, was concerned to defend philosophy as a strict science of objective validity, 
against the relativism he detected in both naturalism or positivism and historicism.
Metaphilosophy
Theodore Kisiel has argued that Heidegger’s earliest inquiries are best 
understood as metaphilosophical:
Heidegger launched his career in 1919 not as a philosopher of being or of life, exis-
tentialist, etc. etc., but as a philosopher of philosophy, a metaphilosopher, and not 
only maintained but magnified that discourse from outside of philosophy to the very 
end.77
77. Theodore Kisiel, “Why Students of Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil Lask”, Heidegger’s 
Way of Thought, ed. A. Denker and M. Heinz, Continuum, NY, 2002, pg. 211 n. 22. Crowell 
points out that “the sense of ‘outside’ here may be problematic (what is ‘outside’ 
philosophy in Heidegger’s sense is still—or better, is just—philosophy)” (Steven Galt 
Crowell, “Lask, Heidegger, and the Homelessness of Logic”, Journal of the British Society 
for Phenomenology, vol. 23, no. 3, October 1992, pg. 222).
39This consideration of what philosophy itself is or can be, which indeed runs throughout 
Heidegger’s entire path of thinking, is evident in the title of the lecture course Kisiel is 
referring to, “The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview” (KNS1919). In 
raising the question as to “the empty possibility that no connection exists between the 
two [philosophy and worldview]” (ZBP 11/9), Heidegger argues that
Worldview becomes the problem of philosophy in a quite new sense. But the core of 
the problem lies in philosophy itself—it is itself a problem. The cardinal question 
concerns the nature and concept of philosophy. (ZBP 12/10)
This metaphilosophical concern was not unique to Heidegger, however. It was 
characteristic of the situation of philosophy in Germany in the 19th century. The rise to 
prominence of the empirical disciplines such as chemistry and physics, both pure and 
applied, resulted in an “identity-crisis of philosophy”.78 The question was, what could 
philosophy be “in a post-metaphysical, post-speculative age dominated by das Faktum 
der Wissenschaft, the fact of science”?79 What it could no longer be was a discipline 
with its own object-domain and methods of investigation. Nor could it be “a universal 
form of theoretical inquiry which, in some sense, included the other disciplines 
themselves in itself”.80 Another fundamental characteristic of post-Hegelian German 
philosophy is its anti-metaphysical tendency, in the sense of the disparagement of the 
supersensible. Traditional philosophical problems such as the question of universal thus 
became transformed into logical or epistemological problems, as with the emphasis by 
Lotze and the neo-Kantians on validities, and Husserl’s intentionality and categorial 
intuition.
This crisis produced a number of different conceptions of philosophy, such as 
materialism and positivism, historical-philological philosophy, and worldview 
78. Schnädelbach, op. cit., pg. 5.
79. Carlton B. Christensen, “What Does (the Young) Heidegger Mean by the Seinsfrage?”, 
Inquiry, vol. 42, 1999, pg. 413.
80. Ibid.
40philosophy. It is out of this philosophical milieu that phenomenology emerges, 
especially with its critique of psychologism, particularly in John Stuart Mill’s System of 
Logic (1843).81 
Late 19th Century German Philosophy
As is increasingly recognized, the contours of 19th century German 
philosophy are often obscured by the present-day philosophical canon, in which post-
Hegelian philosophy tends to be identified with Kierkegaard, Marx and Nietzsche, 
whereas Lotze, Dilthey, the neo-Kantians, and a host of others are less well-
remembered or have even faded into almost complete obscurity.82 To some extent this 
can be perhaps attributed to the identity-crisis of philosophy referred to above. In 
addition, the increasing influence of the social sciences has perhaps obscured the extent 
to which they interacted with philosophy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. For 
instance, today Weber is far better known than Rickert, although much of his work 
depended on Rickert’s methodological studies.83 These faded figures are more 
prominent in the work of scholars who focus on phenomenology and hermeneutics, 
however. Crowell points out that the phenomenological movement “arose...from 
Husserl’s philosophical confrontations with positivists...on the one hand...and neo-
Kantian philosophers...on the other”, and that Dilthey’s thinking between 1880 and 
1911 “was largely forged in confrontation with the currents of positivism and neo-
Kantianism”.84 These 19th century schools of thought are essential “[t]o understand the 
81. Husserl refers to this text repeatedly in his critique of psychologism in Logical 
Investigations, Vol. I (e.g., “Prolegomena”, ch. 5). 
82. Crowell, op. cit., pg. 667; Schnädelbach, pg. 2. This particularly true of Lotze. Sullivan 
states that in his day “Lotze reigned as the single most influential philosopher in Germany, 
perhaps in the world” (Sullivan, op. cit.).
83. Guy Oakes, Weber and Rickert, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 6-10.
84. Crowell, op. cit., pg. 667. See also Barash, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
41phenomenological movement”.85 Historicism, too, became an issue for Husserl, but 
initially only in terms of Dilthey’s notion of worldviews, which Husserl severely 
criticized in his Logos article of 1911.
The Baden neo-Kantians were also concerned with positivism and historicism. 
Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) and Heinrich Rickert (1856-1936) argued that 
philosophy could establish the epistemological foundations for the different empirical 
sciences by reference to the transcendental values involved.86 For example, in 1908, 
Windelband delivered a series of lectures, the fourth of which is entitled “Positivism, 
Historicism, Psychologism”,87 which argued that the methods associated with these 
schools of thought “challenged the legitimate claim of philosophy as the science of 
knowledge”.88 As Windelband saw it, the task of philosophy was “the definition and 
justification of philosophical inquiry itself”.89 In advocating that philosophy go “back 
to Kant”, his aim was to show that the proper task of philosophy was to “identify the 
limits of knowledge in each of the individual disciplines”.90 Thus, for the neo-Kantians, 
philosophy’s task was to provide the validation for both the natural and the historical 
(or cultural) sciences, as well as to justify itself.
Another way of understanding the philosophical response has been put 
forward by Bambach. He argues that the responses to positivism, whose 
85. Crowell, ibid. Noticeably absent from this genealogy is historicism, perhaps because 
Crowell’s focus is on what led to Husserl’s attempt, in his Logische Untersuchungen, “to 
negotiate the impasse...concerning the proper relation between philosophy and the 
‘positive’ (empirical and mathematical) sciences” (ibid., pg. 668). In that work there is 
indeed little discussion, if any, of the historical sciences.
86. Ibid., pg. 672.
87. Wilhelm Windelband, Die Philosophie im deutschen Geistesleben des 19. Jahrhunderts, 
J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1909, pp. 72-95, at <http://philosophiebuch.de/windel19.htm> 4 
May 2005.
88. Bambach, op. cit., pg. 68.
89. Guy Oakes, “Windelband on History and Natural Science”, History and Theory, vol. 19, 
no.2, 1980, pg. 166.
90. Wilhelm Windelband, “History and Natural Science”, trans. Guy Oakes, History and 
Theory, vol. 19, no. 2, 1980, pg. 185 (emphasis added).
42“proponents...felt that metaphysical questions should be handled empirically or not at 
all”, were first, the historical-hermeneutic response, which involved the renewed 
examination of the history of philosophy and critique of primary texts, in a manner 
similar to historical inquiry proper.91 This antiquarian approach led to the “sheer 
restoration of philosophical ideas from the past” in a variety of “neo” movements, such 
as neo-Aristotelianism, neo-Scholasticism, neo-Hegelianism, and of course, neo-
Kantianism.92 Second, this antiquarianism was itself historicized in the theory of 
world-views that Dilthey, among others, offered “to reconcile the limited historical 
insights of individual epochs with the demand for a scientific history of thought”.93 
Dilthey’s thought in part motivated the attempts of the Baden neo-Kantians and the 
phenomenologists to turn philosophy into a strict science.94
Dilthey and Historical Consciousness
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) is a pivotal figure in the philosophical debates of 
the late 19th century, for a number of reasons. First, unlike many of his contemporaries, 
he studied, and was initially favourable towards, Comte’s Positive philosophy, because 
of the insistence on the empirical:
There was only one interpretation, he wrote, which “while acknowledging the 
validity of the positive sciences uproots philosophy [in ihrer Wurzel auflöst], the 
interpretation of Comte, which repudiates psychology and logic”...95
However, Dilthey came to reject much of Comte’s programme, particularly its 
treatment of history by generalization, and the privilege it accorded to the natural 
91. Bambach, op. cit., pg. 27.
92. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
93. Ibid., pg. 25.
94. According to Heidegger, Dilthey was so receptive to the neo-Kantian interpretation of his 
own inquiries that he came to misunderstand them himself (K 155).
95. Simon, op. cit., pg. 245. The quotation is from Dilthey’s essay “Über das Studium der 
Geschichte der Wissenschaften vom Menschen, der Gesellschaft, und dem Staat”, 
published in 1875.
43scientific method.96 In later years, Dilthey’s assessment of Positive philosophy and 
positivism was even less favourable. In Introduction to the Human Sciences, he argued 
that, with regard to the philosophical foundation for historical inquiry, 
The answers given to these questions by Comte and the positivists and by J.S. Mill 
and the empiricists seemed to me to truncate and mutilate historical reality in order 
to assimilate it to the concepts and methods of the natural sciences.97
In Dilthey’s view, the epistemological presuppositions of positivism prevented it from 
grasping historical reality as it is lived and experienced. In particular, Dilthey rejected 
its empiricist presuppositions, i.e., the reduction of knowledge to sense-data and its 
associations.98 Although he agreed that science must be based in experience and is thus 
antimetaphysical, he argued that positivist epistemology, like that of the empiricists and 
Kant, rested on an abstraction from life as it is actually lived and experienced:
Apart from a few beginnings...previous epistemology has explained experience and 
cognition in terms of facts that are merely representational. No real blood flows in 
the veins of the knowing subject constructed by Locke, Hume, and Kant, but rather 
the diluted extract of reason as a mere activity of thought.99
Rather than sense-data, Dilthey argued that empirical inquiry must investigate the “facts 
of consciousness” or “inner experience”, behind which we cannot go:
All science is experiential; but all experience must be related back to and derives its 
validity from the conditions and context of consciousness in which it arises, i.e., the 
totality of our nature. We designate as “epistemological” this standpoint which con-
sistently recognizes the impossibility of going behind these conditions...only in the 
facts of consciousness given in inner experience do we possess reality as it is.100
A second aspect of Dilthey’s significance is that he actively engaged in 
historical research, unlike his neo-Kantian contemporaries. Whereas the neo-Kantians 
wrote on the history of philosophy, Dilthey’s researches concerned the broader sphere 
96. Ibid., pg. 246.
97. Wilhelm Dilthey, Selecteed Works Vol. I, op. cit., pg. 49. The quotation is from the Preface 
to Volume I, originally published in 1883.
98. Cf. Makkreel and Rodi, “Introduction”, in Dilthey, ibid., pg. 8. 
99. Dilthey, ibid., pg. 50. Cf. Bambach, op. cit., pg. 137-139.
100. Dilthey, ibid. Dilthey’s insistence on the primordiality of inner experience or “inner 
perception” was one of the central points on which Windelband and Rickert criticized his 
approach to historical knowledge (cf. Oakes, “Introduction: Rickert’s Theory of Historical 
Knowledge” in Rickert, The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science, pg. xii).
44of the history of ideas.101 This led him to an engagement with the Historical School and 
historicism that went beyond the transcendental value philosophy of the neo-Kantians, 
with its exclusive emphasis on cognitive interests. In Introduction to the Human 
Sciences, Dilthey remarks that
It was the Historical School—taking that term in its broadest sense—that first 
brought about the emancipation of historical consciousness and historical scholar-
ship.102
Nevertheless, in Dilthey’s estimation, the approach of the Historical School remained 
one-sided, since it did not seek to integrate the study of the historical with the 
psychological study of consciousness. This meant that it remained without a proper 
foundation.103 Dilthey’s favourable judgment of positivism was due to its attempt to 
provide such a foundation. However, he disagreed with the positivist naturalization of 
psychology, although he considered the positivist approach and its results to be 
“impoverished, superficial, but analytically refined”.104
Dilthey’s philosophical aim, then, was 
to provide a philosophical foundation for the principle of the Historical School and 
for those modes of research into society currently dominated by that school; this 
should settle the conflict between the Historical School and abstract theories.105
For this reason, he rejected the distinction between the historical and the systematic.106 
Yet he also rejected the relativistic consequences of historicism, which sought to reduce 
the systematic to the historical. The critique of historial reason that Dilthey made his 
life’s work was aimed at providing a foundation for historical consciousness that would 
avoid such relativism, but could still recognize and account for the historical context of 
101. Cf. H.P. Rickman, “General Introduction” in H.P. Rickman, ed., Meaning in History, 
George Allen and Unwin, London, 1961, pp. 16-17.
102. Dilthey, Selected Works Vol. I, op. cit., pg. 47; cf. Bambach, op. cit., pp. 140-142.
103. Dilthey, ibid., pg. 48.
104. Ibid., pg. 49.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid., pg. 47; cf. Bambach, op. cit., pg. 140. Heidegger appropriates this motif from Dilthey, 
and repeats it throughout his early works (e.g., ZBP pg. 107; GA61 pp. 82-83; J pg. 97; 
HCT pg. 7; K pg. 176).
45philosophical systems.107
Dilthey, like Droysen, argued that historical understanding was made possible 
by our being historical. That is, we do not come to know the historical as observers or 
spectators, but through living it. Therefore we are continuous with history, and thus 
“observe” it from within. Historical inquiry is thus also self-inquiry.108 Historicalness 
as a mode of being, Dilthey argued, was the condition for the possibility of scientific 
knowledge of history:
We are, first of all, historical beings and, after that, contemplators of history; only 
because we are the one do we become the other...
The fact that the investigator of history is the same as the one who makes it is the 
first condition that makes scientific history possible.109
Dilthey’s approach, then, was not to determine the ontological status of the historical 
object, as Windelband and Rickert supposed, but rather the mode of being of the 
historical subject. All objectification of history, he argued, depends on the historicalness 
of the historian. Although this does not result in historical relativism, it does raise the 
question of how to secure objective historical knowledge, a question that can only be 
answered by taking into account the psycho-physical totality of the individual. The 
critique of historical reason thus required a psychological approach, but not empirical 
psychology. Instead, it depended on a descriptive psychology (here Dilthey 
appropriated Brentano’s insights, without quite arriving at phenomenology). Dilthey 
attempted to a develop a “theory of worldviews” that would do just this. As he 
explained in a letter to Husserl,
It is the task of the theory of world views...to describe methodologically on the basis 
of an analysis of the historical development of religion, poetry, and metaphysics—
but in contrast to relativism—the relationship of the human mind to the enigma of 
the world and of life.110
107. Cf. Crowell, op. cit., pg. 673.
108. Cf. Gabriel R. Ricci, “Metaphysics and History: The Individual and the General 
Reconciled”, Humanitas, vol. X, no. 1, 1997, n. 10.
109. Wilhelm Dilthey, “Patterns and Meaning in History”, in Sältzer, op. cit., pg. 162.
46In his own work, however, “Dilthey never really resolved the tension between the 
finitude of historical consciousness and the scientific demand for universality.”111 
The Neo-Kantian Account of Historical Knowledge
The neo-Kantian response to Dilthey’s “struggle for a historical worldview”, 
as Heidegger calls it (K), was to argue that Kant’s critical philosophy could serve as the 
basis for a transcendental science of values, but that it needed to be extended to include 
historical or cultural science. Whereas Kant had established the critical philosophy with 
respect to the mathematical sciences of nature, the development of the methods of 
historical inquiry meant that “the historical sciences also constitute a legitimate object 
of philosophical critique”.112
Windelband was the founder of the Baden School of neo-Kantianism, to which 
belonged his student Rickert and Rickert’s student Emil Lask (1875-1915). These 
philosophers, like the Marburg School of Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp and Ernst 
Cassirer (among others), “promoted a transcendental, antipsychologistic reading of 
Kant as the basis for logical ideality and moral absolutism”.113 By returning to Kant, 
they aimed to provide a philosophical ground for the sciences in opposition to 
positivism. Their orientation was towards a transcendental epistemology, which 
entailed that “no prior material conceptions of the object are employed in the theory of 
knowledge”.114 Therefore, they took a strictly formal approach that allowed only “for 
the logic of concept-formation and the formation of judgments” in the theory of 
knowledge.115 In this way, they aimed to establish the conditions of validity for 
110. Quoted in Bambach, op. cit., pg. 173.
111. Ibid., pg. 176.
112. Oakes, op. cit., pg. 167.
113. Steven Galt Crowell, “The Early Decades”, op. cit., pg. 670.
114. Schnädelbach, pg. 57.
115. Ibid.
47scientific knowledge. Positivism held that “experience is a prerational, given field of 
sensation that provides the explanans for higher cognitive achievements”, whereas for 
the neo-Kantians, “experience is the explanandum” that was to be explained by way of 
“a theory of categories”.116 The centrality of the ideas of value and validity came from 
Lotze, who had been Windelband’s teacher.
The Baden School was also influenced by the Fichtean notion of the 
irrationality of “the material of knowledge”, and thus “grounded the validity of logical 
form (ideality) in the primacy of practical reason”.117 For this reason, these thinkers 
advocated a transcendental value-philosophy (which was to be one of the main targets 
of Heidegger’s first lecture courses (ZBP)). They were also concerned with the problem 
of historical knowledge, both in terms of its demarcation from the knowledge of nature, 
and its objective validity.
Windelband: Nomothetic and Idiographical Sciences
Windelband confronts the positivist and historicist challenge to philosophy by 
accepting that, in terms of their objects, philosophy cannot “establish any substantive 
conclusions” itself.118 In his Rectoral Address of 1894, “History and Natural Science”, 
he argues that the role of philosophy in relation to the empirical sciences is “to identify 
the limits of knowledge in each of the individual disciplines”.119 Philosophy 
investigates the principles of knowledge in the different disciplines, to define the form 
of their appropriate methods.120 In this way, philosophy determines “the significance, 
the cognitive value, and the limits of the use of these methods”.121 To define the 
116. Crowell, op. cit., pg. 671.
117. Ibid.
118. Wilhelm Windelband, “Rectorial Address, Strasbourg, 1894”, trans. G. Oakes, History and 
Theory, vol. 19, no. 2, 1980, pg. 185.
119. Ibid., pg. 185.
120. Ibid., pg. 169.
48appropriate methods, however, depends on classification of the disciplines. Windelband 
argues that the distinction of “natural sciences and sciences of the mind” cannot be 
philosophically justified, because it rests on the “substantive dichotomy” of nature and 
mind, which cannot be given a philosophical foundation. Philosophy can only provide a 
“formal principle of classification”, not a substantive or material principle.122
In formal terms, then, the sciences are distinguished by their aims, methods, 
and the types of judgments they aim at. Windelband argues that there are two main 
kinds of sciences, those that aim at general laws, and those that aim at individual 
phenomena. Nomological sciences such as psychology, chemistry, mechanics and 
biology collect and analyze facts in order to determine or discover the general laws of 
the phenomena they investigate. They aim at “the general apodictic judgment” 
concerning their objects.123 Disciplines such as biography, history, literature and art, 
however, aim to describe completely and exhaustively “in its full facticity” a temporally 
particular “artifact of human life”.124 They aim at “the singular, assertoric 
proposition”.125 Windelband concludes, therefore, that
The nomological sciences are concerned with what is invariably the case. The sci-
ences of process are concerned with what was once the case...scientific thought is 
nomothetic in the former case, idiographic in the latter case.126
Correlatively with determining the logical forms of the different disciplines, 
philosophy (as theory of cognition) determines the status of the observed particular. In 
the natural sciences, “the single datum of observation never has any intrinsic scientific 
value”, except as representative of a type, “a special case of a general concept”.127 The 
121. Ibid., pp. 170-171.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid., pg. 175.
124. Ibid., pg. 175.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid.
49historical sciences, however, aim to describe the particular in “all of its concrete and 
distinctive features”.128 
Given that both kinds of inquiry can be firmly established as scientific, the 
final question to be considered is whether they are equally valuable for “our general 
world view and philosophy of life”.129 Windelband argues that they are:
Knowledge of general laws always has the practical value of making possible both 
predictions of future states and a purposeful human intervention in the course of 
events...All purposeful activity in human social life, however, is no less dependent 
upon the experience acquired as a result of historical knowledge. To employ a vari-
ation upon a classical expression, man is an historical animal.130
Thus, “these two cognitive moments remain independent and juxtaposed”.131 In 
particular, the attempt to reduce history to natural science, as found in the “so-called 
positivist philosophy of history”,132 simply fails to recognize that “every interest and 
judgment, every ascription of human value is based upon the singular and the 
unique”.133 The idea that the human individual could be regarded as an instance, and 
thus in principle duplicable, is “terrifying and inconceivable”, he argues, and debases 
life.134 This holds even more so for history:
This point concerning individual human life has even more force when it is applied 
to the total historical process: this process has value only if it is unique.135
127. Ibid. Richardson argues that the status of the single datum of observation as a basis for 
secure empirical knowledge depends on the new concept of experience that was introduced 
by Kant, and was articulated by the neo-Kantians, in particular in Cohen’s Kant’s Theory of 
Experience. The Aristotelian concept of experience consisted in the regularity of 
occurrence, and thus discounted singular exceptions to the general. By distinguishing 
between perception and experience, according to Cohen, Kant argued for an autonomous 
source of the concepts that constitute experience, and thus elevated the singular datum of 
experience into a basis upon which the constitutive concepts of experience could be 
determined (Alan W. Richardson, op. cit.).
128. Windelband, op. cit., pg. 178.
129. Ibid., pg. 180.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid., pg. 183.
132. Ibid., pg. 181.
133. Ibid., pg. 182.
134. Ibid. With respect to this point, Windelband adverts to Nietzsche’s idea of eternal 
recurrence as a “dreadful idea”.
135. Ibid.
50The attempt to subsume life under general laws debases freedom, which can 
only be grasped as a temporally unique act. Such uniqueness cannot be rationally 
determined, and thus has to be recognized as “a residuum of incomprehensible, brute 
fact...an inexpressible and indefinable phenomenon.”136
Facticity
The “residuum of incomprehensible, brute fact” is a reference to the Fichtean 
notion of facticity, i.e., that the material of knowledge that is conceptually ordered is 
ultimately irrational. Only when brought under concepts does reality become rational. 
Thus, there is a discontinuity between reality and knowledge. For the neo-Kantians, this 
discontinuity, which Lask called the hiatus irrationalis, was the price that had to be paid 
to defend the autonomy of philosophy. In recognizing that only the empirical sciences 
can reach substantive conclusions, the Baden neo-Kantians denied Hegelian panlogism, 
i.e., the idea that “individual existence emanates from the concept and realizes or 
embodies its content”.137 In Windelband’s words, “[t]he content of the cosmic process 
cannot be understood as a consequence of its forms.”138 Yet they also denied that the 
logic of concept-formation could be ascertained by way of empirical investigation, as 
both positivism and historicism claimed, because the empirical sciences presuppose the 
formal principles that structure or constitute the givenness of the data of experience.
Rickert: Individualizing and Generalizing Sciences
Windelband’s distinction of nomothetic and idiographic sciences failed to 
provide an adequate account of how historical knowledge is possible, i.e., how 
objective knowledge can arise from the “incomprehensible, brute fact” that also 
136. Ibid., pg. 184.
137. Guy Oakes, Weber and Rickert, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988, pg. 50.
138. Windelband, op. cit., pg. 185.
51constitutes “our nature”. Rickert sought to address this problem by reference to the 
value-relevance of the historical.139 Like Windelband, Rickert’s approach is 
methodological and epistemological, rather than involving an “ontological solution” in 
terms of the object-domains of the respective sciences. Central to Rickert’s analysis is 
the demarcation problem between the natural and historical sciences, which could be 
established neither materially, in terms of the object-domains of nature and spirit, nor 
formally, in terms of the physical and psychical, because there are natural sciences, 
such as psychology, that deals with the psychical, and physical sciences, such as 
archeology, that deal with spirit. The essential demarcation, Rickert argues, had to be in 
terms of the specific interests and methods of the different sciences.140 However, this 
demarcation implies that reality itself is not so differentiated, and “must be viewed as 
entirely uniform”.141 Thus, whereas the positivist and historicist challenges to 
philosophy (and to one another) maintained that there was only one type of science, 
Rickert argues that philosophical clarification showed that both are valid.
The validity of each had to be understood in terms of the formal distinction of 
nature as “the existence of things as far as it is determined according to universal laws”, 
and history as “the nonrepeatable event in its particularity and individuality”;142 and 
the material distinction of value-relatedness, where nature is “devoid of meaning” and 
“culture” is “meaningful and relevant to values”.143 The values at issue are 
transcendental, i.e., they are not real, but rather valid. They hold of the valuable entities, 
139. Cf. Oakes, Weber and Rickert, pg. 48. The two main texts in which Rickert presents his 
theory of historical knowledge are The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science, 
trans. and ed. G. Oakes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986 [1st ed. 1902] and 
Science and History, trans. G. Reisman, ed. A. Goddard, D. Van Nostrand Company, 
Princeton, 1962 [1st ed. 1899]. In what follows I mainly draw upon the latter work.
140. Ibid., pg. 12.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid., pg. 14.
143. Ibid., pg. xvi, 20-21.
52and obligate us to esteem them.144 Values are different from “valuation”, which 
involves “a psychical being who values [cultural phenomena]”.145
The different kinds of sciences cognize reality in terms of their respective 
concepts. They reconstruct the “data of immediate experience”, which in itself is “an 
immeasurable manifold”.146 Reality is infinite in two respects. First, it is infinitely 
divisible, and second, it is infinitely extensive. Reality is a continuum of absolute 
heterogeneity, because “[n]o thing and no event in the world is completely identical 
with any other; it is only more or less similar to it”.147 Therefore, reality always 
exceeds our ability to conceptually grasp it. As such, it is irrational. “[B]ecause it is, in 
its every part, an heterogeneous continuum, it cannot be conceptually grasped as it 
is.”148 Rickert therefore rejects epistemological realism, i.e., what he calls the “copy 
theory of knowledge” and the correspondence theory of truth.149
The question is then how scientific concepts apply to this heterogeneous 
continuum. How do they pick out their object?
Only by means of a conceptual distinction between differentiation and continuity
can reality become “rational”. The continuum can be conceptually mastered as soon 
as it is homogeneous; and the heterogeneous becomes conceivable when we make 
incisions in it, thereby transforming the continuum into a domain of discrete
objects.150
The natural sciences reconstruct reality as a homogeneous continuum, i.e., as a domain 
of objects that conform to general laws, whereas the cultural sciences reconstruct it as a 
heterogeneous discretum, i.e., as a domain of objects that are nonrepeatable, particular 
and individual. In such conceptual transformation, reality becomes rational. However, 
144. Ibid., pg. 22.
145. Ibid., pg. 26.
146. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
147. Ibid., pg. 33.
148. Ibid., pg. 35.
149. Ibid., pg. 31. Cf. Oakes, Weber and Rickert, pp. 56-57, 59-61.
150. Rickert, Science and History, pg. 34.
53such rational transformations of the heterogeneous continuum require a formal 
“principle of selection” to “separate the essential from the unessential of a given 
material” in a process of abstraction.151 For the natural sciences, this is the method of 
generalization, but Rickert rejects the positivist notion of inductive generalization or 
“comparative abstraction”, arguing that the natural sciences can “discover the concept, 
and eventually perhaps even the law they are seeking, in a single object”.152 The 
heterogeneous continuum is transformed into a heterogeneous discretum, on the other 
hand, through “the individualizing procedure of history”.153 But Rickert argues that the 
principle of selection on which this procedure is based is not clear. The central problem 
is the relation between concept and individuality. “Is it at all possible to form concepts 
of individuals? This, essentially, is the logical problem of the method of history.”154
The neo-Kantian attempts to provide a foundation for both the natural and 
historical sciences, and at the same time to defend the autonomy of philosophy, 
ultimately proved unsuccessful, because the reference to values did not account for how 
these values were supposed to apply to irrational reality, nor the status of the values 
themselves. Furthermore, as Dilthey and other historicists argued, Rickert’s exclusive 
focus on the logic of historical concepts ultimately excluded the notion of historical 
time altogether.155
Husserl: The Phenomenology of Consciousness
Although he had already criticized psychologism in Logical Investigations 
(LU §§25-29), in his 1911 Logos essay, Husserl addressed the challenge both 
151. Ibid., pg. 36.
152. Ibid., pg. 42.
153. Ibid., pg. 57.
154. Ibid., pg. 71.
155. Cf. Bambach, op. cit., pp. 120-121.
54positivism and historicism posed to philosophy with respect to the question of objective 
validity.156 Husserl’s concern was to establish philosophy as a rigorous or strict science. 
His critique of both naturalism and historicism is that neither can attain the objective 
validity on which the sciences depend. 
Naturalism or positivism in the form of psychologism, with its treatment of the 
phenomena of consciousness as natural beings, he argues, fails to recognize that 
psychical phenomena cannot be experienced intersubjectively or by the same subject at 
different times. Objective validity cannot come from the experience of natural beings, 
because such experience presupposes it. But the rejection of objective validity on the 
grounds that all knowledge develops, as historicism supposes, is self-defeating, because 
the determination of the historically valid already presupposes objective validity. 
Furthermore, objective validity is not something historical. That is, historicism 
questions absolute validity on the basis of the historical, but the latter concerns what has 
occurred, and thus cannot be the basis for what will not occur, i.e., that what is now 
considered to be absolutely valid will one day cease to be so.
Naturalism
The naturalistic orientation towards philosophy is a consequence of “the 
discovery of nature”, i.e., of “nature considered as a unity of spatiotemporal being 
subject to exact laws of nature” (PRS 169). With this discovery, “the natural scientist 
has the tendency to look upon everything as nature” (PRS 169). Naturalism thus 
involves the naturalizing of consciousness and its data, and the naturalizing of ideas 
“and consequently of all absolute ideals and norms” (PRS 169). This leads to 
156. Edmund Husserl, “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science”, trans. Q. Lauer, in Husserl: Shorter 
Works, ed. P. McCormick and F.A. Elliston, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 
1981, pp. 166-197 (hereafter PRS followed by page number). Heidegger subjects this text 
to his own phenomenological critique in GA17, §§5-16.
55psychologism, in which “formal-logical principles” are interpreted as natural (i.e., 
causal) laws of thinking. But such an attitude denies its very presuppositions, Husserl 
argues, and has “sceptical consequences” (PRS 171). The problem with empirical 
psychology is that it is based on a concept of the nature of things that is inappropriate to 
its subject matter.
Only the spatiotemporal world of bodies is nature in the significant sense of that 
word...In principle, only corporeal being can be experienced in a number of direct 
experiences, i.e., perceptions, as individually identical. Hence, only this being 
can...be experienced by many subjects as individually identical and be described as 
intersubjectively the same. (PRS 178)
Thus, the objective determination of the nature of things by natural science depends on 
the possibility of their being experienced as identical in different experiences. This is 
what the substantial unity of natural things means.
Psychical things, however, are not experiences of something that has a unity 
throughout different experiences, but the experiences themselves:
In the psychical sphere there is...no distinction between appearance and being, and 
if nature is a being that appears in appearances, still appearances themselves...do 
not constitute a being which itself appears by means of appearances lying behind 
it...there is, properly speaking, only one nature, the one that appears in the appear-
ances of things. Everything that in the broadest sense of psychology we call a psy-
chical phenomenon, when looked at in and for itself, is precisely a phenomenon and 
not nature. (PRS 179)
Therefore, to investigate psychical phenomena as natural things is to misunderstand the 
phenomenon that is being investigated. Whereas natural beings endure throughout 
different experiences,
something psychical, a “phenomenon,” comes and goes; it retains no enduring, 
identical being that would be objectively determinable as such in the sense of natu-
ral science... (PRS 180)
To investigate the psychical properly, there must be an inquiry into pure, not 
empirical, consciousness. This requires “a phenomenology of consciousness as opposed 
to a natural science about consciousness” (PRS 173), i.e., an inquiry that excludes all 
“existential positings” or positing of the existence of consciousness as a natural being 
56(PRS 172). In order to attain the rigorous form of theory of knowledge, presuppositions 
about the objects of consciousness have to be suspended, so that consciousness can be 
seen as it is in itself. Husserl argues that
the investigation must be directed toward a scientific essential knowledge of con-
sciousness, toward that which consciousness itself “is” according to its essence in 
all its distinguishable forms. At the same time, however, the investigation must be 
directed toward what consciousness “means,” as well as toward the different ways 
in which—in accord with the essence of the aforementioned forms—it intends the 
objective... (PRS 173)
Only a phenomenology of pure consciousness, Husserl argues, can attain the rigour of a 
scientific theory of knowledge from an “analysis of consciousness itself” (PRS 175). 
And only in this way can the meaning of objective validity become evident.
What it means, that objectivity is, and manifests itself cognitively as so being, must 
precisely become evident purely from consciousness itself, and thereby it must 
become completely understandable. (PRS 173)
The phenomenological method involves the intuition of essences rather than of natures. 
In this method, the intentionality of consciousness, i.e., its directedness-towards its 
contents, is investigated, and not the being of those contents themselves. “Intuition 
grasps essence as essential being, and in no way posits being-there” (PRS 182). In 
investigating essences rather than experiences, phenomenology does not grasp the 
particular, the individual, or the singular, for to do so it would have “to give it a position 
in a ‘world’ of individual being-there” (PRS 183). The only particularity that 
phenomenology can posit is transient phenomenality, “this disappearing perception, 
recollection, etc.” (PRS 183). Thus Husserl argues that, “[f]or phenomenology, the 
singular is eternally the apeiron” (PRS 183).
Historicism
Historicist or Weltanschauung philosophy is a consequence of the “discovery 
of history”, with which “the humanistic scientist sees everything as ‘spirit,’ as a 
historical creation” (PRS 169). “Historicism takes its position in the factual sphere of 
57the empirical life of the spirit” (PRS 185). As such, although it does not naturalize 
spirit, “there arises a relativism that has a close affinity to naturalistic psychologism and 
runs into similar sceptical difficulties” (PRS 185). Historical science inquires into 
“spiritual formations” as social, individual and cultural unities. Such formations have a 
structure, a typology and a “wealth of external and internal forms” that “grow and 
transform themselves”, analogous to “the structure and typology of organic 
development” (PRS185-6). What endures is thus “a stream of development”, that can 
be entered into vitally by “interior intuition” and thus “understood” (PRS 186).
In this manner everything historical becomes for us “understandable,” “explicable,” 
in the “being” peculiar to it, which is precisely “spiritual being,” a unity of interi-
orly self-questioning moments of a sense and at the same time a unity of intelligible 
structuration and development according to inner motivation. (PRS 186)
Historicism argues that spirit as historical creation is singular and yet intelligible in its 
structure, development, and inner motivation. The unity of such a spiritual formation is 
a Weltanschauung, a coherent way of viewing or understanding the world. Historical 
science thus has
the enormous task of thoroughly investigating its morphological structure and 
typology as well as its developmental connections and of making historically under-
standable the spiritual motivations that determine its essence, by reliving them from 
within. (PRS 186)
Historicism differs from historical science as such because it questions the notion of the 
absolute validity of knowledge. The theory of development implies that knowledge too 
develops, and thus is relative to its historical situation. Husserl quotes Dilthey:
In face of the view that embraces the earth and all past events, the absolute validity 
of any particular form of life-interpretation, of religion, and of philosophy disap-
pears. (PRS 186)
Husserl agrees that “Weltanschauung and Weltanschauung philosophy are cultural 
formations that come and go in the stream of human development” (PRS 186). That is, 
the way the world is viewed is historically contextual. But what about the natural 
sciences? Are they not objectively valid, despite the fact that scientific views change?
58Does that mean that in view of this constant change in scientific views we would 
have no right to speak of sciences as objectively valid unities instead of merely as 
cultural formations? (PRS 186)
Insofar as historicism makes this claim, it “carries over into extreme sceptical 
subjectivism. The ideas of truth, theory, and science would then, like all ideas, lose their 
absolute validity” (PRS 186). But what basis does the historian have to make this 
claim? Inquiry into what has historically occurred, Husserl argues, gives no basis for 
the claim that something will not occur, because “historical reasons can produce only 
historical consequences. The desire either to prove or to refute ideas on the basis of 
facts is nonsense” (PRS 187).
Consequently, just as historical science can advance nothing relevant against the 
possibility of absolute validities in general, so it can advance nothing in particular 
against the possibility of an absolute (i.e., scientific) metaphysics or any other kind 
of philosophy. (PRS 187)
In other words, the critique of philosophy is always philosophical, and not historical, 
critique.
For it is clear that philosophical criticism, too, in so far as it is really to lay claim to 
validity, is philosophy and that its sense implies the ideal possibility of a systematic 
philosophy as a strict science. (PRS 187)
Conclusion
Both positivist objectification and historicist intersubjectification subsume the 
moment of subjectivity in the human situation. The philosophical responses to 
positivism and historicism by the neo-Kantians, Dilthey and Husserl can thus be 
understood as attempts to defend subjectivity from this kind of subsumption, either by 
recourse to the transcendental subject (the neo-Kantians and Husserl) or to the historical 
subject (Dilthey). In doing so, however, they ended up by objectifying the subject once 
again. What none of these positions could clarify, then, was the genesis of meaning. 
Positivism reduces meaning to explanatory laws governing objects, which ultimately 
results in meaninglessness, since there can be no explanatory laws of the singular. 
59Historicism reduces meaning to intersubjective historico-cultural context, thereby 
fatally relativizing it. The philosophical responses, however, were unable to locate the 
genesis of meaning within the concretely individual human situation, and thus ended up 
by theoretically objectifying it. Heidegger’s aim, then is to show how objective validity 
(i.e., transcendence or “ek-stasis”) belongs to the human situation itself, i.e., to 
elucidate how facticity is itself hermeneutic, i.e., fraught with meaning.
Heidegger’s critique of his predecessors was that in responding to positivism 
and historicism, they had failed to take into account how the human situation is 
determined neither purely objectively nor intersubjectively, but is always also 
constituted as a historical or situational ‘I’. Whereas positivism objectified the ‘I’ by 
reducing it to a natural being, historicism objectified it by reducing it to a historical 
context. The theoretical attempts by the neo-Kantians, Dilthey, and Husserl likewise 
objectified the ‘I’ as a form of pure consciousness, and thus were unable to account for 
its individuality. For this reason, they were unable to give an appropriate account of 
how objectivity and intersubjectivity required subjectivity. Without the moment of 
subjectivity, there could be no account of the meaningfulness of the human situation as 
concretely individual or as singular. To give an appropriate account of concrete 
individuality, Heidegger argues, an approach is needed that does not objectify it but 
allows for the expression of “the unique being of life” in its historical reality (K 155). 
This was what Dilthey had been working towards, but had been unable to achieve 
because his inquiries remained determined by the theoretical objectification of 
consciousness that he was trying to overcome.
In a later chapter, I will investigate in more detail exactly how Heidegger’s 
method of formal indication shows a way beyond the theoretical aporias of both 
positivism and historicism. In particular, it suggests how subjectivity can be thought in 
60a non-objectifying way, i.e., in a way that does not articulate the subject in objective 
terms (as found in neo-Kantianism, for example). Approaching concrete individuality 
in this way shows how objectivity and intersubjectivity are equioriginary with 
subjectivity, and thus how meaning arises in the discursive encounter with things and 
others. 
In the chapters that follow, I explore the question of the relation between the 
concrete individual and historical meaning as it becomes manifest in positivistic and 
historicist conceptions of economics (ch. 2), and how this in turn manifests itself in 
mainstream development thinking and the postdevelopment critique (ch. 3). The 
explication of some of the key aspects of Heidegger’s philosophical approach to his 
topic (chs. 4 and 5) will then make it possible to see how inquiry into development 
always places the inquirer into question, and how overlooking this fundamental relation 
results in the problem of meaning characteristic of development thinking and its 
critiques (ch. 6).
Chapter 2: Historicist and Positivist EconomicsA world was uncovered the very existence of which 
had not been suspected, that of the laws governing a 
complex society. Although the emergence of society in 
this new and distinctive sense happened in the 
economic field, its reference was universal.
— Karl Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation
Introduction
In this chapter I turn to the question of the nature of economic inquiry, for two 
reasons. First, economic issues are central to the subject of development, to the extent 
that institutions such as the World Bank have consistently maintained that economic 
growth is essential for development. Second, the relationship between positivist 
economic analysis and history is problematic, which in turn makes the economistic 
approach to the subject of development questionable. The abstract universalism of 
positivist economics is evident in the policy prescriptions and economic analyses of 
agencies involved in mainstream international development, such as the OECD and the 
World Bank. Since the issue of the concreteness or historical context of economic 
behaviour is central to the subject of development, then, it is useful to consider how 
historicist economists attempted to approach it. 
Here I examine two conflicting views about economics, the historicist and the 
positivist, which show continuities with the debate over positivist and historicist views 
of history examined in the previous chapter. In fact, one of the central figures in 
positivism, J.S. Mill, is also a central figure in positivist economics.1 In particular, my 
aim is to show how historicist economics involves the attempt to take historical 61
62specificity and the concrete individuality of a particular context of economic behaviour 
into account and, by doing so, recognizes the continuity of theory (or analysis) with 
policy.
The historicist view was predominant in Germany from the late 17th to the 
early 20th century.2 Because this view was opposed to the universal theorizing 
characteristic of positivist economics, it began to lose influence outside of Germany 
after the advent of marginalism in the late 19th century, and today comparatively little is 
known about it.3 Yet many of the criticisms that historicist economists levelled against 
positivist economics are still germane today, and are also relevant to recent critiques of 
the universalist presuppositions of mainstream (or positivist) development thinking.4 
Positivist economics became predominant in Britain and France in the late 18th century 
and elsewhere, such as Austria, in the late 19th century. Because this view has come to 
determine present-day economic orthodoxy, it is generally identified with economics 
per se. It characterizes the economic inquiries of those considered to be the founding 
fathers of the discipline, such as Smith, Ricardo, J.S. Mill, Jevons, Walras and Menger.
1. Dan Hausman argues that “current methodological practice closely resembles Mill’s 
methodology, despite the fact that few economists would explicitly defend it” (Daniel M. 
Hausman, “Philosophy of Economics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2003 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta,  at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/
economics/>.
2. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, this school of economic thought is generally referred to 
as the German Historical School. The influence of German economic thought in other 
countries, particularly the United States and Institutional economics, is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, as is the complex relation of Marx’s thought to German economics (for 
example, his critique of Friedrich List).
3. Cf. Erik S. Reinert and Arno Daastøl, “The Other Canon: The History of Renaissance 
Economics” in Erik S. Reinert, ed., Globalization, Economic Development and Inequality: 
An Alternative Perspective, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2004, pp. 21-70; also available at 
<www.othercanon.org/papers> on 26 April 2005, pp. 1-42. The latter pagination is cited 
here.
4. See for example Erik S. Reinert, “Increasing Poverty in a Globalised World: Marshall 
Plans and Morgenthau Plans as Mechanisms of Polarisation of World Incomes”, The Other 
Canon Foundation, Norway, 2003, at <www.othercanon.org/papers> on 19 May 2005.
63In examining these two views, then, I aim to show that what the historicist 
economists were trying to articulate pertained fundamentally to the related questions of 
what economic inquiry aims to show, and how it aims to do so. Most importantly, the 
historicists rejected the view of positivist economists that it was possible to abstract 
from the economic history of certain countries, in particular Britain, so as to derive 
general laws determining the process of economic change elsewhere. The historicists 
perceived this to be an illegitimate generalization from a particular (and perhaps even 
aberrant) case, arguing instead that economic behaviour had to be understood in terms 
of the specific historical conditions of individual countries. Arguably, positivist 
economics has continued to deny the notion of historical specificity.5
A further area of contention between these two views is related to the question 
of historical specificity. Historicist economists criticized the positivist approach for its 
universalistic notions of human nature, such as the idea that human beings are 
motivated by self-interest or maximization of subjectively perceived utility. This issue 
also had to do with the relevance of economic inquiry to economic policy and politics.6 
Positivist economics maintained that because economic theory was universally 
applicable, the role of government was to harmonize policy with the way that economic 
behaviour was theoretically demonstrated to occur. Failure to do so would result in 
worse economic performance.7 In contrast, the historicists argued that the way people 
interact economically is dependent on the historical context, and that it is the role of 
policy to create the conditions for beneficial economic behaviours. However, the 
historicists’ rejection of universal economic theory did not mean that they aspired to a 
5. Since the late 19th century, with the development of the marginalist approach, positivist 
economics has in effect divorced itself from the study of economic history. Positivist 
economics has even developed its own form of economic history, “cliometrics”, which is 
essentially the retrojection of current economic theory. I discuss this further below.
6. In the Cameralist tradition of the 17th and 18th centuries, a distinction was made between 
internal policy and external politics, due to the nature of the political entities involved.
64non-theoretical economics (as has sometimes been suggested8) nor that they were 
simply advocating inductive methods against the deductive formalism that had come, 
with Ricardo, to dominate positivist economics.9 Other characteristics sometimes 
ascribed to historicist economics are that they espoused collectivism and constructivism 
against the (methodological) individualism and spontaneity of institutions advocated by 
positivist economics.10
Historicist economics was far more complex than this would suggest. Nor 
were all of the historicist economists completely hostile to positivist economics.11 
However, because of its attempt to incorporate diverse intellectual influences, 
historicist economics has often been interpreted either as an unrealized programme or 
as an unsystematic collection of approaches.12 As Peukert argues,
the historical school itself originated from diverse backgrounds and tried to inte-
grate different intellectual and theoretical impulses...On the one hand, German 
romanticism, idealism, the diverse historical schools, e.g. in law, and hermeneutics 
(Dilthey) has a strong impact, but also mercantilist thought and the framework of 
the classical economists. On the other hand also French positivism, empirical and 
behavioural psychology and cultural anthropology as well as evolutionism in the 
variants of Spencer and Darwin had an impact on the historical school.13
7. However, this did not mean that all positivist economists advocated laissez-faire. Adam 
Smith, for example, was well aware of the dangers of business interests colluding to their 
own benefit and to the detriment of others or society as a whole. In a number of passages in 
The Wealth of Nations, Smith warns of the interests of “merchants and manufacturers”, “an 
order of men whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have 
generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have 
upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it” (WNI pg. 359; cf. also WNI pp. 
232-233, WNIV pp. 39, 72-73). And J.S. Mill argued that distribution, unlike production, 
was partly dependent on institutions (John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 
Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1909 [1848] at <http://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/
mlP1.html> on 11 February 2004, Bk. I, ch. I, PR.31.
8. For example, Streissler suggests this about the Younger Historical School (Erich W. 
Streissler, “Rau, Hermann and Roscher: contributions of German economics around the 
middle of the nineteenth century”. European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 
vol. 8, no. 3, 2001, pg. 312).
9. For example, Keith Tribe, Historical Schools of Economics: German and English, Keele 
Economics Research Papers, Keele University, February, 2002, pg. 1.
10. Helge Peukert, “The Multifaceted Balance of the Concept of Staatswissenschaften in the 
Tradition of the Historical School”, European Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 12, 
2001, pg. 113. Another characteristic ascribed to historicist economics, which Peukert does 
not mention here, is an almost slavish devotion to laws of historical development.
11. Cf. Streissler, op. cit., pp. 311-331; Tribe, Historical Schools, op. cit.
65Only with the advent of marginalist or neoclassical economics did the difference in 
approaches turn into an explicit conflict, with the Methodenstreit between Schmoller 
and Menger, but even then, the disagreement was largely at cross-purposes.
The positivist innovation: invention of economy
In the two centuries preceding the appearance in the 18th century of what I 
refer to here as positivist economics,14 there had been significant discussion amongst 
those who came to be called “mercantilists”15 of what would now be considered 
economic topics. However, what was innovative in positivist economics, i.e., the 
conceptualization of economic behaviour as “a discrete conceptual sphere” of human 
activity,16 problematizes interpretation of earlier thought. The earlier term, 
“oeconomy”,
refers us to a world in which human activity directed to the physical maintenance of 
life is conceived in terms of a social grouping of family and servants with a head of 
household whose business it is to see that everyone has their fit requirements.17
The national economy was understood along similar lines, i.e., essentially in terms of 
providing for people, and was not distinguished from the domain of the sovereign. The 
political economists transformed this from a hierarchically to a horizontally conceived 
domain, analytically separable from the state.
12. Cf. Tribe, op. cit., pp. 2, 5-14.
13. Peukert, op. cit.
14. There are various views on where the significant positivist innovation in economic thought 
occurs. Tribe states that “Adam Smith’s Inquiry into the nature and cause of the wealth of 
nations (1776) is uncontroversially acknowledged to be the founding text of modern 
economics” (Keith Tribe, “Oeconomic History”, Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science, vol. 36, 2005, pg. 587). However, he also refers to Schumpeter, who located the 
“transition to a ‘scientific economics’ ” with the Physiocrats in the mid-18th century (pg. 
588), a view that Reinert and Daastøl also endorse (Erik S. Reinert and Arno Daastøl, op. 
cit., pg. 4). Another view, that of William Letwin, holds that economic science originates in 
the 17th century, with Petty, Locke, and North (cf. Marc Blaug, “Economic Theory and 
Economic History in Great Britain, 1650-1776”, Past and Present, no. 28, 1964, pg. 112).
15. This term, invented by Mirabeau in 1763, “has been used to describe the economic thought 
of the entire period from the end of the Middle Ages to the Age of Enlightenment—from 
the fifteenth century to the eighteenth” (Backhouse, op. cit., pp. 57-58).
16. Tribe, “Oeconomic History”, op. cit., pg. 592.
17. Ibid.
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liberty, need, and happiness (or rather satisfaction) have become linked in a chain of 
meaning which is founded upon the economy as a constitutive moment.18
Prior to this conception, then, the issue of state interference in economy that is of 
central concern to positivist economics, particularly political economy, does not arise. 
For the Cameralists in 17th- and 18th-century Germany, for instance, the central 
concept is that of the polity, which “is not one of a zone of action nor of a kind of 
relation between subjects, but rather embraces the whole state through the medium of 
regulation” (which they called Polizei).19
The sense of economy that positivist economics focussed on was the 
production and distribution of wealth in the interactions between atomistic individuals 
according to their self-interest. Self-interest, in turn, was held to be a universal aspect of 
human nature, and therefore to be primary in the analysis of economy. Prior to this 
conception of the relation of economy and wealth, what was significant for householder 
and ruler alike was subsistence, of the family for the former, and of the polity for the 
latter.20 The Cameralists argued that the ruler’s wealth is really the “common weal”, 
i.e., the happiness of his subjects: “a primary form of wealth for a ruler consisted in the 
good order of his subject population”,21 which was what Polizei was to accomplish.
18. Keith Tribe, “Cameralism and the Science of Government”, The Journal of Modern 
History, vol. 56, no. 2, 1984, pg. 266. However, it is important to note also that the concept 
of “the” economy, as a term “referring to the structure or totality of relations of production, 
distribution and consumption of goods and services within a given country or region”, is of 
even more recent provenance, only dating back to “the mid-twentieth century” (Timothy 
Mitchell, “Fixing the Economy”, Cultural Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, 1998, pg. 84). 18th- and 
19th-century texts used “economy” to refer to a type of behaviour, rather than to an object. 
(See also Daniel Breslau, “Economics invents the economy”, Theory and Society, vol. 32, 
2003, pp. 379-411.)
19. Tribe, “Cameralism”, op. cit.
20. We should also note that the standard word in German for “economy” is Wirtschaft, which 
derives from Wirt, meaning “host” or “landlord”. Wirtschaft thus refers to the 
characteristics of being a host, i.e., of providing for someone or provisioning. According to 
Tribe, this can refer to both the activity and the objects provided (Tribe, “Cameralism”, op. 
cit., pg. 269). The terms used for “economics” are Volkswirtschaft (“national provisioning”) 
and Wirtschaftwissenschaft (“science of provisioning”).
21. Ibid., pg. 273.
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behaviour, civil society was discovered to have its own motivating force and thus its 
own laws of motion.22 For positivist economics, the relation between state and 
economy became seen as an issue of restrictive interference by the state with the self-
movement and (so it was postulated) the self-regulation of civil society. Prior to the 
positivist innovation, this issue could not arise. For the Cameralists, such as Von 
Sonnenfels, regulation of economic behaviour is the motivating force. “There are no 
laws of motion in this society except those that lead to its inevitable collapse following 
insufficient government.”23
Although for historicist economics proper, the distinction between state and 
economy or civil society is already part of their intellectual milieu, this did not mean 
that it was simply accepted as a natural state of affairs. In Roscher and particularly in 
Schmoller, the notion of the common weal or the state as a totality is a primary 
motivation for their view of economics as an integrative, rather than specialized, 
discipline. State involvement in economy through regulation and other policy measures 
is the development and progress of the totality, whereas in positivist economics, 
economic development or progress is held to occur through the free interaction of 
individuals in their own interest, so as to discover and take advantage of opportunities 
for gain, thereby leading to technical innovation and hence progress.
Economy and Individuality
A further innovation found in positivist economics is the transformation in the 
concept of the individual, now no longer understood in terms of relations to others and 
to the location she inhabited, but instead as a self-contained agent, interacting with 
22. Ibid., pp. 277, 282-283.
23. Ibid., pg. 277.
68others, but not constituted by such interactions. Through enclosures and the 
introduction of machine production, those who were to become the working classes 
were dissevered from identity through inhabitation, community and vocation. Without 
these bases of identity, individuality came to be seen as residing within each person as 
something self-contained.
Karl Polanyi, following Henry Sumner Maine, argued that this represented the 
privileging of contractus over status as the constitution of society,24 which gave rise to 
the commodification of labour, land and money as the necessary components for the 
self-regulating sphere of economy:
A market economy must comprise all elements of industry, including labor, land, 
and money...But labor and land are no other than the human beings themselves of 
which every society consists and the natural surroundings in which it exists. To 
include them in the market mechanism means to subordinate the substance of soci-
ety itself to the laws of the market.25
Central to this transformation was the notion of improvement that was used to justify 
the enclosures that began in the Tudor period, in which arable land, including the 
commons, was converted to pasture for sheep and the production of wool by lords and 
nobles (and later by merchants and country gentlemen) for private profit. In these 
movements, there was a twin displacement of the smallholders and subsistence farmers 
from their habitation and from their means of subsistence.26 This could be seen as 
improvement only if the conversion compensated that displacement by providing new 
means of subsistence for such individuals, now as agricultural labourers and craftsmen 
attached to or associated with the landlord’s property. But this in turn required the 
notion of the market economy in which labour could be exchanged for subsistence. 
24. Karl Polanyi, The Livelihood of Man, ed. H.W. Pearson, Academic Press, New York, 1977, 
pg. 48.
25. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Beacon Press, Beacon Hill, 1957, pg. 71.
26. Ibid., pp. 34-35; Robert P. Marzec, “Enclosures, Colonization, and the Robinson Crusoe 
Syndrome: A Genealogy of Land in a Global Context”, Boundary 2, vol. 29., no. 2, 2002, 
pg. 140-141.
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An official document of 1607, prepared for the use of the Lords of the Realm, set 
out the problem of change in one powerful phrase: “The poor man shall be satisfied 
in his end: Habitation; and the gentleman not hindered in his desire: Improvement.” 
This formula appears to take for granted the essence of purely economic progress, 
which is to achieve improvement at the price of social dislocation. But it also hints 
at the tragic necessity by which the poor man clings to his hovel, doomed by the 
rich man’s desire for a public improvement which profits him privately.27
The displacement of the commoners had another aspect, that also pertains to 
the conception of the atomistic individual, namely that without some tie to the land, a 
person’s legal identity could no longer be traced back to a master (i.e., a landowner).28 
Such “masterless” men were subject to legal sanctions, often for attempting to assert 
their customary use-rights to provide for their subsistence.
In defense, these landless, “trespassing” laborers referred to themselves as “inhabit-
ants” as a way of laying claim to their centuries-old rights to the land. The term 
inhabitant signaled justified cause for being present on an enclosed area of land for-
merly open.29
However, this sense of “inhabitant” was altered by a legal ruling in 1603, that restricted 
the rights of use to those with specific access to the land, i.e. landowners and their 
tenants. In this “judicial transformation”, Marzec argues, the sense of the human being 
is transformed, from a constitutive relation with her environment, to one of self-
enclosed subjectivity:
Individuality posits selfhood as being grounded within the self, thereby creating the 
opposition of an enclosure or barrier holding together the essence of an inner self 
standing against another self. Inhabitancy names a relation to exteriority and as such 
opens a way of thinking subjectivity as standing upon a structure that gives it sup-
port and meaning: Land sets up humankind.30
Marzec argues further that this metaphysical transformation is also to be found in 
27. Polanyi, op. cit., pg. 34.
28. “As more land was enclosed, more men were legally considered to be ‘masterless’, because 
they could not prove they were tied to a specific owner’s land” (Marzec, op. cit., pg. 140).
29. Ibid., pg. 141.
30. Ibid., pg. 142. The contrast between the interiority of individuality and the relation to 
exteriority designated by inhabitancy needs to be further destructed, however, since the 
notion of exteriority still depends on an independent interiority. As I aim to show in the 
next chapter, Heidegger’s phenomenological elucidation of the human situation argues that 
this contrast itself is determined by the theoretical attitude of the philosophy of 
consciousness, and is dependent on an inadequate sense of subjectivity.
70colonialism, and in particular colonial development, as a “domestication of foreign 
lands and peoples”.31 In this domestication, “what was once intrinsic or peculiar to a 
territory” is deterritorialized, thereby “placing it within the universal flow of the global 
economy”.32 
The laws of economic development
From the conception of economy as a distinct domain of interaction, receiving 
its motive force from self-interest as invariable human nature, it was then possible to 
investigate this domain scientifically, in order to determine the laws governing it. For 
Smith, these had to do with investment and rates of profit, and the determination of 
value by labour and exchange. What is not found in Smith’s analysis, and would not 
become a definitive aspect of economic theory until the advent of neoclassical 
economics in the late 19th century, was the unifying role played by the concept of 
scarcity in economic analysis.33 This was because the political economists, like their 
predecessors, focussed primarily on production and distribution, rather than on 
consumption:
The Classicals perceived rarity to be an aberration: if goods can be produced—i.e., 
created—then there is no inherent scarcity of them....scarcity may play a role [in 
prices] in the short-run (when quantities are fixed), but not in the long-run.34
31. Ibid., pg. 131.
32. Ibid., pg. 152.
33. One suggestion about how to understand the difference between classical economics and 
neoclassical economics is found in the Preface to the 2nd edition (1879) of William Stanley 
Jevons’ (1835-1882) Theory of Political Economy, where he refers to Mill’s statement on 
value: “John Stuart Mill tells us explicitly that ‘The value of a thing means the quantity of 
some other thing, or of things in general, which it exchanges for.’ It might of course be 
explained that Mill did not intend what he said; but as the statement stands it makes value 
into a thing, and is just as philosophic as if one were to say, ‘Right Ascension means the 
planet Mars, or planets in general’.” (pp. xi-xii). Whereas the classical economists sought to 
identify value with the concrete direct and indirect labour required to produce a good, the 
neoclassical economists turned this into a purely formal relationship of the subjective 
perception of scarcity or, as Jevons says, “a Calculus of Pleasure and Pain” (pg. vi). (W. 
Stanley Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy, 5th ed., Ibis, Charlottesville, 1931).
34. “Phases of the Marginalist Revolution” at <http://homepage.newschool.edu/het.essays/
margrev/phases.htm> on 14 March 2003.
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situations in which available resources might fall short of the requirements for 
subsistence. Indeed, this was the issue that Malthus sought to address. What did not 
enter into the classical conception of economy was the notion that consumption itself 
determined value, and that this was predicated on the notion of subjective scarcity. That 
is, consumption was taken to be a given.35 There was a level of subsistence (perhaps 
including status goods) necessary such that labourers would be able to work, but 
because there was always a surplus population, wages could not for long rise above this 
level.36
Production, however, could vary and thus more could always be produced, 
depending on the rate of profit. As well, this determined how income was distributed 
(as profits, rent and wages) between the three “factors” of production (capital, land and 
labour) or, equivalently, the three classes (merchants or capitalists, landowners and the 
working class). Smith did not, of course, live to see the advent of full-scale 
industrialization and the attendant immiseration this caused, which gave rise to the 
“social question” of poverty or surplus population, i.e., the state of affairs in which the 
conditions of the rural and urban poor and unemployed deteriorated to such an extent 
that revolution threatened and on occasion erupted. This phenomenon was prevalent 
throughout much of the 19th century. The conditions responsible were what elicited the 
positivist doctrine of development.
35. See Louis Lefeber, “Classical vs. Neoclassical Economic Thought in Historical 
Perspective: The Interpretation of Processes of Economic Growth and Development”, 
History of Political Thought, vol. XXI, no. 3, 2000, pg. 531.
36. Cf. ibid., pp. 525-542.
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The Franco-British tradition of political economy, in analytically isolating 
economic behaviour as an object of investigation, took it to conform to universal and 
immutable laws, the discovery of which was the task of economics. In this approach the 
principles of economic behaviour were abstracted from the specific socio-historical 
contexts in which they were discovered, so as to be able to make economics into a 
science. Historicist economists objected that this turned economics into the 
investigation of abstract and ideal, rather than concrete and actual, behaviour. Because 
it was essentially formal and deductive (despite attempts to use empirical data in the 
analyses), it was unsuitable for determining economic policy. As Schmoller 
commented,
Once abstract economics had achieved a great system, its source of power dried up 
because it volatilized its results too much into abstract schemes, which no longer 
had any connection to reality.37
As a policy science rather than a purely theoretical science, argued the historicists, 
economics had to take into account the meaning or significance of different economic 
conditions and policy choices, as well as the significance of the outcomes of those 
choices in their specific contexts. Such choices and outcomes in turn affect the meaning 
of conditions. Meaning was central, in terms of both how economists understood 
conditions, policies, etc., and how those involved in them did, because economic 
interaction was not seen as given, mechanistically conforming to general laws, but as 
activity engaged in because of the significance of the actions involved and the intent of 
policy.
37. Gustav von Schmoller, “Zur Methodologie der Staats- und Sozial-Wissenschaften”, 
Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 7, no. 3, 1883, pg. 97 (quoted in Markus Haller, “Mixing 
economics and ethics: Carl Menger vs. Gustav von Schmoller, Social Science Information, 
vol. 4, no. 3, 2004, pg. 8).
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state regulation does or does not harmonize with the general economic laws discovered 
to govern civil society.38 Where policies conflict with these laws, the resulting 
economic behaviour is “inefficient” or, worse, such policies become a means by which 
special interests (such as landowners or businesspeople) are able to distort markets to 
their own benefit. For example, Smith’s argument was that self-regulation of economic 
interaction was more efficient, and that interference by the state could not make it more 
productive, but could make it less so (cf. WN IV pp. 30, 94).
In particular, 19th century German economists criticized positivist economics 
on the grounds that it was an attempt to universalize the specific economic conditions 
that obtained in an industrialized society such as Britain, whereas the economic 
conditions in Germany (and other countries) were quite different.39 Economists in 
Britain might be concerned with how policies should be brought into conformity with 
the actual conditions of industrial production and the need for foreign trade; the 
problem in Germany was how to industrialize in the first place. The solution to this 
problem was not to be found by abstraction from the historical experience of Britain (or 
any other country), because it depended upon the specific historical conditions in 
Germany, which included the existence of an already industrialized and international 
trade-dominating Britain. What Germany required, historicist economists argued, was 
creative and prospective policies in order to bring about non-existent conditions, not 
policies that reflected those conditions.40
38. Cf. Warren Samuels, “The Methodology of Economics and the Case for Policy Diffidence 
and Restraint” in Essays on the Methodology and Discourse of Economics, Macmillan, 
London, 1992, pp. 108-129.
39. Cf. Kahn, op. cit., pg. 238; Backhouse, op. cit., pg. 173.
74When economics in Germany was established as an academic discipline in 
1727, in the form of Cameralwissenschaft, it was policy science rather than political 
economy, largely because it was initially intended to train civil servants to be able to 
administer and increase government revenues. Because policy depended on 
understanding the conditions of the particular statelet, historical knowledge was 
considered to be essential. As Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, one of the mid-18th 
century Cameralists, wrote:
We should have a history from the earliest times in which the chief attention would 
be given to the origin of realms and states, to the efforts to found them and to bring 
them into a flourishing condition, to the principles of government in political, finan-
cial, and police affairs, to the attempts to cultivate and people the lands, to the 
causes of the growth and decay of realms and states, and especially to the govern-
mental mistakes which rulers and ministers have committed...In my opinion such a 
history, if it satisfied its purpose, would go far toward extending a knowledge of 
true governmental and financial principles upon which the happiness of peoples 
largely rests, and such a book could incidentally not fail to be useful to civic soci-
ety.41
Rather than exchange, the central focus of German economics up until at least the 
1930s was on production and administration. 
In order to understand these conflicting views, it is important to see them in 
their historical context. In the next section, I give a brief sketch of the social and 
political contexts and the academic circumstances in which they appeared in Britain, 
France and Germany.
40. This summary should not be taken to suggest that all German economists were of the 
historical school, nor that all British economists were positivists. Rather, it is meant to 
indicate the predominant tendencies in both countries. A further complication for this 
analysis is that there is a tendency to read positivist conceptions back into the historical 
economists, as found, for example, in Erich W. Streissler, “Rau, Hermann and Roscher: 
contributions of German economics around the middle of the nineteenth century”. 
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, vol. 8, no. 3, 2001, pp. 311-331. 
Streissler claims that “the German economists treated here developed the same 
framework...half a century before neoclassics proper, so that I have called their main 
‘paradigm’ the proto-neoclassical tradition...” (pg. 314).
41. Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, Gesammelte Politische und Finanzschriften über 
wichtige Gegenstände der Staatskunst, der Kriegswissenschaften und des Cameral- und 
Finanzwesens, Bd. I, 1761, quoted in Albion Small, The Cameralists, Batoche Books, 
Kitchener, 2001 [1909], pg. 387.
75The Historical Context of Economics
Europe in the 18th century
Throughout the 18th century, Britain experienced political stability and 
increasing wealth, which resulted in a growing class of property owners whose political 
power had increased in relation to the sovereign. This was the result of a number of 
factors. The 17th century had seen the end of full-scale military conflict on British 
soil—from the 18th century onward Britain’s wars were fought overseas—and the Act 
of Settlement in 1701 established the rights of Parliament and the independence of the 
judiciary. Agriculture continued to be transformed into a capitalist enterprise through 
acts of enclosure.42 British colonialism and domination of international trade became 
supreme after the Colonial Wars with France (1754-63), and this lent support to 
“mercantilist” policies such as protection of industries, laws against advanced 
manufacturing in the colonies, the Corn Laws that restricted the import of various 
grains, and the Navigation Acts that
required trade between the colonies and Great Britain to be carried on in British 
ships, while certain classes of commodities were to be confined initially to the mar-
ket of the mother country.43
Such policies not only benefited Britain’s balance of trade with its colonies (the most 
egregious case being that of India),44 but also favoured certain British enterprises, such 
as agricultural entrepreneurs and textile manufacturers. Furthermore, they kept prices 
for consumers high.
The political and economic conditions in Britain were in sharp contrast to 
those in the rest of Europe in the 18th century, which was a century of continental war. 
42. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, pg. 30.
43. Andrew Skinner, “Introduction” to Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations Books IV-V, ed. A. 
Skinner, Penguin Books, London, 1999, pg. xxxiv.
44. Cf. Frédéric F. Clairmont, The Rise and Fall of Economic Liberalism, Southbound/Third 
World Network, Penang, 1996, ch. 3; Cowen and Shenton, DoD 42-56.
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constant territorial losses and gains, owing in part to their shifting alliances with the 
various major powers. At the end of the Seven Years War in 1763, Prussia had emerged 
as a significant political entity, but a large number of sovereign political entities still 
existed, and conflict with Austria over leadership in the German “nation” remained a 
problem until the late 19th century. France, although it remained territorially integrated, 
lost many of its colonies in the Colonial Wars. The economic factors that contributed to 
the outcomes of these conflicts (such as financial dependency on other states and the 
lack of resources to continue the conflict), and their economic consequences (such as 
British international trade supremacy), were a significant influence on the economic 
thinkers of the time.
Economic inquiry in the German statelets reflected these political 
uncertainties. The Cameralists, as we will see below, were primarily concerned with the 
importance of policy in increasing the power of the principality. Power depended on 
production in order to generate revenue for military expenditure, and thus also on 
maintaining the well-being of the ruler’s subjects. This was distinct from the issue of 
politics, which concerned external relations with other political entities. Although 
politics might enter into considerations of what was economically feasible, for example, 
restrictions on trade, the fundamental economic issues had to do with the administration 
of policy and policy reforms that would contribute to material well-being.
French and British economic inquiry in the 18th century came to focus on the 
relationship between government and economy, or state and market. In France, which 
was still an absolute monarchy, the Physiocrats (chiefly Quesnay and Mirabeau) 
attacked state interference that created distortions in the market, although they also 
recognized that markets needed the state in order to function. These thinkers argued that 
77economic production was based on agricultural production, because only agriculture 
produced a surplus. For this reason, economic behaviour was understood to be 
essentially governed by the laws of nature, which thus constrained the activity of the 
state. Turgot, on the other hand, argued that policies restricting trade and commerce 
contradicted the principle that individuals know their own interests better than do 
others. Freedom in commerce would benefit competition, leading to advances in 
manufacturing and lower prices.45
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers such as Hume and Smith also questioned the 
effect of such policies. Their economic inquiries were scientifically oriented, but unlike 
their French counterparts, they were also historically oriented, and a fundamental 
concern was with the scientific explanation of social change. The idea of stages of 
history was a common theme, understood in terms of progress or improvement.46 This 
involved a view of human nature as both universal and yet self-determining. Through 
our own actions, they argued, conditions could be changed, thus changing behaviour.47 
From their scientific perspective, however, these thinkers sought to explain economic 
behaviour by determining the motivations for individual human behaviour. The 
predominant view was that self-interest or “self-love”, as Adam Smith put it (WN I ii, 
pg. 119), was the fundamental motivation.48 The classical liberalism of the 18th century 
was based on the idea of atomistic individuals, driven by innate passions or interests, 
and motivated by gain.49 On this basis, classical liberals argued, the drive to satisfy 
45. Cf. Backhouse, op. cit., pp. 101-5.
46. Ibid., pg. 111.
47. Ibid.
48. Although Smith himself maintained, like his teacher Hutcheson, that human beings are also 
motivated by “fellow feeling”, he “criticized Hutcheson for failing to give due weight to 
man’s selfish propensities” (Andrew Skinner, “Introduction” to Adam Smith, The Wealth of 
Nations I-III, ed. A. Skinner, Penguin Books, London, 1986, pg. 21). In WN, Smith’s 
economic analyses concern only the “selfish propensities” (e.g., WN I ii pg. 119).
49. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, pp. 286-7.
78wants itself produced a social order more natural than those inherited from tradition, 
and also led to greater material well-being.50
The classical liberal concern, then, was the relation between state power and 
individual liberty, whether the latter was understood as involving insatiable appetites 
(as with Hobbes) or the appropriation of nature through labour (Locke). In economic 
terms, this became a question of whether the state benefited or harmed individual 
interests by interfering in economic behaviour (e.g., restrictions on property or 
profession) and its conditions (e.g., mercantilist policies such as restrictions on foreign 
trade). This concern also presupposed a condition that was lacking in Germany, namely, 
a central political authority with the power to interfere economically, yet separate from 
civil society. 
Economics as an academic discipline: Germany and Britain
The difference in approaches to economic thinking, and how the object-
domain was conceived, was also a consequence of the institutionalization of the 
discipline, both in the academic context and with respect to the organs of government or 
administration. Fourcade-Gourinchas argues that economic doctrines produced in 
different countries owed much to the status that economists had, and suggests that “the 
twin questions of ‘who is an economist’ and ‘what economic knowledge is’ in different 
societies are more deeply intertwined than is usually acknowledged”.51
German economics has a long academic history,52 although the appearance of a 
German tradition in economic inquiry came later than in other European nations.53 The 
50. Ibid., pg. 289.
51. Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas, “Politics, institutional structures, and the rise of economics: 
A comparative study”, Theory and Society, vol. 30, 2001, pg. 400.
52. The first academic chair for an economist in Germany was established at the University of 
Halle, in 1727 (Tribe, “Cameralism”, op. cit., pg. 263).
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skilled administrators, and thus the range of topics included in the discipline was 
extensive.54 Cameralist concern with the management of production, population, 
finance and trade had the aim of “do[ing] everything to augment the productive 
activities of the ruler’s subjects, in this way paving the way for their enhanced 
happiness and the ruler’s income”.55 Thus, the orientation and principal interest was not 
abstract and theoretical, but concrete and practical.
In the United Kingdom, in contrast, academics were only appointed to 
positions in economics in the 19th century, Malthus at the East India College in 1805 
being the first. Economic discourse thus came from government officials, businessmen, 
and other intellectuals, rather than from academic economists. Even in the 19th century, 
education in political economy was not highly regarded either by business and industry 
or by the Civil Service.56 Political economy was practised largely outside of academic 
institutions.
The field was organized around popular reviews, on the one hand, and learned soci-
eties and clubs, on the other...Pamphlets and newspapers remained one of the most 
privileged forms of communication on the subject of economics until the late part of 
the nineteenth century; serious economic debates took place in non-specialized and 
popular settings...57
Only towards the end of the century did academics begin to dominate economic 
discourse.
53. Cf. Erik S. Reinert, “A Brief Introduction to Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff (1626-1692)”, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 19, 2005, pp. 221-230. This tradition only 
appeared after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, whereas the Italian and French economic 
traditions began in the late 16th century, and the British tradition in the mid-16th century.
54. Cf. Andre Wakefield, “Books, Bureaus, and the Historiography of Cameralism”, European 
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 19, 2005, pp. 311-320.
55. Tribe, “Cameralism”, op. cit., pg. 272.
56. Fourcade-Gourinchas, op. cit., pg. 411.
57. Ibid. Cf. also Tribe, Historical Schools of Economics, op. cit., pg. 4.
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Most 19th century German economists were critical of classical political 
economy, both for its deductivism and for its assumptions about human nature.58 They 
rejected the “Ricardian vice” of the exclusive use of deductive method, and although 
they did not deny that self-interest was a motivation of action, they questioned the idea 
that such a motivation was analytically determinative for economic understanding, 
independently of specific historical and social circumstances. They viewed “the 
theories of classical political economy as both a product of the circumstances which 
generated them, and, hence, inapplicable elsewhere”.59 This was due to the political, 
economic and intellectual situations of Germany in the 19th century.
Even under the German Empire, power had been vested primarily in the 
statelets (principalities and kingdoms) that constituted it, rather than in the emperor. 
With Napoleon’s re-organization of Europe, and the defeat of Prussia in 1806, there was 
no longer in any sense a unified German state. This contrasted markedly with both 
France, unified territorially in the 15th century, and Britain, in the 17th century. At the 
beginning of the 19th century “Germany” (i.e., the German-speaking people) was a 
multitude of political entities of varying size, and with divergent allegiances. For 
example, when the post-Napoleonic Germanic Confederation was established in 1815 it 
had 39 members, composed of numerous duchies, grand duchies, principalities, free 
cities, parts of five kingdoms, and part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Thus, the form 
of German national consciousness was quite different from the consciousness of 
political nationhood that existed in France and Britain, and of necessity focussed on 
58. Kahn, op. cit., pg. 237.
59. Ibid., pg. 238.
81culture rather than on a territorially defined polity.60 For the German-speaking people, 
the concept of the national was itself a question.
Thus, the German state in the 19th century has to be seen as a project in the 
making. The question of whether this was to include Austria or not was only resolved 
(in the negative) by the establishment of Prussian hegemony through its victories in 
wars engineered by Bismarck over Denmark in 1864, the German Confederation in 
1866, and France in 1871.61 Between 1815 and 1871 the project of unification was 
volatile, as a result of both internal and external factors. Internally, various German 
lands were affected by revolutionary movements in the 1830s and in 1848, as was the 
rest of Europe. The 1848 revolution led to an attempt at unification by a Constituent 
National Assembly, but conflict between liberals, democrats and conservatives was 
resolved in the favour of the latter. Nevertheless, the German Customs Union 
(Zollverein) led by Prussia was established in 1834, which provided for economic 
harmonization between a number of the German lands. This was united with the 
Steuerverein in central Germany between 1852-54, thus economically harmonizing 
what was to become the Second German Reich.
Externally, unification was complicated by the interests of the other major 
European powers, namely Britain, Russia, and France, who saw the establishment of a 
unified German state as a threat to the balance of power system that had been 
established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. France, in particular, was wary of the 
establishment of a state on the European continent of comparable strength to her own.
60. Heide Barmeyer, “German National Thinking and the Building of a Modern National State 
in Germany in the 19th Century”, in Nations and Nationalities in Historical Perspective, 
hrsg. von Gudmunder Halfdanarson und Ann Katherine Isaacs, Edizioni Plus, Pisa, 2001, 
pg. 44.
61. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, op. cit., pp. 89-92.
82The French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars had “destroyed ancient 
institutions, created new states, and challenged old assumptions”.62 Reinforced by the 
economic and social changes brought about by industrialization, this occasioned an 
acute historical consciousness that was reflected in the various scholarly activities 
aimed at preserving the past.
Surely this widespread need to preserve and understand the past was connected with 
the feeling among people that they had entered an age in which, as Alexis de Toc-
queville wrote, “the woof of time is ever being broken and the track of past genera-
tions lost.”63
Many economists in Germany thus viewed their discipline in historical terms. Wilhelm 
Roscher, considered to be the founder of the Older Historical School, had been a 
student of Ranke, and had trained as a historian.
German economics in this period for the most part belongs to what Erik 
Reinert and Arno Daastøl have called the “Renaissance” or “Other Canon” of 
economics, which began to be systematized in the Renaissance with the recognition of 
humanity as creative and innovative.64 In contrast to the contemporary canon of 
“classical/neo-classical mainstream theory”, it is “dynamic and production-centered” 
rather than “mechanistic and barter-centered”. Whereas the contemporary canon is a 
product of the Enlightenment and its “more materialistic understanding of human 
rationality and individuality”, for Renaissance thinkers these aspects of human being 
were “based on an image of man as a spiritual being: creative and productive”.65 
Creativity and productivity are taken to be the “fundamental cause of economic 
welfare”, which when combined with capital give rise to economic growth and 
development. In contrast, the contemporary canon holds that capital accumulation alone 
62. James J. Sheehan, “Foreword”, German Essays on History, ed. R. Sältzer, Continuum, New 
York, 1991, pg. xi.
63. Ibid.
64. Reinert and Daastøl, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
65. Ibid., pg. 4.
83is the cause of economic growth; economic development, however, remains mysterious, 
usually being attributed to technological innovation as a result of capital accumulation 
and exploitation of opportunities for gain.66
Unlike positivist economics, for which economic policy is a matter of 
politically bringing about conformity to economic “truths” for reasons of efficiency, 
historicist economics understands policy as essentially constructive, in the first place of 
economy, but ultimately of the state itself as holistic or as an organic unity.67 Both 
policy and economy itself are to be understood in terms of this end.68 The classical 
political economists observed institutions such as markets, banks, and organs of 
government; economic structures such as the differentiation between agriculture and 
industry; and the diverse economic roles of labourers, landholders, merchants and 
capitalists. They inferred from these that this system of economy was a spontaneous 
occurrence resulting from general laws of economic interaction, which would 
inevitably appear unless prevented by policy, and that this spontaneously occurring 
system was governed by its own order. Historicist economists, in contrast, observed the 
absence of such institutions, structures, and roles in the polities they inhabited, and 
inferred that these were human creations rather than spontaneous occurrences, which 
required policy to bring them into existence:
Renaissance economics emphasises the crucial role of nation-states and the duties 
of ‘the ruler’—i.e. government—not only to regulate in order to provide incentives 
for the creation of welfare (in the ancient tradition of law and economics), but also 
the duty of ‘the ruler’ to initiate projects creating a demand for knowledge-based 
production.
66. “Still today, a fundamental and unresolved problem of standard economic theory is to how 
deal with novelty” (ibid., pg. 28).
67. See also Michael Hutter, “Organism as a metaphor in German economic thought”, in P. 
Mirowski, ed., Natural images in economic thought, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1994, ch. 11.
68. The central role given to economic policy is one of the factors responsible for the 
disappearance of historicist economics. Reinert and Daastøl argue that “the absence of the 
History of Economic Policy as a branch of Economics is responsible for bringing the 
alternative canon into virtual oblivion” (Reinert and Daastøl, op. cit., pg. 4).
84An integral part of this nation-building strategy was a notion that a national market 
had to be created—that such a market did not appear spontaneously.69
The Historical Method
A standard criticism of the historicist economists, particularly of the German 
and English Historical Schools, is that they eschewed economic theory in favour of 
induction from empirical historical data.70 This suggested to critics that the historical 
economists simply failed to recognize that collection of historical data itself 
presupposed theory. In the words of one critic,
we ourselves consider that every economic historian, however stubborn be his con-
victions and genuine his intentions, does actually, though perhaps unconsciously, 
bring some guiding theory to the study and interpretation of facts, and that a careful 
inspection of works on economic history results generally, if not uniformly, in the 
discovery of the familiar outlines of the conceptions of traditional economic the-
ory.71
Such critics failed to recognize that historicist economists neither advocated the 
collection of facts in order to make inductive generalizations, nor did they argue against 
theory per se, but rather against the idea that there was a single theory that could 
account for all economic phenomena throughout history. What they were interested in 
was appropriate theory. As Cunningham observes about the marginalists,
it seems that recent English writers take a different view of the character of eco-
nomic theory. They seem to believe that economic theory, as now restated, is useful 
as a means of investigation in any time or place, and that it can never be considered 
as inappropriate.72
Cunningham agreed that such a universal theory can be applied to all phenomena, 
“because it is universal in form; any matter can be fitted into it”.73 That is, any social 
interaction can be approached as if it were an exchange transaction, and by the use of 
69. Reinert and Daastøl, op. cit., pg. 5.
70. Helge Peukert, “The Schmoller Renaissance”, History of Political Economy, vol. 33, no. 1, 
2001, pg. 71.
71. Quoted in William Cunningham, “Roscher’s Influence in England”, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 5, November 1894, pp. 327-328.
72. Ibid., pg. 330.
73. Ibid.
85some quantitative measurement, can be analysed in terms of utility-maximization.74 
However, this does not mean that such analysis is appropriate to the issue. Arguably, 
approaching many types of social interaction in this way construes them so as to 
eliminate the very meaning of the interaction involved.
But it is a mistake to suppose on this account that it necessarily affords a suitable 
instrument for the investigation of any particular group of phenomena, and that it is 
sure to be appropriate.75
For historicist economists, what was significant was that positivist economic 
theory presupposed certain motivations for economic behaviour, such as self-interest, 
and a certain social structure of economic interaction, i.e., atomistic individualism. At 
best, they argued, this could hold true only for some modern forms of economy. In other 
historical eras
the individual was not a very important organ of economic life; skill was cultivated, 
forethought was exhibited and enterprise was directed by groups and not by individ-
uals.76
If historical investigation showed this to be the case, then individualistic economic 
theory was unlikely to be able to explain the economic behaviour of such periods. And 
economic theory that presupposed the structure of a market economy, i.e., where all 
economic interactions were exchange transactions mediated by the price mechanism, 
would be inappropriate where that structure did not exist.77 Thus, the question of 
appropriate economic theory could not be analytically separated from the understanding 
of a society as a whole, which involves taking into account whatever information might 
be relevant:
74. This approach is found in some of the work of Gary Becker, for example (Backhouse, op. 
cit., pg. 311).
75. Cunningham, op. cit., pg. 330.
76. Ibid., pg. 332.
77. With regard to ancient societies, this argument is set out in Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. 
Arensberg and Harry W. Pearson, eds., Trade and market in the early empires; economies 
in history and theory, Free Press, Glencoe, 1957.
86The historical school was deeply steeped in the German tradition of embracing die 
Ganzheit—the whole. This search for die Ganzheit forced the historical school to 
cross the boundaries into what in the English tradition were other—and to them 
unrelated—academic disciplines. In the German historical tradition it would be 
complete nonsense to exclude any information relevant to the question asked—be it 
from the realm of climatology, pedagogy or any other branch of human knowledge. 
In the German tradition economics was a science that integrated all the others.78
Therefore, historicist economists argued that economic behaviour can only be 
understood in relation to the society in which it occurs. And understanding a society 
requires knowledge of its history. Wilhelm Roscher adverts to the importance of the 
historical constitution of a nation:
The nation is not merely the mass of individuals now living. He, therefore, who 
seeks to investigate the national economy, finds it impossible to satisfy himself with 
the observation of merely contemporary conditions.79
That is, historicist economics is neither Social Statics nor formal-deductive analysis of 
a theoretical economy. In order to understand an economy, we have to understand the 
significance of its institutions, types of behaviour, commodities produced, different 
kinds of labour involved, and so on. Because of this holistic, historical dimension, 
economic inquiry also had to be concerned with relationships between nations, both for 
methodological and substantive reasons.
The difficulty of picking out the essential and normal (das Gesetzmässige) from the 
great mass of phenomena makes it obligatory upon us to compare with one another, 
from the economic point of view, all nations of which we can learn anything. 
Indeed, the nations of the modern world are so entwined with one another that no 
fundamental treatment of one is possible without a treatment of all.80
Thus, another fundamental conception was that nations are interconnected, such that 
these interconnections are constitutive of national economies. There are many forms of 
economy, so that what is essential cannot simply be deduced from axioms; rather, we 
learn about ourselves from others. Such historical understanding was especially 
78. Reinert and Daastøl, op. cit., pg. 36.
79. Wilhelm Roscher, “Preface”, Outline of Lectures on Political Economy, following the 
Historical Method, in W.J. Ashley, “Roscher’s Programme of 1843”, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, vol. 9, no. 1, October 1894, pg. 101, emphasis added.
80. Ibid., pg. 102.
87important with respect to the role of economy in the task of nation-building.
Historicist economics was therefore at odds with classical political economy 
and its marginalist successor in two senses. First, it rejected the idea that economic 
theory could be universal, on the grounds that economic conditions and behaviour were 
context-dependent. Second, it rejected the “globalization” that the economic theory of 
liberal capitalism entailed. In reducing economic behaviour to the interaction of 
atomistic individuals, classical political economy could make no clear distinction 
between national economies. As Hobsbawm puts it, 
Liberalism was the anarchism of the bourgeoisie and, as in revolutionary anarchism, 
it had no place for the state. Or rather, the state as a factor in the economy existed 
only as something which interfered with the autonomous and self-acting operations 
of ‘the market’.81
Since according to historicist economics, the principles determined by 
economic inquiry are historically specific, whatever commonalities there might be 
between the conditions of different societies, such as the city-states of the Italian 
Renaissance and the German principalities of the 17th century, the principles of 
economy applicable depend on the particular characteristics of agriculture, education, 
industry, external politics, and so on. Once these are seen as integral to the development 
of productive forces through industrial policy, it becomes evident that such policy has 
to be contextual and specific for those conditions. Indeed, one of the aims of historicist 
economic inquiry was to determine how to transform the very conditions into which it 
inquires. This is clearly different from positivist economics, which seeks to describe the 
principles of political economy as self-contained or distinct, rather than involving 
transformation to any other form of economic system, even when these are recognized 
(as with Mill) to pertain only to one specific economic system (i.e., the system based on 
private property).
81. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, Abacus, London, 2001, pg. 40.
88Canonical cases
To illustrate some of the main themes found in historicist economics, I briefly 
examine four thinkers from this “Other Canon”, as articulated by Reinert and his 
colleagues. These themes are (i) the emphasis on the mutual implication of state and 
economy, (ii) knowledge and creativity as the motive force of social change, (iii) the 
ideal of the common weal or ethical state, and (iv) the hermeneutic aspects of the 
approach. A further theme, which becomes explicit in the texts from Roscher and 
Schmoller that I examine, is that the concept of the economic polity is one that is only 
ever partially specifiable. Unlike their positivist counterparts, the historicist economists 
recognized that the polity cannot be theorized in a determinate way, because it is 
dynamic. Thus, the historical method involves inquiry into different forms of economy 
that are historically available, in order to achieve an understanding of how state, 
economy and individual interact, and of the dynamic nature of the polity. Ultimately, as 
Roscher indicates, the point is not to prescribe practical rules (or, as in positivist 
economics, principles that determine economic behaviour), but to learn how to think 
practically, i.e., to think of the economic polity or ethical state as integrative and 
dynamic.
The Italian Renaissance: Antonio Serra
The 17th century Neapolitan, Antonio Serra (1580-1650), is an early advocate 
of the idea that economy depends on particular historical conditions.82 In Serra’s time, 
the Italian peninsula comprised a number of political entities, whose politics and 
82. Serra’s importance in this canon is due in part to his influence on List and Roscher. The 
Breve trattato has not, as yet, been translated into English. My analysis here draws on 
Sophus A. Reinert and Erik S. Reinert, “An Early National Innovation System: The Case of 
Antonio Serra’s 1613 Breve Trattato”, Institutions and Economic Development, vol. 1, no. 
3, 2003. See also Theodore A. Sumberg, “Antonio Serra: A Neglected Herald of the 
Acquisitive System”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 50, No. 3, July 
1991, pp. 365-373.
89commerce was subject to continuous interference by the powerful states of Europe. 
Nevertheless, the Venetian Republic managed to prosper because the monetary riches 
that accrued to Spain from its colonies in the Americas ended up in its hands.83 Serra’s 
Breve trattato of 1613 examines why this was so, and why Naples (then a Spanish 
Viceroyalty) was less prosperous. He argues that the accumulation of currency is a 
reflection of underlying economic conditions, not an independent cause of wealth. The 
question then is, what policies are necessary to produce wealth, which the inflow of 
currency would reflect?
According to Reinert and Reinert, “Serra clearly defines economics as an 
Erfahrungswissenschaft, a science based on experience rather than on a priori 
assumptions”.84 For this reason, he argued against the idea of a universal method, 
because the “subject changes across time and space”.85 In Serra’s analysis, the 
economic condition of Naples had to be understood in terms of production, but he sees 
this as part of a greater whole, namely the socio-political entity. For this reason, 
governance is a central issue, “as a mediator between theory and practice, between the 
governing effort and the various levels of abstraction”.86 Governance was one factor 
that determined the wealth of the state, others being the level of manufacturing, the 
productivity of the population, and the extent of trade. Such factors, Serra argued, 
unlike particular factors such as the presence of resources, are common to all kingdoms 
and are all interconnected.87 Nevertheless, he considered industry to be the most 
important, “on the grounds that it is only dependent on the labour of man”.88 He also 
83. Reinert and Reinert, op. cit., pg. 8.
84. Ibid., pg. 13.
85. Antonio Serra, Breve trattato, pg. 135, quoted in Reinert and Reinert, op. cit., pg. 15.
86. Reinert and Reinert, op. cit., pg. 16.
87. Ibid., pg. 17.
88. Ibid., pg. 20.
90argues that industry, unlike agriculture, exhibits increasing returns to scale and the 
possibility of diversification.89 Through diversification into numerous trades, the 
wealth of the nation would be greatly increased by utilizing labour as fully as possible. 
Diversification in manufactures is, as Reinert and Reinert point out, “highly activity-
specific” rather than simply involving production in general.90 It therefore requires 
attention to the qualitative differentiation of labour, rather than to the quantitative 
equivalence of all labour.91
The analyses of classical political economy, in contrast, depend on such 
quantitative equivalence, because value is determined in exchange and what is 
ultimately exchanged is the labour involved in the production of the commodities 
exchanged. Labour itself is also conceived as an exchange transaction: “It was not by 
gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally 
purchased.”92 A pure labour theory of value cannot differentiate between types of 
labour and the improvement in production that comes from innovation. As a result, 
“knowledge and innovation lose all meaning”.93 
The qualitative aspect of labour also comes to the fore in Serra’s notion that 
manufacturing and trade mutually reinforce one another. The diversity of manufactures 
and the qualitative diversity of the labour involved in their production encourages 
people to come to the manufacturing centre, which increases the trade of the region. 
89. Ibid. Dependence on this abstraction has also made it extremely difficult for positivist 
economics to take increasing returns to scale into account, because it cannot be easily 
incorporated into the mathematical—i.e., quantitative—modelling that has come to 
dominate this approach. Cf. Paul Krugman, Development, Geography and Economic 
Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1995.
90. Ibid., pg. 21.
91. Scott Meikle has argued that this is the meaning of Marx’s analysis of “abstract labour” 
(Scott Meikle, “Was Marx an Economist?” at <www.psa.ac.uk/cps/1994.htm> on 14 May 
2005).
92. Smith, WN I ii., pg. 133.
93. Reinert and Reinert, op. cit., pg. 22.
91Increased trade encourages further diversification in manufactures as well as other 
occupations involved in trade, thus bringing more people to the region. This is Serra’s 
“second great innovation[] in the history of economic analysis—the idea of cumulative 
causation”.94 Another key element was the role of government, which through prudent 
policies could encourage the development and growth of manufacturing and trade. This, 
Serra argued, was how Venice had managed to become so wealthy, whereas Naples had 
not.
The significance of Serra’s text, then, is the active and dynamic sense of 
economic and social development it presents. Properly directed diversification in 
manufacturing would result in increasing returns to scale, and cumulative or network 
effects, as it would attract foreign merchants, skilled labourers, etc., thereby increasing 
the productive capabilities of the state and so its revenue generation. To do this 
effectively, however, requires fostering innovation and knowledge, in order to 
determine which manufactures to diversify into and how to do so. As it is unlikely that 
such innovation and knowledge would just spontaneously appear, the state needs to 
play an active role. Furthermore, the determination of such advantages depends on 
knowledge of the specific historical conditions of the state, i.e., where its strengths and 
weaknesses are, in terms of its institutions (education, for example) and its relations to 
other states. State policies thus need to be informed by the historical context.
Cameralism: Von Seckendorff
The Cameralists were a group of academics and governmental advisors in 
17th- and 18th-century Germany (and to some extent in Austria), whose interests and 
inquiries were about how best to obtain the revenues necessary to ensure the survival of 
94. Ibid., pg. 27.
92the state. The state in question was the German principality, or more accurately, the 
principality in which the particular Cameralist worked, since their activities involved 
advising the prince. The Cameralists were skeptical of both the Physiocrats’ insistence 
on the primacy of agriculture,95 and (later) of the classical liberal economists’ 
insistence that man’s fundamental nature was to exchange.96 “[T]he aim of all 
cameralist activity was directed towards Man(kind) and his needs”,97 and they 
recognized that the urban economic activity of manufacturing was central in providing 
for those needs.
Cameralist thinking arose after the Thirty Years War, in which a large number 
of people were killed (anywhere from 1/3 to 2/3 of the population of the German 
Empire) and the means of subsistence were largely destroyed.98 The Peace of 
Westphalia (1648) resulted in the virtual dissolution of the German Empire into more 
than 300 sovereign statelets, which continued to suffer from economic and social 
disorder. The task of the princes was to rebuild their lands, but because large-scale 
armed conflict was a recurrent state of affairs in Europe until the beginning of the 19th 
century, these statelets were constantly under threat.
To assure survival, these small states, each headed by an aristocrat, developed 
strong bureaucracies, run by officials trained in all aspects of statecraft.
The object of this homegrown political science was to teach government officials 
“how to preserve and increase the general means” of the state.99 
The task facing the Cameralist thinkers, then, was to determine the practical aspects of 
95. Erik S. Reinert, “Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717-1771): The Life and Times of an 
Economist Adventurer”, The Other Canon Foundation as <www.theothercanon.org> on 10 
April 2005, pg. 23.
96. Erik S. Reinert, “German Economics as Development Economics: From the Thirty Years 
War to World War II”, How Rich nations got Rich, Centre for Development and the 
Environment, University of Oslo, pg. 4.
97. Reinert, “Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi”, op. cit., pg. 29.
98. Reinert, “Brief Introduction”, op. cit., pp. 222-223.
99. Nicholas W. Balabkins, “The Past as Prologue: An Economist’s Tentative Prognosis for the 
New Millennium”, European Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 12, 2001, pg. 124. The 
quoted text is from Small, op. cit.
93economic management and administration that would ensure the survival of the 
principality in the face of such conditions. Reinert argues that
Cameralism can...not be properly understood outside this context of a simultaneous 
reconstruction of a civilized society and of what would today be called ‘failed 
states’, states where economic life and basic institutions had to be built, virtually 
from scratch.100
The first book in the Cameralist tradition, von Seckendorff’s The German 
Principality, appeared in 1656. It addresses the issue of effective policies for 
developing the principality. Although the rulers of such principalities were seen as 
quasi-absolute,101 this did not mean that they were free from obligation. Echoing the 
Italian Renaissance concept of the “common weal”, the Cameralists’ aim was to 
“convince the kings and rulers that their right to rule a state country also entails a duty 
to develop the same state”.102 The policy prescriptions von Seckendorff sets out include 
the promotion of manufactures and the resettlement of artisans from the countryside 
in the cities, where they were likely to make much better livings...the extension of 
agriculture and activities adding value to the produce of the land [and] eas[ing] the 
mobility of labour by eliminating fees required for settlement and resettlement.103
In order for policy to be effective, it had to address the existing conditions of the 
principality. Hence, the first requirement was an accurate description of those 
conditions. Thus, von Seckendorff outlines the characteristics that need to be 
determined, which include the history, geography, agricultural productivity, make-up of 
the population, and bureaucracy of the principality.104
The Older Historical School: Wilhelm Roscher’s Historical Method
Wilhelm Roscher (1817-1894) is generally considered to be the founder of the 
historical school of economics in Germany.105 In his programme for historical 
100. Reinert, “German Economics as Development Economics”, op. cit., pg. 5.
101. Small, op. cit., pp.70-73.
102. Reinert, “German Economics as Development Economics”, op. cit., pg. 6.
103. Ibid., pg. 5.
104. Small, op. cit., pp. 68-69.
94economics, he argued that the question of how to further a nation’s wealth, although 
important, was not the main purpose, for this is “only a chrematistic, an art”, whereas 
“Political economy [Staatswirthschaft]...is also a political science, whose business it is 
to pass judgment on and rule over men”.106 It is a policy or administrative science, 
rather than a science of business. For this reason, he argues, its aim is 
the representation of what nations have thought, willed, and discovered in the eco-
nomic field, what they have striven after and attained, why they have striven after 
and why they have attained it.107
Alongside institutional structures and forms of economic management, then, it is also 
important to understand causes and reasons. Such understanding can only be acquired 
through comprehensive knowledge of “national life”, especially historical knowledge, 
because “[t]he nation is not merely the mass of individuals now living”. Nations, 
Roscher argues, are not constituted by “merely contemporary conditions”.108 The idea 
that economic behaviour is mechanistic and therefore can be analysed as it is at any 
given instant simply fails to understand the object of the inquiry. 
A further consideration is “[t]he difficulty of picking out the essential and 
normal from the great mass of phenomena”.109 However, investigation of other nations 
and other eras can provide some idea of what may be important. For this reason, “[t]he 
historical method will not be quick either to praise or blame any economic institution 
absolutely”;110 their benefits or drawbacks are always contextual. The ultimate aim of 
this science “is the doctrine of the laws of development of the national economy”,111 
i.e., not how an economic system regulates itself, but how such systems come about.
105. W.J. Ashley, “Roscher’s Programme of 1843”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 9, 
no. 1, 1894, pg. 99.
106. Ibid., pg. 101.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid., pg. 102.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid., pg. 104.
95Roscher’s View of Political Economy
In his System der Volkswirtschaft, Roscher compares the different systems of 
political economy, which he has previously defined as “the science which has to do 
with the laws of the development of the economy of a nation, or with its economic 
national life”.112 He begins by commenting on the obsolescence of the “theological 
method” of the middle ages and the “juridical method of the seventeenth century”.113 
He then considers whether political economy is susceptible to “a mathematical mode of 
treatment” involving “only a formal principle”, rather than “the matter of the 
science”.114 A mathematical mode of treatment could be regarded as appropriate, since 
political economy, like mathematics, “swarms with abstractions”.115 Given that 
economic interactions are mediated by prices, they involve magnitudes and their 
relations, and thus are subject to calculation.116 However, the complexities of “national 
life” and the nature of what is inquired about make such a treatement impossible, for 
there are non-economic motivations for interactions as well (i.e., motivations that are 
not self-interest):
For, most assuredly, as our science has to do with men, it must take them and treat 
them as they actually are, moved at once by very different and non-economic 
motives, belonging to an entirely definite people, stage, etc.117
Abstraction may be a useful and indeed necessary heuristic, but economics, for 
Roscher, is about human behaviour as it actually is, and thus must be concrete, even in 
112. Wilhelm Roscher, Principles of Political Economy, trans. J.J. Lalor, Henry Holt & Co., 
New York, 1878, pg. 87.
113. Ibid., pg. 102.
114. Ibid., pp. 102-103.
115. Ibid., pg. 103.
116. A view that was expressed by marginalists such as Jevons. Cf. William Stanley Jevons, 
“Brief Account of a General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy”, Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, London, XXIX, 1866, pg. 282, at <http://
www.economics.mcmaster.ca/ugcm/3ll3/jevons/mathem.txt> on 12 April 2005, and The 
Theory of Political Economy, op. cit., pp. vii, xxi-xxxi, 7-12.
117. Ibid., pg. 104.
96its theory. Thus, “not only in the transition to practice, but even in finished theory, we 
must turn to the infinite variety of real life”.118 Furthermore, inquiry into “national or 
social life” must keep distinct two main questions, namely (i) What is? and (ii) What 
should be? The contrast between these questions illuminates the distinction between the 
“(realistic) hysiological or historical, and the idealistic methods”.119 Most political 
economists, however, conflate the two.
The Idealistic Method
Commenting on Mill’s postulated harmonizing of deductive and inductive 
explanations, the first method which obtains principles, and the second method which 
confirms them, Roscher argues that what also has to be taken into account is that 
“[e]ven the deductive explanation of economic facts is based on observation, namely, 
on the self-observation of the person accounting for them”.120 There is always a need 
for interpretation or hermeneutic re-living, even in deducing principles; such re-living 
takes into account the context in which the economist deduces principles. This means 
that the provisional nature of every explanation must be recognized. The variety of 
theories about what is economically desirable can be seen as due to context, such that 
“ideal descriptions...depart very little from the real conditions of the public economy 
(of the state, law, etc.) surrounding their authors”.121
However, different people, as a result of “the growth of generations...may 
require different institutions”,122 depending on how their wants change. This leads 
Roscher to suggest that there is a dynamic of “periods of repose and of crisis” in the 
118. Ibid., pg. 105.
119. Ibid., pg. 106.
120. Ibid., pg. 106 n. 11.
121. Ibid., pg. 107.
122. Ibid., pg. 108.
97struggle between generations, whereby institutional change is resisted or enacted, as a 
conflict between “existing forms” and “the real substance of things”.123 This conflict 
can be effected either through reform or revolution, but the latter is “an enormous 
evil”,124 since it is injurious to morals and encourages “infringement of the law”.125 
Roscher suggests that it is better to take “Time” as a model, “whose reforms are the 
surest and most irresistible, but, at the same time...so gradual that they cannot be seen or 
observed at any one moment”.126 Carrying out reform requires (i) a constitution that is 
open “both to the disappearing institutions of the past and to the coming institutions of 
the future”; and (ii) “moral control of themselves” by “all classes of people” so that 
only “legal ways” of change are used.127 Only in this way, Roscher argues, can “two of 
the greatest and apparently most contradictory wants of every legal or moral person” be 
satisfied, namely, “the want of uninterrupted continuity and that of free 
development”.128
The recognition that institutional change is generational acknowledges that 
laws and institutions are “made for the people”, not vice versa, and therefore “[t]heir 
mutability is...by no means such an evil as mankind should endeavour to remove”.129 
As long as the transformation is in accord with how people and their wants have 
changed, it is good and desirable. For this reason, Roscher argues that different 
economic systems can be equally right, given their different particular historical 
contexts, and “the only error would be, if they should claim to be universally 
applicable”.130 This explicitly historicist notion is implicitly directed against the 
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.




129. Ibid., pg. 110.
98positivist notion of progressive development, in which capitalism is presented as 
superior to previous economic forms and thus bound to supersede them. The positivist 
identity of development with progress fails to take different historical contexts into 
account, which Roscher suggests is due to the exclusion of the concrete in favour of the 
abstract deduction of principles. The historical method requires comparative work, such 
that a typology of all the ideal systems can be determined, and also a sensitivity for the 
contemporary which is difficult to acquire.
The Historical Method
Roscher’s historical method rejects the “construction of such ideal systems” 
that is characteristic of positivist economics, and asks for concrete empirical inquiry 
instead:
Our aim is simply to describe man’s economic nature and economic wants, to inves-
tigate the laws and the character of the institutions which are adapted to the satisfac-
tion of these wants, and the greater or less amount of success by which they have 
been attended.131
Yet this approach is not relativistic, Roscher argues, since it recognizes that there are 
“natural laws of Political Economy”.132 Furthermore, the historical method also 
mitigates the alleged superiority of the present or of more advanced civilizations, 
because it explicitly recognizes development, although as specific rather than universal. 
Economic and institutional forms can be compared, but only when “based on a correct 
view of the peculiar course of development followed by the people in question”.133 Not 
only must it be recognized that different stages (immaturity, decline) are less perfect, 
but also that “it is a matter of the greatest difficulty, accurately to determine the 
culminating point of a people’s civilization”.134 Roscher himself believes in continual 
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid., pg. 111.
132. Ibid., pg. 113.
133. Ibid., pg. 114.
99progress, yet recognizes that there can be “pauses” and “retrogressions”, and thus that 
progress is not simply linear, as the positivists suppose.135 Finally, he indicates that the 
purpose of his text is not to prescribe practical rules, “but to train our readers to be 
practical”,136 i.e., “to put our readers in a way to discover such rules of direction for 
themselves”.137 The discovery of such rules, however, depends on understanding why 
certain economic institutions came to be, and also on the self-understanding of the 
person inquiring.
With Roscher, then, we find a very different conception of the role of 
economic inquiry. First of all, it has to be a concrete inquiry, rather than an abstraction 
that imputes motives to economic agents and proceeds to construct theories on this 
basis. Second, it is hermeneutic, since it always involves the self-understanding of the 
economist. Third, there is an inherent motive force in the struggle between generations, 
as wants change over time and institutions fall behind. Thus, Roscher also recognizes 
that the subject has to be open to both the past and the future, if there is to be 
development with continuity. All institutions and laws have to be recognized as being 
provisional, rather than absolute, which means that economics provides no basis for the 
comparative evaluation of different economic forms.
The Younger Historical School: Gustav von Schmoller
In the late 19th century, the marginalist revolution in Britain, France and 
Austria brought about an increasingly formal-deductive approach to economic theory. 
In Germany, however, Gustav von Schmoller (1858-1917) and the “Younger Historical 
School” retained the focus on historical studies. Under Schmoller’s influence, German 
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid., pg. 115 n. 4.
136. Ibid., pg. 115.
137. Ibid., pg. 116.
100economics became increasingly historicist.138 Schmoller held a university chair in 
Berlin from 1882 until his death in 1917, and it was his influence that kept German 
economics much freer of the abstraction and formalism which characterized the 
neoclassical schools. Although he produced detailed historical studies of various 
aspects and areas in 17th- and 18th-century Germany, he did not manage to develop a 
coherent approach that harmonized such studies with his view of the ethical state. As 
Tribe describes it, “the Older School was programmatic but failed to realise their vision; 
while the Younger School executed the programme but lost the vision”.139 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Schmoller did not have a coherent research 
programme. Nau describes this as an attempt to synthesize idealist, positivist and 
historicist elements together as the basis for “an original economic doctrine” that
must be seen in the context of a comprehensive social theory linking an idealist 
statism with an ethical evolutionism against the background of a historicist world 
view. Schmoller wanted to force the competing idealist, positivist and historicist 
streams of thought and their influences among his contemporaries into a develop-
mental model that would harmonize the radical changes of his day.140
The Mercantile System and its Historical Significance
In his inquiry into the mercantile system, Schmoller argued that its 
fundamental importance was “the connection between economic life and the essential, 
controlling organs of social and political life”,141 i.e., how these were brought together 
138. Streissler argues that this constituted a “decided change of paradigm in German economics, 
a change from theoretical studies...towards implied social philosophy, social policy and 
mere historical fact-finding without theory” (op. cit., pg. 312). He argues that prior to this 
the paradigm of German economics was “proto-neoclassical”, anticipating much of what 
came to be attributed to the marginalists (Walras, Jevons and Menger). However, although 
some German economists, such as Rau and Hermann, were perhaps more inclined towards 
classical economics, Roscher, Knies and Hildebrand certainly advocated a historical 
approach.
139. Tribe, Historical Schools, op. cit., pg. 9.
140. Heino Heinrich Nau, “Gustav Schmoller’s Historico-Ethical Political Economy: ethics, 
politics and economics in the younger German Historical School, 1860-1917”, European 
Journal of the History of Economic Thought, vol. 7, no. 4, 2000, pg. 508.
141. Gustav Schmoller, The Mercantile System and its Historical Significance, The Macmillan 
Company, New York, 1910 [1884], pg. 2.
101in a coherent way. In making this claim, he was contesting the views of positivist 
economists that the mercantile system was fundamentally characterized by the failure to 
distinguish wealth from money, and that mercantilists thus advocated trade restrictions 
in the mistaken belief that this would make the nation wealthy.142 This evaluation of the 
mercantile system, Schmoller argued, like all judgments of a historical period, 
“necessarily involves a comparison of it with what preceded and what followed” and 
thus “our understanding of it as occupying a plan in some larger movement of economic 
evolution”.143
Like the historicist historians, then, Schmoller rejected the notion that 
explaining the mercantile system in terms of how it gave rise to the industrial era is the 
appropriate way to understand this particular historical era. Instead, he argued, it has to 
be seen in terms of its relation to political life, because although the political organ “is 
not the only factor that enters into the explanation of economic evolution”, it is the 
“fullest in meaning” and the most influential on “the various forms of economic 
organization”.144 In adverting to the political in this way, Schmoller suggests that this 
domain of life is more expressive of the characteristic of the era, certainly more so than 
social life if this is thought of simply in terms of the interaction of atomistic individuals. 
Thus, he explicitly rejects the account of mercantilism given by the positivist 
economists as “[t]he idea that economic life has ever been a process mainly dependent 
on individual action”, which is “based on the impression that it is concerned merely 
with methods of satisfying individual needs”.145
142. See for example, Adam Smith WN IV; Jean-Baptiste Say, A Treatise on Political Economy, 
ed. C.C. Biddle, trans. C.R. Prinsep, Claxton, Remsen and Hafelfinger, Philadelphia, 1880 
[1821], pp. 62-67; John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, op. cit., Bk. I, Ch. I at 
<http://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlP1.html> on 30 April 2005, PR.4-9.
143. Schmoller, op. cit., pg. 1.
144. Ibid., pg. 2.
145. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
102Although not clearly articulated, there seem to be two main ideas underlying 
Schmoller’s argument. First, he disagrees with the notion that state and economy are 
antagonistic, as found in political economy. Rather, he hearkens back to the Cameralist 
notion of their mutual implication, which, of course, was how it was understood in the 
mercantilist era, in Germany at least.146 As so implicated, the state can perform an 
integrative function, not only for the polity as a whole, but also for the individuals it 
comprises. But this is a process in which economy, too, is active. Second, he seems to 
suggest that individuals do not constitute the economy in the way that positivist 
economics presupposes, but rather that they are situated in it. Peukert has argued that 
for Schmoller
the great economic miracle was not the autonomous interplay of market forces but 
the cooperation of human beings in social institutions (which he calls Organe) with 
common values, languages, and so on.147
For these reasons, Schmoller concludes that mercantilism “in its innermost 
kernel...is nothing but state making...state making and national-economy making at the 
same time”.148 Thus, unlike the analyses of Smith, Say, and Mill, in which 
mercantilism tends to be identified with an erroneous doctrine about specie and trade, 
Schmoller argues that
The essence of the system lies...in the total transformation of society and its organi-
sation, as well as of the state and its institutions, in the replacing of a local and terri-
torial economic policy by that of a national state.149
The Idea of Justice in Political Economy
Schmoller’s text from 1881 articulates the idealist, ethical and hermeneutic 
aspects of his approach. His main concern is the just distribution of economic goods, 
146. Cf. Tribe, “Oeconomic History”, op. cit., pg. 589; 
147. Helge Peukert, “The Schmoller Renaissance”, op. cit., pg. 91. Peukert also argues that 
Schmoller had a Verstehen or hermeneutic research method (pg. 89).
148. Schmoller, op. cit., pg. 50.
149. Ibid., pg. 51.
103and he asks why it is that “economic transactions and social phenomena so often bring 
forth a favorable or adverse criticism which asserts that this is just, that unjust?”150 The 
justice of distribution, he argues, is “the proportionality of two opposite quantities, one 
of human beings and one of goods which are to be distributed” and it is an “ideal 
conception”. Judgments of justice in distribution are based on the “psychological 
processes” of “comparison, classifications and valuations”, and the comparison of these 
with an ideal. 
Judgment as to the just distribution of income, Schmoller argues, is the “only 
psychological basis from which all demands for the right of equality have arisen. It is 
the basis of all individualism.” Part of the psychological process has to do with the 
notion of a “moral community”; this is the basis of judgments about equality. 
Furthermore, these processes are social rather than individual: “every disposition of 
mind, every word, every idea, every conception...is the result not of an individual, but 
of a social process”. Such processes are constituted by convention, by traditions which 
are given form by “customs and existing law”. Thus, “[e]verywhere it is in the main 
traditional standards which govern our judgment”. Such traditional standards therefore 
provide the notion of equality.
However, “modern sentiments and ideals” can arise that conflict with 
traditional standards, and this conflict, Schmoller argues, is what gives rise to 
differences about judgments of equality. Because such conflicts are never-ending, 
“there is...no simple, universally intelligible, familiar and applicable formula of 
justice”. Even when reduced to a formula, there is always the possibility of conflict over 
150. All quotations are from Gustav Schmoller, “The Idea of Justice in Political Economy” 
[1881], trans. E. Halle and C. Schutz, Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Vol. 4, 1893-4 at <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/
schmoller/justice> on 30 April 2005.
104its applicability, scope, and so on. Ultimately, such conflicts are not decided by logic, 
but by the heart.
In relation to the question of the just distribution of economic goods, 
Schmoller argues that positivist economics “sees in the difference between rich and 
poor only an occurrence of nature”. This is because it “sees only...mechanical causes 
which influence this or that distribution of incomes”, such as “demand and supply, 
proportions, natural phenomena” and so on. This view is basically Darwinian. 
However, when different distributions of income are the result of “blind forces”, they 
do not elicit judgments of justice but of resignation. Judgments of justice only arise 
when there are human forces involved.
As far as human action governs and influences the distribution of incomes, so far 
this action will create the psychological processes whose final result is the judgment 
which finds the distribution just or unjust...
Human action applies to conditions of supply and demand, too:
Demand and supply are summary terms for the magnitudes of opposing groups of 
human wills. The causes and conditions of these magnitudes are partly natural, 
mostly however, human relations and powers, human deliberations and actions.
In this way a distinction can arise between, for example, price and just price. In the case 
of labour, demand influences the market price, but moral valuation influences judgment 
as to whether that price is just or not.
Economists, however, are more concerned with the class distribution of 
income rather than the individual distribution. These are mainly the result of human 
economic institutions, centred on the “prevailing rights of property, inheritance and 
contract”. As the result of human feelings, thought, action, customs and laws, then, 
institutional outcomes can be judged as to whether they are just or not. In economic 
acts, “our observations discern moral communities”, i.e., the moral understanding that 
arises between transacting parties or members of a community who act with a common 
purpose. And with more interactions in such communities, particular with increasing 
105division of labour, the “relations of those concerned necessarily exchange a merely 
economic for a generally moral character”, which gives rise to the conceptual relation 
of common production and moral community.
In common production, “labor is the most obvious standard”, and when there 
are different kinds of labour, these will be compared qualitatively, not simply 
quantitatively. The most highly considered qualities are those “which serve the 
common objects”. Here Schmoller argues against the socialist notion articulated in the 
Gotha platform of 1875, of “individual needs as a standard of distributing justice”. 
Needs are self-serving, he argues, whereas labour “serves mankind”. In this way the 
distinction between economic and moral value arises. Schmoller uses this idea to argue 
against the positivist economists’ view that economic order can appear out of the 
interactions of self-interested individuals. Such order does not exist; rather, “it is striven 
for slowly and gradually”. This is the role of custom and law, to moderate self-interest 
so as to bring about social order or harmony.
Ultimately, just distribution depends on “just economic institutions”, which 
means that institutions have to be questioned and tested. “We do not acknowledge any 
one of these institutions to be above history, as having always existed or as necessity 
everlasting”. The testing of institutions, however, can only be done against a 
background of what exists. Institutions cannot all be called into question at once. Like 
Roscher, Schmoller is a gradualist. Institutions have to be reformed slowly, he argues, 
because “[e]ven the most violent revolution can not replace the mental transformation 
of men which is the precondition of a juster law”. A struggle that precedes a change in 
the conception of justice is unlikely to succeed.
The notion of eternal legal and economic institutions was a failing of “the 
older English economists”, who believed that such institutions allowed for “increased 
106production or consumption” through which progress could occur. That is, for positivist 
economics, there can be technical and individual change, but the institutions are a 
given, whereas historical economics shows “that the great epochs of economic progress 
are primarily concerned with the reform of social institutions”. This is where the state 
comes in, because it “is the centre and the heart in which all institutions empty and 
unite”. Thus, contrary to the minimal state conception of political economy, 
Schmoller’s conception of the moral community of common production entails an 
active and responsive state that both supports institutions and is capable of reforming 
them. In the domain of economics, Schmoller regards the argument for laissez-faire as 
essentially regressive, because it simply accepts institutions as they actually are, and 
thus ends up defending the status quo in the name of progress, by arguing that what now 
exists must be superior to all that has come before, simply because it results from the 
latter.151 Such a view, Schmoller argues, devalues life:
The value of our own life, of our own time, does not lie so much in what was 
attained before us, as in the amount of strength and moral energy with which we 
press forward in the path of progress. Great civilized nations, great epochs and great 
men...are those who on the field of economics succeed in securing and carrying 
through greater justice.
Perfect justice, of course, remains an ideal towards which we can only strive.
Schmoller’s conception of economic inquiry, then, is oriented neither towards 
the explanation of how the actual economic system operates, nor to an explanation of 
how it has arisen. Rather, it intends to understand how economy coheres with ethical 
and political interaction, and thus how the whole might be transformed for the better. 
Understanding the historical context is therefore aimed at revealing the possibilities for 
achieving greater justice.
151. A similar point regarding laissez-faire is made by Samuels, who argues that “[w]hen a 
policy of non-intervention is adopted it is tantamount both logically and substantively to 
giving effect to the status quo” (Warren Samuels, “Economics and Theology: The 
Fundamental Common Problem”, in Essays on the Methodology and Discourse of 
Economics, Macmillan, London, 1992, pg. 292).
107In fine
For historicist economists, an ordering economics is antithetical. First, 
creativity does not and cannot equilibriate, since it has the effect of transforming 
existing economic institutions and interactions. Appeals to equilibrium outcomes as 
optimal, such as with the spontaneous harmony of the market, fail to recognize this. 
Second, such appeals suppose that the various institutions, such as the law and the 
market, are simply given, rather than achieved. The naturalization of institutions found 
in positivist economics, particularly the market, involves a failure to recognize the 
ethical task of improving the common weal, which requires institutional reform and 
thus that the state be involved in the economy, not reduced to a night watchman. Third, 
because of the creativity involved in economic production, the possibility of an 
external, detached view of “the economy” as a self-contained, closed system 
disappears. Consequently, knowledge of economic activity cannot be reduced to the 
determination of causal laws of interaction. Rather than an ordering economics, then, 
this “other canon” is oriented towards an understanding or “appreciative” [verstehende] 
economics.
The other canon...is fundamentally holistic, organic and synthetical...in its 
approach...The units of analysis includes both individuals and their institutions in 
time and space.152
Only in recognizing the economic as a dynamic, open totality can it become part of the 
meaning of social development, rather than simply a constraint on it. The aim of 
historicist economics was not to subsume the economy under the state, but rather to see 
them as complementary ways in which development is achieved. The naturalization of 
the economy in positivist economics immunizes it from any possible reform, and thus 
binds us to the past, rather than recognizing that in our interactions, we are always in 
152. Reinert and Daastøl, op. cit., pg. 6.
108the process of changing the institutions that comprise and constitute us.
Positivist Economics
As has been discussed previously, positivist economics can be characterized in 
terms of its universalization of theory, its assumption of the universality of human 
nature, its attempt to discover the laws governing the system of economy, and its 
abstraction from history. These characteristics have both substantive and 
methodological import. What becomes particularly problematic is the relationship of 
the positivist economist to the system of economy she theorizes about. The 
subsumptive (or ordering) concepts of positivist economics objectify economic 
interaction in such a way as to make it questionable how the theory relates to the 
historical situation of the theorist. In this section, then, I look at some illustrations of 
this in positivist economics. Adam Smith’s discussion of the “natural order” of 
economic progress exemplifies how theory comes to trump history. John Stuart Mill’s 
analysis of the method of political economy shows how deductive theory becomes more 
important than the analysis of the particular case. In neoclassical economics, economic 
theory becomes decisively separated from history. Yet this formalism has itself given 
rise to a form of economic history—cliometrics—that tries to subordinate history to 
formal theory. The conceptual difficulties found in this endeavour illustrate some of the 
problematic aspects of positivist economics.
Adam Smith
If positivist economics can be said to originate with any one thinker, then it is 
with Adam Smith.153 Yet Smith’s economic inquiry is complex, because it involves 
both historical investigation and formal analysis. Although in many respects he draws 
109upon the work of the Physiocrats such as Quesnay and other French thinkers such as 
Turgot,154 he was also one of the Scottish Historians, who engaged in philosophical or 
theoretical history, with the aim of giving an account of the stages of historical 
development and their relation to economic forces.155 In the Wealth of Nations, Smith’s 
analysis of the “natural progress of opulence” demonstrates the way in which positivist 
economics subordinates history to abstract theory.156
Smith’s Formalism
Smith analyzed the system of economic interactions on the basis of two 
characteristics of human nature that he argued were universal, namely exchange and 
self-interest. First, “the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” 
(WN I ii, pg. 117) gives rise to the division of labour, which allows for “[t]he greatest 
improvement in the productive powers of labour” (WN I i, pg. 109). The propensity to 
exchange and the division of labour combined with “self-love” (WN I i, pg. 119) or the 
“uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition” (WN 
II iii, pg. 443) accounts for increase in wealth and “the natural progress of things toward 
153. “It is certain that the systematic character of Smith’s formal economics is of great historical 
importance, not merely because of the extent of his coverage but also because he in fact 
provided the foundation of a great edifice, which has been extended rather than destroyed 
by those who followed” (Skinner, “Introduction” to WN I-III, op. cit., pg. 13).
154. Smith was a friend of both. Cf. Skinner, “Introduction” to WN IV-V, op. cit., pp. xvii, xxvii-
xxix.
155. Cf. Skinner, “Introduction” to WN I-III, op. cit., pp. 29-31. See also Backhouse, op. cit., pp. 
110-111.
156. T.E. Cliffe Leslie argued that Smith, unusually, combines both deductive and inductive 
approaches, “hence it is that we have two systems of political economy claiming descent 
from him”, namely the deductive system of Ricardo and the (predominantly) inductive 
system of Malthus and Mill. (“The Political Economy of Adam Smith”, Fortnightly 
Review, November 1, 1870 at <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/leslie/
leslie01.html> on 25 April 2005.). John Neville Keynes observed about Smith that “It has 
been said of him that he first raised political economy to the dignity of a deductive science. 
But he has also been regarded as the founder of the historical-method in political 
economy.” Keynes explained this “apparent contradiction” by “Adam Smith’s freedom 
from excess on the side either of a priori or of a posteriori reasoning. He rejected no 
method of enquiry that could in any way assist him in investigating the phenomena of 
wealth.” (John Neville Keynes, The Scope and Method of Political Economy, 4 ed., 
Batoche Books, Kitchener, 1999 [1917], pg. 11. The first edition was published in 1891.)
110improvement” (WN II iii, pg. 443). From these fundamental and unchanging aspects of 
human nature, Smith derived his formal analysis of the system of economy as one that 
harmonizes, without intention, the self-interested behaviour of individuals. In this 
system, the accumulation of capital is what drives economic development forward. 
However, given the different propensities and risks associated with the main activities 
of production, i.e., agriculture, manufacturing and foreign trade, Smith argued that there 
was a “natural” order to productive investment and hence economic development.
However, Smith’s formal analysis was at odds with the evidence of history, 
which showed quite the opposite sequence.
Productivity and accumulation
Smith’s argument about the natural order of progress is related to his view that 
the prosperity of a nation is determined mainly by “the skill, dexterity, and judgement 
with which its labor is generally applied” (WN I 104).157 This determines how well 
supplied a nation is with “all the necessaries and conveniences for which it has 
occasion”, which is proportional to the ratio of productive labour to “the number of 
those who are to consume it”. This latter ratio is “regulated by two different 
circumstances” (WN I 104, emphasis added):
first, by the skill, dexterity, and judgement with which its labour is generally 
applied; and, secondly, by the proportion between the number of those who are 
employed in useful labour, and that of those who are not so employed. (WN I 
104)158
Given this, productivity can only be increased in two ways, he argues: “by 
increasing either the number of productive labourers, or the productive powers of those 
labourers who had before been employed” (WN II 443). The first way involves an 
157. The World Bank often cites Smith to this effect, e.g., World Development Report 1980, 
pg. 1 (hereafter WDR followed by year and page number). However, Smith’s argument is 
somewhat more complicated than the Bank tends to recognize. 
111increase in the total number of labourers, and thus requires additional maintenance from 
the national product. The second way requires either
some addition and improvement to those machines and instruments which facilitate 
and abridge labour, or of a more proper division and distribution of employment. In 
either case an additional capital is almost always required. (WN II 443)
That is, in order to increase productivity, there must be additional capital. This leads 
Smith to conclude that if a comparison of “the state of a nation at two different periods” 
shows that “the annual produce of its land and labour is evidently greater at the latter 
than at the former”, this indicates that “its capital must have increased during the 
interval between those two periods” (WN II 443). Hence the need for capital 
accumulation.
The natural order of progress
In WN III, “On the Different Progress of Opulence in Different Nations”, 
Smith begins by addressing the “natural progress” of opulence. In every civilized 
society, he argues, the “great commerce” is between “the inhabitants of the town and 
those of the country” (WN III 479), or as we would now say, between the (rural) 
agricultural and (urban) industrial sectors. The influence of the Physiocrats is perhaps 
evident here, in the argument that “[t]he town...may very properly be said to gain its 
whole wealth and subsistence from the country” (WN III 479). Whereas agriculture 
produces subsistence for both sectors, manufacturing produces it for neither. Yet this 
158. “Useful labour” is explained in Bk. II ch. iii by the distinction between “productive” and 
“unproductive labour”. The former “adds to the value of the subject upon which it is 
bestowed”, whereas the latter “has no such effect” (WN II 409). In the latter category Smith 
includes the labour of “menial servants”, the sovereign and “all the officers both of justice 
and war who serve under him” (WN II 410), and that of “churchmen, lawyers, physicians, 
men of letters of all kinds; players buffoons, musicians, opera-singers, opera-dancers, etc.” 
(WN II 411). This does not mean that such labour does not have “a certain value”. 
However, it “produces nothing which could afterwards purchase or procure an equal 
quantity of labour” (WN II 411).
112does not mean that the “gain of the town is the loss of the country” (WN III 479), for the 
division of labour leads to gains from sectoral trade:
The inhabitants of the country purchase of the town a greater quantity of manufac-
tured goods, with the produce of a much smaller quantity of their own labour, than 
they must have employed had they attempted to prepare them themselves. The town 
affords a market for the surplus of the country, or what is over and above the main-
tenance of the cultivators, and it is there that the inhabitants of the country exchange 
it for something else which is in demand among them. (WN III 479).
Thus, the synergy between town and country allows for increased production in both, 
since the market for both products is wider, and so specialization in production is 
possible. The benefit that the town confers on agricultural production is evident, Smith 
argues, in the comparison of
the cultivation of the lands in the neighbourhood of any considerable town with that 
of those which lie at some distance from it...you will easily satisfy yourself how 
much the country is benefited by the commerce of the town. (WN III 480)
One reason for this, of course, is the cost of transport that has to be borne by more 
distant agricultural producers.
Because “subsistence is...prior to conveniency and luxury” (WN III 480), in 
the natural course of things 
The cultivation and improvement of the country, therefore, which affords subsist-
ence, must, necessarily, be prior to the increase of the town, which furnishes only 
the means of conveniency and luxury. It is the surplus produce of the country 
only...that constitutes the subsistence of the town, which can therefore increase only 
with the increase of this surplus produce. (WN III 480).
What gives rise to the difference in “opulence” between different ages and different 
nations, however, is the degree of trade that the town has with foreign agricultural 
producers. In this respect, the “human institution” of trade goes against “the natural 
inclinations of man”, which is that
Upon equal, or nearly equal profits, most men will choose to employ their capitals 
rather in the improvement and cultivation of land than either in manufactures or in 
foreign trade. (WN III 480-81)
Smith argues that this is only natural because of the risks involved in the latter 
activities. “The capital of the landlord...which is fixed in the improvement of his land, 
113seems to be as well secured as the nature of human affairs can admit of” (WN III 481). 
Nevertheless, improvement in cultivation does require “the assistance of some 
artificers” (WN III 481). Thus, concentration on improvements in agriculture, in the 
natural course of affairs, is what drives economic growth and progress:
Had human institutions...never disturbed the natural course of things, the progres-
sive wealth and increase of the towns would, in every political society, be conse-
quential, and in proportion to the improvement and cultivation of the territory or 
country. (WN III 482)
Smith finds evidence for this claim in the North American colonies, in which 
“uncultivated land is still to be had upon easy terms” and thus “no manufactures for 
distant sale have ever yet been established in any of their towns” (WN III 482).159 For 
the North American colonies,
Land is still so cheap, and, consequently, labour so dear among them, that they can 
import from the mother country almost all the more refined or more advanced man-
ufactures cheaper than they could make them for themselves. (WNII 164)
This seems to contradict his analysis regarding both the beneficial effects of the 
proximity of agricultural production to the town and the aversion to the risk of foreign 
trade. Manufactures are preferred as “employment for capital...upon equal or nearly 
equal profits...to foreign commerce” (WN III 482). Given these considerations, Smith 
argues that
According to the natural course of things...the greater part of the capital of every 
growing society is, first, directed to agriculture, afterwards to manufactures, and 
last of all to foreign commerce. This order of things is so very natural that in every 
society that had any territory it has always, I believe, been in some degree observed. 
(WN III 483)
The “unnatural” order of progress
This, then, is the natural course of economic development. Yet Smith 
recognizes that “in all the modern states of Europe” this order has “been, in many 
respects, entirely inverted” (WN III 483), such that foreign commerce has been 
159. Of course, this was the result not simply of the “natural course of things” but of a deliberate 
trade policy Britain imposed on its colonies, as Smith recognizes in WN IV ch. vii. 
114responsible for the introduction of “finer manufactures” and “manufactures and foreign 
commerce together have given birth to the principal improvements of agriculture” (WN 
III 483). Smith attributes this inversion of the natural order to the “manners and 
customs” introduced by the “nature of their original government” (WN III 483-84), 
particularly the engrossment of agricultural land into huge estates, and the laws of 
primogeniture preventing their division. This had two consequences, Smith argues. 
First, there was little incentive for agricultural improvement. Second, the towns and 
cities were in effect shut out from trade with the agricultural sector. Therefore, those 
that could sought to obtain their subsistence by means of foreign, instead of domestic, 
trade, which also involved importing refined foreign manufactures, which could then be 
traded to the great landholders in return for their raw produce. In this way, Smith 
argues, the opulence of the cities arose through trade. The change in tastes that followed 
from the introduction of such refined manufactures then gave rise to domestic demand 
sufficient to support domestic manufactures of the same kind.
The development of the towns also helped improve the estates: (i) by 
providing “a great and ready market for the rude produce of the country” (WNI 507); 
(ii) by merchants using their wealth to purchase land that was then improved because a 
“merchant is accustomed to employ his money chiefly in profitable projects” (WNI 
507); (iii) through the doux commerce effect, in which
commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and 
with them, the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the 
country, who had before lived almost in a continual state of war with their neigh-
bours, and of servile dependency upon their superiors. (WNI 508)
In this way, then, the natural order of agricultural, manufacturing, and foreign 
commerce improvement was reversed through the “civilizing” effect of the cities and 
towns, in the context of the legacy of policies towards landholding and personal liberty. 
115Because the labour involved in manufactures is capable of greater 
specialisation than that of agriculture, however, it is capable of greater increases in 
productivity. Furthermore, Smith argues, “the revenue of a trading and manufacturing 
country must, other things being equal, always be greater than that of one without trade 
or manufactures” (WNII 263). This is because of the favourable terms of trade of 
manufactured goods compared with agricultural produce, which allows such a country 
to overcome its natural constraints (cf. WN II 263-264). Thus, according to Smith’s 
own analysis, concentrating on agriculture at the expense of manufactures decreases the 
potential wealth of a nation, rather than increasing it. A final point is that productivity 
increases in agriculture are more limited than those in manufacturing, because there can 
be a greater division of labour in the latter:
The most opulent nations...generally excel all their neighbours in agriculture as well 
as in manufactures; but they are commonly more distinguished by their superiority 
in the latter than in the former...In agriculture, the labour of the rich country is not 
always much more productive than that of the poor; or, at least, it is never so much 
more productive as it commonly is in manufactures. (WNI 111-12)
The implication of all these points, then, is that despite the supposed “natural 
order of things”, in modern times economic development and growth lies 
predominantly in the manufacturing sector and not the agricultural. Thus, according to 
these aspects of Smith’s analysis, the key to increased national prosperity should lie in 
the development of a domestic manufacturing sector. Yet in Bk. II ch. v, this is denied, 
based upon the “greater quantity of productive labour” that “capital puts into motion” in 
agriculture (WN II 462), and because of the contribution of “labouring cattle” and the 
free contribution of nature herself, by which 
it adds a much greater value to the annual produce of the land and labour of the 
country, to the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants. Of all the ways in which a 
capital can be employed, it is by far the most advantageous to the society. (WN II 
463)
That is, whereas in trade and manufacturing, some portion of the product goes to 
116replace the capital used up in the activity, in agriculture, because there is no return to 
livestock or to nature, the product is proportionally greater. Therefore, Smith argues 
that in cases where a country has insufficient capital to engage in agriculture, 
manufacturing, and trade, it should concentrate on agriculture first, then manufacturing, 
and finally “trade of exportation” which “has the least effect of any of the three” (WN II 
465).160 In this way, the greatest amount of productive labour can be put into motion, 
and the greatest value added to the wealth of society.
One of Smith’s reasons for drawing this conclusion was that
The course of human prosperity...seems scarce ever to have been of so long contin-
uance as to enable any great country to acquire capital sufficient for all those three 
purposes. (WNI 467)
Given this situation, he argues, the attempt to engage in all three activities (or in the first 
two with even less capital) would simply divert capital away from the most productive 
activity, to activities that were less productive, and thereby “obstruct instead of 
promoting the progress of [the] country towards real wealth and greatness” (WNI 466). 
Given these considerations, it then makes sense why Smith (for the most part) argues 
against restrictions on trade. If trade is the least profitable activity to engage in, then it 
would be highly beneficial for a poorer country to have access to the trading services of 
richer countries. But there seems to be a contradiction in Smith’s analysis when it 
comes to manufacturing, since the terms of trade between raw agricultural produce and 
manufactured goods is highly favourable to the latter (according to Smith himself). If a 
country specializes in agriculture entirely, far more of its domestic product will have to 
be traded for the manufactures desired than would be needed to support the same 
amount of domestic production.161 Smith’s conclusion, however, is that a poor country 
should specialize in agriculture, which it can then export in exchange for imports of 
160. An argument often used by the World Bank.
161. As the mercantilists knew full well.
117foreign manufactures carried by foreign shipping and handled by foreign merchants. In 
this way, Smith argues for a return to the “natural order of things”, as opposed to the 
“inverted order” that he observed actually prevailed.162
The question of method
The fundamental orientation of positivist economics is towards explaining 
economic behaviour as a system of interactions governed by general laws, with which 
economic policy should harmonize. For example, in the late 19th century Carl Menger 
argued that
Economic theory is related to the practical activities of economizing men 
[wirtschaftender Mensch] in much the same way that chemistry is related to the 
operations of the practical chemist.
Just as the free will of the practical chemist cannot affect the laws of chemistry,
freedom of the human will...can never have force as a denial of the conformity to 
definite laws of phenomena that condition the outcome of the economic activity of 
men and are entirely independent of the human will.163
The task of the economist, according to Menger, is to discover “a scientific foundation 
for economic affairs”164 through the observation of economic objects and the attempt 
“to discover their causal connections and the laws to which they are subject”.165 The 
162. Cf. Robert A. Blecker, “The ‘Unnatural and Retrograde Order’: Adam Smith’s Theories of 
Trade and Development Reconsidered”, Economica, vol. 64, no. 255, 1997, pp. 527-537. 
This contradiction was one of the focusses of Friedrich List, who argued that Smith’s 
analysis rested upon the “cosmopolitical idea”, rather than on the idea of a world of nation 
states. List argues that the cosmopolitical idea is first found in Quesnay, who “was the first 
who extended his investigations to the whole human race, without taking into consideration 
the idea of the nation” (Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy, trans. 
S.S. Lloyd, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1909 [1844], pg. 97). Political economy 
referred to “that science which limits its teaching to the inquiry how a given nation can 
obtain (under the existing conditions of the world) prosperity, civilisation, and power, by 
means of agriculture, industry, and commerce” (ibid.). Quesnay, List argues, “undoubtedly 
speaks of cosmopolitical economy, i.e. of that science which teaches how the entire human 
race may attain prosperity” (ibid.). And Smith, too, he argues, “treats his doctrine in a 
similarly extended sense, by making it his task to indicate the cosmopolitical idea of the 
absolute freedom of the commerce of the whole world... Adam Smith concerned himself as 
little as Quesnay did with true political economy, i.e. that policy which each separate nation 
had to obey in order to make progress in its economical conditions” (ibid., pp. 97-98).
163. Carl Menger, Principles of Economics, trans. J. Dingwall and B.F. Hoselitz, Ludwig von 
Mises Institute, electronic online edition, 2004 [1871], pg. 48.
164. Ibid., pg. 45.
118fundamental elements are determined by abstraction from the complexities of actual 
economic behaviour, such that the system of interactions can be deductively 
established. 
Mill and the method of political economy
John Stuart Mill’s inquiry into the method of political economy contributed 
significantly to its codification. In Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political 
Economy, Mill argues that
Like other sciences, Political Economy has remained destitute of a definition 
framed on strictly logical principles, or even of, what is more easily to be had, a def-
inition exactly co-extensive with the thing defined.166
The definition of a science “almost invariably” follows “the creation of the science 
itself” (V.2), and is “the result of the last stage of generalization...to which the particular 
truths of the science can be subjected” (V.4). The problem with the current definitions 
of political economy, he argues, is that they do not strictly separate science and art, i.e., 
the “collection of truths” from the “body of rules, or directions for conduct” (V.8). This 
is evident in the view that political economy is concerned with how a nation can 
increase its wealth, which Mill notes is suggested by the title of Smith’s work (V.7, V.9). 
A science, however, has to be concerned with the laws governing phenomena.
Therefore, Mill argues that the science of political economy is concerned with 
“[t]he laws of the production of objects which constitute wealth”, insofar as these 
concern “laws of the human mind” rather than those which concern purely physical 
phenomena (V.28). However, the phenomena that political economy is concerned with 
do not include consumption, but only production and distribution, of those objects. 
165. Ibid., pg. 56.
166. John Stuart Mill, Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, 2nd ed., 
Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer Co., London, 1874 [1844], par. V.5, at 
<www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlUQP5.html> on 12 August 2005. Subsequent references 
are indicated by paragraph number.
119Consumption, Mill argues, is not a proper object for political economy, because “[w]e 
know not of any laws of the consumption of wealth as the subject of a distinct science: 
they can be no other than the laws of human enjoyment”. Political economy only treats 
of consumption as it relates to production and distribution, and not as an independent 
aspect (V.29 n.8). Thus, political economy concerns a branch of the science concerned 
with the “laws of society, or the laws of human nature in the social state” (V.35), the 
branch concerned with the individual “solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, 
and who is capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that 
end...Political economy considers mankind as occupied solely in acquiring and 
consuming wealth” (V.38).
The method of inquiry in Political Economy is “a mixed method of induction 
and ratiocination”, which Mill calls “the method à priori”, which is distinguished from 
direct induction or “the method à posteriori” because it involves “reasoning from an 
assumed hypothesis” (V.45). Whereas direct induction is the approach of practical men, 
the mixed method is that of theorists, who
aim at embracing a wider field of experience, and, having argued upwards from par-
ticular facts to a general principle including a much wider range than that of the 
question under discussion, then argue downwards from that general principle to a 
variety of specific conclusions. (V.43)
Moreover, Mill argues, verification or confirmation of the hypothesis or general 
principle “is no part of the business of science at all, but of the application of science”. 
The general reasoning of science does not involve the examination “whether the facts of 
any actual case are in accordance with it” (V.45). Political economy is 
essentially an abstract science...The conclusions of Political Economy...are only 
true...in the abstract; that is, they are only true under certain suppositions, in which 
none but general causes—causes common to the whole class of cases under consid-
eration—are taken into account. (V.46)
Political economy can only use the method à priori, because it is not experimental. The 
observations on which it is based are “the limited number of experiments which take 
120place...of their own accord, without any preparation or management of ours”. Such 
“experiments” are furthermore “of great complexity” such that we can never perfectly 
know their circumstances (V.51). Nor can we find a “crucial experiment”, in Bacon’s 
sense, by which to isolate specific circumstances so as to determine their effects, since 
the number of different factors involved mitigates finding a sufficient degree of 
similarity. For example, in the “experiments” that occur of their own accord in political 
economy, i.e., the existing conditions of different nations, there are too many 
differences between their circumstances to allow for the attribution to one specific 
difference (e.g., commercial policy) the difference in observed effects (V.54).
Although direct induction is not possible, political economy can arrive at 
truths about the laws governing the social production and distribution of wealth, 
because we can observe the causes on which these depend, which are “laws of human 
nature, and external circumstances capable of exciting the human will to action”. Such 
knowledge
every one can principally collect within himself; with reasonable consideration of 
the differences, of which experience discloses to him the existence, between himself 
and other people. (V.56)
Such causes can be abstracted from so as to deduce “abstract truth”. The abstract truth 
that political economy establishes can then be applied to particular cases by taking into 
account circumstances specific to the case that act as “disturbing causes”. But since our 
knowledge of such causes is always imperfect, the abstract science cannot be relied on 
to predict what will occur in specific cases (V.63-64, V.72).
121In his later Principles of Political Economy, Mill argued that “Writers on 
Political Economy profess to teach, or to investigate, the nature of Wealth, and the laws 
of its production and distribution”.167 Wealth refers to
all useful or agreeable things which possess exchangeable value; or, in other words, 
all useful or agreeable things except those which can be obtained, in the quantity 
desired, without labour or sacrifice.168
The production of wealth “has its necessary conditions”, which comprise both physical 
conditions and those that pertain to human nature. Only the latter are of concern to 
political economy.169 Unlike his predecessors, however, Mill argued that the laws of 
distribution “are partly of human institution: since the manner in which wealth is 
distributed in any given society, depends on the statutes or usages therein obtaining”.170 
In making this distinction, Mill allowed for greater government involvement in 
economic matters than is found in his predecessors. Nevertheless, even though 
government can determine the institutions of distribution, “they cannot arbitrarily 
determine how those institutions shall work”, which depends on “conditions” that “are 
as much a subject for scientific enquiry as any of the physical laws of nature”.171 The 
task of political economy is to investigate the laws of production and distribution “and 
some of the practical consequences deducible from them”.172
John Neville Keynes advocated a similar view of the method of political 
economy. Pointing out that “[e]xperiment is...a resource from which the economist is 
debarred”, he concluded that
167. John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, op. cit., at <http://www.econlib.org/
library/Mill/mlP0.html> on 30 April 2005, PR.2.
168. Ibid., PR.14.
169. Ibid., PR. 30.
170. Ibid., PR. 31.
171. Ibid.
172. Ibid., PR. 32.
122we ought not to take as our starting point the analysis of concrete industrial facts. 
The right method of procedure is, on the contrary, deductive, or, as Mill puts it, a 
priori.173
The inductive method, he argued, “is inadequate to yield more than empirical 
generalizations of uncertain validity”,174 and thus could not be the basis for economics 
as a science. The deductive method, in turn, was possible because its premises were 
“limited in number” and were based on “a few simple and indisputable facts of human 
nature—as for example, that in their economic dealings men are influenced by the 
desire for wealth”.175 Only this motive was important for a science of economic 
behaviour, even though “other motives...do operate on various occasions in determining 
men’s economic activities”, because the influence of the latter is “irregular, uncertain, 
and capricious”.176
For positivist economics, then, the determinants of economic behaviour are 
held to be independent of the economic conditions in which they are observed. The 
scientific approach to economic behaviour depended on a view of society constituted by 
atomistic individuals, whose interactions are mechanistic and governed by laws that 
could be determined by observation alone. 
State and Market
Once economic behaviour was conceptualized as a self-regulating system of 
interaction of atomistic individuals, the relation between state and economic behaviour 
came to be seen as antagonistic. Positivist economics has generally argued that the 
state’s role in economic activity should be restricted as much as possible to providing 
the minimal conditions necessary for economic interaction to occur. The state is thus 
173. J.N. Keynes, op. cit., pg. 13.
174. Ibid.
175. Ibid.
176. Ibid., pg. 14.
123charged to restrain itself from interference in the economy, on the grounds of 
efficiency.177 For example, Smith argued that
No regulation of commerce can increase the quantity of industry in any society 
beyond what its capital can maintain. It can only divert a part of it into a direction 
into which it might not otherwise have gone; and it is by no means certain that this 
artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the society than that into 
which it would have gone of its own accord. (WN IV ii, pg. 30)
Once state and economy (or civil society) had been analytically separated, a 
further distinction between society and the market was seen as necessary, for two 
reasons. First, the construction of economics as a scientific inquiry entails the exclusion 
of social activities not productive of objects or services entering into exchange 
transactions, even though such activities might be economic in the broader sense (e.g., 
housework), because if they were not produced for and exchanged on the market, then 
they did not enter into the production of wealth. Second, social institutions and 
practices that had economic aspects but were seen to conflict with the functioning of the 
economic system, such as welfare provisions, traditional land-use rights, and artisans 
organisations, needed to be reconceptualized as market activities in order to show their 
inefficiency. This required separating them from their social context and meaning.178 In 
this way, the social and the economic (in the form of the market) were made 
analytically distinct.179
177. Establishing this is one of the central aims of The Wealth of Nations, although Smith’s view 
on the role of the state goes beyond the minimal state conception. Cf. Skinner, 
“Introduction” to WN I-III, op. cit., pp. 77-82, and WN V. So too does Mill’s, as discussed 
previously.
178. The conceptual distinction between society and market has a long history, although outside 
of the contemporary canon, this distinction has usually been made to severely circumscribe 
the market, or to critique it. In the Politics, Aristotle distinguishes between economics as 
the art of estate management and chrematistics as the art of getting wealth, and considers 
the latter to be an improper activity because of its social consequences. In a number of his 
writings, Marx analyses the transformation of human activity into abstract labour as a 
commodity . Karl Polanyi examines how 19th-century classical liberal economics 
constructed labour, land and money as elements in the market system and how this 
conception of the market economy was realised in policy, in The Great Transformation, 
Beacon Press, Boston, 1957.
124Although societies were recognized as historically specific, the market was 
conceptualized as a context-independent, universal institution. In 19th-century Britain 
this conception led the classical liberal economists to advocate “disembedding” the 
market from society, and ordering society to conform with market imperatives. As 
Polanyi argued, 
the control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming consequence 
to the whole organization of society: it means no less than the running of society as 
an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, 
social relations are embedded in the economic system.180
When economy comes to be understood solely on an individualistic, atomistic market 
pattern, there is a strong tendency towards policies that both construe and construct 
society in accordance with this pattern. That is, the primacy accorded to the market 
economy leads to advocacy of the market society, because only in such a society can the 
market function properly (i.e., efficiently). Eighteenth-century social institutions and 
practices such as the putting-out system of manufacturing, smallholding, and 
subsistence farming came to be seen as atavistic hindrances to the flourishing of the 
economy.181
179. The recent appearance of the concept of ‘social capital’ in economics could be seen as yet 
another subsumption of social relations by market relations, as with the earlier concept of 
‘human capital’. These concepts are ambiguous, since they are used to refer either to 
attributes of individuals or to attributes of societies or nations, although it is not clear how 
social capital can be an attribute of individuals. Cf. Ben Fine, “The developmental state is 
dead—long live social capital?”, Development and Change, 1999, vol. 30 no. 1, pp. 1-19; 
and Michael Cowen, “Trust in Development”, IDS Working Paper 10/98, at <http://
www.valt.helsinki.fi/kmi/Julkais/WPt/1998/WP1198.HTM> on 10 May 2005.
180. Karl Polanyi, op. cit., pg. 57. Levine argues that the notion of “disembedding” is somewhat 
“problematic since it assumes that the economy has always been present” (David P. Levine, 
“Political Economy and the Idea of Development”, Review of Political Economy, vol. 13, 
no. 4, 2001, pg. 524). As has been suggested above, this assumption is debatable. Thus, just 
as Polanyi objected to the idea of the market as the universal form of the economy, Levine 
adverts to the objection that Polanyi posits (the) economy as a universal form of work and 
subsistence. Arguably, pace Marshall Sahlins, the Bushmen have no economy, “stone age” 
or otherwise.
181. In the late 20th century, through the concerted efforts of neoliberals to roll back the welfare 
state, this conception again became influential in policy-making, as is particularly evident 
in the prescriptions of the Bretton Woods institutions to their low- and middle-income 
“clients”. This set of policy prescriptions has come to be known, somewhat inaccurately, as 
the “Washington Consensus”.
125The positivist conception of the laws of economic behaviour as universal and 
context-independent entailed that the scope of government involvement in economic 
affairs be severely restricted. Since these laws are immutable, no intervention by 
government can counteract their operation. “Sovereigns, as well as their subjects, must 
bow to their authority, and never can violate them with impunity.”182 Only if the market 
were free to function in conformity with those laws could economic growth be assured. 
Government or state intervention in the economic behavior of individuals, based on the 
erroneous assumption that the state could know better than each person what her true 
interests are, only creates distortions. That is, although state intervention might result in 
the same level of wealth production as the market, it could not exceed this level, and 
was much more likely to reduce national wealth (as well as enriching certain interest 
groups). Because the market was seen to co-ordinate the interests of each individual as 
he himself determines them, it was held to be far less likely to lead to such distortions. 
As J.B. Say argued, “every government which interferes, every system calculated to 
influence production, can only do mischief”.183
Neoclassical economics
Marginalism and the Theory of Value
Classical economics took as its domain of inquiry the economic behaviour of 
individuals in a society where production and distribution came about through 
exchange. Yet at the heart of classical economics is a theory of value that does not 
depend on exchange, i.e., the labour theory of value, which holds that the natural price 
of a good is determined by the labour costs of its production. The relative prices of 
different goods were therefore explained by the different amounts of labour required to 
182. Say, op. cit., pg. 13.
183. Ibid., pg. 45.
126produce them. Scarcity was not a theoretically important issue, because goods can 
always be produced. The labour theory of value was refined by David Ricardo, and was 
also a central component of Marx’s analysis of capitalism.184
Not all economists agreed with the Ricardian school, but not until the 
“marginalist revolution” of 1871-74, through the independent theoretical innovations of 
Jevons, Walras and Menger, was the labour theory of value replaced with a strictly 
market-based theory of value.
The essence of [the] Marginalist Revolution, then, was the novel idea that the “nat-
ural value” of a good is determined only by its subjective scarcity, i.e., the degree to 
which people’s desire for that good exceeds its availability.185
As Menger put it,
Value is...nothing inherent in goods, no property of them, nor an independent thing 
existing by itself. It is a judgment economizing men make about the importance of 
the goods at their disposal for the maintenance of their lives and well-being. Hence 
value does not exist outside the consciousness of men.186
If the values of goods do not depend on the cost of their production (i.e., labour) but 
rather on demand for them, then their relative values (i.e., their price) are determined 
solely by demand, which depends on their relative scarcity as subjectively perceived 
(i.e., in terms of the desire for them). This subjective value is a result of the satisfaction 
of needs obtained from the consumption of a good. Furthermore, the marginalists 
argued, the value of a good or a service is dependent not on the satisfaction obtained 
from the total quantity demanded or available, but rather on the satisfaction that each 
additional unit provides. Menger illustrates this with reference to the consumption of 
food:
184. Cf. David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Batoche Books, 
Kitchener, 2001 [1817 (3rd ed. 1821)], ch. 1; Karl Marx, Capital Vol. I, ed. F. Engels, trans. 
S. Moore and E. Aveling, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1887 at <http://www.marxists.org/
archive/marx/works/1867-c1/index.htm> on 11 April 2004. For a critique of the labour 
theory of value, see Steve Keen, Debunking Economics, Pluto Press, Annandale, 2002, ch. 
13.
185. “The Marginalist Revolution of 1871-74” at <http://homepage.newschool.edu/het/essays/
margrev/ncintro.htm> on 14 March 2003.
186. Menger, op. cit., pg. 120.
127The satisfaction of every man’s need for food up to the point where his life is 
thereby assured has the full importance of the maintenance of his life. Consumption 
exceeding this amount, again up to a certain point, has the importance of preserving 
his health (that is, his continuing well-being). Consumption extending beyond even 
this point has merely the importance—as observation shows—of a progressively 
weaker pleasure, until it finally reaches a certain limit at which satisfaction of the 
need for food is so complete that every further intake of food contributes neither to 
the maintenance of life nor to the preservation of health—nor does it even give 
pleasure to the consumer, becoming first a matter of indifference to him, eventually 
a cause of pain, a danger to health, and finally a danger to life itself.187
A basic assumption of marginalism, then, is that the satisfaction derived from each 
additional unit of a good beyond a certain point will decrease, as particular wants or 
needs become satiated.188 Thus, the determination of the relative prices of goods is a 
function of the comparative marginal satisfactions afforded by different goods. And 
given that the basis for economic interaction was taken to be the maximization of 
individuals’ satisfaction, this allowed for the mathematical determination of the 
equilibrium prices of goods, and hence the equilibrium level of output of economic 
production.
There are two important consequences of this change in the theory of value. 
First, it allowed for the construction of economic theories based entirely on exchange. 
Economics thus became the science of exchange, rather than the science of the 
production and distribution of wealth. Issues of production and distribution could now 
be addressed as exchange phenomena mediated by prices, just as consumption was. 
Thus, with fewer assumptions, the theoretical models could incorporate more 
phenomena. Second, in locating value entirely in subjective desire, analysis of 
economic behaviour did not need to take into account the social relations of production, 
187. Ibid., pg. 124.
188. Although this seems to agree with common sense (how many bananas can a person really 
enjoy at one sitting?), it disregards the social relations of possession, in which simply 
owning or having command over an additional unit can afford equal satisfaction. Imelda 
Marcos’s predilection for shoes is one example.
128nor how the pursuit of self-interest contributes to the satisfaction of the needs of all. As 
Regenia Gagnier puts it:
The object of classical political economy as Adam Smith perceived it in The Wealth 
of Nations was to fulfil “the needs and desires of the people”...The object of neo-
classical economics under the Marginal Revolution after 1870 was to maximize 
individual choice and preference without comparing or ranking needs intersubjec-
tively.189
Because the satisfaction of desires is subjective, the only legitimate ranking is a purely 
individual one. Intersubjective comparisons are held to be impossible in principle. 
Thus, marginalism and neoclassical economics alike are confronted with a logical 
inconsistency: only individual preferences count, yet these cannot be aggregated in any 
determinate way so as to arrive at a social demand function.190 And despite some 
periods of retreat, the marginalist approach has become the dominant form of 
economics today, in the form of neoclassical economics.
Thus, there is no requirement for the neoclassical economist to take into 
account what the subjective interests of economic actors are, since it is sufficient to 
postulate just that there are such interests. In this way, positivist economics gradually 
became separated from historical inquiry, since such inquiry could only reveal 
particular disturbances in the operation of the general laws of the economy. Positivist 
economics is thus an ordering or organising [ordnende] economics,191 i.e., it orders 
economic behaviour in terms of the relations between production, distribution, 
accumulation, consumption, etc., into a mechanical system of interactions for which 
equilibrium is the ideal. From this conception of economic behaviour comes the 
construction of the economy as a separate and self-contained object of study.192
189. Regenia Gagnier, “The Law of Progress and the Ironies of Individualism in the Nineteenth 
Century”, New Literary History, vol. 31, 2000, pp. 328-329.
190. Cf. Steve Keen, op. cit., ch. 2.
191. Reinert and Daastøl, op. cit., pg. 3. The term comes Werner Sombart’s Drei 
Nationalökonomien.
129General equilibrium
The present-day form of positivist economics is neoclassical economics.193 As 
the mainstream economics of the last four decades or so, it has been central in 20th-
century development theory and practice.194 Here I briefly discuss some of the central 
components of neoclassical economics that will indicate its relation to the positions of 
positivism, historicism and abstract theoreticism. Neoclassical economics, like all 
positivistic economics, is predicated on certain assumptions about human nature, 
although these are formal assumptions, in the sense that they characterize functions in 
economic models. Assumptions fundamental to neoclassical economics include the 
following:
1. People have rational preferences among outcomes. 2. Individuals maximize util-
ity and firms maximize profits. 3. People act independently on the basis of full and 
relevant information.195
What is not included in the assumptions of neoclassical economics is consideration of 
the nature of the institutions that might possibly accommodate them. Apart from the 
asymmetry implied by assumptions 2 and 3 (do firms “act independently”? Even in an 
ideal world it is not obvious that collusive behaviour on the part of firms—oligopoly—
does not satisfy neoclassical assumptions.), the question is, what kind of institution 
allows for both utility-maximization and independent action? If we think of the possible 
ways in which individuals can act so as to secure their own gain (i.e., maximize their 
utility), we might come up with a list such as: reciprocity, co-operation, competition, 
192. See Timothy Mitchell, “Fixing the Economy”, Cultural Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, 1998, pp. 
82-101; Daniel Breslau, “Economics invents the economy”, Theory and Society, vol. 32, 
2003, pp. 379-411.
193. Strictly speaking, “neoclassical economics” refers to marginalism and equilibrium analysis. 
However, following the period when Keynesian economics was dominant (from around 
1940 to the mid-1960s), there was a synthesis of Keynesian macroeconomic ideas with 
general equilibrium analysis, which was known as the “neoclassical synthesis”. Hence, the 
dominant or “orthodox” school of economic thought today is generally referred to as 
neoclassical economics, to distinguish it from the Austrian, Marxian, post-Keynesian, 
evolutionary, etc. schools of “heterodox” economics. Cf. Backhouse, op. cit., pp. 313-316, 
323-326; Keen, op. cit., ch. 14.
130collusion, domination, etc. Not all of those allow for independent action, however. In 
fact, neoclassical economists would argue, the only situation in which people can act 
independently is if their actions take place in an institutional context in which they are 
essentially anonymous. That is, since economic action is measured by prices, and thus 
is mediated by monetary values, independence of action requires a situation in which no 
individual is able to determine prices.
The characterization of economics in general as the “science of exchange” is some-
what of an exaggeration, but as a characterization of Neoclassical economics, it is 
no exaggeration at all. The quintessential feature of Neoclassical economics, above 
everything else, is that it addresses all economic phenomena in the same manner: it 
first reduces the problem to one of pure exchange, and then searches for the equilib-
rium exchange ratio.196
What distinguishes neoclassical economics from classical economics, then, is 
not simply the focus on exchange, but rather the conceptualization of all such exchange 
within the equilibrium framework. In 1832, Richard Whately advocated “catallactics” 
as a more suitable name for the discipline than “political economy”. He disagreed with 
Smith that the discipline could be characterized by reference to the “Wealth of 
Nations”, since “this supplies a name only for the subject-matter, not for the science 
194. Economics is, of course, a diverse endeavour. There are a number of different schools of 
contemporary economic thought, including post-Keynesian, Austrian, New 
Institutionalism, evolutionary economics, and so on, just as there are a number of different 
branches of inquiry, such as microeconomics, macroeconomics, applied economics, 
econometrics, etc. However, there is a mainstream theoretical core, namely “the theory of 
the equilibria resulting from constrained rational individual choice” (Daniel H. Hausman, 
“Philosophy of Economics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2003 
Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta,  at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/economics/
> on 14 January 2006). I do not have the space here to explore the various differences. Nor 
do I discuss Keynes, despite his importance both for 20th century economic thought and for 
development economics. In the last three decades, interventionist ideas often associated 
with Keynes have been discarded in the name of neoliberal policies, such as reducing the 
role of government in economic interaction (e.g., deregulation, privatization), lifting 
controls on foreign investment, rolling back labour legislation, and so on.
195. E. Roy Weintraub, “Neoclassical Economics”, Library of Economics and Liberty, at <http:/
/www.econlib.org/library/Enc/NeoclassicalEconomics.html> on 15 March 2003.
196. “Markets and Exchange”, op. cit.
131itself”.197 Whately goes on to explain his preference, in terms of his understanding of 
man as homo catallacticus:
Man might be defined, “An animal that makes Exchanges;” no other, even of those 
animals which in other points make the nearest approach to rationality, having, to all 
appearance, the least notion of bartering, or in any way exchanging one thing for 
another. And it is in this point of view alone that Man is contemplated by Political-
Economy. This view does not essentially differ from that of A. Smith; since in this 
science the term Wealth is limited to exchangeable commodities; and it treats of 
them so far forth only as they are, or are designed to be, the subjects of exchange. 
But for this very reason it is perhaps the more convenient to describe Political-
Economy as the science of Exchanges, rather than as the science of national 
Wealth.198
Whately indicates that the market concept was already more determinative for 19th- 
century positive economists than for their predecessors (at least in their own eyes). The 
split between history and theory, and the increasing technicalization and formalization 
of the discipline that the marginalist revolution presages, implied a rethinking of the 
role of economics as a discipline, and of its goals as well. Despite the inclinations 
towards social reform that characterized many of the late 19th-century economists, 
there was a marked tendency to approach the discipline as a pure science, concerned 
chiefly to determine truths about the functioning of (industrial) economies, rather than 
to provide prescriptions for policy designed to bring about such an economy.199 In this 
way the discipline became more abstract, and the emphasis on equilibrium theory 
resulted in a much narrower view of the scope of economics, which had less to do with 
real economies and more to do with idealized models of economies. Whatever the 
differences between the varieties of neoclassical economic thought today, they are all 
characterized by exchange:
All branches of Neoclassical economics feed into or stem from this central proce-
dure. They can all be classified according to whether they seek to (1) characterize 
the agents that will be involved in the exchange; (2) characterize the process of 
exchange itself; (3) characterize the results of the equilibrium exchange. Thus, we 
197. Richard Whately, Introductory Lectures on Political Economy, at <http://www.econlib.org/
library/Whately/whtPE.html> on 15 March 2003.
198. Ibid.
199. Although Marshall, for one, held otherwise. See Backhouse, pg. 181.
132see that consumer theory and producer theory fall into category (1). General equi-
librium theory, the theory of the core, etc. fall into category (2); capital theory, dis-
tribution theory, growth theory, etc. all fall into category (3). Exchange is the 
Neoclassical forest, the rest of Neoclassical economics is but trees. Equilibrium 
exchange, then, becomes the Procrustean bed of Neoclassicism: if a particular phe-
nomenon is to be considered “economics”, it must be reducible to equilibrium 
exchange; if it is not thus reducible, it is not economics.200
The neoclassical economics problematic, then, was to give an account of the 
interaction of utility and supply as mediated through the price mechanism. In the 
market system, it was argued, first by Léon Walras (1834-1910), equations could be 
derived to express quantities demanded, quantities supplied, and the prices at which 
these would equilibrate, for all goods in the economy. Thus, the set of equations could 
be solved to show that there is a determinate solution—a general equilibrium—in which 
demand and supply are balanced. That is, the prices of goods could be given 
determinate values based on demand and supply. This was a new vision of the economy 
as a self-regulating system, which added mathematical rigour to the claim that only the 
free market would produce the most optimal outcome, for it could be shown that 
interference in the operation of the market so conceived would only result in lower 
equilibrium prices and hence lower quantities demanded and supplied, and thus less 
output for the economy as a whole.201
However, with this vision came a problem that had not faced classical 
economics, namely, the question of growth. For if economies are always in equilibrium, 
200. “Market Exchange”, 14 March 2003 at <http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/essays/margrev/
markets.htm>
201. However, as Louis Lefeber points out, the analytic framework of neoclassical economics is 
essentially silent on institutions, including the market. The equilibration of the economy 
need not depend on market interactions: “Western practitioners of neoclassicism implicitly 
take the existence of capitalist institutions and the ethos of private enterprise for 
granted...But with a different concept of the state or set of institutions, neoclassical 
economic theory can also be employed as a planning tool for centrally controlled 
economies” (Lefeber, op. cit., pg. 528 n. 10). The institutions so taken for granted are, of 
course, the historical aspect of any system of economic behaviour, from which neoclassical 
economics abstracts. The “new institutional economics” of Douglass C. North and others is 
an attempt to use the neoclassical framework to explain institutions in terms of transaction 
costs, i.e., frictions or inefficiencies in the market. Thus, it attempts to endogenize 
institutions—save for the market itself, of course.
133or only ever temporarily disequilibriated, then this suggests a steady state, rather than 
dynamic progress. In classical economics, the theory was that profits would be invested 
in productive labour, thereby increasing capital accumulation and so leading to growth. 
Economic growth also involved development in that, for Smith at least, growth and 
capital accumulation were the preconditions for the division of labour.202 Growth was 
thus endogenous or internal to the theoretical system of the economy. In neoclassical 
economics, in contrast, the economic system is theorized to be always either in, or 
moving back towards, its equilibrium state, in which payments to factors are balanced 
out. There is no endogenous explanation of growth. Thus, it has generally been ascribed 
to exogenous or external factors, such as technological change, although the attempt has 
been made to link such change to rates of savings and investment. However, the 
neoclassical theory considers the motivating factors for saving and investment, i.e., the 
rate of interest, as determined by the market, and thus excludes (or simply ignores) the 
role of government, both in its role of providing demand, and as a determinant of 
investment.
Economic History
The complexity of the relation between the theory of history and the history of 
theory can perhaps best be illustrated with reference to economic history. Economic 
history is both a subject and a discipline; the latter was hived off (or banished) from 
economics proper with the neoclassical revolution (the shift from political economy to 
marginalism).203 The formalism and abstract deductivism of neoclassical economics 
202. Cf. Roger Backhouse, The Penguin History of Economics, op. cit., pp. 124-127.
203. Cf. Carlo Cipolla, Between History and Economics, trans. C. Woodall, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1991, pp. 3-4; Margaret Schabas, “Parmenides and the Cliometricians”, in D. 
Little, ed., On the Reliability of Economic Models: Essays in the Philosophy of Economics, 
Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1995, pg. 184; Hobsbawm, On History, op. cit., pp. 98-99; Sidney 
Pollard, “Economic History—A Science of Society?” in N.B. Harte, ed., The Study of 
Economic History, Frank Cass, London, 1971, pg. 292.
134and its emphasis on equilibrium analysis did not allow for historical factors to enter into 
the theory. The universal and (literally) timeless economy, dependent on universal and 
timeless human nature, could be “observed” and studied without reference to historical 
occurrences and empirical evidence. This paradigm shift also resulted in a disavowal of 
the history of economic thought, thereby eliding (or explicitly denying) the historical 
context that gave rise to neoclassicism itself, both materially and intellectually.204 In 
keeping with the positivist conception of science, but in an even more thorough-going 
way, neoclassical economics came to represent itself as the science of an object, “the” 
economy. This could be regarded as a rather peculiar, even somewhat theological or 
metaphysical, approach to an undeniably human phenomenon, i.e., that we are so 
constituted as to need material sustenance.205 However, it has become the dominant 
form of economic thought to such an extent that it has, perversely, given rise to a form 
of economic history itself, called “cliometrics”, that aims to show that ahistorical 
neoclassical economic theory is substantiated by history.206 But to claim that this theory 
is universally and timelessly applicable is only to claim that its object has always had 
the features the theory claims to describe, not that the theory is itself somehow eternal. 
204. Cf. Charles M.A. Clarke, Economic Theory and Natural Philosophy, Edward Elgar, 
Aldershot, 1992, pp. 4-7.
205. Cf. Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1974, ch. 1. I 
say “human phenomenon” here to draw attention to the implication of what has become the 
standard definition of economics in introductory texts (as well as more advanced ones), i.e., 
that of Lionel Robbins: “Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a 
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.” (Lionel Robbins, 
An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 2nd ed., Macmillan, 
London, 1935, pg. 16, quoted in Backhouse, The Penguin History of Economics, op. cit., 
pg. 3). This definition, when taken to apply to concrete human behaviour, evidences what 
Karl Polanyi called the “economistic fallacy”, namely, identifying the logic of choice with 
the process of satisfying material needs (cf. Polanyi, The Livelihood of Man, op. cit., pp. 6-
34). Geoffrey Hodgson expresses this in another way, as the confusion of production and 
consumption with supply and demand. As he points out, the “curse of Adam” is not the 
universality of supply and demand, i.e., the need to exchange under conditions of scarcity, 
but the need to work (Geoffrey Hodgson, How Economics Forgot History, Routledge, 
London, 2001, pg. 276).
206. Cf. Schabas, op. cit., pg. 198.
135Thus, if it must be recognized that the “discovery” of the theory was an historical 
occurrence, then this should at least be recognized. But does this mean that the 
historical specificity of the origination of the theory needs to be incorporated into the 
theory itself? Does economic theory need to be hermeneutic?207
The point about the self-understanding of individuals engaged in economic 
activity is not merely a question about the particular attributes that neoclassical 
economics ascribes to people. Rather, it is a question about the notion of invariable, 
universal human nature. This objectified notion is a 3rd-person description which does 
not allow room for subjectivity. In denying subjectivity, however, the possibility of 
history is denied, since the variations in occurrences can all be reduced to laws 
governing interactions.208 Without modification in human nature, i.e., without the 
historical subject, how can change in economic and social structures be properly 
understood?
Neoclassical economists and cliometricians apply concepts and theoretical 
explanations to historical phenomena which could not have been part of the 
understanding of those phenomena of the actors involved in them. Insofar as such 
phenomena involved intentional undertakings—reform of economic policies, for 
example—they were motivated by different purposes and meanings. Abstraction from 
these “subjective” aspects the way that neoclassical economics postulates means that 
these phenomena are no longer analyzed as historical. There is a further complication, 
in that the structures that neoclassical economics theoretically posits simply did not 
exist in earlier historical periods, regardless of whether hypothetical “as-if” 
constructions can give an explanation of such historical phenomena.209 For example, 
207. Cf. Warren Samuels, op. cit.
208. Cf. Paul Bairoch, Economics and World History, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1993, 
pg. 176.
136the market-oriented analysis of a predominantly non-market (or pre-capitalist) society 
cannot hold if it depends on individuals interacting in anonymous economic 
transactions so as to rationally maximize their utility. And unfortunately, the test of the 
methodology of positive economics proposed by Milton Friedman, i.e., that its 
predictive power and not the realism of its assumptions is all that matters,210 cannot be 
used in this case, since the outcomes are already known and thus determine the 
model.211
Finally, it must also be recognized that economic theory has policy 
consequences, or at least is brought into discussions of policy. (German economists, as 
discussed previously, always understood this to be the aim of economic inquiry.) As 
such, theory cannot be disentangled from policy and thus from historical phenomena, 
even if only in the less direct sense that economists train civil servants (e.g., Malthus at 
the East India College). This is one of the reasons historicist economists argued that the 
discipline has to be an understanding, and not ordering, discipline. Policy brings about 
economic phenomena, which economics then analyzes, so as to be able to recommend 
policy or to pronounce on the probability of future occurrences (e.g., giving warnings of 
a stockmarket bubble or a balance-of-payments problem).212
This inextricable relationship between the history of ideas and ideas of history 
is even more pronounced in the case of development. Whereas neoclassical economics 
209. Cf. Hobsbawm, On History, op. cit., pp. 115-116.
210. Milton Friedman, “The methodology of positive economics”, in D. M. Hausman, ed., The 
Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, 
pp. 210-244.
211. This problem has to do with econometric method, since the data used to estimate the 
coefficients of parameters, i.e., the relationship of economic variables, cannot then be used 
to confirm those coefficients. Cf. Schabas, op. cit., pg. 186; Hobsbawm, On History, op. 
cit., pp. 117-118.
212. Cf. Hobsbawm, On History, op. cit., pp. 96-98. Again, the abstract theoreticism of 
neoclassical economics, when taken to assume the market as a given, fails to recognize that 
the market is a policy choice, and not a “natural” object.
137is essentially static and has no convincing theory of growth,213 let alone development, 
classical economics explicitly did, as The Wealth of Nations clearly demonstrates.214 
That is, classical economics was concerned with explaining how it was that the 
capitalist economy had come to appear, and what the determining factors were for its 
future behaviour. Smith and other political economists recognized the distinction 
between previous forms of economic behaviour and how these might have evolved, as 
well as the difference in how these were understood in their various historical 
contexts.215 In the 19th century, then, positivistic economic inquiry tended to be 
concerned with historical economic development, although in its methodology it 
abstracted from history to determine general laws that could then be used to justify 
policies. However, as we have seen, development was not the province of economists 
alone. With the establishment of methods of historical investigation, particularly in 
Germany, the historical context of individual events could be made intelligible in terms 
of how they both expressed and were determined by their historical context, i.e., the 
individuality of an era or culture. Likewise, Comte’s Sociology was a developmental 
science. And to this was added the Darwinian theory of evolution,216 suitably adapted 
by Herbert Spencer to defend a laissez faire view of social evolution in which some 
classes were naturally bound to go to the wall.
213. Cf. Roger Backhouse, Economists and the Economy, Transaction, London, 1994, pp. 47, 
59-60.
214. Cf. Alexander Gerschenkron, “History of Economic Doctrines and Economic History”, The 
American Economic Review, vol. 59, no. 2, 1969, pp. 4-5; Lefeber, op. cit., pp. 525-526.
215. Although when formalized and used for policy reforms, as Polanyi pointed out, such 
historical inquiry tended to be overshadowed by the conviction that the market society was 
somehow natural or inevitable (Polanyi, The Great Transformation, op. cit., pp. 124-127).
216. Although whether this was as influenced by the social sciences as is sometimes claimed is 
debatable. See for instance Donald Winch, “Darwin Fallen Among Political Economists”, 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 145, no. 4, 2001, pp. 415-437.
138Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined some of the fundamental tenets of two 
“canons” in economics, in order to highlight the relationship of economic thinking to its 
historical context. Positivist economics has its roots in the Enlightenment and its 
emphasis on individualism. In the analysis that emerges from the capitalist system of 
production at the beginning of industrialization in Britain, the economic behaviour of 
individuals is defined by exchange motivated by self-interest. The individual as an 
economic agent is conceptualized as seeking to satisfy his wants, desires, or passions 
through exchange interactions with others. The system of economic behaviour as a 
whole then comes to be seen as a mechanism that works so as to harmonize individual 
interests through exchange. As such a mechanism, it is understood to be governed by 
“immutable and eternal” laws that can be determined either through the scientific 
method of Newton and Galileo or, in the Ricardian school, through a deductive analysis 
from axioms that are rationally established. Therefore, it was unnecessary to inquire 
into the history of particular contemporary economic issues in order to understand 
them; the only requirement for policy purposes is knowledge of the current state or 
condition of the system. The history of the system becomes irrelevant, except for the 
purposes of object-lessons.
This description should not, of course, be taken to suggest that positivist 
economics has been entirely averse to history. Indeed, Hume was known to his 
contemporaries as a historian, rather than a philosopher (or economist),217 and his 
essays contain much historical detail, as does The Wealth of Nations. For subsequent 
thinkers, however, economic history came to be interpreted according to the universal 
217. Backhouse, op. cit., pg. 114.
139and immutable principles of economic behaviour discovered by this canon itself. The 
observation that Leslie makes about Smith is all the more appropriate to his epigones:
What he did not see was, that his own system, in its turn, was the product of a par-
ticular history; that what he regarded as the System of Nature was a descendant of 
the System of Nature as conceived by the ancients, in a form fashioned by the ideas 
and circumstances of his own time, and coloured by his own disposition and course 
of life.218
From the conviction that modern political economy had discovered the principles of 
economic behaviour, the successful economic policies of earlier eras could only be seen 
as the result of chance. Say was particularly dismissive of earlier knowledge of 
economic principles, as we have seen. For Say, it was self-evident that “[t]he principles 
of political economy are eternal and immutable; but one nation is acquainted with them, 
and another not”.219 This was thanks to Smith, who “caused us to perceive the 
fallaciousness of all the previous systems of political economy”.220 Mill expresses the 
same view of political economy, although at first in a less triumphalist tone:
The conception, accordingly, of Political Economy as a branch of science is 
extremely modern; but the subject with which its enquiries are conversant has in all 
ages necessarily constituted one of the chief practical interests of mankind...221
Subsequently, however, he pronounces that
The false theories of political economy which have done so much mischief in times 
past, are entirely discredited among all who have not lagged behind the general 
progress of opinion.222
The development of political economy itself was, of course, taken to indicate 
that the eternal principles of economic behaviour had been discovered and thus that 
humanity had progressed. This meant that past economic events could now be fully 
understood in terms of these principles alone; it was unnecessary to know how events 
were understood by economists (or other thinkers) at the time. After the marginalist 
218. Leslie, op. cit.
219. Ibid., pp. 144-145.
220. Ibid., pg. 19.
221. John Stuart Mill, op. cit., PR.1.
222. Ibid., V.10.3.
140revolution, with the mathematization of the discipline, the history of economic thought 
ceased to be integral to the study of economics. The increasing use of techniques of 
mathematical analysis drove a further wedge between economics and history. Not only 
did economics “forget history”, it also forgot its own disciplinary history.223
Once it was believed that the “eternal and immutable” laws of economic 
behaviour had been determined, it then became possible to justify certain economic 
policies on the basis of their accordance with those laws. On the basis of scientific 
inquiry, the assumptions behind certain policies could be shown to be erroneous.
The grand mischiefs of authoritative interference proceed not from occasional 
exceptions to established maxims, but from false ideas of the nature of things, and 
the false maxims built upon them.224
Thus, in commercial policy, trade restrictions were criticized because it could be shown 
that they only benefited a narrow class of producers or merchants at a cost to consumers 
that outweighed the benefit.225 In industrial policy, the creation of monopolies and the 
award of subsidies to favoured industries were rejected because it could be shown that 
they allocated capital inefficiently (among other disadvantages).226 Entails and other 
traditional rights of inheritance or land-use were criticized because it could be shown 
that they hindered the improvement of agricultural production. And market regulations 
that restricted the rights of merchants to engross or forestall and required them to sell 
through fairs were rejected because it could be shown that they led to inefficient 
distribution.227 Indeed, as discussed above, for Smith the historical progression of 
economic growth driven by manufacturing and trade, rather than by agriculture, was 
contrary to the natural order of progression.
223. The expression is taken from the title of Geoffrey Hodgson’s book, How Economics Forgot 
History, Routledge, London, 2000.
224. Say, op. cit., pg. 60.
225. Smith, WN IV viii, pp. 245-246; Ricardo, op. cit., pg. 89; Say, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
226. Smith, WN IV ii, pg. 30; 
227. Say, op. cit., pp. 80-82.
141In contrast, the central idea of historicist economics is that human beings are 
fundamentally creative. The combination of creativity and productive resources is what 
gives rise to wealth. In this canon, wealth is understood not as a given stock of 
resources or productive capacities, but as the “common weal”. The common weal is an 
inclusive concept that implies the ongoing transformation of the community through 
innovation and context-dependent policies. As such, the task of economics is seen to 
involve understanding historical conditions so as to be able to transform them, in the 
process transforming the understanding of economic behaviour. Historicist economics 
was fundamentally hermeneutic, in recognizing that its disciplinary findings were also 
historically contextual.
The conception of human beings as fundamentally creative and productive is 
central to historicism. Creativity is an explanans of economic progress, whereas for 
positivism, it is an explanandum. The latter’s insistence on the atomistic notion of 
human beings as self-interested agents who only seek to better their condition (in their 
economic behaviour, at least), and the static equilibrium implied by the conception of 
the economic system as a mechanism, makes it difficult to account for innovation. 
Positivist economic principles seek to explain how the system works to equilibrate 
production and consumption through the price mechanism. Oriented to explaining 
equilibrium, they do not explain in a convincing way how the economic system comes 
to be transformed, whether intentionally or by its own internal logic. Essentially, the 
explanation offered is that this happens through technological innovations in 
production.228 In order for capital to be productive, i.e., to earn a return, it must be 
invested. However, the return on capital in industries with mature production 
technologies tends to be constant (save for external “shocks” such as disruptions in the 
228. “Technological” is used here in a broad sense to include management processes, 
organizational structures, and so on, as well as production, i.e., machine-technologies.
142supply of primary commodities), and may even decrease over time. In the face of this, 
self-interested capitalists, seeking to better their conditions, are motivated to innovate 
and therefore direct some of their capital investment into research and development. 
Successful innovations allow for returns to capital beyond “normal profits”. This leads 
other producers to adopt such innovations, whereby the new technology matures and 
profits return to normal.
As a result of this process, the economic system changes to some degree, 
whether within a single industry (such as with the introduction of robotics into 
automobile manufacturing) or more broadly (such as the development of internet-based 
sales systems). Nevertheless, the economic system as a whole is still conceived as 
equilibrating production and consumption. Innovation is “endogenized” in this 
explanation (i.e., it is incorporated into the system), and thus cannot be understood as 
transformative of the economic system as a whole. Because this system is analytically 
divorced from its social and political context, there is an inherent conservatism to 
positivist economic theory. This is particularly evident in relation to the issue of 
development, where such economic theory is used to recommend policies that depend 
on conditions that obtain in leisured countries, such as the privatization of industry and 
services, the deregulation of markets, the liberalization of trade regimes, etc. However, 
the problem for hard-working countries is not that those conditions obtain but policies 
are lacking. Rather, it is that those conditions do not obtain in the first place. The policy 
advice suggested to (or often imposed upon) hard-working countries says, in effect, “be 
like us”, whereas the problem that has occasioned such advice in the first place is that 
“they” are not “like us”. 
The classical political economy of Ricardo, Say, Mill, and others was 
essentially concerned with the economic conditions of politically unified and 
143economically dominant nations, such as Britain and France. However much the 
analyses might have accurately represented such conditions, they did not address the 
very different conditions facing other Europeans, such as the Germans and Italians. As 
has been pointed out, it is unlikely that policies that work well for price-makers (i.e., 
those with the economic power to determine market prices, such as through monopolies 
on production or control of shipping) can work as well for price-takers (i.e., those 
without such power).
Positivist economics provided the conceptual and theoretical basis for 
development thinking, as is evident in mainstream development thinking today. This 
basis includes the following ideas: economies are comparable, because they all involve 
the interaction of human beings who have an invariable, universal nature (whether 
defined in terms of self-interest, wants, basic needs, capabilities, etc.); there is a natural 
progression to all economies, which is governed by laws that are universal and can be 
objectively determined (arguably, Smith’s “natural order” is still a guiding principle for 
stages-theory, which is still influential in current positivist development, e.g., the World 
Bank); economies can be analyzed and explained in isolation, independently of their 
interactions with other economies and international conditions (a view that has been 
referred to as “methodological nationalism”229); an economy is essentially self-moving 
and self-regulating (in the era of development economics (the 1950s and 1960s), it was 
generally held that this was a stage that could be achieved, if the state directed 
investment and provided infrastructure to bring about the transition); the aim or goal of 
(economic) development is already known; history provides the “object-lessons” of the 
universal trajectory of development (when examined in a sufficiently abstract way so as 
229. See Charles Gore, “The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for 
Developing Countries”, World Development, vol. 28, no. 5, 2000, pp. 789-804, and 
“Methodological Nationalism and the Misunderstanding of East Asian Industrialisation”, 
European Journal of Development Research, vol. 8, no. 1, 1996, pp. 77-122.
144to determine the laws of progress); these theoretically determined laws are more 
determinative than any individual historical case (i.e., actual history cannot disconfirm 
the laws of progress).
Finally, the aim of development as an intentional undertaking is to bring about 
the “natural” conditions that have historically failed to appear. Although the 
specification of those conditions may vary, they depend in general on the notion of a 
universal human nature; a significant problem has been, then, to get people to recognize 
their nature, i.e., that they are rational maximisers, self-interested, etc. This is another 
feature that positivist development inherits from positivist economics: the idea that 
human nature can be determined objectively, and thus override the self-understanding 
individuals have of, and the meaning they ascribe to, their interactions and encounters. 
Thus Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) could argue that
the economist...follows indeed in a more patient and thoughtful way, and with 
greater precautions, what everybody is always doing every day in ordinary life...He 
estimates the incentives to action by their effects just in the same way as people do 
in common life.230
Yet he also argued that
Economic language seems technical and less real than that of common life. But in 
truth it is more real, because it is more careful and takes more account of differences 
and difficulties.231
For Marshall, as for other economists, the greater insight that economics has into 
ordinary life is not from ignoring subjective aspects of action, but precisely by taking 
them into account. But economics does so in a rather unusual way, at least for a 
discipline that claims exactitude as one of its chief virtues. For the subjective aspects 
are not themselves investigated, but rather are observed externally, so to speak.
230. Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th edition, Library of Economics and Liberty, 
Bk. I. ch. II at <http://www.econlib.org/library/Marshall/marP1.html#Bk.I,Ch.II> on 14 
March 2003.
231. Ibid., Appendix B, at <http://www.econlib.org/library/Marshall/marP57.html> on 14 June 
2005.
145It concerns itself chiefly with those desires, aspirations and other affections of 
human nature, the outward manifestations of which appear as incentives to action in 
such a form that the force or quantity of the incentives can be estimated and meas-
ured with some approach to accuracy; and which therefore are in some degree ame-
nable to treatment by scientific machinery...
It is essential to note that the economist does not claim to measure any affection of 
the mind in itself, or directly; but only indirectly through its effect. No one can com-
pare and measure accurately against one another even his own mental states at dif-
ferent times...232
Thus economics does not study the subjective per se, but only its outward and objective 
manifestation. From these it infers the preferences, wants, desires, etc., which are then 
used to explain value. The objectivity of economics is what justifies this authority, since 
it can compare the indirect effects of the subjective more accurately than the individual 
can compare her own subjective states.
232. Ibid., Bk. I, ch. I.
Chapter 3: Positivist and Historicist
International DevelopmentIntroduction
In this chapter, I discuss two related topics: first, how positivism manifests 
itself in mainstream development thinking; and second, postdevelopment’s historicist 
critique of the mainstream. I aim to show that both positivist and historicist conceptions 
of development are problematic in terms of meaning, because both alienate the meaning 
of, and in development, from the subject of development. This problem of meaning 
concerns the way that history and progress are understood, on the one hand, and the 
relation between knowledge, agency and self-understanding, on the other.
This chapter does not examine in detail the history of international 
development in the UN era (i.e., post-1945),1 or the various contemporary schools of 
development thinking, such as people-centered development, participatory action 
research, or world-system analysis. In part, this is simply for reasons of space. Another 
reason is that in recent years, positivist development has become syncretic (at least 
rhetorically), incorporating aspects of different theoretical approaches.2 Despite this 
syncretism, these approaches share a theoretical attitude towards development, whether 
this is understood as an objective, unintended process, or as an intentional, subjective 
(and often imperialistic) process. This attitude is antithetical to grasping and expressing 
concrete individuality in its historicalness, and yet such historical individuality is 
essential to development. In the relation posited between the theorist and the theorized, 
1. Such surveys can easily be found in standard texts on development, for example, John 
Martinussen, Society, State and Market, Zed Books, London, 1997; Michael P. Todaro and 
Stephen C. Smith, Economic Development, 8th ed., Addison-Wesley, Boston, 2003.
2. Cf. Todaro and Smith, op. cit., pg. 111.146
147the possibility of grasping the concrete individuality of both is denied, yet it is the 
concrete individuality of the hard-working country that is postulated as the problem of 
development. Thus, the aporia of development thinking is found in the problem of 
expressing concrete individuality and what this entails for the genesis of meaning. In 
both positivist and historicist development thinking, the meaning of development is 
made incoherent.
Defining Development?
The difficulty of defining development is well-recognised, and arises not only 
from the conflation of the process of developing with the goal or end-state of 
developedness,3 where the former itself is problematized in relation to the latter (i.e., 
how can we know that this process is a process of developing until, and unless, 
developedness is reached?). There is also the conflation of the intention to develop and 
the immanent process of development that first appeared in the 19th century with the 
positivism of the Saint-Simonians and Comte, as Cowen and Shenton argue (DoD ix-x). 
These thinkers introduced the notion that an intention to develop could be brought to 
bear upon the immanent process of development, so as to bring about progress with 
order, rather than the disorderly progress that the technical, economic and political 
revolutions of the 18th century manifested. This was a reconceptualization of the 17th- 
and 18th-century concept of progress, so as to connect it with order in the immanent 
process of development. It was also a reconceptualization of the earlier, phusiological 
or “organic” notion of development, which involved the idea of the expression of what 
was latent in a society or culture (i.e., its individual principle), but not the notion of 
3. Cf. DoD 3; Barbara Ingham, “The Meaning of Development”, World Development, vol. 21, 
no. 11, 1993, pg. 1803.
148advancement or improvement. Yet it did involve, also, the notion of destruction or 
decay, because development (as fu/sij) was understood to be cyclical.
Although the 17th- and 18th- century notion of progress consisted in 
improvement and the destruction of (or liberation from) superstitions and traditions, it 
was not thought of as an immanent process, but rather as a consequence of reason and, 
in particular, rational inquiry into nature. The 19th-century idea of development 
introduced the distinction between intention and immanent process, but this then raised 
the question of how the former was to be brought to bear on the latter, for intention 
requires knowing what to intend, i.e., knowing the end (developedness) in advance. If 
the immanent process has not occurred, how can this be known? And then how can 
development be brought about? The answer of 19th-century positivism was to argue for 
the notion of trusteeship, i.e., some agency capable of embodying the intention, so as to 
bring it to bear on the immanent process latent in society. The notion of trusteeship, 
which constitutes development as a doctrine, Cowen and Shenton argue, is the modern 
idea of development that has determined development thinking into the present.4 They 
find it operative not just in the mainstream, but also in (historicist) critiques of 
development, which they find invoke equally a trustee to act on behalf of those unable 
to reject positivist development and find their own indigenous alternative to it.5 
What is important here, in the light of the previous chapter, is to look at the 
conditions that allowed for this invention, and that have continued to be invoked in 
attempts to define development, construct development theories, and justify practices. 
As has often been pointed out, the idea and practice of development originated in 
Europe, in particular in Britain and France, and is therefore often criticized as 
4. “An intention to develop becomes a doctrine of development when it is attached, or when it 
is pleaded that it be attached, to the agency of the state to become an expression of state 
policy” (DoD viii).
5. I examine this point in more detail below.
149Eurocentric.6 What is less often noted is that in its 19th-century form, this idea was not 
directed primarily, if at all, at non-European nations or peoples, but at the North 
Atlantic nations themselves.7 “The idea of intentional development, through the state 
practice of development, had arisen in Europe to deal with the problem of a surplus 
population in Europe” (DoD 174). This is clear in Comte, who specifically rejects the 
idea that anything is to be learnt from less advanced areas as regards social statics and 
social dynamics, and thus that their development is of anything but secondary concern.
History and Development
In the U.N. era, the aim of positivist development has been to bring about the 
conditions and institutions (although, in practice, almost exclusively the market) that 
will allow the economy to equilibriate at a higher level than it presently does, so 
enabling economic growth to occur. These conditions and institutions are deemed by 
assumption not to be present in the underdeveloped economies, since if they were, 
capital accumulation, rates of profit, etc., would all have already occurred so as to bring 
about such growth. The historically contextual institutions that may be present in a 
country or society are simply irrelevant, for they fail, again by assumption, to 
instantiate the idealized institutions of neoclassical economic analysis.8
The disparity between such purportedly “natural” conditions and actual history 
makes positivist development conceptually problematic. What is aimed at—
developedness—is determined from the historical context of the developed countries, 
6. See for example Björn Hettne, Development Theory and the Three Worlds, Longman, 
Harlow, 1995, ch. 1. Cf. DoD 470-472.
7. Arguably, Colbert’s attempt in the 17th century to bind the various French colonies and 
France into a trade group had the same kind of trusteeship and constructive intent as 19th- 
century development doctrine, a point Cowen and Shenton do not discuss. Nevertheless, 
these were settler colonies of Europeans, not colonies of non-Europeans.
8. See for example Alice Sindzingre and Howard Stein, “Institutions, Development, and 
Global Integration: A Theoretical Contribution”, at <http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar/
erc2002/pdf/i017.pdf> on 14 January 2006.
150suitably abstracted through theoretical analysis to appear as the ideal for all societies. 
But abstraction from history cannot establish this as an ideal, for the process of 
development simply cannot be mimetic. The events that constitute the history of the 
leisured countries are unrepeatable. Yet the individuality of such historical occurrences 
is inessential to the abstract history of positivist development. The histories of the hard-
working countries are similarly abstracted from, often with regard to the very same 
events, in positivist explanations of why they are not developed. But if their own 
history does not explain their lack of development, then it is difficult to specify what 
does. That is, it is difficult to specify how an abstract occurrence is responsible for a 
concretely individual condition. It is even more problematic to claim that their 
development involves the same immanent process that occurred in the leisured 
countries, a process which for some reason has simply failed to occur.
The fundamental difficulty for any concept of progressive development is how 
to justify what is to count as the desirable end-state of developedness. That is, unlike 
with progress, in which the new supersedes the old, whether destructively or 
inclusively, in development the new is identified as somehow latent in the old. When 
this is turned into a constructivist conception (and undertaking), the difficulty is how to 
determine what is latent in the actual, i.e., in present conditions. How, exactly, is the 
present supposed to manifest the latent as latent, i.e., in its latency? The political 
economists, in one respect, were not troubled by this, since the universality of human 
nature they presupposed showed how the optimal economic structure ought to be so as 
to enable its own progress. Yet this view still encounters the hermeneutic problem of 
how to recognize—and allow for—the provisionality of these conceptions themselves. 
A significant complication in discussing development, one that we have also 
encountered in the discussion of economics, is the mutual implication of theory and 
151practice. The history of development thinking not only reflects the history of 
development, but also inflects it. Changes in development thinking have affected what 
has been undertaken in the name of development, and also how previous intentional 
development has come to be understood. For example, the neoliberal approach 
predominant at the World Bank in the 1980s and 1990s (the “Washington Consensus”9) 
consisted predominantly of policy prescriptions aimed at minimizing government 
involvement in economic matters. The ensuing deterioration in conditions in the hard-
working countries affected has since become further “data” for theoretical analysis of 
development. Yet these “data” are often treated as if they had simply occurred, rather 
than having resulted from inentional action.
Dependency Theory
The attempt to link such historical practices and policies to the twin 
phenomena of development and underdevelopment was the aim of dependency 
theorists such as Baran, dos Santos, Frank and others, who argued that Marx’s analysis 
of capitalist exploitation of labour could be applied to the relation between “centre” and 
“periphery” countries (i.e., developed and underdeveloped). The economic conditions 
of the centre, and its historical role in colonizing the periphery, allowed it to accumulate 
the surplus generated in the periphery, for example, through the deteriorating terms of 
trade that producers of primary commodities faced. In this way the development of the 
9. The term was invented by John Williamson. Cf. John Williamson, “What Washington 
Means by Policy Reform”, in John Williamson, ed., Latin American Adjustment: How 
Much Has Happened?, Institute for International Economics, Washington, 1990; 
“Democracy and the ‘Washington Consensus’ ”, World Development, vol. 21, no. 8, 1993, 
pp. 1329-1336; “What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington Consensus?”, 
The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 15, no. 2, 2000, pp. 251-264; and “The Strange 
History of the Washington Consensus”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, vol. 27, no. 
2, Winter 2004-05, pp. 195-206. For critiques see Charles Gore, “The Rise and Fall of the 
Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries”, World Development, 
vol.  28, no. 5, 2000, pp. 789-804; and Ha-Joon Chang and Ilene Grabel, “Reclaiming 
development from the Washington consensus”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 
vol. 27, no. 2, Winter 2004-05, pp. 273-291.
152developed countries was predicated on the underdevelopment of the underdeveloped.10 
The situation of underdevelopment was neither simply that of not yet having reached 
the conditions of “take-off”, nor a result of a failure to modernize. Rather, the countries 
of the periphery were actively and transitively underdeveloped by the more advanced 
countries, to effect the latters’ own development. Given that there were few, if any, 
opportunities for the underdeveloped to emulate this practice, and that they were faced 
with an international order dominated by the developed, some dependency theorists, 
such as Frank, argued that the only solution lay in “de-linking” from this systemic 
exploitation.11 However, few underdeveloped countries were capable of such a radical 
rejection of the world order, and attempts at autarky since the end of the 19th century 
have been limited to exceptional cases, such as the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea and, perhaps, the Kingdom of Bhutan.
Nor is it evident that de-linking could have had the developmental effects 
suggested. First of all, as some neo-Marxist critics pointed out, the idea of de-linking 
seemed to involve not some alternative to capitalist exploitation, but rather the 
replacement of external exploitation by internal exploitation. If the point of de-linking 
was simply to accumulate capital domestically, rather than allowing it to be siphoned 
off, then this hardly represented an improvement in the conditions of the working 
class.12 The second problem is more fundamental: what was supposed to be an 
alternative to underdevelopment was yet another form of bringing to bear on an 
10. Cf. Andre Gundar Frank, “The Underdevelopment of Development,” in S.C. Chew and 
R.A. Denemark, eds.  The Underdevelopment of Development, SAGE, London, 1996, 
pp. 17-55; Todaro and Smith, op. cit., pp. 123-127; Martinussen, op. cit., pp. 39-40, 85-100; 
Hettne, op. cit., pp. 87-104; DoD 61-63.
11. Myrdal makes the same point in Asian Drama with respect to trade. Cf. Gunnar Myrdal, 
Asian Drama, Pelican Books, Harmondsworth, 1977, pg. 52.
12. Cf. DoD 78.
153immanent process an intention to develop that could not originate in the 
underdeveloped country itself.
Development as Doctrine
As Cowen and Shenton point out, the aim of the intention to develop is not 
simply to install certain conditions (such as markets, rule of law and property rights, or 
health care, education and employment), but to bring about a situation in which such 
conditions are sought after by the underdeveloped themselves (DoD 3-4). The intention 
is to bring about the process that will result in people being able to intend their own 
development. There are two problems with this. First, the very basis for what is 
supposed to be intended—i.e., the process whereby the now-developed became so—
was not itself intended. It was an immanent process and only as such could the intention 
first appear. Second, it follows that the intention to develop cannot do what positivist 
development posits, i.e., bring about that intention in others where the basis for it is 
lacking.
The origin of positivist development thinking in the 19th century has been 
examined in detail by Cowen and Shenton, to show the conceptual conflations that 
inform contemporary development thinking. Of particular importance is the positivist 
articulation of development as a counterpoint to progress. Cowen and Shenton argue 
that the contradictions in positivist development come from conflations of concepts of 
progress, development, intention and process. These conflations stem from the conflict 
between two sets of concepts. First, there is a contradiction between the association of 
destruction with creation in the concept of development and the idea of improvement in 
the concept of progress.13 This is further complicated by the difference between the 
13. It should be noted, however, that the phusiological concept of development on which 
historicism rests does not involve destruction, because cyclical decline is part of what it 
means to be a totality.
154classical notion of development, which involved sequential creation and destruction, 
and the modern, technical notion that these are simultaneous. Such simultaneity then 
implies that discontinuity, rather than continuity, is inherent to development.
In its classical origin, and not only in ancient Greece, development was understood 
as a natural process in which phases of renewal, expansion, contraction and decom-
position followed each other sequentially according to a perpetually recurrent cycle. 
In the modern world, a world in which it is artifice rather than nature that provides 
the analogue for the understanding of movement, development has increasingly 
come to refer to a discontinuous process in which destruction and renewal are 
simultaneous, as much as sequential. (DoD viii)
Second, there is the conflict between the concept of order as natural and order as a 
result of intentional activity. The naturally immanent process of development involves 
disorder as much as order, yet disorder mitigates improvement, particularly when 
improvement is understood as the new that encompasses rather than replaces the old.14 
In the classical, cyclical conception of development, in which there was no idea of 
improvement, there was no contradiction between development and order: the natural 
order of things necessarily involved decay. When order is located in intention, however, 
it becomes opposed to the natural order of decay.
Logically...it is difficult to understand how it is possible for development to be 
intended without the belief that destruction will create improvement, the purpose of 
the intent to develop. Belief in making development happen can only be grounded 
in the process of development, in that it is the process of development, and not the 
intention to develop, which makes destruction a necessary part of development. 
(DoD ix)
When these contradictions are considered in relation to history, a discordance appears 
between the transcendence of history in the intention to develop, and immanence in it in 
the process of development, which also gets elided in positivist development. The 
intention to develop transcends history in arising from, and being directed towards, 
historical conditions. “Indeed, most intentions to develop are themselves responses to 
what are deemed to be the undesirable effect—unemployment, impoverishment—of 
14. As can be found, for example, in the arguments of Fontenelle and others in the battle of the 
Ancients and Moderns (cf. Robert Nisbet, Social Change and History, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1970, pp. 104-110).
155processes of development” (DoD ix).
The modern idea of development as a counterpoint to progress arose in 
response to the effects of the social upheavals of the late 18th and 19th centuries in 
Europe, resulting from political and economic transformations. It therefore referred to 
those countries undergoing social changes, such as industrialization, that were 
considered to be progressive. The intention to order progress was itself a result of 
progress, so transcending the historical context. In the U.N. era of international 
development, the notion of the transcendence of history is similarly evident, but now 
related to lack of progress, i.e., stagnation in a state of “un-” or “underdevelopedness”. 
The intent to develop thus takes on the additional sense of bringing progress about as a 
response to its failure to occur. Some condition (e.g., lack of capital accumulation, the 
lack of an industrial sector, the domination of “traditional” values and ways of thinking) 
is posited as preventing the immanent process from occurring. However, in U.N.-era 
development, those who are to develop are no longer the same as those capable of 
developing. The transcendence of positivist development thinking to its own historical 
situation is brought to bear by some agency or other (e.g., the World Bank, bilateral 
development agencies, NGOs), on behalf of those considered to be incapable of doing 
so themselves because of their historical immanence.
This endeavour, which Cowen and Shenton characterize as “trusteeship” 
(DoD  ix), is thus riven by the contradiction between the situation of the “trustees” (i.e., 
the development experts) and that of the “underdeveloped”, because the intention to 
develop that motivates the trustees does not originate in the situation of 
underdevelopedness. Yet what it aims to bring about is the situation that the developed 
are in, based on the belief that the present situation of underdevelopedness (in the hard-
working countries) is an earlier stage of the present situation of developedness (in the 
156leisured countries). Operative in this belief, then, is the comparative method, in which 
history is linearized into necessary stages that all societies pass through.15 The idea of 
linear stages of social evolution, in which the leisured countries represent more 
advanced stages, denies their coevalness with the hard-working countries, because it 
represents them as existing in “another time”.16 Coevalness problematizes the notion of 
stages because it entails that societies cannot be regarded as atomistic or self-contained, 
and thus comparable across space and time. Only through such a denial does the 
doctrine of development have credibility, because the coexistence or coevalness of 
developedness and underdevelopedness contradicts the necessity ascribed to social 
evolution (or history) upon which this doctrine rests.
Comte
The developmental solution, which can be traced back to Comte, is the 
Comparative Method, i.e., the notion that coeval societies or cultures can be compared 
so as to determine the different stages of development they have reached.17 Here, 
taxonomy is conflated with temporality.18 But this conflation by itself cannot establish 
what it aims to, since there is no way to determine whether the “after” state posited is an 
improvement. For this, a third concept is required, i.e., the necessary continuity of the 
temporal order. Comte’s argument was that historical continuity is shown by social 
15. Cf. Robert Nisbet, “Developmentalism: A Critical Analysis” in The Making of Modern 
Society, Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton, 1986, pp. 33-69.
16. Johannes Fabian argues that the denial of coevalness (or “allochronism”) is characteristic of 
anthropology. It is “a persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of 
anthropology in a Time other than that of the producer of anthropological discourse” 
(Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How anthropology makes its object, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1983, pg. 31). Development and anthropology, of course, arise 
from the same intellectual milieu.
17. Cf. Robert Nisbet, Social Change and History, op. cit., pp. 189-197 and The Making of 
Modern Society, Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton, 1986, pp. 54-57.
18. Temporality being one way to reconcile freedom and order. Cf. Leonard Binder, “The 
Natural History of Development Theory”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 
28, no. 1, 1986, pp. 3-5.
157advancement in history, for this is what allows for the explanation of itself, i.e., how it is 
that we can now grasp that society has advanced. As Nisbet describes the Comparative 
Method,
It is a synchronization of three distinguishable orders of fact: (1) the relationships of 
a coexisting logico-spatial series, (2) the relationships of a selected temporal series 
with emphasis on before-and-after in time, and (3) an evolutionary or developmen-
tal series that is held to mark ‘normal’ or ‘true’ development of a type.19
For Comte, progress was indeed improvement, but it came at a cost, namely 
disorder in the social fabric that threatened to overwhelm the new society that was 
beginning to emerge. However, progress was also a saviour, since it involved increase 
in the scope of knowledge and increasing sophistication in research, particularly in the 
natural sciences and in economics. Comte, following Saint-Simon, argued that 
scientific method had developed to a point where it was now possible to scientifically 
investigate society itself. The study of history could be put on firm scientific 
foundations, so as to determine the laws governing progress, thus allowing it to be 
directed so as to preserve order. This was Comte’s notion of development, in which 
there could be progress with order, so long as social change was scientifically managed.
The concept of development was thus elided into progress. With development, 
as opposed to progress alone, the improvement of society could be brought about in a 
way that corresponded to tendencies held to be latent in society. In this way, continuity 
between the old and the new could be ensured. The intentional undertaking to direct 
society by a managerial class (the “trustee”) could ensure that change and continuity 
would be balanced, rather than one becoming dominant over the other, which would 
lead either to social breakdown or social stagnation. The important feature of Comte’s 
conception of development, then, is that it is an intentional undertaking, yet one that 
seeks to bring about only what is deemed to be already latent in society itself. Thus, 
19. Nisbet, The Making of Modern Society, op. cit., pg. 54.
158development depends on prior knowledge of the goal that is intended. That is, it 
depends on the analysis of society so as to determine what tendencies are latent in it. 
But such analysis has itself been made possible not by development, but by progress. In 
other words, it is progress that has made development possible, yet in Comte’s 
conception (as with colonial and post-colonial development), development is now to 
make progress possible—at least, progress that does not engender a radical 
discontinuity with the past.
Comte’s conception of development, and the analysis it required, was directed 
in the first instance to the “most advanced nations” (i.e., those of Western Europe), 
rather than to those that have “from any cause whatsoever, been arrested, and left in an 
imperfect state”.20 Furthermore, the analysis involves a “scientific treatment” of history 
that is an “abstract inquiry into the laws of society”, because the stage of advancement 
which society had reached, Comte argued, did not allow for a “concrete Sociology”.21 
The primary aim of development was to address “the problem of moral regeneration” 
and “the social regeneration of Western Europe”, which Comte perceived to be in crisis. 
Once this was achieved, it was to be followed by “political reorganization”, or the 
“reorganization of society”.22
Comte’s concept of development has a number of aspects. First, it depends on 
the objective scientific analysis of “abstract history”, by which Comte means the 
history of Western European nations according to the various stages these have passed 
through, and not the concrete history of events, which are too complex for analysis (at 
least at present, according to Comte). Second, it involves the notion that lack of 
20. Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte Vol. III, trans. H. Martineau, 
Batoche Books, Kitchener, 2000 [1896], pg. 5.
21. Ibid., pg. 6.
22. Auguste Comte, A General View of Positivism, Paris, 1848.
159progress means imperfection. Third, development can bring about advancement 
without the destruction of the past, because it can bring out what is latent in society, 
unlike progress on its own. Whereas progress resulted in disorder, development was to 
result in regeneration. Fourth, development is to order progress, although it itself is a 
result of (disordered) progress. Finally, this concept was not oriented towards the 
advancement of a particular polity or nation-state, but the advancement of humanity, 
although, as Comte argued, this had to start with the more advanced nations.23
Cowen and Shenton argue for an end to doctrines of development, which 
suppose that the development of one people can be entrusted to another, yet their 
immanent critique does not suggest how “free development” might be understood when 
it is “contained within a world of necessity and actual relative scarcity” (DoD 450). Part 
of the reason for this, I suggest, is that they pay little attention to historicism and its 
influence on German development thinking in the 19th century.24 This is an important 
intellectual source of present-day critiques of positivist development, such as 
institutionalism and postdevelopment. The latter are often dismissed as dependent on 
postmodernism and the relativism it entails, expressed in terms of the “West” and its 
“other”. The significance of historicism, however, was its emphasis on historical 
immanence and the inadequacy of universalist causal explanations for articulating that 
situation intelligibly. For historicist development thinking, no cultural comparison can 
tell us what we should do or become (although this does not mean that we cannot learn 
23. “...practice requires as imperatively as theory that we should concentrate our view upon the 
most advanced social progression. When we have learned what to look for from the elite of 
humanity, we shall know how the superior portion should intervene for the advantage of the 
inferior; and we cannot understand the fact, or the consequent function, in any other way: 
for the view of co-existing states of inequality could not help us. Our first limit then is that 
we are to concentrate our sociological analysis on the historical estimate of the most 
advanced social development.” (Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte Vol. III, 
op. cit., pg. 6).
24. Except for Friedrich List. Cf. DoD 158-165.
160from others). There is no universal blueprint for social life, but only the individual 
development of each era or culture. At issue in historicism is the actuality that 
constitutes the meaningfulness of each individual historical era, rather than the 
necessity of causal laws. However, historicism, too, is aporetic with respect to the 
possibility of freedom in development, as the freedom of possibility.
Positivist Development
A wide range of actors are involved in positivist development, such as the 
multilateral and bilateral development agencies, non-governmental organizations, 
academics in various disciplines, and development workers. This range makes the 
subject of development heterogeneous. In calling them positivist or mainstream, I do 
not mean to imply that there is necessarily a shared set of ideas or beliefs about the 
subject, save perhaps the idea that development can be brought about. Nor is there 
necessarily theoretical agreement as to what constitutes development. There are 
disagreements about factors, causality, the roles played or functions performed by 
different institutions, and so on. Given such heterogeneity, it has been argued in recent 
years that development has become predominantly identified with practice, and is thus 
coming to mean “whatever is done in the name of development”.25 Since practices 
depend on practitioners, “[d]evelopment thus comes to be defined in a multiplicity of 
ways because there are a multitude of ‘developers’ who are entrusted with the task of 
development” (DoD 4). Yet there is general agreement on how development might be 
explained (or defined), i.e., through the theoretical analysis of its causes that 
accompanies such practice, whether implicitly or explicitly. 
25. Alan Thomas, “Development as Practice”, Journal of International Development, vol. 12, 
2000, pg. 775.
161There is also general agreement about how development is conceptualized, 
i.e., as a process that can be observed and explained. Disagreements about development 
are not about how we conceive of development, nor how we investigate it, but rather 
about how it is to be achieved, and thus the adequacy of accounts of the empirical (or 
historical) evidence. In categorizing all of these positions as mainstream development 
thinking, then, I am not claiming that there is substantive agreement on the subject of 
development. Rather, I am claiming that they share a conception of development that 
informs the particular factors that are focussed on.
Meaning
The central problem of the subject of development is one of meaning.26 Hard-
working people are posited as unable to grasp the meaning of their own development, 
precisely because they are hard-working, and therefore it has to be determined for them 
by those who can. Determined in this way, however, it cannot be the meaning of 
development for them, because it is not something they themselves have had any part 
in. It might be understood as an abstract description of a theoretical process or end-state 
and therefore meaningful as an abstraction, but it cannot be understood as the meaning 
of their development, because this does not—and cannot—include the way they come 
to determine it as meaningful. The point here is not that positivist development supplies 
the wrong meaning of development for the hard-working, and that it should instead find 
out from them what the right meaning is, as historicist development thinkers suppose. 
26. The centrality of this problem should be evident from the difficulty encountered in defining 
development. In order to be an object of positivist inquiry, it must already be defined. The 
elisions, abstractions, equivocations and caveats encountered in attempts to clearly identify 
the subject of development, and the use of proxies by those who are engaged at a more 
“practical” level, all indicate how deep this problem runs. Even the postdevelopment critics 
fall foul of the same type of essentialising that they decry in positivist development, thus 
establishing it as the “other” by which their critiques are ultimately determined. I take this 
to be yet another indication of the need for a phenomenological approach.
162Rather, the point is that the meaning of development cannot be determined in this way 
at all, because it is not an object. Positivist development determines the end or aim of 
development theoretically, and then seeks to implement this. But implementation 
cannot transform this theoretical end into an end that people have determined for 
themselves, and therefore it cannot become theirs. The hard-working are posited as 
always outside their own development, a situation that no amount of technical 
implementation by others can overcome. If this is the case for the hard-working, then it 
would seem to apply equally to the leisured countries. Yet positivist development 
denies this, because it identifies the meaning of development with the conditions of the 
leisured countries that they have attained or achieved themselves.
Positivist development makes the meaningfulness of the subject of 
development problematic, because it posits development as an objective process 
governed by general or universal laws. Development is only meaningful as the 
instantiation of progress, determined with reference to those countries or societies 
considered to have advanced forms of economic interaction, and to have solved the 
problem of absolute poverty. The meaning of progress is taken to be given or self-
evident. Positivist development depends implicitly on the Enlightenment idea of 
universal history, in which the historical experience of different societies is linearized 
into a single historical trajectory for humankind. This linearization abstracts from 
historical specificity by treating each historical context as an instantiation of a stage of 
progressive transformation. The meaning of historical contexts is thus taken to lie not in 
their concrete individuality, but only in the way they instantiate what can be objectively 
measured. The historical is subsumed under general laws, which, as we have seen, 
destroys the meaning of the historical as singular and unique.
163The idea of progress thus determines the significance of development as an 
intentional undertaking: development is to bring about progress where it has not yet 
occurred. Seen in this way, development becomes the realization of socioeconomic 
conditions that already exist elsewhere and which are taken to represent progress. 
Knowledge of progress is possible because we can observe and compare socioeconomic 
conditions to determine what gave rise to them, i.e., the causes or laws that governed 
their appearance. Development depends, therefore, on the positivistic concept of 
knowledge, in which the analysis of historical change is aimed at determining the 
general laws that govern it, for the purposes of prediction and control.27 Development 
involves prediction, because the intention must be implemented in such a way as to 
bring about what is intended, in light of the laws governing the immanent process. As 
Cowen and Shenton point out, 
to intend to develop does not necessarily mean that development will result from 
any particular action undertaken in the name of development. However, the exist-
ence of an intent to develop does mean that it is believed that it is possible to act in 
the name of development and that it is believed that development will follow from 
actions deemed desirable to realise an intention of development. (DoD viii)
Development involves control because it is meant to counter the destructive effects of 
progress, e.g., the immiseration caused by the technological transformation of industrial 
production, particularly the problem of surplus population, unemployment, or poverty, 
a problem that finds its first modern expression in the work of Malthus.28 Yet positivist 
development draws ahistorical conclusions from its analysis of history, because it 
naturalizes the historical conditions so analysed. History, in effect, becomes 
meaningless.
27. This positivistic view of science can be found in John Stuart Mill, Essays on Some 
Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, op. cit., pg. 98.
28. Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, London, 1798 at <http://
socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/malthus/popu.txt> on 30 April 2005.
164Development is seen as the intention to bring about progress on the basis of 
knowledge of the general laws of progress. Thus, progress itself is a necessary 
condition for development to be undertaken. The study by development experts of 
(unintentional) progress, e.g., in the early industrializing countries, is posited to provide 
the knowledge that can then be operationalized. For example, socioeconomic progress 
is often seen in terms of stages, such as primitive, feudal, and capitalist.29 The 
investigation of the transitions between such stages is taken to reveal the general laws 
governing their occurrence, the knowledge of which can then be applied to the 
conditions of those who have not yet made the transition to capitalism, industrialization, 
the knowledge society, etc. And this then raises a further question about what has 
prevented such transitions from occurring. Yet what is less often asked is what makes 
such knowledge itself possible. How is it possible to inquire into the laws of progress, 
given that such inquiry is a prerequisite for intending development?
The problematization of meaning arises because development is objectified as 
a process to be explained. Individuals are separated from involvement in, and 
constitution of, their own historical context in the explanation of historical occurrences. 
Furthermore, the significance of historical context is denied as constitutive in 
development since, on the one hand, historical immanence is seen as what prevents 
development, whereas, on the other, historical transcendence is thought to be possible 
only on the basis of developedness. For this reason, as Cowen and Shenton argue, the 
notion of trusteeship is brought in as a bridge. The trustee—the developmental state, the 
development agency, the Bank, etc.—is held to be capable of acting on behalf of those 
held incapable of acting on their own behalf. The situation of the developer is 
absolutely distinct from the situation of the developee, a heterogeneity that cannot be 
29. As found in Turgot, the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, Marx and, in its U.N.-era 
form, in W.W. Rostow, in which the stages are characterized in terms of consumption.
165overcome by appeal to transcendence, universality, etc., because such appeal already 
presupposes that the meaning is identical for developer and developee alike.
The meaning of developedness is presupposed as objectively given by the 
existence of the leisured countries. This meaning is not contestable; only the 
explanation of development is, and this requires expert knowledge. Positivist 
development entertains no dispute about the meaning of developedness, because this is 
objectively demonstrated in the indicators which signify it and by which it is measured. 
Contention over the meaning of development is therefore taken to indicate a lack of 
knowledge and expertise, which is equated with lack of developedness itself. 
Furthermore, in regarding development as an objective process, the idea that inquiry 
into development is itself part of development cannot enter into the analysis. This 
makes development into a process already given, and thus ultimately static.
My principal aim here is to show how positivist development, although 
appearing to recognize that the subject of development is far more complex than 
positivist economics can account for, reformulates notions that pose a challenge to this 
predominantly economic framework in a way that assimilates them to it. Positivist 
development thinking takes development as an object that can be studied, learnt about, 
and operationalized, but cannot itself call this approach into question, nor the analytic 
tools used to study it. Positivist development is unable to consider that the subject of 
development might be complex because it is not an object at all. By objectifying 
development, it removes development thinking itself from the subject of development. 
That is, such thinking is about development, but is not seen as constituting it in any 
way. Thus, the role of the development expert is viewed as that of an objective, 
scientific observer of the socioeconomic situation, and not as a co-constituter of the 
meaning of the particular phenomenon concerned. 
166The Development Problematic
Surplus population and poverty
In positivist development, poverty is generally regarded as a defining 
characteristic of underdevelopedness. For example, the World Bank’s mission 
statement says that “[o]ur dream is a world free of poverty.”30 The Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) says that, “CIDA supports sustainable 
development activities in order to reduce poverty and to contribute to a more secure, 
equitable and prosperous world.”31 The vision of CARE Canada is: “[w]e seek a world 
of hope, tolerance and social justice, where poverty has been overcome and people live 
in dignity and security.”32 The Agence française de Développement Group (AfD), in its 
operations on its own behalf, “finances projects in nearly all sectors of the economy. 
Their goal is to struggle against poverty and improve living conditions”.33 The Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) defines development cooperation by 
its “aim to alleviate poverty by helping people in partner countries to help 
themselves.”34 The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development has 
as its goal “[a] world without poverty, fear and ecological destruction”.35 Oxfam 
Canada is “dedicated to fighting poverty and injustice around the world” and Oxfam 
UK’s purpose is “to overcome poverty and suffering”.36 Norway’s development agency 
NORAD states that its “most important task is to contribute in the international 
30. At <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK: 
20040565~menuPK:34563~pagePK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html> 
on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
31. At <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/whatwedo.htm> on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
32. At <http://care.ca/about/about_e.shtm#mission> on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
33. At <http://www.afd.fr/jahia/Jahia/op/edit/pid/180> on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
34. At <http://www.sdc.admin.ch/index.php?userhash=29146280&navID=396&lID=1> on 12 
July 2005, emphasis added.
35. At <http://www.bmz.de/de/ziele/index.html> on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
36. At <http://www.oxfam.ca/what_we_do/index.htm> and <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/ 
about_us/mission.htm>, respectively, on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
167cooperation to fight poverty”37 and sees one of the main goals of development 
cooperation as “[t]o combat poverty and contribute towards lasting improvements in 
living standards and quality of life”.38 The mission of South Africa’s National 
Development Agency (NDA) is to “contribute[] towards the eradication of poverty and 
its causes”.39 The goal of the work of Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA) “is to improve the standard of living of poor people and, in the long term, to 
eradicate poverty”.40 These, of course, are just a fraction of the organizations involved 
in development activities, whether at the community, regional, national or international 
level.41
Development thinkers, too, have focussed on poverty. In Asian Drama, first 
published in 1968, Gunnar Myrdal wrote that “‘[d]evelopment’ means the process of 
moving away from ‘underdevelopment’, of rising out of poverty.”42 More recently, 
Joseph Stiglitz, although purportedly arguing for “a new paradigm for development”, 
has claimed that
The experience of the past 50 years has demonstrated that development is possible, 
but not inevitable. While a few countries have succeeded in rapid economic 
growth...bringing millions of their citizens out of poverty, many more countries 
have actually seen...poverty increase.43
Amartya Sen, too, ultimately couches his conception of “development as freedom” in 
terms of poverty.44 Development addresses “the more inclusive idea of capability 
37. At <http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=1139&V_LANG_ID=0> on 12 July 
2005, emphasis added.
38. At <http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=1284> on 12 July 2005, emphasis 
added.
39. At <http://www.nda.org.za/ndaVm.htm> on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
40. At <http://www.sida.se/Sida/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=160> on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
41. Devdir's Directory of Development Organizations 2005 lists 43,500 organizations 
worldwide that are involved in development in one way or another, and warns that “[t]he 
database is not exhaustive and there may be other relevant organizations in your country.” 
Downloadable at <www.devdir.org>.
42. Myrdal, op. cit., pg. 355.
43. Joseph Stiglitz, “Towards a New Paradigm for Development,” UNCTAD, Geneva, 1998, 
pg. 5 (my emphasis).
168deprivation” (DaF 20), which he then reformulates as “capability-poverty”: “poverty 
must be seen as the deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely as lowness of 
incomes” (DaF 87).
Because poverty is demonstrable (through the use of statistical measurements, 
research projects, and anecdotal observation), it is taken as a given. It is taken to be so 
self-evident that it is difficult to clarify whether leisured and hard-working countries are 
differentiated in other respects, and how this functions as the basis of positivist 
development thinking. The only difference that counts is that leisured countries have 
“solved” the problem of (absolute) poverty (at least for themselves), as is evident in its 
minimal levels according to whatever the baseline is for poverty in a particular country. 
Hard-working countries have failed to solve this problem, and so remained immersed in 
widespread poverty and destitution.
Although it is now usually argued that development is about more than just 
economic growth, development experts still maintain that economic growth is an 
important factor, since a certain level of production in a society provides the resources 
with which to address poverty.45 The problem for the poor is not simply that they are 
poor but that their poverty, as a lack of productive resources, is what makes them unable 
to affect their situation. The argument is that the situation of the poor denies them the 
ability to take the steps necessary to address their own poverty.46 For example, the 
44. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1999. Hereafter DaF 
followed by page number.
45. An argument which can be found in Adam Smith. Cf. WN I 104.
46. A situation that has been called a “poverty trap”. See UNCTAD, The Least Developed 
Countries Report 2002: Escaping the Poverty Trap, United Nations, Geneva, 2002; Jeffrey 
D. Sachs, John W. McArthur, Guido Schmidt-Traub, Margaret Kruk, Chandrika Bahadur, 
Michael Faye and Gordon McCord, “Ending Africa’s poverty trap”, Brookings papers on 
economic activity, vol. 1, 2004: 117–240; Charles Gore, “Globalization, the International 
Poverty Trap and Chronic Poverty in the Least Developed Countries”, CPRC Working 
Paper No. 30, Manchester, 2003; Alice Sindzingre, “Explaining Threshold Effects of 
Globalisation on Poverty: An Institutional Perspective”, UNU-WIDER Conference, 
Helsinki, October 29-30, 2004.
169accumulation of capital is spread too thin to allow it to be productively invested; 
government revenues per capita are so low that they do not allow for investment in 
productive public goods. Leisured countries, in contrast, have the resources both for all 
sorts of social programmes to be possible and for their different economic sectors to be 
able to exploit opportunities. And despite the persistence of poverty (on some measure, 
at least) in rich societies, their resources enable them to undertake ameliorative 
programs (e.g., income support, free or inexpensive education, health-care provision, 
etc.) that can enable the poor to climb out of poverty (at least in principle).
For this reason, the development goal is to provide the means not present in the 
underdeveloped society itself whereby that society can come to be the agent of its own 
development. Foreign aid and technical co-operation (whether for infrastructure 
projects such as building dams and roads, or for targetted projects such as vaccination) 
are a means to bridge the developmental gap. But this gap is not merely one of income 
level. Therefore, foreign aid is not redistributive, but is intended as a catalyst for 
change, from poor (because of traditional and contextual constraints) to increasing 
wealth (by becoming modern[ised]). This view is characteristic of the various positivist 
development theories found throughout the U.N. era: modernisation theorists who 
focussed on economic growth, industrialization, and the sequence of stages that 
countries must go through;47 structuralist theorists who focussed on unemployment and 
structural imbalances between agricultural (“traditional”) and industrial (“modern”) 
sectors;48 dependency theorists who focussed on the international environment and its 
47. For example, Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse, Hirschman and Rostow (cf. Martinussen, op. cit., 
pp. 56-72; Todaro and Smith, op. cit., pp. 112-115). Rostow’s stages theory can be found in 
W.W. Rostow, “The Take-off into Self-sustained Growth”, The Economic Journal, vol. 66, 
no. 261, March 1956, pp. 25-48, and “The Stages of Economic Growth”, The Economic 
History Review, New Series, vol. 12, no. 1, 1959, pp. 1-16.
48. For example, Lewis, Prebisch, and Myrdal (cf. Martinussen, op. cit., pp. 73-84; Todaro and 
Smith, op. cit., pp. 116-123).
170effects on capital accumulation in the “periphery”;49 neoliberal theorists who argued for 
privatization and deregulation, and “market-friendly” policies;50 and recent (and 
somewhat more nuanced) development thinkers who argue that industrialisation needs 
to be accompanied by social transformation (almost always in terms of the connected 
domains of marketization and institution- or capacity-building, the latter creating the 
conditions for the former, which itself involves a change in attitudes).51 For these 
theorists, development assistance is ostensibly aimed at supplying the conditions for 
development through the action of the “trustee” (e.g., the Bank or the “developmental 
state”), which on the basis of its own experience and resources is able to provide the 
knowledge and capacity necessary.
The centrality of poverty in positivist development reflects the 19th century 
concern about the “social question”, i.e., the appearance of large numbers of 
unemployed, particularly in urban areas, as a consequence of the industrialization or 
mechanization of agricultural and manufacturing production. In this way, a “surplus 
population” was created that had neither its own means of subsistence, nor access to the 
means of production (cf. DoD 151-153). Yet this state of affairs, despite the social 
immiseration, was also recognized to be progressive. The 19th-century development 
problematic thus concerned the social immiseration and revolutionary consequences of 
such progress.52 The positivist conception of intentional development arose in response 
to this situation.53 For example, the issue for the Saint-Simonians, was “the creation of 
49. As discussed above.
50. For example, Bauer, Lal, Bhagwati, and Krueger (cf. Todaro and Smith, op. cit., pp. 128-
131). This was the view of the IMF and World Bank view throughout most of the 1980s and 
1990s, often called the “Washington Consensus”.
51. For example, Stiglitz.
52. Revolutions broke out across Europe in the 1820s, 1830s and, most seriously, in 1848. Cf. 
Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, op. cit., ch. 6; The Age of Capital, op. cit., ch. 1.
53. As we have seen in the previous chapter, economic development as understood by the early 
political economists was not an intentional undertaking. 
171order in a society undergoing radical transformation and the nature of that 
transformation itself” (DoD 22).
Objectification by quantification and classification
Positivist development in the U.N. era elides the conceptual difficulties 
through objectification of the subject of development, i.e., by data-gathering, 
quantification and measurement, and increasing reliance on sophisticated analytical 
techniques to show what the significant variables are, how they relate to one another, 
and how these can be operationalized. The underdeveloped are considered to be 
incapable of doing this on their own behalf. Therefore, they cannot determine their own 
development, and thus the development that is posited for them as what should occur 
cannot be binding for them, in the sense that they recognize it as the meaning of their 
development. If they could recognize it as the meaning of their own development, they 
would already have the basis for the intention, and therefore intentional development 
would be unnecessary.
In U.N.-era development, the nation-state has primacy, despite various 
attempts to recognize both supra- and sub-national regionality (particularly in the 
European Union). Therefore, social change is generally articulated in terms of national 
entities. The problematic of development involves the classification of countries, as 
developed and underdeveloped, modern and traditional, high-, middle- and low-
income, etc., as is evident in the tables and indices produced annually by the World 
Bank and the UNDP.
The modern idea of development is a result of the particular histories of the 
leisured countries, not those of the hard-working countries. The measure of 
developedness is therefore based on these histories. Yet this measure is supposed to be 
applicable outside of those countries. More precisely, the standards and values used to 
172determine stages of development are supposed to transcend the societies in which they 
arise. But how can they be transcendent or universal, when the very notion of 
development as an intentional activity rests on the fact that such standards are not 
present in “underdeveloped” societies?
These contradictions were resolved in positivist economics, as we have seen, 
in its discovery of the “natural laws” governing economic interaction. Because such 
laws also determined economic progress, the latter was held to be latent in the 
economic system. In Marx’s view, this made development inevitable: 
Intrinsically, it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of development of the 
social antagonisms that result from the natural laws of capitalist production. It is a 
question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity 
towards inevitable results. The country that is more developed industrially only 
shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.54
The naturalization of economic behaviour made it feasible to propose and implement 
policies designed to harmonize society with these laws. The “iron necessity” provided 
the basis for the classical liberal program of “the running of society as an adjunct to the 
market”,55 a program that involved, as Karl Polanyi expressed it, “a mystical readiness 
to accept the social consequences of economic improvement, whatever they might 
be”.56 Nevertheless, whatever the economic improvement, the social improvement 
predicted in instituting the market society proved to be illusory.
Although naturalistic economic laws provide a theoretical basis for the 
intention to develop, there is still a need for universal, objective standards of the 
improvement that this intention is to bring about. Without such standards, the claim that 
the leisured countries are more developed or advanced than, rather than simply different 
from, the hard-working countries would be unsupportable. Thus, in the U.N. era the 
54. Karl Marx, Preface to the First Edition, Capital Vol. I, op. cit..
55. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, op. cit., pg. 57.
56. Ibid., pg. 33.
173determination of developedness has involved data-collection and the construction of 
indices to quantify social and economic achievement, such as GNP, mortality and 
morbidity rates, education rates, etc. Such measurement and use of indices objectifies 
and thus abstracts from the lived reality that constitutes the situations measured.
Social change and transformation
The second aspect that characterizes the development problematic is the nature 
of social change and transformation. There are four aspects to this: (i) whether social 
change is mechanistic, involving the interaction of independently existing “atomic-like 
entities” (DoD 211) that are not affected by such change themselves, or whether it is 
organic, involving the interdependence of entities which themselves change along with 
the changes in society; (ii) whether such change is the result of external forces such as 
general laws of history, or of internal tendencies; (iii) whether the very idea of social 
change can itself change; (iv) the role of agency (intention or purpose), i.e., whether 
social change can be directed or whether the domain of agency is subordinated to it, and 
also how such change itself affects both the understanding of this role and the purposes 
themselves.
One conceptual basis for classification of countries that is not usually clearly 
articulated is the source of social change or movement ascribed: developed countries 
are considered to have an internal source of social movement or self-transformation as a 
consequence of their history or the process of development, whereas underdeveloped 
countries are considered to lack this source, and thus to be unmoving or immobile, or 
“stagnant”, precisely because development has not occurred. With this classification, 
the development problematic is seen to be concerned with how to transform hard-
working countries so as to be the motive source of their own development.
This view is evident in the modernisation paradigm, which maintains that 
174tradition only properly pertains to hard-working countries, because they remain 
determined by their traditional ways of being, which prevent them from recognizing 
their own agency (i.e., that they are the creators of their own history). Leisured 
countries, on the other hand, are seen as being free from determination by tradition.57 
However, this serves to occlude the significance of tradition in leisured countries, i.e., 
that their ability to change themselves is a result of their history and thus is part of their 
tradition. The modernisation view of hard-working countries as “not yet self-moving” 
is correlative to the failure to recognize that “being had” by tradition is a way of having 
tradition, i.e., of being a society. Tradition is not the “no longer” of the past, nor is 
modernity the “not yet” of the future. Traditions are only such in the way they are had, 
i.e., in the significance they have for members of a society, however implicit or latent 
this might be. Tradition is not a possession, but is constituted in the relation a society 
has towards its history.
Positivist development problematizes this by attempting to quantify and 
measure all aspects of social being, thereby making them amenable to technical 
intervention. It holds that the state of self-producing or self-moving can be achieved by 
means of technical production. But in order to achieve this the society in question 
would already have to be self-determining, which cannot therefore be the aim or end-
state. That is, being produced cannot be equated with self-producing. A society cannot 
be “modern” in the sense that positivist development supposes without being had by its 
traditions. Correlatively, a society cannot be “traditional” without having its traditions.
57. For example, Rostow, “Take-Off”, op. cit., pp. 27-28 and “Stages”, op. cit., pp. 4-5; Stiglitz, 
op. cit., pp. 5, 12-13, 16. Myrdal articulates a similar view, but also attempts to locate this in 
the developing countries themselves (Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 20-21, 27-33, 36-38).
175Illustrations of Positivist Development
The positivist conception of development is primarily due to the central role of 
positivist economics and its theoretical models. Since this is most evident in the World 
Bank’s conception of, and approach to, development, I draw on the Bank’s publications 
to illustrate the tenets of positivist development. A variant of positivist development is 
found in Amartya Sen’s concept of development as the expansion of capabilities 
(“development as freedom”) and its operationalization by the UNDP. Although this 
variant appears to go beyond the positivism of economics, in many ways it actually 
furthers this tendency by broadening quantificational analysis to include quality of life. 
Although it goes beyond the narrow focus on income and growth that until recently 
typified mainstream development thinking, it does so in a similarly positivist way. The 
capabilities or capacities deemed significant are those which can be measured, and so 
made quantitatively comparable. This leaves no scope for consideration of the meaning 
of such capabilities, and thus how they are qualitatively distinct, which would require 
historical contextualization.
The World Bank
The World Bank has always been the premier development institution. In providing 
loans and expertise, it has exerted considerable influence over domestic develop-
ment policy.58
In order to provide some evidence for my analysis of positivist development, I 
examine the World Bank. Although only one institution among many, the Bank is 
highly influential in positivist development thinking, for a number of reasons, including 
its membership structure, the scope of its involvement, its knowledge production, and 
58. Philip McMichael, Development and Social Change, Pine Forge, Thousand Oaks, 2000, 
pg. 50.
176its institutional links. Thus, despite the wide criticism of many of its policy 
prescriptions in recent years, its conception of development is not idiosyncratic.
Almost all countries belong to the Bank, and are shareholders in it. They 
contribute to the capital that it uses for its operations, which means that borrowing 
countries are also owners of the institution from which they are borrowing.
The World Bank is a major actor in the material and discursive fields of develop-
ment—something that cannot be overlooked in any overview of the sector. It pos-
sesses unparalleled economic and institutional resources with which to implement 
projects and programmes around the world.59
The Bank is involved in a large number of projects in almost every sector and 
underdeveloped country and is considered to be “a conveyor belt of ideas about 
development to the borrowing countries”.60
In addition, the Bank has extensive data-gathering and research capacities,61 
and produces numerous reports, policy papers, technical papers, etc., on a wide variety 
of development issues, and regularly produces reports on individual countries. Through 
such avenues, it has contributed extensively to development thinking and played a 
“major role...as a source of ideas on economic and social development”.62 It has links 
to other international institutions (e.g., the International Monetary Fund (IMF), other 
development institutions and agencies, and non-governmental organizations). The Bank 
also works in partnership with other development institutions and agencies, such as the 
regional development banks (most of which were modelled on the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)63), bilateral aid agencies, and non-
59. Emma Mawdsley and Jonathan Rigg, “A survey of the World Development Reports I: 
discursive strategies”, Progress in Development Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, 2002, pg. 16.
60. Michael Gavin and Dani Rodrik, “The World Bank in Historical Perspective”, American 
Economic Review, vol. 85, no. 2, 1995, pg. 332.
61. The Bank’s administrative budget for fiscal 2004 was $1.87 billion (Annual Report 2004, 
pg. 7) and it employs “[s]ome 10,000 development professionals” worldwide, according to 
the Bank’s website (“What is the World Bank” at <www.worldbank.org>)..
62. Gavin and Rodrik, op. cit., pg. 329.
63. UNITAR/DFM, “Lesson 3”, Online Course in the Negotiation of Financial Transactions, 
2003, pg. 18.
177governmental organizations (NGOs). Finally, as is evident in its publications, the Bank 
is concerned to present itself not just as an opinion leader, but as responsive to ideas 
from other sources.
Where the Bank’s strength lies is in its tremendous powers to spread and popularize 
ideas that it latches on to. Once the Bank gets hold of an idea, its financial clout 
ensures that the idea will gain wide currency.64
The World Bank’s Conception of Development
An examination of some of the Bank’s reports can make its theoretical attitude 
to development evident. My aim is to show the following. First, the Bank views 
development as an immanent or natural process evident in the history of North Atlantic 
countries in the 19th century and certain East Asian countries in the late 19th and 20th 
centuries. Studying the history of the leisured countries, as well as the recent history of 
the hard-working countries, is considered sufficient to show experts how development 
occurs or fails to occur and thus how development agencies and experts can assist or 
intervene to speed it up or bring it about. Second, development is objectified as a linear 
process that holds good for all societies. This process is seen fundamentally as an 
economic process, to be explained predominantly with the analytical framework of 
neoclassical economics, as a matter of allowing markets to function properly so as to 
bring about growth.65 The experts who study this process and learn about it are not 
considered to be part of the process itself. Rather, they stand outside of it, purely as 
observers. What is observed does not include the conceptualization and action of such 
observers. Nor are development interventions properly considered to be a part of the 
process, since what they aim to bring about is an objective, “natural” process. In this 
conception, then, the relationship between the leisured and hard-working countries is 
64. Gavin and Rodrik, op. cit., pg. 333.
65. As is evident in the Bank’s constant reiteration of the necessity of economic growth.
178treated as inessential. Development is a process that can be instantiated by any country, 
regardless of conditions in other countries.
In World Bank publications, we find all of the central aspects of positivist 
development: (i) the objectification of the subject of development, both concretely as 
“the poor” and abstractly as “poverty”; (ii) theoretical abstraction from history; (iii) the 
identification of knowledge with development; and (iv) the disjunction between 
development as the implementation of objectively determined policy, and as a form of 
self-understanding that arises through determination of policy.
The Reification of Poverty
The Report draws on years of World Bank experience—in the analysis of projects, 
sectors and national economies, and in research—to examine the causes and effects 
of progress in human development and what it takes to implement successful pro-
grams in this area.66
The first Report to focus on poverty67 characterizes the situation of hard-
working countries as involving “two major challenges”, which are “to continue their 
social and economic development” in an increasingly difficult international 
environment, and to “tackle the plight of the 800 million people living in absolute 
poverty, who have benefited much too little from past progress” (WDR80:1). In its 
examination of these challenges, the Report takes as “[o]ne of its central themes...the 
importance of people in development”, citing Adam Smith’s observation “that the 
66. World Bank, World Development Report 1980, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980, 
pg. iii (hereafter WDR followed by year and page number). Note that every WDR carries a 
disclaimer, such as “This volume is a product of the staff of the World Bank, and the 
judgments made herein do not necessarily reflect the views of its Board of Executive 
Directors or the countries they represent” (e.g., WDR98/99:ii). Thus, as Mawdsley and 
Rigg point out, “[t]hey are officially not documents of the Executive Board of the World 
Bank, and so do not represent formal policy papers” (op. cit., pg. 9). The status of the 
WDRs is complex, as the case of the Kanbur Report (WDR00/01) evinced. For this reason, 
I also make some reference to the Annual Reports (referred to by AR with year and page 
number following), which are official documents. These documents cover the whole 
history of the Bank, whereas the WDRs only began in 1978.
67. The others are WDR90 and WDR00/01.
179prosperity of a nation is determined mainly ‘by the skill, dexterity, and judgment with 
which its labor is generally applied’ ” (WDR80:1).
As with other WDRs (particularly WDR00/01), WDR80 characterizes 
development as “attacking absolute poverty” (WDR80:2), which is to be accomplished 
by accelerating growth and taking measures “to raise the incomes specifically of poorer 
groups” (WDR80:2). Development is understood primarily as concerned with poverty, 
thus involving distinctions between groups of people.68 This restricted sense of 
development raises the question of why development should be of general concern, a 
question which cannot be answered by appeal to positivist economic analyses. Several 
reasons are suggested, such as basic moral considerations, the self-interest of the more 
well-off in terms of economic opportunities and interconnections (such as trade and 
investment) and, more recently, the issue of security, since extremely poor countries are 
viewed as likely to become “failed states” (i.e., those in which central government has 
collapsed, such as Somalia) and thus breeding grounds for extremists of one type or 
another.69
Objectification of “the poor”
An element common to all the WDRs is the objectification of “the poor”. 
WDR80 states that
The poor are a mixed group. Some cope reasonably well; others are on the margin 
of survival. Their well-being can fluctuate widely...
The poor have other things in common, apart from their extremely low incomes... 
(WDR80:33)
In such objectification, people are completely identified with their conditions, which 
68. Arguably, this has now become central to the positivist conception of development (as the 
Bank likes to say, “a consensus has been reached”), as the mission statements of various 
bilateral development agencies and the recent campaign to “Make Poverty History” show.
69. Thus the “war on terror” is the correlative to “attacking poverty”. The symmetry is evident 
in the martial language and abstract target of both.
180could be called (after Marx) “poverty fetishism”, i.e., turning people into predicates of 
poverty, rather than poverty being a predicate of people. This monodimensional 
characterization is in stark contrast to the characterization of the non-poor (who are 
only infrequently mentioned in the Reports) and, presumably, with the way that the 
authors of the Report and the experts whose views they rely on would characterize 
themselves. Poverty supplies the “absolute constraint”, such that people are reduced to 
passive recipients of external forces (natural, political, social and—less often 
mentioned—developmental). They are represented in a way that makes them tractable 
to intentional planning done on their behalf by agencies and governments, through 
“strategies” aiming to transform them from poor to “less poor”, a process they are not 
capable of themselves. Indeed, the lack of such ability or capacity is itself identified 
with poverty:
Unable to read a road sign, let alone a newspaper, their knowledge and understand-
ing remain severely circumscribed. Yet they learn about the possibility of a better 
life from direct observation, from friends and relatives, and perhaps from small 
improvements in their own circumstances; and they hope that their children will 
somehow be able to climb out of poverty. (WDR80:33)
This characterization of “the poor” denies their agency, i.e., that these are people who, 
like others, are striving to survive and living their lives, no matter what their conditions 
may be. These conditions do not determine them as human beings, any more than is the 
case with others.
The positivist presupposition here is that the human situation is a matter of 
“facts” and the acquisition of knowledge that the expert can have about “the poor”. 
Development expertise is considered to be sufficient for understanding the lives of 
others, but only in such a way that these lives are objectified. The absolute distinction 
made between the experts and the poor (or even the better off and the poor), implies that 
only those who are knowledgeable live their lives, and do so only by effecting 
improvements in their conditions. This suggests that the ability to understand our 
181situation is a function of having the ability to change it through technical knowledge 
about it, rather than being a constitutive aspect of living it. The poor are regarded as 
lived by their conditions, or rather, as not living at all in this sense. We find here the 
conflation of two different notions of “a better life”: on the one hand, the notion of an 
objectively demonstrable improvement that “the poor” cannot understand; on the other, 
the notion of the capability to understand improvement, i.e., the ability to make 
evaluative judgments about conditions of life. This conflation is essential to the 
objectification of the subject of development, because it allows for external 
determination of what is “better” even when the people concerned do not recognize it as 
such or even disagree with it. Such objectification also allows for the quantification of 
poverty, and its measurement through data-gathering activities, although there are 
technical difficulties encountered: 
It is difficult to measure the extent of poverty. To begin with, absolute poverty 
means more than low income...There is also room for disagreement about where to 
draw the line between the poor and the rest, and about the correct way to calculate 
and compare incomes and living standards at different times and in different places.
To compound these difficulties, the data are inadequate...Nor is direct observation 
necessarily a reliable basis for generalization... (WDR80:33)
Although such difficulties might suggest that this concept of poverty is overly 
determinate, the positivist explanation is that “[n]or is there any serious disagreement 
about who the poor are” (WDR80:35). “The poor” is an objective, natural category that 
can be observed and thus theorized about. Positivist development is not concerned with 
understanding the situation of the subject of development, but rather with ordering it 
into categories that then allow solutions to be sought and implemented.
Despite the adoption of elements from the “human development” approach of 
Amartya Sen and the UNDP, the WDRs retain a predominantly economic focus, and 
thus seek to explain development in terms of the policies and practises that may have an 
impact on the quantitative dimensions of poverty (such as rates of infant mortality, 
182morbidity, educational attainment, etc.). Development is not understood as a situation 
of human existence, but is treated as an object—a process—discovered in the world, 
and thus analyzable positivistically. WDR80 displays a rather uneasy compromise 
between its neoclassical economics basis and the notion of “human development” (as 
the Bank understands it):
The case for human development is not only, or even primarily, an economic one. 
Less hunger, fewer child deaths and a better chance of primary education are almost 
universally accepted as important ends in themselves. But in a world of tight budg-
etary and manpower constraints, the governments of developing countries must ask 
what these gains would cost—and what the best balance is between direct and indi-
rect ways of achieving them. (WDR80:32)
The point of human development, at least as the UNDP formulated it, was of course 
that it encompassed the economic. By enclosing it in a logic of cost-benefit analysis (a 
logic which is always normative and not positive, despite the apparent neutrality of the 
language), the primacy of the economic is once again reasserted.
Abstraction from History
Positivist development also objectifies through abstraction from history. For 
example, in its discussion of how oil-importing countries adjust to conditions of high 
oil prices, WDR80 argues from the “earlier experience” of “a similar adjustment in 
1974-78” that
The adjustment process has two stages. First, when there is a sudden increase in the 
cost of imports relative to export earnings, countries squeeze imports—and so 
growth slows sharply. Because too sharp a fall is disruptive, both economically and 
politically, countries accept large current account deficits and finance them from 
borrowing or aid. (WDR80:3)
This description of the adjustment process abstracts from the concrete situations in 
question. There is no consideration given as to why these countries followed this 
process. Rather, the implication is that this process simply occurs naturally, rather than 
that it was intentionally undertaken (perhaps even with advice from agencies such as 
the Bank). The way that these countries are theorized to have responded to the previous 
183situation is presented as an objective process. The Report continues:
The second stage is to reduce these current account deficits to levels that can be 
financed over the medium term. At the same time output and trade must be restruc-
tured to meet the new circumstances. This structural change requires heavy invest-
ment. (WDR80:3)
Notably, this description purports to describe what historically occurred between 1974-
78, but it presents it as a universal description of “the adjustment process”, as if this 
were what would always occur in such conditions. There is no reflection here that, 
having gone through a previous adjustment, such countries might actually pursue 
different policies, perhaps because they have learnt from the past. That is, there is no 
consideration given to the fact that such countries are no longer the same as they were 
in the previous period, having lived through and experienced that period. The analysis 
dehistoricizes the history it purports to describe.
WDR90 gives a clear example of how positivist development interprets history 
to conform with its presuppositions:
A review of development experience shows that the most effective way of achiev-
ing rapid and politically sustainable improvements in the quality of life for the poor 
has been through a two-part strategy. The first element of the strategy is the pursuit 
of a pattern of growth that ensures productive use of the poor’s most abundant 
asset—labor. The second element is widespread provision to the poor of basic social 
services, especially primary education, primary health care, and family planning. 
(WDR 90:iii)
Which “development experience” is being referred to here is not clear, nor whose 
experience of it. It does not appear to include the experience of the 19th-century 
industrializing countries, in which capital-intensive production replaced labor-intensive 
production, resulting in widespread immiseration amongst the poor. Some countries, 
such as Germany, did enact measures to provide social services to the poor, but others, 
notably Britain, did not. Further on in the Report (Box 3.4), this is actually referred to, 
but without acknowledging that this strategy is not what the Bank prescribes. In 
discussing the industrial revolution in the U.K. and the U.S.A., it states that
184In both countries development in the early phase of the revolution was capital-
intensive. Since at the same time the labor supply was increasing, the real wages of 
unskilled workers grew slowly, and economic growth had only a small effect on 
poverty. After about 1820 in the United Kingdom and 1880 in the United States, 
however, real wages began to rise, and poverty began to decline. (WDR90:50)70
Only later did “the labor-saving bias of early industrialization [give] way to a neutral or 
labor-intensive bias” (WDR90:50). This could be seen as supporting the Bank’s view of 
the correct strategy for development (i.e., concentration on labor-intensive production), 
since the focus of its policy recommendations is on reducing poverty. But this would be 
precisely to disregard the development experience of the early industrializers. The 
“development experience” that the Bank refers to seems to be that of “three East Asian 
countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand”, which achieved high growth that was 
“relatively labor-intensive, with agriculture to the fore”. This growth “generated 
demand for the factors of production owned by the poor” (i.e., their labour) 
(WDR90:51).71
Furthermore, the strategies of the East Asian tiger economies were not 
oriented towards labor-intensive activities per se, but rather towards sectors that 
showed potential for productivity increases. Thus, in Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
South Korea, the initial focus was on textile and clothing production, guided by 
strategic industrial policy and the direction of financial resources by the government. 
Later, as this sector matured, the focus shifted to other industries, including the 
production of capital goods, heavy industry, and finally high technology.72 China, too, 
70. No reference is given for this claim. In fact, real wages did not substantially improve in 
Britain until the middle of the 19th century. Cf. Backhouse, Economists and the Economy, 
op. cit., pg. 39.
71. However, subsequent events, such as the financial crisis of 1997, would suggest that this 
development strategy had a number of problems.
72. See, for example, Charles Gore, “Methodological Nationalism...”, op. cit.; Alice H. 
Amsden, “Why Isn’t the Whole World Experimenting with the East Asian Model to 
Develop?: Review of The East Asian Miracle”, World Development, vol. 22, no. 4, 1994, 
pp. 627-633.
185has followed a different approach from the one that WDR90 recommends, yet has 
reduced the incidence of poverty substantially (although not across all regions).
The technocratic view is evident in WDR90’s analysis of the “politics of 
poverty”, which argues that “policies to reduce poverty involve a tradeoff”, principally 
“between the interests of the poor and those of the nonpoor” (WDR90:3). Policies that 
favour the poor, such as “[s]witching to an efficient, labor-intensive pattern of 
development and investing more in the human capital of the poor”, are part of a 
development strategy that is “more likely to be adopted in countries where the poor 
have a say in political and economic decision-making” (WDR90:3). That is, where the 
poor have such a say, they will tend to support those policies that favour them. 
However, this does not entail that they have a say in determining policies, for example, 
by contributing to debate and discussion in order to determine what is appropriate and 
feasible. The Bank’s conception of development is a technocratic one, in which experts 
who have knowledge gained through observation of the “development experience” are 
in a position to present policies for endorsement. Here, then, the determination of 
policies is not considered to be part of the “development process”, which instead is 
what occurs when policies are implemented. Nor is the acquisition of knowledge about 
development considered to be a part of development itself. For example, the Report’s 
emphasis on education is at the primary level, which is instrumentally valuable in that it 
“increases the capacity of the poor to take advantage of...opportunities” for productive 
employment. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr has criticized this notion as a “human resource 
development approach” that “stresses how education and health enhance productivity, 
and have important value for promoting economic growth”.73
73. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, “Rescuing the Human Development Concept from the HDI: 
Reflections on a New Agenda”, pg. 2, n.d., at <http://hder.undp.org/docs/training/oxford/
readings/fukuda-parr_Rescuing.pdf> on 10 June 2005.
186The Bank’s view of the significance of history is also problematic. For 
example, WDR02 states that it “emphasizes the importance of historical context”. But 
what is meant here is not the historical context that gave rise to present development 
conditions. Rather, it is the effect that decisions and choices in the present will have for 
the future: “where countries are today affects where they can go” (WDR02:iii). This is 
consistent with neoclassical economics, for which present conditions are simply taken 
as given, rather than as the outcome of previous decisions and choices. The failure to 
recognize this leads to the simplistic assertion that sources of “interference” in the 
operation of markets should be reduced or eliminated. Yet this is to naturalize present 
conditions, by treating them as objects or objective occurrences encountered in the 
world, rather than as meaningful contexts of socioeconomic life. In neoclassical 
economic model-building, such policy contexts are treated as natural objects that 
constrain the freedom of economic interaction.
Knowledge as Development
Leisured and hard-working countries are characterized by their ability, or lack 
thereof, to transcend their history. This contrast is expressed in terms of the contrast 
between the global and the local or, in their nominalized forms, globalization and 
localization.74 In WDR98, this is expressed in terms of knowledge and information, and 
is used to characterize the difference between poor and rich countries and people. 
Hence it is seen as an aspect of the meaning of poverty:
Poor countries—and poor people—differ from rich ones not only because they have 
less capital but because they have less knowledge. Knowledge is often costly to cre-
ate, and that is why much of it is created in industrial countries. (WDR98:1)
Such lack of knowledge, as is evident in WDR80, is also considered to be lack of self-
74. See also Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Scan Globally, Reinvent Locally”, Keynote Address, Global 
Development Network Conference, December, 1999. 
187knowledge, or at least lack of the kind of scientific and universal knowledge that can 
explain the particular situations that poor countries and poor people are in.
In WDR99, the twin poles of globalization and localization are recognized “as 
forces that bring new opportunities but also raise new or greater challenges in terms of 
economic and political instability” (WDR99:iii-iv). That is, they are regarded as 
impersonal, external forces to which we can only respond, rather than as aspects of how 
we organize our political and economic systems. They are regarded as givens, rather 
than as the outcomes of particular choices that we have made (or have imposed on 
others, or had imposed on us). The development response suggested is based on
insights rooted in pragmatic judgements about how the existing conditions of soci-
ety will affect which policy choices make sense, or how one sequence of policies is 
preferable to another, or how certain policies can complement and sustain each 
other. (WDR99:iv)
The Policy Problematic
As with the lessons learnt from experience, however, it is evident here that policy 
choices are not considered to have an effect on “the existing conditions of society”, but 
simply to be responsive to them. The “pragmatic” view recommended here is one that 
accepts “the forces of globalisation and localization” as they are, rather than encourages 
attempts to direct them.75 This corresponds to the central notion in positivist economics 
that, as we have seen, economic interaction is governed by laws that policy cannot alter.
Furthermore, the situation in which development policy is to be implemented 
is subject to “many forces” that will “reshape” it (WDR99:1). These forces are the 
unintended consequences of individual and social actions, such as “innovations in 
75. It is interesting to note that in the 9th Raúl Prebisch Lecture to UNCTAD, the World Bank’s 
then Chief Economist, Joseph Stiglitz, argued that development was concerned with the 
movement from “traditional ways of thinking” that are characterized by “the acceptance of 
the world as it is” to “the modern perspective” that “recognizes change”, i.e., that we can 
take actions to change our world (“Towards a New Paradigm for Development”, October, 
1998). Yet here in WDR99, the view is that the forces of globalisation and localization are 
external and given, because “[t]hey are driven by powerful underlying forces” 
(WDR99:iv).
188technology, the spread of knowledge...the financial integration of the world and rising 
demands for political and human rights” (WDR99:1). Although not referred to in 
WDR99 as “progress”, it is clear that these “forces” are considered to have potentially 
beneficial effects, despite their capacity to destabilize society. 
If they are managed well, these forces could revolutionize the prospects for devel-
opment and human welfare. However, the same forces are also capable of generat-
ing instability and human suffering that are beyond the ability of individual nation-
states to remedy. (WDR99:1)
This corresponds precisely to the 19th century positivist conception of progress, as 
found for example, in Comte.
I have argued above that a central tenet of positivist development is the 
universality of development, although not necessarily its inevitability (cf. WDR99:14). 
Whether this is thought of in terms of “linear stages of growth”, as was the case with 
modernization theory in the 1950s and 1960s,76 or in terms of social objectives, as 
WDR99 argues, the fundamental idea is one of convergence in socioeconomic terms. 
Even though the consensus in mainstream development thinking is no longer that there 
is “a single, overarching policy prescription” that can bring about progress, this does 
not mean pluralism in the concept of development. The particular policies that can 
achieve the goals that constitute development may vary from one country to another, 
whereas the goals or objectives themselves are universal, comprising aspects such as 
“[r]aising per capita income”, having “better health services and educational 
opportunities, greater participation in public life, a clean environment, intergenerational 
equity, and more” (WDR99:2). Furthermore, the policy diffidence that WDR99 appears 
to suggest is limited by constraints on governments:
Governments play a vital role in development, but there is no simple set of rules that 
tells them what to do. Beyond generally accepted rules, the role of government in 
the economy varies, depending on capacity, capabilities, the country’s level of 
76. Cf. Todaro and Smith, op. cit., pp. 111-116; Martinussen, op. cit., ch. 5; Hettne, op. cit., pp. 
49-66; Rostow, op. cit. 
189development, external conditions, and a host of other factors. (WDR99:2-3, empha-
sis altered)
By “generally accepted rules”, the Bank means “policy fundamentals” (WDR99:11) 
that ensure the “macroeconomic stability” that “is a necessary condition for the success 
of development initiatives” (WDR99:3). Unlike other aspects of the mainstream 
consensus on development, however, this does not “depend[] on time and place” 
(WDR99:3). “[M]acroeconomic stability is an essential prerequisite for achieving the 
growth needed for development” (WDR99:1). That is, macroeconomic stability is a 
universal requirement, rather than a contextually specific one.
The Knowledge Bank
The Bank’s capacity for the production of knowledge about development has 
inspired it, since 1996, to argue that it is a “knowledge bank” as well.77 As Wolfensohn 
stated,
The Bank Group’s relationships with governments and institutions all over the 
world, and our unique reservoir of development experience across sectors and coun-
tries, position us to play a leading role in this new global knowledge partnership.
We have been in the business of researching and disseminating the lessons of devel-
opment for a long time. But the revolution in information technology increases the 
potential value of these efforts by vastly extending their reach. To capture this 
potential, we need to invest in the necessary systems, in Washington and world-
wide, that will enhance our ability to gather development information and experi-
ence, and share it with our clients. We need to become, in effect, the Knowledge 
Bank.78
This role for the Bank was later justified on the basis of the relationship between 
poverty and lack of knowledge. Seeing poverty in terms of knowledge allows for the 
articulation of the development problem to also include “knowledge gaps” and 
“information problems”, and the suggestion that “developing countries must institute 
policies that will enable them to narrow the knowledge gaps that separate them from 
77. This was announced by then-President James Wolfensohn in his address to the Annual 
Meetings of the Bank and the International Monetary Fund (James D. Wolfensohn, “People 
and Development”, World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings Address, 1 October 1996).
78. Ibid.
190rich countries” (WDR98/99:iii). Stiglitz, too, endorsed this view of the Bank, arguing 
that
one of its central tasks [is] to help countries to close the knowledge gap. It can pro-
vide the cross-country experience that, when melded with local knowledge, makes 
possible effective choices of development policies, programmes and projects.79
In many respects, this announcement represents the culmination of a trend that was 
evident in the Bank in the first decade of its existence. In 1955, the Bank indicated how 
its role had changed during that first decade: “At first regarded only as a source of 
loans, today it is often looked to by its members as a source of advice on many different 
aspects of economic development” (AR54/55:29). At that time, the Bank’s knowledge 
and expertise were being called upon by its members. Forty years later, the intention is 
to become a central directorate of development knowledge for the entire world. The 
question is whether positing lack of knowledge as a component of poverty is a coherent 
shift in the Bank’s conception of development, or whether it represents a shift at all.
Knowledge and Policy: The Comprehensive Development Framework
The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), the new approach to 
development launched by the Bank in 1999, is intended to allow countries to determine 
their own development policies. “It advocates: a holistic long-term strategy; the country 
in the lead, both ‘owning’ and directing the development agenda, with the Bank and 
other partners each defining their support in their respective business plans...”80 
Presented in this way, it suggests an approach that is determined by individual 
countries, and therefore is not universalistic in the technocratic way that development 
assistance has hitherto been practised.
The CDF is essentially a process: it is not a blueprint to be applied to all countries in 
a uniform manner.81
79. Stiglitz, “New Paradigm”, op. cit., pg. 21.
80. World Bank, “What is CDF” at <www.worldbank.org> on 14 June 2005.
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different paradigm, one in which it is recognized that development is a singular 
undertaking rather than the reproduction of the policies and institutions that are found in 
leisured countries. It could be argued that with the CDF, the Bank has recognized the 
limitations of its previous ahistorical, positivist approach to development, and now 
views development as historically contextualized.
However, a closer look at the CDF indicates that this is not, in fact, the case. 
One reason is that, as the Bank’s website says,
The CDF principles have been widely and explicitly accepted by the international 
community, as a basis for achieving greater poverty reduction and sustainable 
development.82
That is, although perhaps particular policy recommendations are no longer determined 
by the Bank (or development experts from other agencies), the principles that are to 
guide the determination of policies are. Thus, countries are expected to conform to 
principles, rather than policy recommendations, that have been determined for them by 
outside experts. As a report on the CDF from 2001 states,
Countries need to develop both the long-term vision and a medium-term strategy—
such as PRSP [Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper]—in a well-concerted manner. 
The long-term vision must focus on country-determined development goals, and 
their sequencing and prioritization. Medium-term strategies should derive from the 
long-term vision, and care should be taken that they are not driven solely by short-
term concerns.83
With the CDF, then, the Bank no longer determines what hard-working countries should 
do, but rather the process whereby they themselves work out what to do. Just as with 
policy recommendations previously, the implication is that the determination of this 
process is not itself a part of development. Whereas in the earlier approach hard-
working countries were considered unable to determine development policies precisely 
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. CDF Secretariat, Preface to “Comprehensive Development Framework: Meeting the 
Promise?”, World Bank, September 17, 2001 at <www.worldbank.org> on 14 June 2005.
192because they are not developed, so in the new approach such countries are considered 
unable to determine the process of determining their own policies. The positivist, 
universalistic attitude reappears, only now at a higher level of abstraction.
Another reason why the CDF remains a universalistic approach to 
development is because it is seen to require adherence to the same economic policies 
that the Bank has always prescribed:84
A stable macroeconomy, shaped by prudent fiscal and monetary policies, is an 
essential backdrop to the development efforts the CDF proposes. This stable macro-
economic environment occupies the “other half of the balance sheet,” complement-
ing the CDF. (WDR99:21, Box 4)
Against this “other half of the balance sheet”, the notion of “country ownership” is 
drained of content.
And just as hard-working countries had problems implementing the Bank’s 
policy recommendations (or prescriptions, depending on the conditions under which 
Bank expertise was involved), so too are they having problems with implementing the 
principles. The same 2001 report examined 46 countries that were attempting to 
implement CDF and concluded that
implementation of the principles has been difficult and uneven among these coun-
tries, not least because most of them are among the poorest countries of the 
world...Considerable persistence will be required to realize our long-term goal of 
improving the effectiveness of the development process through application of the 
CDF principles.85
Furthermore, the Bank retains authority over the implementation of the CDF because it 
has tied it to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which are the response of 
Bank and the IMF to their member governments’ direction to find new ways in which 
to address the problem of indebtedness.86 This approach required hard-working country 
84. Cf. World Development Movement, One size for all, September 2005, available at 
<www.wdm.org.uk/onesize.pdf>).
85. Ibid., pg. 2, emphasis added.
86. Cf. Ann Pettifor, “Introduction” in Alan Whaites, ed., Masters of their own development?, 
World Vision International, Monrovia CA, 2002, pg. 4.
193governments to make a commitment to spend the savings from debt-relief on health and 
education.87 The PRSPs thus put the Bank and the IMF in a position of authority over 
those governments, at least insofar as debt relief is concerned. Whaites argues that
The fact that PRSPs were a new instrument of conditionality was sometimes down-
played amidst the talk of participation and pro-poor policy. Yet this was a signifi-
cant evolution in the lineage of conditions that have been laid down for borrowing 
states since the early 1980s.88
Thus, by building in PRSPs, the Bank retains control over policy. The Bank sees itself 
in the position of the expert in development thinking. This attitude is continuous with 
that expressed previously by the Bank in WDR 98, entitled Knowledge for 
Development, which argues that international development institutions (such as the 
Bank itself) can reduce the “knowledge gaps” and “information problems” that hard-
working countries suffer from, by
creating new knowledge, transferring and adapting knowledge to the needs of 
developing countries, and managing knowledge so that it is kept accessible and con-
stantly refreshed. (WDR98:6)
Further on in the same Report, the last role of such institutions is qualified as “to 
manage the rapidly growing body of knowledge about development” (WDR98:6). In 
other words, international institutions are considered to be capable both of producing 
knowledge that is relevant to hard-working countries’ situations and of adapting it to 
their needs. And part of the knowledge to be produced, adapted and managed is 
knowledge about development, i.e., about the conditions in hard-working countries 
themselves. As with the CDF, there is an assumption of the need for trusteeship, since 
the hard-working countries lack the capacity to produce and manage knowledge about 
their own development (or in the case of the CDF, to implement their own processes of 
policy determination). Thus, despite the claim that the CDF represents a new approach 
in which hard-working countries “own” their policies, in reality it simply reproduces, at 
87. Alan Whaites, “Making PRSPs Work”, in Whaites, ed, op. cit., pg. 9
88. Ibid., pg. 10.
194a more abstract level, the need for an external agent that can embody the intention to 
develop.
Another admission in the 2001 report on the CDF is particularly revealing:
Of the four main principles of the CDF, the focus on and accountability for develop-
ment results is the area where the least progress has been made. There are a number 
of reasons for this. There is still much to learn about how the linkages between pol-
icy actions and development results are operationalized.89
It is surprising to see the Bank making this particular claim, given that its approach to 
development over the preceding half-century had involved making policy 
recommendations/prescriptions on the basis that they would produce the development 
results that the Bank predicted. If the Bank actually means what it says here, it would 
suggest that its own capacity in development is far less authoritative than sometimes 
presented. It would also suggest that the Bank might have more to learn from the hard-
working countries about “operationalising” their own development “results” than they 
themselves have. WDR99 sometimes comes close to saying this:
The twists and turns of development policy and the nature of the successes and fail-
ures around the world illustrate the difficulty of interpreting the development 
drama. The situations in which success and failure occur differ so much that it is 
sometimes not apparent which lessons should be extracted or whether they can be 
applied to other countries. (WDR99:17)
However, this near admission of the singularity of development and the limitations of 
positivist development thinking is quickly discounted:
Despite the difficulty of drawing clearly applicable lessons from development his-
tory, current development thinking has been able to draw on country experiences to 
suggest a range of complementary policies. These policies, if implemented together 
and in a way that takes into account the situations of individual countries, are likely 
to encourage development. (WDR99:17)
In fact, the emphasis on the complexity of development and the difficulty in drawing 
lessons from it could be interpreted as a tacit self-justification for the Bank’s existence, 
which has the expertise and resources lacking in hard-working countries to investigate 
this complex object and draw the appropriate conclusions. WDR98, as we have seen, 
89. CDF Secretariat, op. cit., pg. 5 (emphasis added).
195makes just such an argument.
Thus, despite its adoption of this new approach, WDR99 still argues that the 
“recommendations for improving the provision of structural, physical, human and 
sectoral services” that have been made in “a number of World Development Reports” 
since 1990 (and thus guided by the previous conceptual frameworks) are still relevant.
While some details may have changed in light of recent experiences, the tried and 
effective mechanisms for removing development bottlenecks presented in these 
reports remain a useful starting point. (WDR99:20)
The “bottlenecks” referred to here are “the economic or governmental weaknesses that 
stand in the way of a wide range of development objectives” (WDR99:20).90 The claim 
that mainstream development thinking has been able to determine “tried and effective 
mechanisms” to address these “weaknesses” suggests that it already knows how to 
bring development about, yet the recognition of “the failure of many development 
efforts” (WDR99:14) makes that claim doubtful. If the complexity of development is 
such that it requires a new approach (e.g., the CDF), are the mechanisms that have 
previously been recommended really so effective? And if so, why has “development 
success” been so limited? Does the problem actually lie in implementation of policies 
by hard-working countries, or might it perhaps lie in the conception of development?
Development Goals
Further inquiry could, and should, be made into the way that “development 
goals” have come to replace policy prescriptions, particularly the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), which are an internationally agreed upon set of targets to 
be achieved by 2015. The effect of the MDGs in mainstream development thinking has 
been to shift the focus from policy recommendations, which by their own standards 
90. Note that these “bottlenecks” are considered to be obstacles to development, not what is 
supposed to be developed.
196(except the counterfactuals of “what would have happened unless...”) have proven to be 
less effective than those who prescribed them believed. Indeed, the Bank’s own claim in 
WDR99 that there have been “frequent enough” successes is belied by its recognition 
that 
In fact, rich countries have been growing faster than poor countries since the Indus-
trial Revolution in the mid-19th century. A recent estimate suggests that the ratio of 
per capita income between the richest and the poorest countries increased sixfold 
between 1870 and 1985. (WDR99:14)
The period under consideration here predates the U.N. era of development. Therefore, it 
is important to also take into account the fact that between 1980 and 2000, most hard-
working countries have experienced a decline in real per capita GDP growth, whereas 
most leisured countries have experienced an increase. As the authors of a CPER 
Briefing Paper note, 
this evidence does not prove that the policies associated with globalization were 
responsible for the deterioration in performance. But it does present a very strong 
prima facie case that some structural and policy changes implemented during the 
last two decades are responsible for these declines.91
Even if such policies were not responsible for the declines, they did not result in the 
increase in economic performance that was the reason why they were recommended. Of 
course, such policy recommendations cannot take into account unforeseen exogenous 
factors. But it is indicative that the Bank notes that “[s]tandard economic theories 
predict that, other things being equal, poor countries should grow faster than rich ones” 
(WDR99:14). Since this has not occurred over the past century, it could be argued that 
standard economic theories are not very robust. However, the Bank argues instead that 
the problem lies with the hard-working countries themselves:
Both past and present development thinking has devoted much effort to uncovering 
explanations for why low-income countries have difficulty in following this pattern. 
A number of studies show that low-income countries can grow faster than high-
income countries...if they implement an appropriate mix of growth-enhancing poli-
91. Mark Wiesbrot, Dean Baker, Egor Kraev and Judy Chen, “The Scorecard on Globalization 
1980-2000: Twenty Years of Diminished Progress”, CEPR Briefing Paper, July 11, 2001, 
pg. 15.
197cies. And increasing experience with development outcomes is providing insight 
into the complexity of the process and the multifaceted approach needed to achieve 
this growth. (WDR99:15, emphasis added)
Such assertions indicate that the historical evidence is of less consequence than 
economic theory. The historical evidence is that the prediction of standard economic 
theories that hard-working countries will grow faster than leisured countries has been 
wrong. Nevertheless, studies that can only be based on theory rather than history show 
that they can grow faster. Therefore, hard-working countries are at fault because they 
have failed to implement the appropriate policies. What gets no mention here is why 
these countries implemented the policies that they did. Given that they have been Bank 
“clients” over the past decades, and (for the most highly indebted) in more recent times 
subject to onerous conditionality from both the Bank and the IMF, it is reasonable to 
suppose that the policy prescriptions that such countries implemented (however 
effectively) were those originating from the Bretton Woods institutions themselves.92 
Assuming that these institutions have no good reason for prescribing deliberately 
inappropriate policies, and that (more contentiously) these policies are based on the 
“standard economic theories” that predict the outcomes that did not, in fact, occur, it is 
reasonable to think that such theories might be wrong. As has been discussed 
previously, with regard to Adam Smith’s objection to the “inversion” of the “natural 
order of things” in the economic sphere, the disparity between theory and history in 
positivist economics tends to get resolved in favour of the former, because it cannot 
account for the contingency and uniqueness of the latter. This, too, is an aspect of the 
theoretical attitude of positivism in the human historical sciences.
92. This is not to deny that what may be recommended or prescribed in the way of policy may 
not in fact be what is implemented. But there is a difference between inadequate 
implementation and inappropriate policy that goes unrecognized here.
198Amartya Sen and the UNDP
Development as Freedom
Amartya Sen’s “capabilities approach” to development is another version of 
positivist development, one which combines economic with philosophical analysis. 
Sen’s view of development is that it is “a process of expanding the real freedoms that 
people enjoy” (DaF 3). Such real freedoms are those that allow people the choice and 
the opportunity of “exercising their reasoned agency” (DaF xii). Development, then, 
involves overcoming or removing constraints on “instrumental freedoms” such as 
“economic opportunities, political freedoms, social facilities, transparency guarantees, 
and protective security” (DaF xii). However, Sen is careful to point out that it is not just 
the removal of these constraints that is important, but also how it is done. It needs to 
involve “individual agency”, or “intrinsic” human freedom.
With Sen, we find a broader view of development than one that focusses just 
on GDP or individual income growth. Focussing on the expansion of real freedoms, or 
capabilities, is important for two reasons: (i) the “evaluative reason”, whereby 
development (or “progress”, as Sen actually says) is assessed “primarily in terms of 
whether the freedoms that people have are enhanced”; and (ii) the “effectiveness 
reason”, i.e., that “achievement of development is thoroughly dependent on the free 
agency of people” (DaF 4). Thus development depends on the exercise of that which it 
aims at (i.e., freedoms). Sen distinguishes between “free and sustainable agency” and 
“the strengthening of free agencies of other kinds” (DaF 4), although not always 
consistently. He also relates the expansion of individual freedom to “social 
development”, arguing that
What people can positively achieve is influenced by economic opportunities, politi-
cal liberties, social powers, and the enabling conditions of good health, basic educa-
tion, and the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives. (DaF 5)
199The “institutional arrangements” for such opportunities are affected in turn by “the 
exercise of people’s freedoms” in participating in “social choice and in the making of 
public decisions” (DaF 5). The exercise of individual agency affects the institutional 
environment, thereby affecting the social opportunities available for the exercise of 
further individual agency, in a positive feedback arrangement.
In focusing on capabilities, rather than on the degree to which objectified 
needs are met, Sen emphasises the qualitative aspects of development both as a process 
and as a result. As well, he calls for an ethical approach that takes into account both 
rights and the quality of life (or agency and well-being93).
Poverty as Capability Deprivation
Sen argues that the narrow focus on income growth and other purely economic 
indicators fails to recognize that poverty is “the deprivation of basic capabilities, rather 
than merely lowness of incomes” (DaF 87). Although income deprivation may indeed 
be a capability deprivation, it might not be the most significant one for development to 
address. The narrow focus on economic growth obscures the fact that “economic 
growth cannot sensibly be treated as an end in itself” (DaF 14).94 Therefore, 
development must be about expanding people’s capability sets, i.e., giving them more 
opportunities to pursue things that “they have reason to value”. It “has to be concerned 
with enhancing the lives we lead and the freedoms we enjoy” (DaF 14) or, as he 
expresses it elsewhere, “what people can or cannot do”.95 This in turn means that “[t]he 
removal of substantial unfreedoms...is constitutive of development” (DaF xii). This 
seems like a plausibly expanded view of development, given that it seeks not to impose 
93. Sen articulates this in “Well-being, Agency and Freedom”, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 
82, no. 4, 1985, pp. 169-221.
94. Cf. also Amartya Sen, “Development: Which Way Now?”, The Economic Journal, vol. 93, 
no. 372, 1983, pg. 753.
95. Ibid., pg. 754.
200values, but only to expand capabilities, thus allowing people the freedom to choose 
those functionings they “have reason to value”. Of course, there must be constraints on 
functionings that negatively affect those of others, but this is a question of justice rather 
than development per se.
For Sen, substantive freedoms are intrinsically valuable, and therefore are 
vindicated “over and above the directly constitutive role of those freedoms in 
development” (DaF 5). As instrumentally valuable, however, they are also interrelated, 
with expansion of freedoms or opportunities in one area, such as market transactions, 
affecting those in another, such as political participation. Furthermore, these different 
freedoms all combine in the “general capability of a person” (DaF 10). Sen has 
elaborated his view of capabilities over a number of years in many publications. Here I 
simply present it in rough outline. The essential distinction that Sen makes in order to 
evaluate well-being is between “functionings” and “capability”, the former being 
“various doings and beings that come into this assessment”.96 They are “the various 
things a person may value doing or being”, whereas the latter “refers to the alternative 
combinations of functionings that are feasible for her to achieve” (DaF 75). “A person’s 
capability set can be defined as the set of functioning vectors within his or her reach.”97 
Thus, functionings are what we actually do or are, whereas the capability set is the 
opportunities or possibilities we have of doing or being otherwise. The expansion of 
functionings may or may not be an expansion of a capability set. In contrast, expansion 
of a capability set by definition involves the expansion of functionings.
The general capability an individual has (her “capability set”) has two 
dimensions, which are (i) “the processes that allow freedom of actions and decisions”, 
96. “Well-being, Agency and Freedom”, op. cit., pg. 197.
97. Ibid., pp. 200-201.
201and (ii) “the actual opportunities that people have, given their personal and social 
circumstances” (DaF 17). Individual freedom can be constrained either at the process 
level (e.g., political processes such as an inadequate electoral system) and at the 
opportunity level (e.g., preventing someone from casting her vote).
The example Sen uses repeatedly to illustrate his approach is the difference 
between starving and choosing to fast.98 Although they may be identical in terms of 
caloric intake and thus “have the same functioning achievement” (DaF 75), the person 
starving has a restricted capability set that does not include the functioning of eating. So 
the capability set is a set of possible, but not necessarily realized, combination of 
functionings. For example, my capability set includes the functioning of fasting, 
although I may rarely realize it.
While the combination of a person’s functionings reflects her actual achievements, 
the capability set represents the freedom to achieve: the alternative functioning 
combinations from which this person can choose. (DaF 75)
The “freedom to achieve” is the intrinsic value of freedom, rather than an instrumental 
value. This maps on to Sen’s distinction between processes that allow for freedom of 
action and actual opportunities to act. Thus, development can be understood either as 
expanding realized functionings or as expanding opportunities to realize functionings. 
Furthermore, Sen argues, it allows for a more robust evaluative role of freedom,
since the value of a set need not invariably be identified with the value of the best—
or the chosen—element of it. It is possible to attach importance to having opportu-
nities that are not taken up. (DaF 76)
This latter aspect—having opportunities that are not taken up—is crucial, since without 
such opportunities the value or importance of choice would be problematic, and there 
would be no way to distinguish btween the fasting and the starving person. “The 
98. For example, “Freedom of Choice”, pg. 292; “Well-being, Agency and Freedom”, op. cit., 
pp. 201-202. This is related to Sen’s extensive and well-known work on famines and food 
policy. See for example “Food and Freedom”, World Development, vol. 17, no. 6, 1989, pp. 
769-781.
202freedom to choose between alternative functioning bundles reflects a person’s 
‘advantage’—his or her ‘capability’ to function.”99
Individualism and Universalism
Sen’s view, as is clear in Development as Freedom, is individualistic, for it 
“treats the freedoms of individuals as the basic building blocks” and argues that “the 
success of a society is to be evaluated...primarily by the substantive freedoms that the 
members of that society enjoy” (DaF 18). However, there is a difference between 
focussing on individuals in terms of their “substantive freedoms” and specifying that 
this is what development is concerned with. That is, Sen’s argument is not that 
individuals themselves need to understand or engage in development in these terms, but 
that they should be seen as having their capabilities expanded by the process of 
development. The central question that Sen repeatedly evades is, who exactly is it that 
is supposed to do the evaluating?
Sen’s view is universalistic, as well, “informed by a belief in the ability of 
different people from different cultures to share many common values and to agree on 
some common commitments” (DaF 244).100 The social dimension of human existence 
allows for exercise of reasoned agency. “Individual freedom is quintessentially a social 
product”, he states (DaF 31), but this does not mean that freedom is construed 
intersubjectively. Although “[i]ndividual capabilities crucially depend on, among other 
things, economic, social, and political arrangements” (DaF 53), but such arrangements 
do not constitute freedoms, but only allow for their exercise. Thus,
there is a two-way relation between (1) social arrangements to expand individual 
freedoms and (2) the use of individual freedoms not only to improve the respective 
99. “Freedom of Choice”, pg. 279.
100. Cf. Stuart Corbridge, “Development as freedom: the spaces of Amartya Sen”, Progress in 
Development Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, 2002, pp. 200-202.
203lives but also to make the social arrangements more appropriate and effective. 
(DaF 31)
Nevertheless, there is social influence on “individual conceptions of justice and 
propriety”, which “depend on social associations” (DaF 31).
Values and meanings
Sen seeks to link value to choice, so that he can defend freedom as an intrinsic, 
rather than just instrumental, value. For this reason, he argues that value comes from the 
possibility of choosing or acting in accordance with values for which a person has 
reasons. However, Sen does not consider the issue of meaning in choice. Arguably, the 
difference between fasting and starving is not just one that concerns other possibilities 
that I could realize (or functionings that I could achieve, in Sen’s terminology), but also 
involves my understanding of the act or condition. That is, a functioning may be 
meaningful even if it is not something that I can choose (either because it is not 
available to me or because no other possibility is available). My starving condition 
could be meaningful and therefore valuable to me, perhaps because it represents a 
refusal to bend to the will of well-provisioned but corrupt officials. For Sen, however, 
only fasting can be valuable because it can be chosen over some other possibility 
available to me. Starving is not valuable, because I cannot choose it. Similarly, in the 
case of tradition, Sen argues that insofar as I simply inherit it, it cannot be valuable. For 
Sen, then, value is subjective, inasmuch as values cannot be chosen for me. That is, I 
cannot be provided with functionings, because these are not choices I have made. We 
cannot force a fasting person to eat and also claim that this is valuable for her. 
Paternalism is not an option for development, in Sen’s view.
Sen makes two claims with regard to values and choice that, taken together, are 
problematic. First, he indicates that choosing may well be a functioning, or “can be 
204seen” as one. For example, simply being given a higher income without my own active 
participation and choice in the matter may, in fact, result in a lower-value capability set, 
perhaps because my previous form of livelihood is taken away and replaced by a 
welfare cheque that provides me with more income. Second, on the question of values 
and what functionings and capabilities should be given higher value, he argues that 
determining “the weights [that] are to be selected” in trying to order combinations of 
functionings is a “judgemental exercise” that “can be resolved only through reasoned 
evaluation” (DaF 78). What is left unclarified is the basis on which such choices and 
values can be mine, i.e., can be those that I identify as my possibilities. Is “reasoned 
evaluation” itself a value to be evaluated, and if so, by whom and on what basis?
The point of the distinction between functionings and capabilities is to allow 
for the intrinsic value of freedom. Sen argues that
If freedom is only instrumentally valued, then the valuation of the person’s capabil-
ity to function would be no different from evaluating the chosen functioning bundle 
in the respective capability set, i.e., the person’s actual functionings.101
Without the notion of the capability set, the value of identical functionings will be the 
same regardless of whether these are constrained, coerced or freely chosen. The 
intrinsic value of freedom, i.e., freedom to choose, is only possible as a separate value 
if “the valuation of the capability set does not coincide with the evaluation of the 
chosen element of it”.102 Arguably, then, the functionings-capability distinction is the 
way Sen makes meaning evaluative.
101. “Freedom of Choice”, op. cit., pp. 289-290.
102. Ibid., pg. 290.
205Human Development Report 1990
HDR90 introduced the concept of ‘human development’ and the UNDP’s way 
of measuring this, the Human Development Indicators (HDI), as an operationalization 
of Sen’s capability approach.103 In explaining the concept, HDR90 argues that
people must be at the centre of all development. The purpose of development is to 
offer people more options. One of their options is access to income—not as an end 
in itself but as a means to acquiring human well-being. But there are other options 
as well...People cannot be reduced to a single dimension as economic creatures. 
(HDR90:iii)
Like the WDRs, HDR90 insists that “growth in national production (GDP) is absolutely 
necessary to meet all essential human objectives”, yet it goes on to say that “what is 
important is to study how this growth translates—or fails to translate—into human 
development in various societies” (HDR90: iii). The “options” that constitute human 
development include “access to income...long life, knowledge, political freedom, 
personal security, community participation and guaranteed human rights” 
(HDR90:iii).104 This does not mean that these options are to be imposed or provided, 
however. Development is supposed to enable people to realize these conditions 
themselves. Indeed, the ability to choose how they develop is central to the concept of 
human development: “The basic objective of development is to create an enabling 
environment for people to enjoy long, healthy, and creative lives” (HDR90:9).
Here, as in other passages in the Report, development is considered as an intentional 
process. However, unlike in the Bank’s concept of development, HDR90 explicitly 
103. This is discussed in Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, “The Human Development Paradigm: 
Operationalizing Sen’s Ideas on Capabilities”, Feminist Economics, vol. 9, no. 2-3, 2003, 
pp. 301-317.
104. The question might be raised as to whether these are in fact “options”, as the HDR suggests. 
For example, although people do commit suicide, it is somewhat unusual to consider long 
life as an option, i.e., as something that people choose from among alternatives. Similar 
arguments can be made about the other aspects the HDR mentions. It is perhaps more usual 
(and arguably makes more sense) to consider these as conditions rather than options. The 
source of this notion that such conditions should be treated as options is Sen’s capabilities 
approach. Viewing conditions as options is an attempt to counter the idea that development 
could be achieved without freedom. However, in “optionalizing” every aspect of the human 
situation, Sen commits himself to a rather extreme version of the theoretical attitude.
206identifies development with an achieved state as well: “The term human development 
here denotes both the process of widening people’s choices and the level of their 
achieved well-being” (HDR90:10).
HDR90 is explicit about the objectification involved in development thinking: 
“What makes [people] and the study of the development process fascinating is the 
entire spectrum through which human capabilities are expanded and utilised” 
(HDR90:iii). Reference to “the development process” makes it evident that 
development is understood here as a universal process. Human development, like 
economic or socioeconomic development, is a comparative conception, that allows for 
the comparison of different societies in terms of the “levels” of human development 
they have achieved. As such, it is positivist development, differing only in the 
identification of the purpose of development with the expansion of options, rather than 
economic growth or reduction of poverty. 
The HDR claims that its “orientation...is practical and pragmatic”, aiming “to 
analyse country experience to distill practical insights” so as to “make relevant 
experience available to all policymakers” rather than “to recommend any particular 
model of development” (HDR90:iii). Thus, the “study of the development process” in 
the Report aims to “make[] a contribution to the definition, measurement and policy 
analysis of human development” (HDR90:iii). Human development, like economic and 
socioeconomic development, is viewed as an object to be investigated, the investigation 
of which is external to that object. And the way this process is objectified is typically 
positivist, i.e., through quantification and comparison. The UNDP has therefore 
constructed the HDI, a system of quantification and measurement, “which assemble all 
available social and human data for each country in a comparable form” (HDR90:iii). 
207Tradition and History
Both Sen’s individualism and the privilege he accords to reason are evident in 
his discussion of tradition, and his response to those such as postdevelopment thinkers 
who view development as (potentially) inimical to traditional ways of life. The real 
issue here, Sen argues, “concerns the source of authority and legitimacy” (DaF 31). If 
economic development may alleviate poverty at the cost of “a traditional way of life”, 
“then it is the people directly involved who must have the opportunity to participate in 
deciding what should be chosen” (DaF 31). That is, such decisions should not be taken 
by “secular or religious authorities that enforce traditions” (DaF 32), but by individuals 
who “must be allowed to decide freely what traditions they wish or not wish to follow” 
(DaF 32). For Sen, then, reasoned agency (or the freedom to decide) trumps 
consideration of traditions. But this view is problematic. First of all, he posits an 
opposition between freedom to choose traditions and enforcement of traditions, as a 
question of who chooses, i.e., all those concerned or some elite authority. Although this 
may characterize some situations (such as with the issues in some societies of honour 
killings or gay marriage), it is not the fundamental question, which concerns how values 
and reasoning themselves are determined.
Sen’s view of tradition is evident in the chapter he contributed to HDR04, 
entitled “Cultural liberty and human development”. HDR04 states at the outset that
Human development is first and foremost about allowing people to lead the kind of 
life they choose—and providing them with the tools and opportunities to make 
those choices...this is as much a question of politics as economics... (HDR04:v)
Here Sen argues that cultural diversity “is not itself a characteristic of human 
freedoms”, and should only be taken as significant insofar as it has “causal connections 
to human freedom” (HDR04:16). For Sen, the cultural values that constitute cultural 
diversity are fundamentally individual values, and diversity arises “if individuals are 
208allowed and encouraged to live as they would value living” (HDR04:16). What is 
important is cultural liberty, which is characterized elsewhere in the report as “being 
able to choose one’s identity—who one is—without losing the respect of others or 
being excluded from other choices” (HDR04:1). Thus, choosing one’s identity, not the 
fact that one has a cultural identity that is different from others, is “what is ultimately 
important” for Sen (HDR04:16). Values are constituted by reasoned agency, and thus it 
is only what we choose that is important.105
But this is a problematic view of culture and tradition, because these are what 
they are precisely in being not chosen, but inherited or grown up in. Nobody chooses 
the culture she is born into, just as nobody can choose the tradition she inherits. We 
grow up in a culture (or even cultures, in the case of mixed marriages or culturally 
mixed communities) and inherit our traditions. Although we may well recognize the 
traditions of others as traditions, we cannot recognize them as possibly our own 
traditions. Sen makes it seem as if these were objects of free, rational choice from the 
outset, and he interprets the argument against development (or modernization) that it 
might destroy culture or tradition as an argument that such free rational choice should 
be denied. Again, in HDR04, he states that
the reasons for being sceptical of giving automatic priority to inherited culture can 
be seen in terms of who makes what choices. Being born in a particular cultural 
milieu is not an exercise of freedom—quite the contrary. It becomes aligned to cul-
tural liberty only if the person chooses to continue to live within the terms of that 
culture, and does so having had the opportunity of considering other alternatives. 
(HDR04:16-17, emphasis added)
This argument equates the lack of choice over the culture we are born into (i.e., what we 
always already are) as being “contrary” to the exercise of freedom, either as the failure 
to exercise such freedom or as a constraint upon it (e.g., by some third party). But this is 
an incoherent way of understanding the human situation. It supposes that individuals 
105. And, as we have seen, not even the reasons why we value whatever we do.
209are fundamentally acultural, such that they can stand outside of any culture and 
evaluate it on its merits. This is simply a theoretical abstraction of culture and tradition. 
I may try to imagine not belonging to the culture I do, but this is still done from the 
situation of belonging to a culture. Sen simply fails to recognize that we are historically 
situated beings, no matter what choices we might make.106 He does not see that his 
argument belongs to a particular culture too, say, the culture of rationalistic 
individualist economist-philosophers.
In critiquing certain communitarian views of the importance of “discovery of 
identity”, Sen argues that it is less than clear “how identity can be a matter of just 
discovering something about oneself, rather than, explicitly or by implication, 
exercising a choice” (HDR04 17). Ignoring the unwarranted qualification of “just” here, 
the question this raises is, if identity is always a matter of “exercising a choice”, who is 
it that is doing the choosing? Sen takes the position of the “view from nowhere”,107 as 
if we could step outside the culture or tradition that we find ourselves born into and 
evaluate our “cultural” or “traditional selves” from an acultural or atraditional 
viewpoint. But then what constitutes the evaluator? What is it to be an evaluator? And 
what standards are to be used to evaluate?
Sen’s approach to culture and tradition, then, is a kind of “commodity 
approach”, which he uses to justify cultural diversity and to establish the value of 
cultural liberty. Without diversity, I cannot exercise my liberty, because I have nothing 
106. Cf. Séverine Deneulin, “A freedom-centred view of development in Ricoeur’s ethics”, 
Conference Proceedings, “Transforming Unjust Structures: Capabilities and Justice”, 26-27 
June 2003, at <http://www.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/vhi/ricoeur/papers/deneulin.pdf>.
107. In “Positional Objectivity”, Sen argues that it is possible to evaluate cultural views as 
objective, from an internal as well as an external standpoint. However, as is the case 
elsewhere, Sen is not concerned here with the evaluator, but only with what is being 
evaluated. (Amartya Sen, “Positional Objectivity”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 22, 
no. 2, 1993, pp. 126-145). Sen’s view is critiqued in Lawrence Hamilton, “A Theory of 
True Interests in the Work of Amartya Sen: A Political Critique”, Conference Proceedings, 
“Justice and Poverty: examining Sen’s Capability Approach”, 5-7 June 2001, at <http://
www.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/vhi/sen/papers/hamilton.pdf>.
210to choose from. If there are a plurality of cultures somehow available to me, then I am 
able to make a more reasoned and informed “choice” of the culture to which I want to 
belong, just as having a wider range of brands of soap allows me an opportunity to 
exercise my “soap liberty”. But cultures are not like commodities. We cannot just 
decide to be Singapore Malays, Toronto Greeks or Boston Irish, etc. I may spend all my 
time with my Indian or Italian friends, imitate their behaviour, learn their languages, 
and change my name, but none of these “choices” can make me an Indian or an 
Italian.108
Reason and Choice
Reasoned choice is central to Sen’s analysis of poverty as capability 
deprivation. For those aspects that cannot be chosen, such as culture and tradition, the 
implication is that there is no basis on which to say that the functioning is valuable, or 
even, properly, a functioning at all. It is not something I can do or be, but rather it 
constitutes me as I always already am. In such cases, the requirement for reasoned 
(e)valuation becomes problematic, because development is concerned with expanding 
the range of possible functionings, which are only valuable insofar as there is reason to 
value them. Insofar as culture or tradition cannot be a functioning, it falls out of the 
“evaluative space”109 of the capability set. Strictly speaking, such aspects of the human 
situation cannot enter into Sen’s ahistorical, abstract liberalism.
A further question might be raised about the capacity to reason and hence to 
value. If I am incapable of this (because I have not had the opportunity to learn how to 
evaluate, say), then how am I to evaluate the expansion of my capabilities that 
108. Or, to be more precise, such choices do not make me a person whose inherited tradition is 
Indian, Italian, etc.
109. Cf. Deneulin, op. cit. Corbridge notes that “space” is “a word found repeatedly in [Sen’s] 
work” (op. cit., n. 1).
211development is to bring about? Sen evades the question by appeal to values such as “the 
capability to live really long...and to have a good life while alive...things that would be 
strongly valued by nearly all of us” (DaF 14), but this is far too weak to constitute a 
foundation for the edifice of valuations and substantive freedoms that Sen constructs. 
First, we should note the use of the conditional here. Sen’s claim is not that nearly all of 
us do strongly value and desire these things, but rather that we “would”. But the 
conditions are not specified. However, we can infer that the condition Sen has in mind 
is some form of reasoned agency, as his constant reference to “what people have reason 
to value” indicates. Once again, this seems to suggest either that the choices of those 
who do not have “reason to value” do not count, or that their choices can be evaluated 
for them by those in a position to impute to them the values they would have had if they 
had had the ability to make reasoned evaluations. As Cowen and Shenton point out, this 
is simply another doctrine of development, couched in the language of values and 
reasoned agency (cf. DoD 442-452).
The apparent reluctance to pronounce on substantive values is evident 
throughout Sen’s work, and allows him to claim that the evaluative space is left open 
for the deliberation about valuations, since the capabilities approach does not provide a 
complete ranking or weighting of the various functionings in the capability set. Thus 
Sen can claim that
In focusing on freedoms in evaluating development, it is not being suggested that 
there is some unique and precise “criterion” of development in terms of which the 
different development experiences can always be compared and ranked. (DaF 33)
Nevertheless, Sen gives an extensive list of substantive freedoms and their correlative 
unfreedoms: poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportunities, systematic social 
deprivation, neglect of public facilities, intolerance, overactivity of repressive states; 
“economic poverty, which robs people of the freedom to satisfy hunger, or to achieve 
212sufficient nutrition, or to obtain remedies for treatable illnesses, or the opportunity to be 
adequately clothed or sheltered, or to enjoy clean water or sanitary facilities”; “lack of 
public facilities and social care...absence of epidemiological programs, or of organized 
arrangements for health care or educational facilities, or of effective institutions for the 
maintenance of local peace and order”; “denial of political and civil liberties by 
authoritarian regimes” (DaF 3-4). The substantive freedoms include: “being able to 
avoid such deprivations as starvation, undernourishment, escapable morbidity and 
premature mortality”; “the freedoms associated with being literate and numerate, 
enjoying political participation and uncensored speech” (DaF 36). Arguably, these lists 
represent the values predominantly identified with liberal market democracy. Sen thus 
does in fact severely circumscribe alternative conceptions of the good.
More importantly, Sen’s analysis does not actually support his argument that 
forcing someone into a situation of choice she is not capable of choosing herself can be 
seen as an expansion of real freedoms. As Cowen and Shenton point out
To be able to decide upon policy, to have the desire, knowledge and capability to do 
so, is to have achieved what are routinely stated to be the central goals of develop-
ment. (DoD 443)
With Sen, then, the stated goal of development is the expansion of the real freedoms 
that people enjoy, but the reality and enjoyment of those freedoms depends on the 
ability to rationally evaluate them, and this may be precisely what is held to be lacking. 
In such cases, appeal to the value of freedom as reasoned choice to justify development 
intervention once again simply states the problem of development.
The problem of values
With the concept of capabilities, Sen seeks to articulate the different 
instrumental freedoms that constitute human freedom as “an intrinsic value of 
development” (DoD 450; cf. DaF xii, 37). The freedom to decide what one considers to 
213be valuable, rather than a particular level of attainment, he argues, is the proper end of 
the process of development.110 “The objective of development relates to the valuation 
of the actual freedoms enjoyed by the people involved” (DaF 53).111 However, this 
does not include the determination of what development itself is, which is a matter for 
policy analysts and experts such as Sen. Although he argues that valuations (i.e., the 
weights assigned to different functionings in the capability set) have to be made explicit 
and be subjected to deliberation by those concerned, the conceptualization of 
development as freedom is not itself open to valuation. The substantive freedoms that 
development must concern are all delineated in advance. The question then becomes, 
what is the source or basis for these substantive freedoms? Is it anything other than the 
theoretical abstraction from the history of the leisured countries?
A fundamental issue is a process “to favour the creation of conditions in which 
people have real opportunities of judging the kind of lives they would like to lead” 
(DaF 63), but this process has already been determined. In achieving this end, particular 
values will change, as capabilities are expanded. As Cowen and Shenton put it, 
Intrinsic valuation, whereby one person has the freedom to choose to do something 
or be somebody different from another, Sen makes it clear, will be changed by the 
process of development itself...what he calls ‘value endogeneity’ will, in the actual 
course of development, change what is ‘regarded as valuable and what weights are 
attached to these objects’ of choice. (DoD 450).
Different capabilities thus represent not just different ways of being and doing, but also 
the different values attached to these. Capability in general, then, becomes “the absolute 
criterion for an acceptable standard of living” (ibid.). Nevertheless, when 
110. Cf. Amartya Sen, “Freedom of Choice: Concept and Content”, European Economic 
Review, vol. 32, 1988, pg. 290.
111. Sen’s distinction between value on the one hand, and valuation or evaluation on the other 
(Sen is not entirely consistent in his usage) seems to echo the same distinction in Rickert. 
Whereas the problem for Rickert was to explain the relation between transcendental values 
and valuations, Sen refuses to address the issue. But his attempt to leave the specification of 
values open is disingenuous, since his characterization of the process of development is in 
effect a description of contemporary liberal democracy.
214operationalized, this approach too turns out to be a matter of quantification and 
comparison, because the level of capability reached indicates whether or not the process 
of development is successful.
It is the extent of capability, the absolute value of development, which serves as 
both a goal of state policy and criterion for the evaluation of the process of develop-
ment itself. (DoD 451)
As Cowen and Shenton argue, what constrains development is “a world of 
necessity” in which “the freedom to choose is different from that of the freedom to do” 
(i.e., the capability set is different from the functionings achieved). Expanding people’s 
capabilities is the goal of development (or state policy), but it is also “the criterion for 
the evaluation of the process of development itself” (DoD 451). Where does this 
criterion come from to inform state policy? It comes from the necessity of the present to 
produce more.
Values of development are shot through with ambiguity because they are presented 
as an abstraction of history. They are treated as if they were absolute standards. The 
values posit a definitive prospect of improvement through stating what improve-
ment might mean but they also rest upon an historical condition of poverty which 
has made one population, or one part of it, relatively poorer than another. As such, 
these values, though necessarily relative, are presented as if they were an absolute 
standpoint from which to gauge the extent of the rapid, large-scale improvement of 
development. (DoD 452).
Historicist Development
The most radical alternative to positivist development in the last two decades 
is perhaps postdevelopment. This designation covers a number of different authors, 
many of whom were involved in mainstream development at one time themselves. 
Although postdevelopment critiques of the mainstream have largely been ignored by 
official development institutions such as the Bank, they have occasioned some response 
from academics and other development thinkers. The significance of postdevelopment 
lies in its critique of the epistemological and methodological basis of positivist 
development. Rather than its interpretation of the empirical evidence, these thinkers 
215seek to question the positivist conception of development, which they regard as a 
pervasive category of thought that originates in the West, but has come to colonize the 
worldwide understanding of our historical situation.The argument is that positivist 
development theory and practice is predicated on a particular worldview. 
The development discourse is made up of a web of key concepts...such as poverty, 
production, the notion of the state, or equality...Each of them crystallizes a set of 
tacit assumptions which reinforce the Occidental worldview. Development has so 
pervasively spread these assumptions that people everywhere have been caught up 
in a Western perception of reality.112
Because the “Western perception of reality” is fundamentally constituted by these 
development concepts, postdevelopment thinkers argue that it cannot correct itself. The 
only possibility that they see for freeing ourselves from the “Occidental worldview” is 
for other worldviews to challenge it. 
If ‘development’ itself has become a problem, and has sowed the seeds of discon-
tent and ethnic conflict, a corrective to development can only come from other 
worldviews, other visions.113
Postdevelopment reiterates the historicist critique of both positivism and universal 
history. The worldview of development is seen as inimical to the existence of other 
worldviews, and its extension by the process of “Westernization” involves conflict 
with, and destruction of, other cultures, traditional knowledge and alternative 
worldviews as competitors in a global marketplace of ideas. 
The historicism of postdevelopment is not explicitly connected to 19th century 
historicism, finding its inspiration instead in the work of Ivan Illich and Michel 
Foucault, among others. However, the postdevelopment critique of positivist 
development frequently involves a genealogy of the term that tries to demonstrate its 
112. Wolfgang Sachs, “Introduction” in Wolfgang Sachs, ed., The Development Dictionary, Zed 
Books, London, 1995, pg. 5.
113. Rajni Kothari, Rethinking Development. In Search of Human Alternatives, Ajanta, Delhi, 
1988, pg. 216. Quoted in Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Dilemmas of Development Discourse: 
The Crisis of Developmentalism and the Comparative Method”, Development and Change, 
vol. 22, 1991, pg. 23.
216historical relativism.114 Development, this critique claims, is “a specifically Western 
cultural concern”.115 Rather than universal and hence, in some sense, necessary and 
inevitable, the postdevelopment view is that “the development ideal, and the practices 
in pursuit of this goal, are products of a particular time and place; they are inventions of 
Western culture”.116 In this way, the positivist concept of development is historicized 
and relativized. The postdevelopment critique reiterates many of the points that were 
raised against positivist conceptions of history, economics and the human studies by 
19th century historicists. Positivist development, it is argued, simply universalizes the 
historical experience and contemporary conditions of North Atlantic countries, thus 
failing to recognize the “otherness” of different countries or societies.117 Positivist 
development depends on the notion that history is a single, linear, and progressive 
process, and thus fails to see that history is plural, i.e., that there are only ever 
histories.118 Postdevelopment reiterates the notion of historical individuality that has its 
origin in Romanticism, particularly in Herder, and that was itself historicized by the 
19th century historicists. Thus, even though it proposes “alternatives to development” 
rather than “alternative development”, which is seen as positivist development 
refashioned,119 postdevelopment itself rests on an implicit concept of historicist 
114. For example, in Gustavo Esteva, “Development”, in W. Sachs, ed., op. cit., pp. 6-25; Arturo 
Escobar, Encountering Development, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995; and 
Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, trans. P. 
Camiller, Zed Books, London, 1997.
115. Martin O’Connor and Rosemary Arnoux, “Translators’ Introduction” to Serge Latouche, In 
the Wake of the Affluent Society, trans. M. O’Connor and R. Arnoux, Zed Books, London, 
1993, pg. 6.
116. Ibid., pg. 7.
117. As Joel Kahn points out, in the 19th century “for many German writers Germany itself was 
the other” (Kahn, op. cit., pg. 242).
118. Or even that history itself is a hegemonic category of Enlightenment rationality, in which 
“the historical past stands for all of the past because it is presumed to be the only past”, as 
Ashis Nandy argues (Ashis Nandy, “History’s Forgotten Doubles”, History and Theory, 
vol. 34, no. 2, pg. 48). For Nandy, overcoming universal history requires abandoning the 
notion that the only access to the past is through history, and thus even the idea of plural 
histories.
119. See for example Latouche, Affluent Society, op. cit., ch. 5.
217development. The opposition to positivist development as universalistic and hegemonic 
is not, ultimately, non-developmental.
Postdevelopment rejects the concept of development, which is seen as a 
Western construct that repeats and reinforces the hegemony of the Western perception 
of the world. In this perception there exist those who have advanced or caught up and 
those who are lagging behind.120 The categorization inherent in the positivist concept 
of development denies the diversity and multiplicity of peoples, cultures and 
perceptions of reality, seeking instead to impose “a unilinear way of social 
evolution”.121 And through its discursive hegemony, it has succeeded (to some extent) 
in colonizing (or “developmentising”) other minds:
Development occupies the centre of an incredibly powerful semantic constellation. 
There is nothing in modern mentality comparable to it as a force guiding thought 
and behaviour. At the same time, very few words are as feeble, as fragile and as 
incapable of giving substance and meaning to thought and behaviour as this one.122
In rejecting this categorization, the postdevelopment thinkers shift the locus of the 
debate away from the interpretation of the empirical data, and consequent debates about 
causal factors, to the categories of thinking involved. In this way, they call into question 
the methodological commitment to “[p]lacing the world under a single standard of 
measurement” that “destroys the possibility” of recognizing different cultures as 
equally valuable.
If it could be recognized that different cultures really have their own standards of 
value, which cannot be subsumed into one another or rank-ordered on some supra-
cultural scale, it would make sense to give each equal respect and equal voice. The 
contrary notion, and the one that prevails today, that all the world’s cultures can be 
measured against a single ‘standard of living’ measure...renders all those cultures 
commeasurable, and hence unequal.123 
120. Cf. Latouche, ibid., pg. 101; Wolfgang Sachs, “Development: The Rise and Decline of an 
Ideal”, Wuppertal Papers, no. 108, August 2000, pp. 6-7.
121. Gustavo Esteva, “Development” in Sachs, The Development Dictionary, op. cit., pg. 9.
122. Ibid., pg. 8.
123. C. Douglas Lummis, “Equality” in Sachs, The Development Dictionary, op. cit., pg. 48.
218This linear and universal conception of history and humanity has become a 
way in which the world and its various cultures or societies are ordered. In contrast to 
the positivist conception of development as an objective process that can be 
scientifically investigated, for postdevelopment thinkers this is rather a way of making 
intelligible and systematizing knowledge of the hard-working countries for the West, 
and thus also systematizing the hard-working themselves. 
Like ‘civilisation’ in the nineteenth century, ‘development’ is the name not only for 
a value, but also for a dominant problematic or interpretive grid through which the 
impoverished regions of the world are known to us. Within this interpretive grid, a 
host of everyday observations are rendered intelligible and meaningful.124
Because of its discursive hegemony, positivist development is “dominating 
knowledge”, i.e., it both dominates what can be known about the underdeveloped world 
and is itself a knowledge that dominates.125 Serge Latouche characterises the West as 
“a vast social machine anchored inside our heads”, 126 which operates through 
development as “one kind of planned Westernization” that involves “a reform of society 
as a whole”.127 But this project of Westernization has failed, Latouche argues, which 
shows up the weakness in the Western development model. Not only is the Western 
model not universalisable, it cannot even give a coherent account of itself, because it 
depends on two processes that are contradictory:
Westernization is a two-pronged economic and cultural process: universal in its 
expansion and its history, reproducible through the West’s capacity to act as a model 
and through its identity as a ‘machine’.128
The contradiction arises because the Western model of “technological society...with all 
its attributes from mass consumption to liberal democracy” is an expansionist model. 
124. James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development’, Depoliticisation, and 
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, pg. xiii.
125. As the title of one collection of essays calls it (S. A. Marglin and F.A. Marglin, Dominating 
Knowledge: development, culture and resistance, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990).
126. Serge Latouche, The Westernization of the World, trans. R. Morris, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1996, pg. 53.
127. Ibid., pg. 69.
128. Ibid., pg. 50.
219Historically, the West sustained itself by expanding its sphere of interests, to encompass 
non-European regions. The process continues today, with geographic colonisation 
replaced by economic colonisation in the search for profits from low-wage labour, from 
captive markets, and from trade restrictions. Successful reproduction of this model, as 
in East Asia, leads to economic conflict between different instantiations of the model. 
Thus, it is far from universalisable in the economic sphere. Nor, however, is it fully 
reproducible, because to reproduce it means to engage in the kind of expansionism just 
mentioned. And “[t]he more it touches on the hard core of the system, the more 
difficult, conflictive and limited it becomes”.129 This shows up the essential weakness 
of the West, which 
may seem to steamroller everything in its path, but while it may flatten other cul-
tures, it cannot actually grind them to dust: the ground is elastic and gives beneath 
them.130
It is in this very weakness of development that the postdevelopment thinkers 
find hope. The West’s inability to reproduce itself by way of its model of development 
involves not just contradictory dynamic forces, but also a level of commitment from the 
underdeveloped that they are in principle incapable of giving, because they do not (yet) 
share the values that would enable such commitment to be total. Whether colonised or 
underdeveloped, non-Western societies have always engaged in resistance because of 
the need to engage in commitment. As a result, cultures subject to colonisation and 
development have become hybrid, displaying moments of resistance in their 
dereliction:
...alongside the failure of Westernization which is shown by general dereliction, 
there are many consistent signs of resistance, survival and endurance. They bear 
witness to the vitality and creativity of these cultures: cultures which show them-
selves in the emergence of syncretic forms, appropriations, counter-cultures.131
129. Ibid., pg. 51.
130. Ibid., pg. 100.
131. Ibid., pg. 103.
220In Latouche’s interpretation of the global sweep of development, Western culture 
becomes a monolithic “anticulture”, that destroys the cultural specificity of everything 
that it encounters. Not that Latouche sees nothing of value in the West, but he sees its 
essential characteristic as a kind of negativity that seeks to reduce all relations to market 
interactions, and all cultural forms to an ahistorical universalism.
Westernization is first and foremost a vast worldwide economic transformation, 
even if the most noticeable result is a uniformity of methods and models rather than 
the successful acquisition of the means of conforming to them.132
The decline of the West, or of Westernization as an ideal, is due to its own internal 
contradictions rather than any failing in the means or will to implement it.
If the Westernization of the world is currently failing, this is not because the dissem-
inators of information are insufficiently powerful, but more simply because, on the 
one hand, the ‘basis of culture’, the economy, does not follow, and on the other, the 
‘social system’ which bears the weight of change is in the process of collapse. The 
developmental model cannot be generalized: rather it is an instrument of worldwide 
domination whose complex dynamic is always enlarging, or re-creating, rents in the 
‘infrastructure’, insofar as the meaning of the latter is derived from the spectacular 
power system which accompanies it. The crisis of development will inevitably be a 
cultural crisis.133
In such a disenchanted world, hope and salvation can no longer come from the 
West, collapsing as it is under the strains of its own self-contradiction. In the radically 
dichotomized view of the West and “the Rest” that characterises postdevelopment, the 
future of the planet is to be found in the indigenous perspectives of the Rest, who have 
managed to create a hybrid culture of survival in the face of the self- and other-
consuming Western culture. Having pushed to the limit its scientistic and formal models 
of social change and progress, the West, it seems, has nothing to contribute to the 
debate about the future. 
Western societies were able to export their contradictions and put off the day of 
reckoning by a perpetual flight into the future. However, if my analysis is correct, 
the very heart of the stabilizing mechanism is now under attack. It is no longer pos-
sible to produce a creative reaction at the heart of a decomposing body; it can only 
come from outside it, and in a way, be directed against it.134
132. Ibid., pg. 75.
133. Ibid.
221With the positivist concept of development, as we have seen, there is an 
intrinsic alienation of individuals from active involvement in the meaning of the social 
change that concerns them. The meaning of development is a matter for experts who 
have the technical proficiency necessary to understand it, and thus are the only ones in a 
position to determine such meaning. There is an inherent asymmetry in the relation 
between experts and those who are to develop, which can be characterized in terms of 
who has the power to define. The postdevelopment critique focusses on this asymmetry, 
and asks how it is that subjective agency is only possible for those considered to be 
developed, and more particularly, for those with expertise, whereas those whose lives 
are the subject of development thinking are denied such agency and thus the power to 
determine the meaning of their own history.135 In contrast to the objective 
determination of historical meaning involved in the positivist concept of development, 
postdevelopment suggests that historical meaning can only be determined 
intersubjectively, i.e., by those actively involved in creating the conditions of their 
social change.
As a counterconcept to the positivist notion of scientific objectivity, historicist 
critiques of development appeal to concepts of community, social networks, social ties, 
and so on.136 But there are problems with this counterconcept, as is evident in N’Dione 
et al.:
Changing human beings means changing their way of seeing the world and 
especially the way they see the world in which and off which they live. We must not 
134. Ibid., pg. 113.
135. Cf. Arturo Escobar, op. cit., pg. 8.
136. For example, Geoff Mulgan argues for the primacy of small communities in self-
determination: “Bookchin, Illich and Schumacher have reasserted the primacy of small 
communities taking responsibility for their own condition of life” (Geoff Mulgan, 
“Reasserting the Primacy of Small Communities”, in M. Rahnema with V. Bawtree, op. 
cit., pg. 382); N’Dione et al. discuss the recreation of social ties in Senegal (Emmanuel 
Seni N’Dione, Philippe de Leener, Jean-Pierre Perier, Mamadou Ndiaye and Pierre Jacolin, 
“Reinventing the Present: The Chodak Experience in Senegal”, in Rahnema and Bawtree, 
op. cit., pp. 364-376).
222impose our own ways of seeing; instead we must be able to recognize the meaning 
that people give to what they do or to their own lives, and enable them to rediscover 
their capacity to make sense of it all.137
Two problems are evident in this passage, which are characteristic of historicist (anti-) 
development. First, we might wonder who is involved in “changing human beings”. Is 
this an inclusive sense of “human beings”, i.e., does it include the authors and the 
readers, and all those to be “changed”? Second, what is the motivation for such change 
and how does it arise? This is a far more significant problem, for if it arises from some 
dissatisfaction with the current way the world is seen, then the ability to see the world in 
a different way is already present and, therefore, there is little need for the historicist to 
articulate it. This is the same logical problem found in positivist development.
Thus it is hard to see this as the articulation of a different concept of 
development or social change, rather than merely a different set of values. The 
difference is supposed to reside in the call to abstain from imposing “our own ways of 
seeing”, in favour of recognizing the meaning that others find in their lives. Yet there is 
also the supposition that “we” (whoever we are) are able to help others rediscover their 
own meanings and ways of seeing. But how is it that we can see in a way that is not one 
of our “own” ways of seeing, at least latently or implicitly? In addition, if this were not 
the case, how would it be possible to help someone else “rediscover their capacity to 
make sense of it all”? Surely the sense “they” make of it must make sense to us, at least 
in principle (i.e., they must be able to make sense for us of their capacity to make sense, 
if we do not at first understand it ourselves). Otherwise, we wouldn’t be able to 
understand their “rediscovery” as being such. The fundamental point is that meaning 
must already be shared in principle, if this type of engagement is to be possible. But 
then how does this differ from positivist development, which also supposes that 
137. N’Dione et al., op. cit., pg. 370.
223underdeveloped people can come to understand how the developed see the world? In 
the case of positivist development, of course, such meaning is taken to be already 
explicit, embodied in the various systems of knowledge production taken to represent 
developedness and justified by the standards of objectivity that constitute positivism.138
The historicist argument is that the difference lies in the recognition that there 
are different sources of meaning, which therefore changes the nature of the interaction 
between the hard-working and those who are to help them. The helpers may explicitly 
recognize their own “capacity to make sense of it all”, but they are not supposed to 
impose this on the hard-working. Rather, such capacity is regarded only as formal, i.e., 
in the sense that notions of communication, helping, and so forth involve the 
presupposition that there is a capacity to make sense of it all, whether explicit or 
implicit, but the sense that is actually made will differ from context to context, people to 
people, community to community, and so on. On the material level, then, those who 
help must remain silent and receptive to whatever sense may be rediscovered.
But this is problematic in relation to the historicist critique of positivist 
development. Because it is critical, historicist (anti-)development entails a detachment 
or disseverance of the critic from her context (i.e., the encounter with development), yet 
this is exactly what the historicist criticizes positivist development for, i.e., the idea that 
it is possible to stand outside of, or to abstract from, history so as to determine the 
meaning of development. The historicist critique of positivist development itself is at 
odds with what it proposes would take the place of positivist development. That is, the 
historicist’s critical stance is predominantly, if not entirely, a theoretical stance that 
therefore shares a kinship with positivism.139 Historicism is, above all, founded on the 
138. The question of the presupposition of such standards, as well as the purported explicitness 
of meaning, is raised in the exploration of Heidegger’s notion of formal indication in chs. 4-
6.
224notion that history can be studied as objectively as nature but requires methods suitable 
to its object-domain. Yet historicist (anti-)development thinking draws a distinction 
between the cultivation of its theoretical approach and the genuine or authentic 
development that might be occasioned were positivist development to be dispensed 
with. Indeed, it can be argued that in many ways the primary texts of the historicist 
critique are concerned not so much with articulating a different approach to thinking the 
subject of development as they are with critique. Thus, the difference between such 
critics and those they purport to speak for is all too close to the difference between 
positivist development experts and those to whom they give the benefit of their expert 
advice. How, then, can one speak against the concept of development, when the ability 
to do so depends on the culture of development? This problem is one that the historicist 
critics are aware of. As the translators of Latouche’s In the Wake of the Affluent Society 
say of an earlier text:
Might one not riposte that this is still a Western voice, and speaking still from a 
position of unique privilege? In some ways this is true. How does one avoid the 
cynicisms allowed by a privileged position on the one hand, and the bad faith of 
White man’s guilt on the other? While it is cynical (or perhaps, in certain contexts, 
naive) to suppose that true respect for the other can come at no cost to oneself, is it 
a priori true that martyrdom through self-destitution or armed revolutionary zeal is 
a more meaningful gesture?140
Alternatives to development
Historicist development thinking holds that the meaning of social change or 
evolution cannot be determined in the abstract, but only by each particular society. The 
meaning that positivism ascribes to “development”, and which it universalizes as a 
technical activity, is considered an unwarranted universalization of the history of the 
North Atlantic nations.141 That is, although historicists may agree that “the West” 
139. A situation also found in the cross-fertilization between positivism and historicism found in 
the German Historical School of historians.
140. Martin O’Connor and Rosemary Arnoux, “Translator’s Introduction” in Serge Latouche, 
Affluent Society, op. cit., pg. 16. It should be noted that both of these authors were 
academics in New Zealand at the time of the translation.
225developed in the way that positivist development thinking characterizes it, they argue 
that despite its universalistic tendencies, it does not represent a general law of social 
evolution. Instead, it only represents the cultural evolution of the West, as a culture that 
is a sort of “anti-culture”, i.e., is inimical to other cultures.142 The universalization of 
North Atlantic history represents one interpretation of history, called “development”, 
which denies that other interpretations of history are even possible. Historicists reject 
this notion, and argue that there is no objective process of development to be 
operationalized. In particular, the historicist critique is concerned with how the concept 
of progress and its interpretation in economic terms are used to construct this linearized 
universal history.143 The counterconcept to progress and universal history is to be found 
in culture, but this cannot simply be assimilated into the progressive view as 
development agencies in recent years have argued.144 Rather, as with historicism 
proper, historicist development thinking argues that the progressive, economistic 
concept of development simply valorizes one particular culture.
The economic, this domain or dimension of calculating rationality, is not a natural 
reality. On the contrary, it is an historical and cultural invention, which in the mod-
ern West has been given an unprecedented pre-eminence.145
Although these thinkers reject the totalizing economic conception of history, 
they still hold that theorists have a role to play in articulating social or cultural change 
as an alternative to development, and they have numerous suggestions about what 
141. For historicists, the social evolutions in East Asia are ambiguous. They cannot be properly 
assimilated to the positivist notion of development, since to some extent they were socially 
determined. The case of Japan is even more ambiguous. For example, see Latouche, 
Westernization, op. cit., pp. 27, 51, 75, 93; Affluent Society, op. cit., pp. 52-53, 150, 169-
170.
142. Latouche, Westernization, pp. 43-46.
143. See for example, Escobar, op. cit., pg. 216; Latouche, Affluent Society, pp. 22-25; José 
Maria Sbert, “Progress”, in W. Sachs, The Development Dictionary, op. cit., pp. 192-205.
144. For example, HDR04.
145. Latouche, Affluent Society, op. cit,, pg. 25.
226needs to be done.146 Thus, they are as willing to theorize about cultural change as 
positivism is about development.
Escobar and Social Movements
Arturo Escobar argues that the “theory of social movements” found in recent 
reconsiderations of “resistance and political practice” can be brought to bear on the 
question of how to imagine a post-development era.147 
Social movements constitute an analytical and political terrain in which the weak-
ening of development and the displacement of certain categories of modernity (for 
example, progress and the economy), can be defined and explored.148
The “critique of the discourse and practice of development can help to clear the ground 
for a more radical imagining of alternative futures”.149 But it turns out to involve the 
same kind of theoretical attitude and gaze of the expert that Escobar finds objectionable 
in mainstream development:
The emergence of a powerful alternative social movement discourse raises further 
questions: how do popular actions become objects of knowledge in social move-
ment discourse?...Who can ‘know,’ according to what rules, and what are the perti-
nent objects?150
Once again, then, we find the theoretical objectification of life being valorized as a 
central aspect of the demand to think beyond the
seeming inability to imagine a new domain which finally leaves behind the imagi-
nary of development, and transcends development’s dependence on Western moder-
nity and historicity...151
Is this anything more than a suggestion to replace one form of theoretical expertise (the 
economists’) with another (the social theorists’)? If the theoreticism of the former is 
146. See for example, Esteva, op. cit., pp. 20-23; W. Sachs, “One World”, The Development 
Dictionary, op. cit., pg. 113 and Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and 
Development, Fernwood, Halifax, 1999, pp. 86-89; Rahnema, “Afterword” in The 
Postdevelopment Reader, op. cit., pp. 391-402.
147. Escobar, op. cit., pg. 211.
148. Ibid., pg. 216.
149. Ibid., pg. 212.
150. Ibid.
151. Ibid.
227problematic, how does that of the latter avoid the same difficulty, i.e., of constructing 
the subject of development in a way that hard-working people themselves cannot? 
Central to the postdevelopment critique is that development “links forms of knowledge 
about the Third World with the deployment of forms of power and intervention”, such 
that the Third World is constructed “silently, without our noticing it”.152 The nexus of 
post-war “research and knowledge to provide a reliable picture of a country’s social and 
economic problems”153 has been essential to positivist development, as we have seen 
with the World Bank. Only through the acquisition of such information could these 
countries become targets for development interventions, whether or not these are best 
understood as “new mechanisms of power embodied in endless programmes and 
‘strategies’”.154 Escobar’s central criticism, like that of other postdevelopment thinkers, 
is the way such knowledge is put in the service of power. But how does social theory 
avoid the dilemma of “experts studying development problems and producing theories 
ad nauseam”?155 The critique of discourse is Escobar’s favoured approach, as such 
critique is always historically contextual:
Philosophers have made us aware that we cannot describe exhaustively the period 
in which we happen to live, since it is from within its rules that we speak and think, 
and since it provides the basis for our descriptions and our own history...only a cer-
tain distance from [our era] will enable us to attempt the critical description of its 
totality as an era which has ceased to be ours.156
Yet although this distance may not be possible for theorists with respect to their own 
situation, the suggestion is that they can perform this function for the hard-working:
Critical thought...will also help in visualizing some possible paths along which 
communities can move away from development into a different domain, yet 
unknown...in which they can experiment with different ways of organizing societies 
and economies and of dealing with the ravages of four decades of development.157
152. Ibid., pg. 213.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid., pg. 214.
155. Ibid.
156. Ibid., pg. 215.
157. Ibid.
228This raises two questions. First, how can such critical thought, determined as it is by its 
“other” (i.e., positivist development), possibly indicate this “different domain, yet 
unknown”? Second, do such communities really need this “help”, or is it yet another 
normalizing discourse?
The desire for imagining “alternative futures” betrays the way in which 
postdevelopment finds itself bound by the past. But instead of the economists’ past of 
the market society, with its own ineluctable logic inevitably leading towards 
“convergence”, we have the anthropologists’ and social theorists’ past, a past of 
heterogeneous cultures or societies. In this respect, the postdevelopment thinkers show 
their debt to historicism:
...to think about ‘alternatives to development’ requires a theoretical and practical 
transformation in existing notions of development, modernity and the economy. 
This can best be achieved by building upon the practices of the social movements, 
especially those in the Third World. These movements are essential to the creation 
of alternative visions of democracy, economy and society.158
Cultural change involves “the ongoing work of social movements”, 
understood to comprise “daily life and its practices” in which people produce their own 
meanings in resistance, transformation and subversion of “structures of domination”.159 
Escobar argues that these need to be studied by social science in order to “make visible 
the domain of popular practices and the inter-subjective meanings that underlie 
them”.160 Whatever potential social movements themselves may have for thinking in 
terms of cultural change rather than development, they still need to be theorized, 
although “the belief that theory is produced in one place and applied in another is no 
longer acceptable practice”.161 Rather, “critical thought must be ‘situated’ ”.162 Only in 
158. Ibid., pg. 212
159. Ibid., pp. 216-217.
160. Ibid.
161. Ibid., pg. 221.
162. Ibid., pg. 216.
229this way, Escobar argues, can “the centrality of popular practices” as the locus of 
“meaning production” be restored, rather than “reducing the movements to something 
else”, i.e., economic or political categories.163
Whilst acknowledging that there may be a problem with the theoretical attitude 
itself, the argument is that the production of theory becomes polyvalent or pluralized 
with the “multiple sites of production and multiple mediations in the generation and 
production of theory”.164 This multiplicity, which Escobar argues can be thought of as 
“nomadic” and responsive to the fluidity and variability of “the everyday”, is thus 
counterposed to the uniformity and linearity of development thinking.165 However, 
there remains a tension between the theoretical attitude itself and the concreteness of 
social movements:
In the process, the West is partly reproduced as the site of enunciation, but also dis-
placed and resisted. In important ways Third World intellectuals, while trying to 
extricate themselves from the West, remain bound to it in complex ways, sharing, to 
a greater or lesser extent, the theoretical imaginary of the West. Yet theoretical pro-
duction cannot be seen in simple terms, as produced in one part and applied in 
another, but rather as a process of multiple conversations in a discontinuous ter-
rain.166
Latouche and the Informal
Serge Latouche offers another form of this post-economistic yet theoretical 
attitude. He designates the subject of development as “the archipelago of the informal”, 
and seeks to describe how the informal, as a new form of solidarity and sociality, 
escapes economistic attempts to draw it into the formal. Because of its polymorphism 
and concreteness, it “can be considered as a possible prefiguring of an other 
society”,167 which, “as a form of social life” is “an authentic culture of poverty”.168 
163. Ibid., pg. 217.
164. Ibid., pg. 221.
165. Ibid., pg. 223.
166. Ibid.
167. Latouche, Affluent Society, op. cit., pg. 125.
168. Ibid., pg. 127.
230This domain, in which people find their social existence on the periphery or in the 
interstices of the “grand society” that positivist development theory maintains is 
possible for all, is conceptualized by the mainstream for the most part in negative terms. 
Thus, the informal economy “appears to the economist as a-typical, bereft of its own 
logic or identity other than can be indicated by this displacement away from, or even 
effacement of, the ‘normal’ ”.169 What characterizes this domain or form of social 
existence, and therefore makes it resistant to attempts to normalize it, is that “[t]hese are 
people torn between lost tradition and impossible modernity”.170 Neither the one nor 
the other, the informal cannot be reduced to the categories of ‘traditional’ or ‘modern’, 
either in economic or cultural terms.
Latouche argues, therefore, that to understand the informal society requires 
different approaches and ways of thinking that do not attempt to reduce it to the usual 
concept of economic rationality, and thus domesticate it to the various narratives of 
progress, economic development, or even ‘alternative’ development.171 As with 
Escobar’s focus on social movements, Latouche’s notion of the informal is an attempt 
to articulate the concrete historical specificity of social groups.
The informal, properly understood, cannot be dissociated from the whole of the 
social context...The informal covers the whole ensemble of daily practices...
If one apprehends the informal in its totality, one sees that it has to do with a whole 
different form of activity which obeys a social rationality (or rationalities) not reduc-
ible to pure economic logic and hence not reducible to the terms of analysis emanat-
ing from the West.172
This raises the question of how theorizing the informal differs in principle from the 
“terms of analysis” identified with development. The notion of having a “total view”, 
whether of the formal or the informal, and thus grasping the whole of its context, is 
169. Ibid., pg. 129.
170. Ibid., pg. 134.
171. Ibid., pp. 139-145.
172. Ibid., pp. 137-138.
231characteristic of the theoretical attitude, whatever the categories are whereby this is to 
be achieved. There is a tension between the rejected theoreticism of positivist 
development, and the articulation of this other form of sociality.
Even if theoreticians, scientists and philosophers cannot see how to achieve a syn-
thesis between tradition and modernity, between the West and its other, develop-
ment’s castaways may succeed in practice in inventing a life, in reconstructing a 
sociality through a more or less happy fusing together of the different elements.173
In rejecting the notion that the informal can simply be coopted into an 
alternative pathway to development, Latouche argues that
The paradigm (concept and model) of development is profoundly unidimensional; it 
excludes cultural pluralism and difference, whereas the informal rests on their exist-
ence and is nourished by them. The paradox of the normalisation of the informal 
and equally of the ‘alternative’ development whose very name is suggestive of its 
difficulties, stems from the following double bind: either one is in the different 
dynamism characteristic of the informal, or one sacrifices this dynamism for nor-
malisation.174
The difficulty that faces postdevelopment, as with historicism, is how a non-
normalising “paradigm” could be possible and, correlatively, what this implies for the 
practices of intellectuals and theorists.175 In the Development Dictionary, Sachs refers 
to the various authors as “[d]eprofessionalized intellectuals”, but it is hard to 
distinguish how their theoretical approaches differ from those of positivist development 
in terms of form, as opposed to content.176 Latouche argues that postdevelopment 
inquiry is decentering and anti-totalizing,177 but it is unclear how the categories used to 
articulate the informal arise out of the informal itself, rather than being theoretically 
imposed on it. And without such specification, this approach can appear simply to be 
culturalist conservatism. In Nederveen Pieterse’s view, “[t]o post-development there are 
romantic and nostalgic strands: reverence for community, Gemeinschaft, the 
tradition”.178 But Latouche argues that the informal represents a “rupture” in 
173. Ibid., pg. 216.
174. Ibid., pg. 158, emphasis altered.
232modernity, “through the re-embedding of the economic within the social totality”.179
What is at issue here is the relation of the theoretical to the social totality that is 
theorized about. How does theorizing itself belong to the social totality? Does 
theorizing about difference give rise to different ways of understanding self and others, 
or does it simply give rise to different theory? The historicist critique relies on the same 
dichotomies as positivist development, which gives it the appearance of atavism or 
conservatism. In analyzing the informal as a new form of sociality, Latouche argues that 
it involves an “impossible synthesis of holism with individualism” that calls into 
question these categories.180 Whereas individualism, despite its fictional representation 
as “natural”, involves “emancipatory virtues” that are “undeniable”,181 their 
abstractness and formalism bring them into conflict with the “concrete liberties of non-
Westerners” as “freedoms valued in holistic communities”.182 Yet Latouche also 
recognizes that the latter may be highly restrictive. “Hierarchies are very severe, and 
indeed become intolerable, unacceptable and unjust once the belief in their 
175. Postdevelopment thinkers are more aware of this difficulty than is usually recognized by 
their critics. Nederveen Pieterse’s argument against postdevelopment is that it itself arises 
out of modernization, and yet refuses to articulate a paradigm or programme, and thus 
remains paradoxical. However, his recommendation of pluralism or polycentrism as the 
way forward, rather than universalism or relativism, ignores the difficulty. (Jan Nederveen 
Pieterse, “Dilemmas of Development Discourse: The Crisis of Developmentalism and the 
Comparative Method”, Development and Change, vol. 22, 1991, pp. 5-29; “My Paradigm 
or Yours? Alternative Development, Post-Development, Reflexive Development”, 
Development and Change, vol. 29, 1998, pp. 343-373; and “After post-development”, 
Third World Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 2, 2000, pp. 175-191.) From the perspective of 
anthropology, Grillo’s critique is that postdevelopment operates with an overly monolithic 
concept of development. What needs to be asked, he suggests, is whether postdevelopment 
rests on a failure to recognize that meaning is already contested, and that there is no single 
discourse of development. Postdevelopment seems to accept all too easily positivist 
development’s self-representation. (R.D. Grillo, “Discourses of Development: The View 
from Anthropology” in R.D. Grillo and R.L. Stirrat, Discourses of Development: 
Anthropological Perspectives, Berg, Oxford, 1997, pp. 1-33). Morgan Brigg argues that the 
use of Foucault in postdevelopment is superficial, and that a more thorough engagement 
with Foucault would show the strengths of the postdevelopment position, particularly in its 
critiques of the institutionalised practices of the UN and World Bank. (Morgan Brigg, 
“Post-development, Foucault and the colonisation metaphor”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 
23, no. 3, 2002, pp. 421-436.)
233transcendental foundation—the belief that ensures their legitimacy—breaks down.”183 
Such conflict cannot be theoretically reconciled, Latouche suggests:
In the practical life of the informal society...the fusion sometimes happens naturally. 
The entrepreneurs of the informal sector are individuals in their own right at the 
same time as members of a community.184
It thus remains unclear exactly what the status of theory is supposed to be, and whether 
it has a role to play in the construction of these new forms of sociality, or whether it is 
simply all that is left for Western(ized) intellectuals to do.
Conclusion
The fundamental aporia of positivist (i.e., mainstream) development thinking 
is the discontinuity between the objectification of the historical and the historicalness of 
such objectification. The idea of history as an object is that it manifests the general laws 
governing economic interaction and thus the telic ideal for development theory and 
practice. Yet this idea itself originated in a specific historical context. This means that 
the laws of economic interaction are considered to hold whether or not they have been 
determined, such that these laws themselves gave rise to the specific historical 
conditions that allowed for their character and existence to be determined. This is 
aporetic because the outcome was therefore the unintended and unforeseen result of 
economic interactions, the intention of which was entirely different (e.g., the 
“mercantilist” pursuit of specie). Having reached the stage of intellectual advancement 
176. W. Sachs, The Development Dictionary, op. cit., pg. 5.
177. Cf. Latouche, Affluent Society, op. cit., pg. 187.
178. Nederveen Pieterse, “My Paradigm or Yours?”, op. cit., pg. 361.
179. Latouche, Affluent Society, op. cit., pg. 188. The notion of the (dis-) embedding of the 
economy is central to Polanyi’s analysis of 19th century economic liberalism.
180. Ibid., pg. 225.
181. Ibid., pg. 226.
182. Ibid., pg. 227.
183. Ibid., pg. 228.
184. Ibid.
234necessary to determine the laws governing this outcome, we can now know the 
consequences of our (unintended) economic interactions, and thus we can no longer act 
in the way that gave rise to the conditions of developedness (or modernity) as it first 
appeared in late 18th-century Europe. From the 19th century onwards, then, positivist 
economics was oriented towards the reformation of political and economic institutions 
to harmonize with these laws, but now with the outcome fully intended.
My aim has been, first, to outline the positivist conception of the development 
problematic, and illustrate it with reference to two main sources of development 
thinking, namely the World Bank and the UNDP. The keystone of positivist 
development is the assumption that it transcends its own historical context (i.e., the 
situation of the leisured countries) such that it can prescribe policies or principles to 
hard-working countries on the basis of this transcendence. The problem with this 
attitude is the contradiction involved, which is that the positivist attitude itself arises 
from its particular historical context and is thus determined by it (as historicist 
economists argued against their positivist counterparts). To put this another way, the 
positivist attitude is based on the notion that the historical situation from which it arose, 
and to which it was a response, is identical with the historical situation in the hard-
working countries, which it is supposed to be capable of addressing by way of the 
intention to develop these countries. However, by the positivist standard itself, this 
cannot be the case, because if it were, the hard-working countries would be in a position 
to develop themselves. In the positivist claim to have discovered the “natural laws” by 
which progress occurs lies the contradiction of history: such progress has not occurred 
in the hard-working countries. Furthermore, neither did it occur historically in the 
leisured countries as a result of the positivistic intention to develop. Positivist 
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corresponds to self-directedness.
Although historicists reject the positivist notion that development is inevitable 
and thus an activity that can be transitively operationalized in the relations between 
different countries or cultures, they do accept the idea that cultural evolution or change 
can be theoretically conceptualised. Cultural evolution is as much a theoretical object 
for historicists as development is for positivists. However, because there are different 
cultural evolutions, it can only be theorized in terms of form. Despite not being cross-
culturally applicable in the sense that positivist development is, cultural evolution is 
equally regarded as something that can be brought about. What is at issue here is 
whether it can be thought of as a transitive activity at all. That is, can cultural change, 
any more than development, be appropriately conceptualized as intent married to 
process by means of practice? It is the dissevering of history into intent and process that 
is problematic here.
The fundamental problem has to do with the ascription of intent to one set of 
people, i.e., the “development experts” or postdevelopment’s “deprofessionalized 
intellectuals”, and the process (of what is supposed to happen) to another. The 
presumption is, as Cowen and Shenton show, that development practice can be 
transitive because it is the operationalization of that which does not change, i.e., the 
ideal of development, however articulated, for those unable to recognize it. 
Development expertise is predicated upon this differentiation. What is not adequately 
recognized is the relation to what is objectified (as intent and process). That is, the 
development expert is never simply a theoretical observer. The very requirement of 
expertise entails an involvement with the underdeveloped, and thus a pretheoretical 
relation. Yet the development ideal involves a distancing mechanism such that this 
236relation does not, and cannot, figure theoretically.185 Development always involves 
coming to grasp development itself, and insofar as this is denied of the underdeveloped, 
the only development possible is that of the developed, who are in no need of it. 
Abstracted from history, development proves illusory. Yet when identified with history, 
there is no development, because there is no possible way of specifying it as a process.
The positivist claim to a transcendent understanding of human social existence 
is undermined. This is not, however, to deny the possibility of such a transcendent 
understanding, but only that it can be based on having discovered the “natural laws” of 
economic interaction, progress, development, history, etc., as the positivist attitude 
claims. Such an attitude is equally immanent in its own historical context. This does not 
mean, however, that all understanding is culturally or historically relative. Rather, my 
argument is that the transcendence of understanding the human situation is its 
immanence to its historical site. The mutual implication of transcendence and 
immanence (or objectivity and subjectivity) depends on individuation, i.e., on 
objectivity for subjectivity, which is how we have our history in being it. And although 
this takes place in contention with others over the meaning of our traditions and history, 
it cannot be reduced to intersubjectivity, either. It cannot properly be understood simply 
as convention or inherited norms, because the validity or normativity of these depends 
on their being subjectively identificatied as valid or normative.
The peculiarity of the human situation, i.e., that our transcendence belongs to, 
is based on, and is directed towards our immanence, is what makes a phenomenological 
approach to development important. Unless we are able to grasp that we belong to, and 
are constituted by, that which we purport to be able to study objectively, we run the risk 
of simply lapsing into the theoretical attitude, in which we regard ourselves and our 
185. This is analogous to Fabian’s “denial of coevalness” and “allochronism”.
237historical contexts as objects produced according to universal natural laws. This 
attitude, which I have argued is characteristic of positivist development, not only 
occludes how we can come to have an understanding of others and their concrete 
individuality, but also occludes our self-understanding, because it tempts us into 
thinking that we already know who we are.
What is evident in the technocratic prescriptions for, and positivistic 
explanations of, progress and development is the denial of the very history that has 
constituted this approach. The question of the subject of development, which is to say, 
how it is that we are able to transcend the immanent process (i.e., our particular history) 
that constitutes us as who we are, cannot be approached by way of the kind of thinking 
that presupposes such transcendence as the very basis for thinking itself. This is not an 
epistemological issue of how we can know anything about development, but rather an 
ontological issue of how we are the way we ontically, phenomenally are.
Chapter 4: Heidegger’s Appropriation of the Tradition
The formal indication of concrete individualityBut whatever the plight of this communication may be, 
its claims must be restricted to calling something to the 
attention of others. This is ultimately the predicament 
of all philosophizing regarding its intention of having 
an effect in the world of others.
— Martin Heidegger, “Comments on 
Karl Jaspers’ Psychology of Worldviews
Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss some of the important influences on Heidegger’s early 
thought. My focus is on how he appropriates various ideas in his project of destructing 
the theoretical attitude as a way of inquiring about, and expressing the dynamic 
incompleteness of, the human situation (or being human) in its concrete individuality. 
This project is most fully articulated in Being and Time, which will be examined in 
detail in the next chapter.
The aspects of what is to be shown and how to show it in this project are 
mutually implicated. Heidegger argues that we cannot approach such an inquiry 
theoretically, because the human situation manifests aspects that cannot pertain to 
objects, whereas the theoretical attitude objectifies what it inquires into.1 In particular, 
it is the constitution of the human situation by an a priori relatedness to what it is not, or 
in other words its constitution by its finitude and incompleteness, that outstrips 
objectification. The human situation is incomplete because it is constituted only in the 
encounter with beings that, despite belonging to the human situation, are not reducible 
1. Of course, human beings can be objectified. Indeed, this is what the positive human 
sciences do. Heidegger argues, however, that such sciences cannot get at what it means to 
be human, which is a fundamental characteristic of the human situation. Only philosophy 
(as a science) is able to do so, because only philosophy has the right kind of concepts.238
239to it. Without such beings, Heidegger suggests, the human situation could not possibly 
be the way it phenomenally is. The theoretical attitude is inadequate because it 
presupposes that the human situation can be comprehended as a self-contained entity in 
isolation from any other being, i.e., as subject, ego, consciousness, etc. In modern 
philosophy—the philosophy of consciousness—this is widely held to originate with 
Descartes’ skeptical reduction of everything that differs from consciousness to a 
moment of it, which Descartes argued shows the independence and self-containment of 
the human situation as res cogitans, the thinking thing.
The second aspect of the incompleteness of the human situation is its 
relatedness to what it is “not yet”, i.e., to what and how it is becoming. Heidegger’s 
phenomenological clarification of the temporal incompleteness of the human 
situation—the meaning of our “timeliness” [Zeitlichkeit]—involves a reinterpretation 
of the meaning of the historical. In articulating this, he appropriates Dilthey’s insight 
that history constitutes the human situation, rather than being a property of it.2 This 
insight rests on a distinction between history as an object (of historiography, say) and 
history as a way of being, i.e., between the “object-historical” and “being-historical”. 
Heidegger’s phenomenological approach transforms the aspect of history that becomes 
problematic in theoretical conceptualization, i.e., that this “object” is historical 
precisely in no longer being there. This is problematic, because theoretical 
objectification seems to depend on the self-presence of the object, whereas history 
involves a kind of self-absence. Heidegger draws upon Dilthey’s insights to show that 
this paradox originates with the theoretical attitude itself, in the way it objectifies time. 
In his phenomenological destruction of this attitude, then, Heidegger seeks to show that 
the timeliness of the human situation is not tensed, but rather aspective. It involves the 
2. Heidegger argues that this was Dilthey’s fundamental motivation, yet one he was unable to 
find a way to express. Cf. K 159, 162, 172-173.
240perfective aspect of having-come-to-be, the imperfective aspect of coming-to-be, and 
their relatedness. In his approach to the historical as a fundamental character of life, 
Dilthey opposed the epistemologically-oriented approach, which took the issue of 
history to be a problem of the objectivity of historical knowledge. With such an 
oppositional approach, Heidegger argues, Dilthey was unable to free his thinking from 
the strictures that the theoretical attitude itself imposes.3 Dilthey was unable to 
investigate how the human situation is historical, i.e., its historicalness, because his 
approach to the issue remained determined by the theoretical attitude itself. 
Thus, there are two aspects to the incompleteness of the human situation that 
Heidegger is concerned with, which correspond to the question of the being of beings 
and the relation of this to time, respectively (hence being and time). In terms of the 
phenomenological description of the incompleteness of the human situation in BT, this 
can be expressed as mortal finitude.4 Finitude is phenomenologically clarified in 
Division I of BT, mortality in Division II. In what follows, I articulate these aspects in 
terms of structural incompleteness (finitude) and dynamic incompleteness (mortality). 
One of Heidegger’s aims in BT, I argue, is to show how structural incompleteness arises 
3. Cf. Robert C. Scharff, “Heidegger’s ‘Appropriation’ of Dilthey before Being and Time”, 
Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 35, no. 1, 1997, pp. 105-128.
4. The debate about the continuity of and/or discontinuities in Heidegger’s thoughtpath is 
ongoing. In the last two decades, publication of the early lecture-courses and private 
monographs such as Contributions to Philosophy (GA65), that date from Heidegger’s 
middle period (the 1930s) has shed new light on the issue. Some scholars, such as Sheehan, 
Kisiel and Van Buren, argue that the continuity has now been made evident, and the radical 
discontinuity between “Heidegger I” and “Heidegger II” is simply a misunderstanding of 
what Heidegger meant by the “turn” [die Kehre]. Sheehan argues that with Contributions, 
Heidegger “gets things right” (Sheehan, “A Paradigm Shift...”, op. cit., pg. 187). Kisiel asks 
suggestively whether “the hermeneutic breakthrough of 1919 already contains in ovo 
everything essential that came to light in the later Heidegger’s thought” (GBT 458). Van 
Buren suggests that there are “three traits” found in the later Heidegger that “were first 
inscribed in his youthful thought: namely, the end of philosophy, a new beginning, and 
indeed a constant beginning or being on the way” (John Van Buren, The Young Heidegger, 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994, pg. 29). For these scholars, BT thus stands 
out as somewhat of an aberration, in the “failed project” (GBT 3, 458) of the attempt to 
interpret time as a Kantian transcendental schematic horizon for being (articulated in 
SZ §69c; cf. GBT 444-451). Space does not permit further consideration of this issue here.
241in and for dynamic incompleteness, such that they are mutually implicated.
Heidegger’s phenomenological description of the incompleteness of the 
human situation suggests a way to approach the subject of development that avoids both 
the theoretical objectification of positivist development and the anti-positivistic, yet 
equally theoretical, historicization of development. A phenomenological approach 
allows for the clarification of how these objectifications belong to the dynamic tension 
between historical necessity, on the one hand, and the possibility that constitutes being 
our history rather than merely having it, on the other. That is, it allows us to clarify the 
mutual implication of historical immanence and historical transcendence. This 
clarification involves reconsideration of subjectivity in the genesis of meaning, i.e., not 
as the origin of meaning, nor as simply the recipient of it, but rather, along with 
objectivity and intersubjectivity, co-implicated in its constitution.
Despite this, my approach should not be thought of as an application of 
Heidegger’s thinking to the subject of development. That is, my aim is not (nor can it 
be) to take the results of Heidegger’s inquiries as a system to be used in propounding a 
new theory of development, because another of Heidegger’s fundamental aims is to 
show that such results are not themselves the topic of the inquiry. In this sense, he is 
faithful to the (appropriately interpreted) maxim of phenomenology: “To the matters 
themselves!” (SZ 34). The matter of BT is not so much what it shows, but how it shows 
what it does. But this matter becomes convoluted because the “what” and the “how” are 
mutually implicated.5 The how of philosophical inquiry is one of the ways of being of 
5. For this reason, Heidegger can easily come to appear primarily as a methodologist or a 
metaphilosopher. For example, see Steven Galt Crowell, “Heidegger’s Phenomenological 
Decade”, Man and World, vol. 28, 1995, pp. 436 and “Lask, Heidegger, and the 
Homelessness of Logic”, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol. 23, no. 3, 
1992, pg. 222; Theodore Kisiel, “Why Students of Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil 
Lask”, in Heidegger’s Way of Thought, ed. A. Denker and M. Heinz, Continuum, New 
York, 2002, n. 22.
242the human situation, but equally, the human situation and its ways of being is what 
philosophy inquires about. This recursiveness itself, Heidegger argues, is what makes 
such inquiry possible, i.e., what makes it possible for philosophy to “repeat” or 
“retrieve” life. For this reason, phenomenology must also be hermeneutic, in a double 
sense. First, in being a part of the whole it seeks to describe or clarify, it must proceed 
hermeneutically. Second, it must show how the human situation itself is hermeneutical.
Consequently, phenomenological clarification (which for Heidegger is what all 
philosophical inquiry properly is) can only ever be provisional (cf. SZ 436). This is 
another way in which it differs from the theoretical attitude. There can be no complete 
and final presentation of the human situation, precisely because the human situation is 
itself fundamentally incomplete and unfinished. Whenever philosophical results are 
presented as a complete system, the very phenomenon we are seeking to clarify is 
occluded. Likewise, if phenomenological results are taken as theoretical assertions, 
their intention is missed.6 In clarifying the incompleteness of the human situation, then, 
we must be careful to avoid theoretically completing it. The showing or indicating has 
to be incomplete, so as to allow the full concreteness or facticity of the human situation 
to show itself. As Heidegger puts it in BT, “[p]henomenology then means:...Letting see 
what shows itself from itself, just as it shows itself from itself” (SZ 34). In order not to 
complete or to construct the matter to be seen, such letting see can only be formal, so as 
to leave the seeing open to the matter itself. And if this applies to such formal 
indications, a fortiori it applies to BT itself (or any of Heidegger’s other texts, for that 
matter). In this respect, BT “is an ‘empty’ book”, requiring an enactment on the part of 
the reader.7
6. John Van Buren relates how Heidegger sought to avoid this happening with his own 
formally indicative approach, for example, telling a student “There will be no 
heideggerizing here! We want to get at the topic.” (John Van Buren, The Young Heidegger, 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994, pg. 45.)
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allows for the inclusion of such incompleteness and its deformalization in the inquiry 
itself, by recognizing that the subject of development itself has to include such 
incompleteness.
Theoretical Completeness and the Concrete Individual
The theoretical legacy
In the Logos essay Husserl sets out an idea of philosophy as a strict science 
that is epistemological, universalistic, and ahistorical. It is this idea of philosophy that 
Heidegger critiques, in his transformation of phenomenology into fundamental 
ontology that occupies him throughout the 1920s, an endeavour strongly influenced by 
Dilthey’s thinking.8 In seeking to “cultivate the spirit of Count Yorck in order to serve 
Dilthey’s work” (SZ 404), Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics aims to express 
the singular in its being-historical, an endeavour almost diametrically opposite to 
Husserl’s. In doing so, Heidegger argues that the naturalization of history in positivism 
and the historicization of nature in historicism belong together in the happening of the 
human situation. The concrete individuality of the human situation, he argues, is the 
transcendence of history in immanence to it. That is, our way of being is both to have 
history and to be “had” by it. But this can only be elucidated through a 
phenomenological inquiry that recognizes the hermeneutical aspect of the human 
situation, i.e., that we both belong to our history, and yet transcend it in being-historical, 
i.e., in being towards that history. The challenge to philosophy that both positivism and 
7. Ryan Streeter, “Heidegger’s formal indication: A question of method in Being and Time”, 
Man and World, vol. 30, 1997, pg. 426.
8. Cf. Scharff, “Heidegger’s ‘Appropriation’ ”, op. cit.; Theodore R. Schatzki, “Living Out of 
the Past: Dilthey and Heidegger on Life and History”, Inquiry, vol. 46, 2003, pp. 301-323.
244historicism pose, Heidegger argues, is based on the theoretical attitude towards the 
human situation. The fundamental presupposition of this attitude is that the knowing 
consciousness stands outside of that which it knows about. For positivism, this meant 
that consciousness was a natural object that could be observed and studied so as to 
determine the natural laws by which it operates. For historicism, on the other hand, this 
meant that the historical formations of spirit could be observed and typologized in terms 
of their inner motivations, but only insofar as these appear to us.
Heidegger rejects Husserl’s shift towards the transcendental-ideal constitution 
of consciousness, because it once again reverts to the theoretical attitude. Such an 
attitude grasps experience as a happening that happens to me, as if I were somehow 
outside of or constituted independently from my experience. But the fundamental 
characteristic of experience, Heidegger argues, is that it “befalls me”. It happens, and 
my “I” happens right along with it (ZBP 73-76/62-4).9 The theoretical attitude cannot 
express this, because its insistence on the formal-logical cuts off access to singularizing 
and properizing befalling. The irreducible belonging together of experience and “I” 
means that any theoretical attempt to conceptualize it is already compromised by the 
presupposition of the difference between consciousness and its object. For this reason, 
neither formal-logical concepts nor empirical generalizations can hope to grasp and 
express the befalling in which and out of which (and indeed, as which) the “I” occurs.
The central issue for Heidegger, then, is the question of historical meaning, its 
relation to the a priori, and whether historicism expresses this in an adequate way. Of 
equal concern, however, is positivist reductionism, which denies the originary 
meaningfulness of the world, maintaining instead that only law-like regularity can 
satisfy the requirements of objective knowledge. For many 19th-century German 
9. “Happen along” is one suitable translation for sich er-eignis; “befalling”, according to the 
OED, is an archaic verbal substantive, which could therefore translate Ereignis.
245philosophers, positivism drew implicitly on Kant’s critical philosophy, which was 
understood as delineating the regulative conditions for objective knowledge of nature. 
This prompted the question of whether it was necessary to “go beyond Kant” (in 
Windelband’s words) in order to provide a “critique of historical reason” (as Dilthey 
argued), so as to provide a foundation for objective knowledge of history. Heidegger, 
however, argues that neither epistemologically- nor methodologically-oriented 
philosophical inquiry (exemplified in neo-Kantianism) could address the twin crises of 
historicism and positivism (or scientism). The “crisis of the sciences” arises because of 
their theoretical inability “to reclaim their particular domain of objects originally” 
(HCT pp. 2-3). The question of the meaningfulness of history and nature cannot start 
with either of these domains, nor with the demarcation between them, because these 
arise with the sciences themselves (HCT pg. 2). The theoretical attitude objectifies what 
is encountered, and as objectified, such beings are denuded of the context of 
meaningfulness. For Heidegger, this is a fundamental characteristic of the sciences, 
which shows their positivistic character:
All the scientific disciplines are dominated by positivism, the tendency toward the 
positive, where “positive” is understood in terms of facts, and facts are understood 
in terms of a particular interpretation of reality. (HCT pg. 15)
Epistemologically- and methodologically-oriented philosophy is also determined by the 
theoretical attitude, Heidegger argues, for example, in the neo-Kantian attempts to solve 
the demarcation problem of the domains of empirical knowledge. In taking these 
object-domains as given, such inquiries conform to “traditional philosophy of science, 
which proceeds after the fact of an accidental, historically given science in order to 
investigate its structure” (HCT pg. 2). In doing so, this kind of philosophy fails to take 
into account not only the context of meaningfulness of what is encountered, but also the 
situation of the inquirer. Such a focus on objects, or things, Heidegger argues, results in 
246“absolute reification” as an “abyss” of meaninglessness or “nothingness” (KNS §13).
Heidegger’s argument is that meaningfulness cannot be properly expressed 
without an appropriate account of subjectivity, which neither positivism nor historicism 
could provide. Yet the epistemologically-oriented philosophy that was prevalent in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries was also inadequate. Positivism holds that 
subjectivity can be assimilated to objectivity, as with psychologism or, today, 
neurobiology and cognitive science, for example. Historicism denied that positivism 
could give an adequate account of historical meaning, because of its intersubjective 
constitution. The philosophical responses to these positions can be understood as 
attempts to argue for the autonomy of subjectivity. However, their epistemological bias, 
Heidegger argues, results in a theoretical objectification of subjectivity, whether as 
practical reason, life, or pure consciousness. In Heidegger’s view, the only one to see 
that the theoretical attitude was in principle incapable of giving an adequate account of 
historical meaning was Dilthey. However, Dilthey’s commitment to empirical 
psychology meant that his inquiries, too, remained epistemologically determined, 
despite his intent to establish a “special root-discipline of psychology” in contrast to the 
naturalistic psychology of his day. Yet his hermeneutic approach suggested the proper 
context of the issue by collapsing the distinction between knower and known in 
regarding the historian as continuous with the history she investigates.10 For Heidegger, 
then, this very contrast itself showed that Dilthey’s researches remained determined by 
that which he struggled against. The philosophical issue that Dilthey was unable to 
express, Heidegger argues, is how the questioner stands in relation to that which is in 
question. Once we recognize this as the originary source of all inquiry, we can come to 
understand this relation in a way that is neither objective, intersubjective, nor 
10. Robert C. Scharff, “Non-Analytical, Unspeculative Philosophy of History: The Legacy of 
Wilhelm Dilthey”, Cultural Hermeneutics, vol. 3, 1976, pg. 296.
247subjective, but rather involves all three moments equally, in their equioriginariness. 
That is, we can come to understand it as an inquiry in which the inquirer herself stands 
in question. Husserl’s anti-psychologistic phenomenology provided a way in which to 
express the concrete individuality of human being as a historical-hermeneutic situation, 
and thus to make evident how lived experience can be understood as “meaningful, not 
thing-like” (ZBP 69/58).
In effect, Heidegger’s innovation in addressing the aporias of positivism, 
historicism and theoretical philosophy was to approach the inquiry into historical 
meaning by elucidating inquiring itself. Only this approach, he argues, can give an 
adequate account of the equioriginariness of subjectivity, by taking it into account in the 
inquiry itself. Positivism and theoretical philosophy presuppose the objectification of 
subjectivity in the very form of their inquiries, in which subjectivity is taken to be 
something available or on hand to be investigated. Although historicism avoided 
objectifying subjectivity in this way, by arguing for the continuity of inquirer and what 
is inquired about, in the historicization of history and human being, it reduced 
subjectivity to intersubjectivity. Neither form of reductionism, Heidegger argues, can 
give an appropriate account of how the history that intersubjectively constitutes me can 
also be objectively valid as the history that I have. Ultimately, Heidegger argues, this is 
a question about meaningfulness. The focus of Heidegger’s phenomenological 
inquiries, then, is how inquiring itself can be understood as meaningful. 
Heidegger transforms Dilthey’s notion of hermeneutics into the fundamental 
understanding of all experience (in the double genitive sense). Phenomenology aims 
“to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself” (SZ 34). 
A phenomenon, unlike an object, is constituted by its mode of showing itself in itself.11 
11. I.e., it is unlike a theoretical object, which shows itself according to general or formal-
logical categories.
248Such showing also involves the one to whom it shows. When the phenomenon is 
experience, however, the “letting show” is part of the phenomenon itself. That is, the 
articulation of appearance belongs to what is to be described. Phenomenological 
description is a description of the describing (the phenomenon). Thus, the attitudinal 
requirement for such description is intensified. What Heidegger is after is not so much a 
description of the describing, but a description of what makes such describing possible. 
In this sense, then, hermeneutics belongs to phenomenology in the double genitive 
sense (i.e., phenomenological hermeneutics is hermeneutical phenomenology).
Thus, the possibility of expressing the singularity of being rests on our 
belonging to, or immanence in, it. Understanding is only possible because what we 
understand is what we already are.12 Yet, at the same time, understanding our situation 
(having the whole) transcends it. Thus, Heidegger’s inquiry concerns how such 
immanence and transcendence (facticity and logicity, or history and the a priori) can 
belong together without reducing one to the other. Heidegger’s phenomenological-
hermeneutical approach to grasping this is the method of formal indication, which is 
exemplified most fully (although not explained) in Being and Time.
Concrete individuality
The philosophical responses of Windelband, Rickert and Husserl turned on the 
question of what constitutes objectivity. The priority they accorded to epistemology led 
them to argue that concrete individuality is incomprehensible or irrational, because it 
cannot be conceptualized or intuited. Heidegger argues that this would mean that 
although I could be the concrete individual I am, this would be both ungraspable and 
12. Consequently, the “results” of the analytic can only ever be provisional, since such an 
analytic itself affects our self-understanding, and thus who and how we are. Heidegger 
adverts to the significance this has for the analytic in the final section of BT: “The 
presentation of the constitution of being of being-situate remains however but one way.” 
(SZ 436)
249inexpressible. The very notion of being it then becomes problematic. Thus, in order to 
address the question of concrete individuality, a clarification of the meaning of being is 
necessary. But, as mentioned previously, this question has to be approached in a way 
appropriate to the issue, which the epistemologically-oriented approaches of his 
predecessors were unable to do.
Heidegger argues that the problem lies in the theoretical attitude. This attitude, 
characteristic of both epistemologically-oriented philosophy and of the positive 
sciences, presupposes that knowledge of objects is achieved by contemplating them in 
isolation from one another. For Rickert, this meant that an object is a conceptual 
abstraction from the heterogeneous continuum of reality. For Husserl, it involved 
bracketing the existential commitments of the natural attitude. In the positive sciences, 
it involves the notion that it investigates objects that are “on hand” or “just there”, 
waiting to be discovered through scientific inquiry. In each case, what is problematic is 
the givenness of the object, i.e., how it is given for the inquiry. The theoretical attitude 
decontextualizes phenomena, such that they are no longer the experience of a 
historically constituted individual, but rather the objects of an ahistorical, worldless 
subject. By construing all experience as immanent to consciousness or as “facts of 
consciousness”, the theoretical attitude thus results in an inability to give any account of 
the object whatsoever. Heidegger refers to this as “absolute reification” (ZBP 63/53).
The theoretical attitude is unable to grasp the structural incompleteness of the 
human situation because it takes this to be independent, self-contained and hence 
complete in itself. This is the legacy of substantialist ontology, Heidegger argues: what 
truly is, is that which remains the same throughout change (cf. SZ 95-96). Theoretical 
inquiry thus regards beings in terms of what is unchanging in them. The human 
situation, however, cannot be grasped in this way, because one of its fundamental 
250characteristics is that it is timely. It flows, and in such flowing, the relations it evinces to 
other beings, and to itself as well, undergo change and transformation. Consequently, 
this holds for any kind of inquiry as well. The theoretical attitude presupposes that 
inquiry does not change the object, nor does it change the inquirer in any essential way. 
In asking about the movement of the planets, for instance, we may come to know more 
about them, but neither they nor we become different beings. Yet if such inquiry is 
about that which doesn’t change, what does it entail for the relation between the knower 
and the known, or between consciousness and its contents? If neither are essentially 
changed by the inquiry, then what is inquiry supposed to consist of? This is the aspect 
that the theoretical attitude fails to take into account.
Neo-Kantianism and the Irrational
Rickert: Valid values and the heterothesis
As discussed in chapter 1, Rickert argued that the heterogeneous continuum of 
reality is irrational, because in order to become an object of knowledge, it must be 
brought under concepts, and thus ceases either to be heterogeneous or to be a 
continuum. In the generalizing concepts of the natural sciences, the heterogeneity of 
reality is transformed into a homogeneity; in the individualizing concepts of the cultural 
sciences, the continuum is transformed into a discretum. Only by way of one or the 
other is knowledge possible. The fundamental characteristic of these types of inquiry, 
Rickert argued, is their value-relevance or value-relatedness [Wertbeziehung], i.e., the 
values in terms of which the heterogeneous continuum is individuated or generalized.13 
Such values, Rickert argued, are not value-judgments or valuations, but rather were 
entirely theoretical. “Values are not realities...Their nature consists entirely in their 
13. Rickert, Science and History, op. cit., pg. 21.
251acceptance as valid.”14 And although cultural values are the distinguishing element for 
the science of history, this discipline itself does not address the validity of values.15 
However, this raised the question as to the status of such values, and how they are 
supposed to be normative in experience, i.e., how they are supposed to be valid for the 
material which they form. As Heidegger argued, the relation between value-judgment 
and its fulfilment is the relation between a norm and being [Sein], or the ideal and the 
material, of which it holds or is valid for (ZBP 54/45). But how is such a norm or value, 
which does not exist but is only valid, supposed to hold of an existent? Heidegger 
suggests, following Lask, that “the material as such refers beyond itself” (ZBP 55/46). 
I cannot explore this question further here. The significance of Rickert’s 
distinction between validities and existents is that it is elaborated by Lask into the 
principle of the material determination of form, as a way of articulating how validities 
are valid for existents, which principle is appropriated by Heidegger as the ontological 
difference between being and beings. I turn to this in the next section.
One aspect of Rickert’s thinking that Heidegger does, however, appropriate is 
the notion of the heterothesis. This notion, Kisiel explains, is “that a One cannot even 
be thought of without the Other, that being identical with itself and being different from 
something else are equally primordial”, a notion which appears in GA64 and later in BT 
as “equioriginality” [Gleichursprünglichkeit] (GBT 332-333). In his 
Habilitationsschrift, Heidegger refers to this notion in relation to the question about the 
“something” [Etwas]:16
In what way is the something a something? Because it is not an other. It is a some-
thing and in being-something the not-being-the-other...The one and the other are 
given equally immediately with the object in general; not the one or even one [Eins] 
14. Ibid., pg. 88.
15. Ibid., pg. 89.
16. According to Kisiel, Heidegger adopts this term and also the impersonal “it” [es] “from the 
neo-Kantians...as an alternative way of talking about ‘being’ ” (GBT 23).
252in contrast to two, but rather the one and the other, the “heterothesis”, is the true ori-
gin of thinking as taking hold of the object. (FS 218)
He also mentions it in connection with the convertibility of the transcendental unum and 
ens, as the “true ‘origin’ of the thinking of the object” (FS 230-231). Quoting from 
Rickert, Heidegger points out “that there is no object [Gegenstand] if the one and the 
other are not given” (FS 231).
Lask: The material determination of form
Emil Lask was another philosopher who attempted “on the basis of a theory of 
meaning, to determine a concept of autonomous philosophy distinct from both 
empirical science and metaphysics”.17 A student of Rickert’s, Lask had a significant 
influence on Heidegger at an early stage, particularly with respect to the issue of 
meaning, the status of the categories, and the question of concreteness.18 Lask rejected 
Rickert’s normative conception of validity in favour of a strictly objective conception, 
yet he agrees with the rejection of the metaphysical distinction between sensisble and 
supersensible beings, in favour of a transcendental distinction “between objects of any 
kind and the logical forms which render such objects intelligible”.19 It is validity 
[Geltung] that characterizes logical form, as opposed to the actuality, occurrence or 
existence of objects.
17. Crowell, “Emil Lask”, op. cit., pg. 69.
18. There is relatively little available in the secondary literature regarding Lask. Apart from the 
essays by Crowell and Kisiel already referred to, see Gabriel Motzkin, “Emil Lask and the 
Crisis of Neo-Kantianism”, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, no. 2, 1989, pp. 171-190; 
Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, “Neo-Kantianism and Phenomenology: The Case of 
Emil Lask and Johannes Daubert”, Kanti-Studien, vol. 81, 1991, pp. 303-318 and “Two 
Idealisms: Lask and Husserl”, Kant-Studien, vol. 83, 1993, pp. 448-466; Theodore Kisiel, 
“Heidegger-Lask-Fichte” in Tom Rockmore, ed., Heidegger, German Idealism, and Neo-
Kantianism, Humanity Books, Amherst, 2000, pp. 239-270; and Craig Brandist, “Two 
Routes ‘to Concreteness’ in the Work of the Bakhtin Circle”, Journal of the History of 
Ideas, vol. 63, no. 3, 2002, 521-537.
19. Crowell, “Homelessness”, op. cit., pg. 226.
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of objects. Seiendes and Geltendes: this is the basic duality within the “universe of 
the thinkable” (All des Denkbaren).20
Thus, validities [Geltende] are not existents [Seiende], and therefore cannot be said to 
be real. ‘Being’, in Lask’s analysis, is not an existent but a validity, and therefore, there 
is an ontological difference between being and existents. For the early Heidegger, then, 
this is the incipient location of the ontological difference, between beings and their 
being, or between beings and their meaning. Insofar as the positive sciences investigate 
beings as “existents”, they cannot inquire into the meaning of such beings, because 
(contrary to positivism and psychologism) such meaning is not to be found in beings 
themselves. In Lask’s formulation, “[t]he being of entities [Sein des Seienden] belongs 
to the realm of validity, and thus to the non-entitative [Nicht-Seienden].”21 The task of 
transcendental logic thus becomes to “specify the character of the relation between non-
entitative validity and the objects (or entities) themselves”.22 
In explicating how validities hold, or are valid for, existents, Lask proposed the 
“principle of the material determination of form”, i.e., that the relation of validities to 
existents is one of implication [Bewandtnis].23 According to this principle, “the 
moment which differentiates form does not lie within the realm of validity itself but 
must be chalked up to that which is engaged by the form...to the material”.24 Because 
validity can only be for something, the logical forms do not form the material, but are 
rather implicated in it.25 “There is no validity that would not be a validity-with-regard-
to, a validity-in-respect-of, a validity-of [Hingelten].”26 For this reason, Lask argues, 
20. Ibid.
21. Emil Lask, Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre, in Gesammelte Schriften, 
vol. II, ed. Eugen Herrigel, J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1923, pg. 46, quoted in Crowell, ibid., 
pg. 226.
22. Crowell, ibid., pg. 227.
23. Another notion that Heidegger appropriates. Cf. Crowell, ibid., pg. 228; 
24. Lask, op. cit., pg. 58, cited in Crowell, ibid., pg. 228.
25. Crowell, ibid.
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in, and therefore neither do they “synthesize material since they are nothing but a 
certain way of being of material”.27 In ordinary contexts, objects are encountered as 
meaningful, but without their meaning being brought to clarity, which only takes place 
in transcendental reflection, or philosophical inquiry.
Transcendental reflection on categories only registers as “form character” what the 
material “is in itself” (LP 69), and so brings out the meaning character of the object 
as a whole.28
The categories are “not forms of thought but forms of meaning”.29 For Lask, then, 
“[c]ategorial validity is the objectivity of objects, the being of beings, the thinghood of 
things, etc.”,30 and objects are “unities of meaning”, where meaning is the difference 
between an object
taken in non-philosophical contexts (both everyday and scientific) and the same 
object as it is known through the transcendental reflection which clarifies its truth 
structure, the Urverhältnis of categorial form and material.31
Form is thus “the intelligibility of the object qua meaningful whole”.32
Heidegger, following Lask, aims at articulating this through an explication of 
meaningfulness. As Crowell puts it, “[m]eaning becomes the basic theme of a 
philosophy of logic which attempts to criticise Kantian representationalism without 
falling into metaphysics.”33 Hence Heidegger’s formulation in BT of the task of 
philosophy as the investigation of “the question of the meaning [or sense, Sinn] of 
being” (SZ 1).
26. Lask, op. cit., pg. 32, cited in Crowell, “Aletheiology”, op. cit., pg. 79.
27. Crowell, “Aletheiology”, op. cit., pg. 80.
28. Ibid.
29. Steven Galt Crowell, “Making Logic Philosophical Again (1912-1916)”, in Theodore 
Kisiel and John van Buren, eds., Reading Heidegger from the start: essays in his earliest 
thought, SUNY Press, Albany, 1994, pg. 62.
30. Crowell, “Aletheiology”, op. cit., pg. 76.
31. Ibid., pp. 77-78.
32. Ibid., pg. 80.
33. Crowell, “Homelessness”, op. cit., pg. 228.
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truth.
The Copernican turn is taken to mean that there is no “metalogical” (and so no scep-
tical) abyss between the thing and the “truth” of the thing, that “truth extends to the 
object itself, is identical to it” (LP 109).34
Transcendental philosophy, for Lask, is thus the investigation of the conditions of the 
possibility of the positive sciences. Whereas the latter investigate empirical features of 
domains of entities,
transcendental philosophy...thematises all objects in terms of their validity structure 
or intelligibility (truth). Such investigation reveals in empirical objects a transcen-
dental predicate (LP 123)—viz., “meaning”—which is not found in any empirical 
catalogue of “what is”. Thus, as Lask continues, “the objects are identical to theo-
retical meaning”...For philosophy, objects are “in truth” meanings.35
Although Heidegger adopts Lask’s conception of transcendental philosophy, 
he sought to go beyond Lask by including the investigation of the grounds of 
subjectivity in the task of transcendental philosophy. For Heidegger, Lask’s inquiries 
remained one-sided, focused only on the constitution of objects by validity, and thus 
fails to take into account the reflective moment in such constitution, “the Kantian side 
of the equation”.36 In the conclusion to his Habilitationsschrift, he writes:
These contexts of problems can be understood to be ultimately decisive for the 
problem of categories only if we recognize a second basic task of any theory of cat-
egories: situating the problem of categories within the problems of judgment and the 
subject.37
The problem of the categories had to be situated within these latter problems, 
Heidegger argued, because “only through judgment does [consciousness] become 
conscious of it as true, valid meaning” (FS 285). To this end, Heidegger adopts and 
transforms Husserl’s notion of intentionality as a way of accessing and expressing “how 
such an object is ‘there’ for reflection, what it means to say that ontological truth is 
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Crowell, op. cit., pg. 230.
37. Martin Heidegger, “The Theory of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus”, in 
Supplements, ed. John Van Buren, SUNY Press, Albany, 2002, pg. 63.
256‘given’ ”.38 Because validity is intentional, i.e., it holds of or is valid for, the analysis of 
intentionality is necessary “if Lask’s theory of material determination of form is itself to 
be made intelligible or clarified ‘logically’ ”.39
For Heidegger, then, the crucial aspect missing from Lask’s account of 
meaning is how this is meaningful for the subject. Heidegger’s subsequent inquiries are 
oriented towards elucidating how meaningfulness, concreteness and subjectivity belong 
together and can be brought to expression in the phenomenological inquiry into 
pretheoretical life, in the form of fundamental ontology.
Husserl and Phenomenology
Heidegger’s appropriation of Husserl’s phenomenology is a complex issue, 
which cannot be examined in detail here. Instead, I simply discuss some of the notions 
that Heidegger himself indicates are the central discoveries of phenomenology.
Intentionality
As mentioned above, in the conclusion of his Habilitationsschrift, Heidegger 
indicates how Lask’s transcendental logic needs to be related to the problems of 
judgment and the subject. Heidegger appropriates Husserl’s analysis of intentionality as 
a way to get at the givenness of meaning in factical life (cf. GBT 30-33). Unlike the 
neo-Kantians, who followed Fichte in arguing that facticity was brute, irrational reality, 
about which nothing can be said, Heidegger agrees with Lask and Husserl that the 
immediacy of the factic already involves categorial intuition, which can be read off 
from facticities, although not defined (cf. GBT 26-28).40 Thus, facticity is already 
intentional.
38. Crowell, op. cit., pg. 231.
39. Ibid.
40. See also Kisiel, “Heidegger-Lask-Fichte”, op. cit.
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grounds the validity of the categories found in factic life experience, as valid-for. For 
Heidegger, then, the importance of intentionality is that it “is a structure of lived 
experiences [Erlebnisse] as such and not a coordination relative to other realities, 
something added to the experiences taken as psychic states” (HCT pg. 29). For this 
reason, Heidegger argues that the theoretical attitude towards consciousness as an 
“inner sphere” that must go “outside” in order to encounter and grasp beings is 
phenomenologically unsound. The human situation is always already structured by 
intentionality, i.e., in being in the world it is already “outside” (SZ 62). The discovery 
of intentionality, he argues, shows that the philosophy of consciousness “[s]ince 
Descartes” rests on metaphysical presuppositions about the psychic and the physical 
(HCT pp. 30-31). Such presuppositions are not faithful to the “matter itself”, because 
they hold that intentionality is something added on to perception or experience (HCT 
pp. 31, 35).
What is particularly important with the discovery of intentionality is the way 
what is intended provides evidence for the intending. In intentionality, intending and the 
intended belong together, although for Heidegger, this belonging-together remains 
unclarified in Husserl.
We thus have an inherent affinity between the way something is intended, the inten-
tio, and the intentum, whereby intentum, the intended, is to be understood in the 
sense just developed, not the perceived as an entity, but the entity in the how of its 
being-perceived, the intentum in the how of its being-intended. Only with the how 
of the being-intended belonging to every intentio, as such does the basic constitu-
tion of intentionality come into view at all, even though only provisionally. (HCT 
pg. 45)
In this belonging-together, the intended provides intuitive fulfilment for the intending, 
where “intuition” means “simply apprehending the bodily given as it shows itself” 
(HCT pg. 47). Such apprehension involves categorial intuition, i.e., the intuition of the 
perceived as categorially structured. 
258Categorial Intuition
...categorial intuition is just a concretion of the basic constitution of intentionality. 
(HCT pg. 72)
Husserl’s phenomenology provided another component, along with 
intentionality, that Heidegger appropriated methodologically in his pursuit of 
facticity.41 This was the notion of categorial intuition. Husserl had argued that in our 
experience of a phenomenon such as a green book, although we perceive the book and 
green, nowhere do we perceive the book’s being green (or its greenness), i.e., the 
category of ‘green’ (LUII §43, pg. 277; §44, pg. 280). Then how do I intend the green 
book? Husserl’s answer was that along with perception there must also be categorial 
intuition. That is, I intuit “being green”, rather than perceiving it. Husserl argued that 
this distinction meant that the categories are not real objects, but are ideal (LUII §46, 
pg. 282). Heidegger appropriates this as a way to get at the meaning of being itself. For 
if I categorially intuit “being green”, then what I am intuiting is the being of it, i.e., that 
the category ‘green’ applies in the phenomenon. Heidegger’s appropriation of 
categorial intuition is thus intimately connected with his appropriation of Lask’s 
analysis of validities and existents. Against Lask’s objectivist position, however, 
Heidegger argues that the distinction between validities and existents is founded in 
intentionality.
Thus, Heidegger argues that I intuit the being of the book, i.e., that this book, 
here and now, is or exists, in the same way that I intuit its greenness. The intentional 
relation to this individual thing involves the intuition of its concrete individuality, i.e., 
that it is this being and not another. Although concrete individuality (or facticity) may 
be theoretically inaccessible, it is not experientially inaccessible. (How could it be, 
41. Cf. Heidegger’s letter to Karl Löwith, August 1927, in Karl Löwith, Martin Heidegger and 
European Nihilism, ed. R. Wolin, trans. G. Steiner, Columbia University Press, New York, 
1995, pg. 242.
259since my experience is my experience, i.e., is always concretely individual?) This 
means, Heidegger argues, that being is quite the opposite of the most universal and 
hence empty concept. It is the most singular and determinate concept, yet a concept of a 
peculiar sort, because it has no determinate content. Being holds of beings, yet does not 
pertain to their determinate characteristics (their whatness) but rather to their thatness. 
Of course, there is no thatness without whatness (the implication of the formal), but 
equally thatness does not determine the whatness.
The original sense of the a priori
Another aspect of Husserl’s phenomenology that Heidegger appropriates is the 
sense of the a priori that it discloses. This is based in categorial intuition, in that the 
categories intuited in experience are a priori to their instantiation in a given 
phenomenon. This indicates, argues Heidegger, that there is a “specific indifference of 
the a priori to subjectivity” (HCT pg. 74), contrary to the views of the philosophers of 
consciousness. This aprioricity, which is “[i]n the ideal as in the real”, thus indicates 
that the a priori is neither immanent nor transcendent, i.e., belongs neither to 
subjectivity nor to objectivity (reality). Yet since the a priori has “universal scope”, 
Heidegger argues, “the a priori phenomenologically understood is not a title for a 
comportment [of the subject] but a title for being” (HCT pg. 74). Furthermore, 
phenomenology also shows that “the way of access to the a priori” is through “a simple 
intuition”, and not an inference. That is, it is neither hypothetical nor posited:
It is not inferred indirectly, surmised from some symptoms in the real, hypotheti-
cally reckoned, as one infers, from the presence of certain disturbances in the move-
ments of a body, the presence of other bodies that are not seen at all. It is absurd to 
transpose this approach, which makes sense in the realm of the physical, to philoso-
phy too... (HCT pg. 74)
Contrary to positivism (and particularly psychologism), the a priori cannot be grasped 
by induction or by hypothesis, as Mill, for example, maintained.
260Thus, for Heidegger, the “original sense of the a priori” cannot be grasped 
either by the philosophy of consciousness or by positivism, since both are determined 
theoretically. A proper clarification of the a priori is still lacking, however, since this 
“really presupposes the understanding of what we are seeking: time” (HCT pg. 72). In 
BT, Heidegger articulates this as the “factical a priori”, i.e., the “always alreadiness” of 
the human situation.
Destructing the Theoretical Attitude with Formal Indication
Heidegger’s approach, variously called “formally indicating hermeneutics” 
(ZBP), “hermeneutics of facticity” (OHF) and “fundamental ontology” (BT), is a 
pretheoretical, nonobjectifying inquiry into the human situation. Whereas the 
theoretical attitude objectifies what it inquires into, Heidegger argues that the human 
situation is not an object, and cannot be understood as such. An object is a particular 
instance, subsumed under general or formal categories. But my situation, Heidegger 
argues, is not an instance of anything. Rather, it is concretely individual and this is 
constituted by its differentiation from every other real being. However, this makes the 
question of expressing the human situation problematic, since expressing anything 
requires language, and language is constituted by general terms. Yet the human 
situation in its concrete historical individuality is such that it is both heterogeneous (i.e., 
never an instance) and a continuum (i.e., related to, or continuous with, all of history).
For Heidegger, the import of the claim that the concrete individual is 
inexpressible showed that there is a problem with the theoretical attitude itself. The 
neo-Kantian constructivist attempt to resolve the conflict between positivism and 
historicism about the objectivity of historical knowledge led to the conclusion that the 
human situation is unknowable and ultimately irrational. Yet the theoretical attitude 
261itself arises from, or belongs to, the human situation. On what basis is this attitude 
capable of judging the condition that makes it possible? At the very least, the 
relationship between the theoretical attitude and the human situation needs 
clarification.42 But how is this relation to be clarified, if not theoretically? What other 
way of inquiring can inquire into the conditions of inquiry itself? To put this another 
way, how is it that we can transcend our situation so as to express it, if we are 
completely immanent in it?43 And conversely, if we can transcend it, then how can we 
be completely immanent in it?
In the philosophy of consciousness, this problem manifests itself in the 
presupposition that knowledge concerns the contents of consciousness. Objectivity then 
pertains to the way that such contents are combined in consciousness through 
subsumption under concepts. But the status of these concepts is left undetermined. They 
are neither perceptions nor objects. Then how do we have knowledge of them?
Heidegger seeks a way of expressing the human situation that avoids 
theoretical prejudices. Expressions such as Da-sein and Verstehen are what Heidegger 
calls “formal indications” [formale Anzeige].44 These are used deliberately so as to 
have a twofold effect. First, they are intended to ward off or warn us away from both 
everyday concepts and the concepts of the philosophical tradition. Second, they are 
intended to effect a transformation in thinking, through transforming the understanding 
of, and in, the human situation. Such formal indications are fundamentally provisional, 
and only as such can they formally indicate.
42. Nevertheless, even though neo-Kantian constructivism was unable to offer any satisfactory 
account of the historical individuality of the human situation, it still had value. As Bambach 
states, “for all its problems, Neo-Kantian thinking served a positive function. For it was 
only in this hypostatized form, Heidegger claimed, that the aporias of subject/object 
metaphysics could genuinely reveal themselves” (Bambach, op. cit., pg. 109).
43. In Dilthey’s terms, “knowledge cannot go behind life” (Dilthey, Selected Works Vol. I, op. 
cit., pg. 489).
44. About which, see below.
262Phenomenology and de-concealment
Phenomenology is anti-metaphysical and empirical, although anti-naturalistic 
as well. Phenomenological inquiry is not oriented to the disclosure of a reality “behind” 
the phenomena it investigates, but to what can be made evident in the phenomena as 
they show themselves. Phenomenology concerns the way that beings show themselves, 
i.e., what it means for them to be phenomena. 
Nothing else essentially stands “behind” the phenomena of phenomenology, 
although what is to become a phenomenon can be concealed. And exactly for the 
reason that phenomena firstly and mostly are not given, phenomenology is needed. 
Covered-up-ness is the counterconcept to “phenomenon”. (SZ 36)
For Heidegger, phenomenology is hermeneutic ontology, or “a productive logic” that 
discloses the pre-theoretical constitution of the beings that the positive disciplines 
investigate (HCT pg. 2). This method enables us to elucidate or clarify the 
hermeneutical character of the human situation and show its interpretativeness (and 
interpretedness), as well as the interpretativeness that constitutes the method (cf. SZ 
37). Both in everydayness and in theoretical constructivism, Heidegger argues, this 
hermeneutic character is concealed.
The structures of the human situation that Heidegger seeks to lay bare in BT 
are there in, and as, everyday experiences. However, both the philosophical tradition 
and everydayness make such structures almost unrecognizable, because they do not 
correspond to the usual concepts. This is most evident in the notion of the self, against 
which Heidegger counterposes being-situate [Da-sein],45 a formal indication that does 
not “eclipse” the self, so much as decentre it.46 The philosophical tradition, he argues, 
has privileged the self or the knowing consciousness, especially with the modern 
emphasis on certainty traceable to Descartes, vis-à-vis its own experience, thus 
45. Here, Da-sein is translated as either “being-situate” or “the human situation”, depending on 
context.
46. Cf. Michael Zimmerman, The Eclipse of the Self, Ohio University Press, Athens, 1981.
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in everyday experience, we think of ourselves as persons, egos, selves or ‘I’s, in 
opposition to others, natural beings, etc. But where in experience, Heidegger asks, is the 
radical differentiation between self and things found? Where is the self supposed to 
encounter it? Can experience be properly characterized in such a way?
Heidegger’s approach is to ask about the experiencing of the human situation 
as a phenomenon. Inquiring in this way shows that the phenomenon is always already 
being-in-the-world. The human situation is a unitary phenomenon that includes things 
encountered, others who are there, and something ‘I’-like. The more attention we pay to 
this phenomenon (the phenomenon that we ourselves are), Heidegger argues, the more 
it becomes evident that it is not divided into different domains or objects, and that the 
‘I’ is not some object that we encounter in the phenomenon. Rather, the ‘I’ is a way of 
being of the phenomenon, and inquiry about a way of being cannot proceed 
epistemologically, i.e., in terms of how knowledge about it is possible.
The concept of philosophy and philosophical concepts
Heidegger argues that intuition and expression of the concrete individuality of 
the human situation must be an ontological issue concerning the question of the 
meaning of being, rather than an epistemological issue concerning the conditions of 
objective validity, since objectivity already involves abstraction. Heidegger 
appropriates Rickert’s notion of “the heterogeneity of everything real”,47 i.e., that 
everything real is only such in differing from everything else. Whereas Rickert argued 
that this meant that the individual could not be expressed, Heidegger argues on the 
contrary that as the most individuating concept,48 the way to uncover or disclose the 
47. Rickert, Science and History, op. cit., pg. 34.
48. I.e., ‘being’ as a distributive, rather than a subsumptive, universal (cf. GBT 318, 397).
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individual that I am, which concrete individuality is fundamental to the human 
situation. And because one of my ways to be—my possibilities—is to ask about my 
being, such inquiry itself is a mode of individuating. Thus, Heidegger’s 
phenomenological hermeneutics aims to “listen in” on the individuating that constitutes 
the human situation, by showing how such questioning itself brings the questioner into 
question.
Fundamental ontology of being-situate
Heidegger argues that we have to start with the being that is nearest to us, 
which means starting with the being that we ourselves are (SZ 7). His early inquiries are 
thus directed towards expressing the singularity of what he variously calls the 
“historical ‘I’ ”, the “situation ‘I’ ”, and “the human situation” or “being-situate” (GBT 
16-17, 493). Fundamental ontology aims to clarify the characteristics (in BT called 
“existentials” [Existentiale]) of our way of being such that being is meaningful.
Object and inquiry
In Heidegger’s earliest extant lecture-course (KNS1919), he focusses on the 
way the theoretical attitude takes its object in advance as an object for the subject or 
knowing consciousness. But what is the status of consciousness itself? Both the neo-
Kantians and Husserl denied that consciousness is an object (in contrast to 
positivism).49 The problem then becomes, what to make of the judgments about 
consciousness found in philosophy. To what do these refer? If the aim of philosophical 
inquiry is to explicate or clarify the characteristics of consciousness or knowing, then it 
must take such inquiry itself into account as an aspect of knowing. In taking its object 
49. Cf. Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, “Two Idealisms: Lask and Husserl”, Kant-Studien, 
vol. 83, 1993, pg. 457.
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theoretical attitude denies that inquiring belongs to the way objects are encountered, or 
in other words, to the constitution either of consciousness or object. For this reason, it is 
unable to take into account the enactment of the relation of consciousness to its object, 
yet it depends upon such enactment in order for it to have an object at all. The object is 
taken as given, whereas in the relating of subject to object, givenness becomes 
problematic.
Intentionality
Heidegger’s method of formal indication is an appropriation of Husserl’s 
analysis of intentionality that aims to express the “giving” that constitutes the givenness 
of objects. As such, this giving cannot itself be an object, since it is prior to all 
objectification. To the theoretical attitude, this appears either circular or self-
contradictory, since for this attitude whatever can be grasped—including the giving of 
the given—must be an object. Any endeavour to determine what constitutes object-
hood would thus involve “[t]he circularity of self-presupposition and self-grounding” 
(ZBP 16/14). Heidegger argues, however, that the problem of circularity pertains only 
to the theoretical attitude itself:
Precisely that which first is to be posited must be presupposed. Circularity is an 
eminently theoretical phenomenon, it is really the most refined expression of a 
purely theoretical difficulty. (ZBP 95/80)
Overcoming the problem of circularity cannot be achieved theoretically. Rather, a 
different approach altogether is required, which allows us to express the fundamental 
relating of knower and known, or how experiencing and experienced belong together.50 
Such an inquiry cannot presuppose the division into knower and known, however. 
50. This sense of belonging together, or the intimate familiarity of experience with itself, is 
what Heidegger subsequently refers to as “understanding” [Verstehen] (cf. GBT 507).
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in which such a division can first arise. But inquiry itself arises in the human situation. 
Thus, the inquiry encompasses two “directions” or “vectors”, that of being “in” and 
based “upon” life or the human situation and that of being “out” “towards” it (J 82; cf. 
GBT 141-142). The question, then, is how to express this. To do so, Heidegger 
appropriates Husserl’s analysis of intentionality.
Husserl articulated intentionality as comprising the intending and the intended 
(or meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment). Heidegger reinterprets these as 
“senses” that express factical life experience or the human situation, namely the 
relational sense [Bezugssinn] (the intending) and the content (or containment) sense 
[Gehaltssinn] (the intended) of the phenomenon, to which he adds a third sense, the 
enactment or actualization sense [Vollzugssinn] (GA59:10, 37; J 87). This tripled-
sensed intentionality belongs to the “fundamental structure of factical life experience” 
(GA59:10), and constitutes it as “context of sense” (GA59:37). The theoretical attitude 
fastens on the relational sense. It thus fails to see that every relation to a content must be 
enacted or happen in experience, and so destroys the situational context of factic life 
experience (ZBP 174). Experience is not simply a static correlation of subject and 
object, or concept and content, but rather the happening of this correlation, which itself 
gives rise to the theoretical attitude, and therefore is not itself theoretically 
determinable. The theoretical attempt to determine experience denies this happening 
and thus de-vivifies or de-lives [entlebt] life and experience (ZBP 89-90/75-6). This is 
why, Heidegger argues, the accusation of circularity pertains to the theoretical itself:
We now see also that the sphere in which there is circularity, precisely because it is 
theoretical, de-vivified, and thus derivative, cannot be the sphere of primordiality. 
(ZBP 96/81)
De-vivification fails to see the enactment or livedness of experience, and thus cannot 
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attitude possible. The “sphere of primordiality” can only be attained by
a science that is pre-theoretical or supra-theoretical, at any rate non-theoretical, a 
genuinely primordial science from which the theoretical itself originates. (ZBP 
96/81)
Philosophy as phenomenological hermeneutics, or fundamental ontology, is the 
genuinely primordial science that Heidegger seeks to explicate. However, a science (or 
way of inquiring) that aims to express the pretheoretical concretely individual needs a 
different, non-theoretical method or approach. Heidegger calls this “formal indication”.
Formal indication
The aim of philosophy is to grasp the enactment of the relation of concepts to 
contents, i.e., to show the origin of concept-formation in the inquiry itself, which 
requires a way to express this enactment without thereby objectifying it. How is this 
possible? Is it even possible? In KNS, Heidegger considers Paul Natorp’s double 
objection to phenomenology, i.e., that in phenomenological description, too, life is “de-
lived” (cf. GBT 47-49). First, Natorp argued, phenomenology is reflective and therefore 
“stills the stream” of experience (ZBP 100-101/85; cf. J 84). Phenomenology, too, is a 
generalizing science or approach, and thus is equally unable to express the flow of 
experience or the concrete individual. Particular experiences are extracted from the 
context of the experiential flow and are transformed into objects for investigation:
The reflection makes something which was previously unexamined, something 
merely unreflectively experienced, into something ‘looked at’. We look at it. In 
reflection it stands before us as an object of reflection, we are directed towards it 
and make it into an object as such, standing over against us. Thus, in reflection we 
are theoretically orientated. All theoretical comportment, we said, is de-vivifying. 
This now shows itself in the case of life-experiences, for in reflection they are no 
longer lived but looked at. We set the experiences out before us out of immediate 
experience; we intrude so to speak into the flowing stream of experiences and pull 
one or more of them out, we ‘still the stream’ as Natorp says. (ZBP 100-101/84-5)
Second, Natorp argued that phenomenology is descriptive, and because 
description is subsumptive, it therefore destroys the individuality of the lived-
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subsumes particulars under general concepts. As Heidegger puts it,
All description is a ‘grasping-in-words’—‘verbal expression’ is generalizing. This 
objection rests on the opinion that all language is itself already objectifying, i.e. that 
living in meaning implies a theoretical grasping of what is meant, that the fulfilment 
of meaning is without further ado only object-giving. (ZBP 111/93)
The theoretical identification of meaning with objectivity is one of the targets of 
Heidegger’s destruction.
Heidegger argues that Natorp’s objection to phenomenological description 
presupposes that philosophical concepts are like other concepts, i.e., that they are 
subsumptive or ordering concepts (GA59:40). This view fails to recognize that 
philosophical concepts are not bound to objects, either as generalizing (GA59:35-36) or 
as formalizing (GA58:262). The concepts of positive disciplines are determined by the 
objects that they investigate (for instance, species and genus in taxonomy), and thus 
remain bound to those objects as the “form” of such “contents” (GA59:248-249). In 
contrast, Heidegger argues, philosophical concepts refer us to the happening of 
experience, and in doing so ward off any dependence on, or relation to, specific, fixed 
meanings or contents (GA58:143). Rather than being bound to contents, they refer us to 
how the relation to such content comes about in experience. They are therefore non-
objectifying or non-reifying (GA58:198). Philosophy, Heidegger says, “has no object 
[Objekte] before it” (GA58:235).
Heidegger’s notion of formal indications as concepts that express sense rather 
than order objects (GA58:143) is one way of characterizing philosophical concepts. 
These concepts, precisely because they are formal, enable the expression of concrete 
individuality. They are both “re-cepts” or “retro-cepts” [Rückgriffe] and “pre-cepts” 
[Vor-griffe],51 and
51. Cf. Kisiel, GBT 55.
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they live in life itself and, going along with life, they are at once originating and 
carry their provenance in themselves. They are at once preceptive and retroceptive, 
i.e. they express life in its motivated tendency or tending motivation. (ZBP 117/99)
Such concepts are directional, rather than ordering. That is, they indicate or point us in 
the direction of something (cf. GA61:107). They call our attention to something, which 
is a fundamental characteristic of philosophy (J 75). This notion of directing or 
indicating concepts is closely connected to the directionality of “sense” in BT, and also 
the kinetic sense of existence that Heidegger seeks to express.
Heidegger’s innovation is not simply methodological or conceptual, however. 
It is a reorientation of philosophy away from epistemology, towards (fundamental) 
ontology, where being is now understood as “life as such”, rather than objectivity (GBT 
223-4). Thus, for Heidegger, the topic we want to approach is the method of 
approaching it (GBT 21). The comportment that constitutes philosophy is
not a mere attitude toward grasping, a mere discussion, but a relation that even and 
precisely through the grasping “is” what it grasps and grasps what it “is”. (GA61 
pg. 46)
Philosophy aims to grasp life in its concrete individuality or facticity, and this can only 
be done by grasping the way that factical life expresses itself. Such grasping, too, is an 
expression of factical life; it is life’s self-expression, philosophically formalized.52 We 
cannot have a fully determinate concept in advance of what we are trying to investigate, 
for this would not allow for the very expressiveness we are trying to grasp. However, 
we must have some concept of what we are investigating. Such a preliminary concept is 
indeterminate, and can only become determinate in (or as) the inquiring itself. Formal 
indication is a way to get at the facticity of experience, i.e., that experience is never 
“experience in general”, but is always “mine” or concretely individual. Formality 
52. The formality of formal indication therefore avoids Rickert’s objection to life-philosophy, 
that it has no way of “to distinguish between living life and thinking about it” (Crowell, 
“Heidegger’s Phenomenological Decade”, op. cit., pg. 444-445). Heidegger refers to this 
objection in his Jaspers’ review (J 80).
270indicates facticity.
Objectifying, generalizing concepts cannot express the “mineness” of 
experience, because this is never an instance of something:
In the archontic sense belonging to the actualizing of our basic experience of the “I 
am”, an experience that concerns precisely me myself in a radical manner, we find 
that this experience does not experience the “I” as something located in a region, as 
an individuation of a “universal”, or as an instance of something. (J 92)
Whenever we attempt to grasp experience by means of objectifying concepts (such as 
those that determine object-domains like psychology or physiology), we eliminate 
precisely that which we are trying to grasp: the concrete individuality of experience.
We see that each time we attempt to give a regional definition of the “I” (a defini-
tion that arises from a foreconception about such things as a stream of conscious-
ness, a context of experience), we thereby “efface” the sense of the “am” and turn 
the “I” into an object able to be ascertained and classified by inserting it into a 
region. (J 92)
Then how is the concrete individual to be grasped without objectifying it? Formal 
indication, Heidegger suggests, allows for such nonobjectifying access by explicitly 
warding off or prohibiting the contents of experience (i.e., objects) so as to allow the 
conceptualizing itself to be grasped. Objectification arises, Heidegger suggests, by 
fixation on the contents of experience (the experienced), rather than its happening 
(experiencing). By staying strictly with how experience expresses itself, rather than 
what it expresses, formally indicative concepts allow the expression of the “am” to be 
brought into relief. Such concepts draw our attention to the contextualizing sense of the 
“(I) am”. Thus, the “I” is not so much a noun as a “verbal indicator” (i.e., it indicates the 
context for a verb-to-come).
Occasional Expressions
For his notion of philosophical concepts as formal indications, Heidegger 
draws in particular on Husserl’s analysis in Logical Investigations of essentially 
occasional expressions such as “here”, “now”, “this” and, most importantly, “I”.53 
271Unlike expressions such as “hair”, “noun” and “thesis”, such expressions do not 
immediately present an object, because they require a context in which to do so. Devoid 
of context, “here” does not present a place, nor does “I” present a speaker. Yet nor are 
such expressions universal, in the sense of applying to every possible place or every 
possible speaker equally. The general sense of such expressions, their “indicating 
meaning”, is directive. They direct the hearer or reader towards the specific context in 
which the expression has its particular meaning, the “meaning indicated”. Thus, such 
expressions are not subsumptive, but indicative or directive. Rather than subsuming 
generally, they indicate the individual. When I say “here” to you, I have a meaning 
indicated (I know I am referring to an area on the floor beside the fridge, say), but you 
do not have access to this. You have access to the meaning indicated only in the context, 
i.e., from the indicating meaning. That is, you do not know in advance what I might 
mean by “here”, but can only know it from the context of its occurrence. Abstracted 
from its context, “here” has no determinate meaning, but neither is it meaningless. The 
expression itself contextualizes, by drawing attention to the context of its utterance. In 
this way, it differs from objectifying, general expressions such as “electron” or 
“sandwich”.
Intentionality and Enactment
Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s analysis of intentionality is that it neglected 
the being of the intentional (i.e., that the intentional relation happens or takes place), 
and thus had overlooked the enactment sense of experience (HCT pp. 108-109). Husserl 
had distinguished the relational and content senses of intentionality, i.e., that in every 
intentional act there is a correlation between intending and the intended, that differs 
53. Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations I, Routledge, London, 2001, pp. 217-220; Logical 
Investigations II, pp. 199-200. Cf. Streeter, op. cit.
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in intentional experience. Rather, experience is constituted by contents and the relations 
to these. The content is the experienced, i.e., what is “had” in the experience, whereas 
the relation is the experiencing, i.e., the “having” of the experienced. Husserl argued 
that content and relation always go together, to constitute any experience as an 
experience. His analysis depended on bracketing ontological commitments about 
beings or what exists, so as to draw out the constitution of the intentional. However, 
Heidegger argues that such bracketing itself presupposes the being of intentionality, and 
therefore cannot be used to investigate it.
Husserl’s view that the relational sense of the intentional is something given in 
experience is questionable, Heidegger argues, because it overlooks the correlating or 
“belonging together” of intending and what is intended, i.e., of experience and 
experienced (HCT pg. 47). “The being of life, of lived-experiences [Erlebnisse] do not 
signify occurring but rather enactment...” (GA58:156). In Husserl’s analysis, 
intentional acts are ultimately static, rather than enacted, correlations. “For Husserl, 
there is no special correlation, since it is given with noema and noesis and included in 
them” (HCT pg. 94). Husserl had provided a theoretical analysis of intentionality, and 
had neglected the inquiry into the being of intentionality. Therefore, he had neglected to 
pay attention to “any particular individuation of lived experiences” (HCT pg. 109). The 
intentional act of Husserl’s analysis was a theoretical object, not an individuated 
phenomenon. The phenomenological reduction or bracketing thus “regards the what, 
the structure of the acts, but as a result does not thematize their way to be, their being an 
act as such” (HCT pg. 109). And only in the being of intentional acts is individuation 
determinable.
Heidegger argues that the sense of experience is not given in the content of 
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experience is something that I am implicitly intimately familiar with as my 
experience.54 To articulate this, the implicit must be made explicit, through paying 
attention to the way life expresses itself. In order that the enactment of the relating not 
be concealed by what is experienced, the specific contents of experience must be kept at 
bay. This is the aim of formal indication: to direct us towards the very directing-towards 
of experience, in this sense “repeating” experience. Unlike with the theoretical attitude 
(and the everyday attitude), it aims neither to tell us what experience is, nor to tell us 
what we experience.
Formal indication, then, is Heidegger’s method for grasping experience as it is 
in itself. But the immediacy, individuality, and situationality of experience means that it 
can never be directly expressed. Formal indications are directing, not direct; they point 
to the enactment of experience without trying to directly specify it. All expression 
involves generalizing or universalizing, and therefore cannot directly express 
experience as individual or in its “mineness” [Jemeinigkeit] (SZ 41-42; cf. ZBP 69/58). 
Formal indications only function, then, by warding off the identification of experience 
with content, i.e., what is experienced. This is the first of the functions of formal 
indications, the “prohibitive-referring function”:55
The formal indication...possesses, along with its referential character, a prohibiting 
(deterring, preventing) one at the same time...the formal indication functions 
both...to guide as well as to deter in various ways. (PIA/GA61:105)
Heidegger illustrates this in his argument that philosophy itself can only be defined in a 
formally indicative way:
It is characteristic of an indicative definition that it precisely does not present fully 
and properly the object which is to be determined. Indeed, it merely indicates, but, 
54. This, too, is what Heidegger means by “understanding”, which he appropriates from 
Dilthey (cf. Bambach, op. cit., pp. 158, 168).
55. Daniel O. Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal 
Indications”, Review of Metaphysics, vol. 47, June 1994, pp. 783.
274as genuinely indicative, it does give in advance the principle of the object. An indic-
ative definition includes the sense that concretion is not to be possessed there with-
out further ado but that the concrete instead presents a task of its own kind and a 
peculiarly constituted task of actualization. (PIA/GA61:26)56
In directing or indicating in this “improper” way, then, formal indications are 
determinately indeterminate. Therefore, they require an enactment on the part of the 
reader or hearer. To return to the analysis of occasional expressions, with these we find 
different indicating meanings for different expressions (“here” compared to “now” or 
“I”, say). Each gives a direction as to how the meaning is to be fulfilled (by looking for 
some location, by noting the time, or by regarding the speaker, in the specific context). 
Similarly, formal indications refer to how the meaning-fulfilment is to be enacted:
The term, “formally indicated”, does not mean merely represented, meant, or inti-
mated in some way or other, such that it would remain completely open how and 
where we are to gain possession of the object itself...
There resides in the formal indication a very definite bond; this bond says that I 
stand in a quite definite direction of approach, and it points out the only way of 
arriving at what is proper, namely, by exhausting and fulfilling what is improperly 
indicated, by following the indication. (PIA/GA61:26)
For Heidegger, then, every philosophical concept has this prohibitive-referring 
character, and points out how to arrive at its fulfilment as “what is proper” or 
appropriate to it: by following in the direction that the concept itself points. In doing so, 
the way objects are usually conceptually grasped is reversed. Instead of being presented 
with a determinate content or meaning by the concept, we have to enact or actively 
bring about the relation that the concept points to. So doing, however, transforms our 
way of understanding. This “reversing-transforming” function is the second function of 
formal indication.57
Formal indication is thus quite different from the universalization found in 
56. See also ZBP 13-14/11-12.
57. Dahlstrom explains this as follows: “The second function of a philosophical concept as a 
formal indication is to reverse the customary way of objectifying whatever is entertained, a 
reversal that transforms the individual who philosophizes. Accordingly, this second 
function is referred to as the ‘reversing-transforming’ function.” (Dalhstrom, op. cit., pg. 
783.)
275both generalization and formalization. Generalization consists in the hierarchical 
ordering of the material domain by general concepts, as in the schema (red, green, 
brown) —> (colour, sound, taste) —> (sense quality, idea). In each case of 
generalization, the contents of one level are bound to a universal or general concept at 
the next level, and vice versa. Particulars are grasped by means of genera and species. 
This constitutes one form of the theoretical attitude. Determination of the particular 
remains bound to the material content of what is universalized. “Generalization is in its 
enactment bound to a material region” (GA61:58). What is determined (e.g., red) and 
what does the determining (e.g., colour) belong to the same material region. Such 
concepts order the material to which they apply:
Generalizing determination is always determination of a counterstance [eines 
Gegenstands] by another, according to its material content, such that the determin-
ing, for its part, itself belongs in the same material region that the What to be deter-
mined stands in. Generalizing is therefore ordering, the determining by another, 
such that this other as encompassing belongs to the same material region as that to 
be determined. (GA60:61)
Formalization, on the other hand, does not refer to material contents, but to the 
relations that obtain between such contents.58 Thus, it “is matter-free. It is also free 
from any sequence of levels” (GA60:58). In contrast to generalization, formalization “is 
not bound to the determined What of the counterstance to be determined” (GA60:61). 
Formal determinations such as “something”, “other”, “and” and “or” apply equally to 
every level of generalization and to every material domain. “Red” is a “something” and 
blue is an “other” for it, “colour” is a “something” and “smell” is an “other” for it, and 
so on. Every phenomenon can be formalized in this way, since each is constituted in 
such relations. In the experience of a phenomenon, or the concept of an object, the 
former relates to the latter in one or more of these senses. But such formal relations are 
not determined by particular material contents. The “something” that formalizes this 
58. Cf. Husserl, LU II, pp. 39-40.
276red sock is not bound to the redness (it could be a blue something), the sock (it could be 
a red something else), or even to “this” (it could be that something). Formalization 
universalizes the relational sense of the phenomenon, free of its content sense. The 
relational sense as the how of experiencing is thus also given in a theoretical attitude:
formal predication is not materially content bound, but it must somehow be moti-
vated...It arises from the sense of the attitudinal relation [Einstellungsbezugs] itself. 
(GA60:58)
Thus, whereas generalization concerns contents, formalization concerns forms, which 
are relations to contents.
Neither generalization nor formalization concern the enactment of the 
relational sense of the phenomenon, i.e., the way that the how of being experienced 
happens. How is it that the object is a something? Or that it is “in addition to” 
something else? In generalization, such enactment is taken to arise from the material 
region itself. In formalization, it arises in “the inappropriate theoretical attitude in its 
relational sense” (GA60:59), i.e., as an ideal, formal-logical relation. Formal 
theorization therefore conceals the enactment sense:
precisely because the formal determination is completely indifferent to the content, 
it is all the more fateful for the relational and enactment sides of the phenomenon—
because it prescribes or at least implies a theoretical relational sense. It completely 
conceals the aspect of enactment... (GA60:63)
By disregarding the contents of experience, formalization determines the relational 
sense in advance, rather than taking it in its arising with the phenomenon. Thus, where 
the positive sciences focus on generalization of material contents, theoretical 
philosophy isolates the formal-logical relations taken to constitute all such contents. 
Neither is capable of grasping enactment, because of its concrete individuality. Neither 
positivism nor the various epistemologically-oriented philosophical approaches can 
therefore grasp and express the enactment sense fundamental to concrete individuality.
“Philosophizing,” Heidegger argues, “must...be considered in its originary 
277attitudinal enactment [Einstellungsvollzug]” (GA60:59). Formal indication is directed 
towards precisely this enactment-sense, and therefore must ward off or prohibit the 
theoretical relational sense, in which the enactment is predetermined or taken as a 
given, in order to let the enactment-sense itself be grasped:
The formal is something relational-like. The indication should indicate beforehand 
the relation of the phenomenon—above all, in a negative sense, just like a warning! 
A phenomenon must be pregiven such that its relational sense is held in suspense. 
The relation and enactment of the phenomenon are not determined in advance, they 
are held in suspense...the formal indication is a defence, a preceding protection such 
that the enactment character stays free. (GA60:63-64).
Heidegger’s aim is to bring this predetermination of givenness into question, and this is 
what the method of formal indication is to accomplish.
Thus, formal indication is intended to problematize the theoretical attitude 
itself, in order to allow the phenomenon (e.g., being-in-the-world) to show itself from 
itself. Heidegger’s interest is the showing or encountering of phenomena, and not what 
is shown or encountered. To let this enactment be seen as a problem, however, the 
relational sense cannot be predetermined. The method of inquiry must itself ward off 
the theoretical attitude and the way it orders phenomena in advance. “In the ‘formal 
indication’...it is not a matter of an order” (GA60:64).
For Heidegger, then, philosophical inquiry does not aim to secure the 
foundation for inquiry into experience. Indeed, he denies that this is even a genuine 
problem (cf. ZBP 78-79/66-67). Philosophizing always has its basis in factic life-
experience as enactment, he argues, and it is this basis that phenomenology seeks to 
articulate. Philosophy does not come ex nihilo but arises in, and out of, experience (or, 
in BT, in the ontic).
Philosophy is not an attitude towards a content that is fastened on in the enactment 
of philosophizing; not a material domain that represents an objective context; not 
objectivity in a theoretical relation whose enactment character is only co-present 
[mitvorhanden] but doesn’t seriously come into question. (GA59:171)
The tendency in philosophy to assume a perspective not rooted in the ontic, and hence 
278untroubled by contingency and facticity, comes from the factical itself. Life as such is 
already expressive, otherwise it would not be a “problem” for us. The real questions, 
according to Heidegger, are how life has itself and how it expresses that having (i.e., its 
motivation and tendency).
Hermeneutics of facticity
As mentioned previously, the formally indicative approach aims to “repeat” or 
go along with life or experience (GA58:23). Rather than a theoretical approach that 
purports to stand “outside” experience or the human situation and thus to be able to 
grasp it objectively, formal indication is found in experience, in the directedness of the 
relational sense of experience towards the content-sense. For this reason, it is 
hermeneutical. Heidegger therefore also refers to his topical method as a 
“hermeneutical intuition” (ZBP 117/99, 219/187) and as a “hermeneutics of facticity” 
(OHF).
The most intriguing and puzzling aspect of the human situation is its circular, 
recursive, or self-referential aspect. Being-situate is a way of being which involves 
awareness of, or intimate familiarity with, being-situate. The human situation is not just 
one of immersion in the pure flow of experience, but involves experience of this 
experience. To put this another way, the human situation is one in which ‘I’ happen 
(however that might be), and one aspect of the happening of my ‘I’ is that it is an 
awareness of this happening itself. This is not simply self-awareness, because it 
includes all the phenomenal aspects that constitute being-situate. That is, being-situate 
“includes” an ‘I’, but this ‘I’ also includes being-situate.59 Such a relation cannot be 
grasped by subsumptive concepts, because these either reduce being-situate to an aspect 
59. The meaning of “includes” here is, of course, one of the things Heidegger is attempting to 
express.
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being-situate, as in materialism and positivism. Heidegger appropriates Dilthey’s 
insights in arguing that this can only be appropriately grasped hermeneutically, i.e., in a 
way that shows how the ‘I’ belongs to being-situate and being-situate belongs to the ‘I’. 
In an early lecture-course, Heidegger expresses this as the “remarkable concentration 
upon the self-world” (GA58:59). This is one way in which he tries to express the 
hermeneutical structure of being-situate, which includes in itself the distress, worry or 
care about the whole of being-situate as the movedness of being-situate (GA59:173; J 
87; PIA 115).
Dilthey and history
This brings us, in a roundabout fashion, to the question of history. The 
transformation in thinking that Heidegger aims to effect through formal indication is 
one that wards off the theoretical attitude towards history, i.e., the attitude that regards 
history as an object (the “object-historical” [Objekts-Historischen], as he calls it 
(GA60:36)). This attitude is readily evident in positivism, for which history is simply 
one empirical object (or domain of objects) among others, to be investigated by the 
same methods with the same aim, i.e., to ascertain the general laws that pertain to it. It 
is also evident in historicism, Heidegger argues, despite its historicization of history and 
human being. Finally, it can be seen in the work of Windelband and Rickert, who 
despite their rejection of the positivist naturalization of history, argued that history was 
just as much an object as natural beings. Neo-Kantianism shared with historicism the 
idea of worldview [Weltanschauung].
According to Heidegger, it is only Dilthey who takes a non-theoretical attitude 
towards history. Rather than approach history as an object, Dilthey’s concern is with life 
as historical being:
280The struggle for a historical worldview is not played out in debates about the histor-
ical conception of the world but rather in those about the sense of historical being 
itself. And here we are speaking of the labors of Dilthey’s research. (K 150)
In Dilthey’s thinking, history is seen in relation to “the phenomenon of life” (K 155), 
which he sought to conceptualize by way of descriptive (rather than empirical) 
psychology. What was central for Dilthey was “the psychical context”, i.e., life as 
always there and as a whole:
Context was for him what is primary; it was the whole of life itself. It is always 
already there and is not first constructed out of elements. It is to be grasped first, 
and its component parts are to be loosened free from it...Psychical life is originally 
always given in its wholeness... (K 157)
Dilthey’s aim, however, was to understand the reality of historical being. And on this 
point, Heidegger argues, Dilthey did not see that inquiry into life as historical being 
requires inquiry into the being of the historical, in connection with the ontological 
inquiry into the meaning of being:
What is important is to work out the being of the historical, i.e., historicalness rather 
than the historical, being rather than beings, reality rather than the real...Dilthey 
penetrated into that reality, namely, human being-situate which, in the authentic 
sense, is in the sense of historical being...But he did not pose the question of histor-
icalness itself... (K 159, trans. altered)
In §77 of BT, Heidegger examines the correspondence between Count Yorck 
and Dilthey, as a way of summarizing how his own inquiry into historicalness “is 
resolved to cultivate the spirit of Count Yorck in the service of Dilthey’s work” (SZ 
404). Count Yorck took issue with Dilthey’s psychology, which, according to 
Heidegger, 
...is supposed to understand “life” in the historical developmental context and effec-
tive contexts as the way in which the human is, as the possible object of the human 
sciences and especially the root of these sciences. (SZ 398)
Yorck argued instead for “a logic striding ahead of the sciences and guiding them,” 
which “includes the task of working out, positively and radically, the various categorial 
structures of the being that is nature and the being that is history (Da-sein)” (SZ 399). 
He argued that the “historical school” was “antiquarian...construing things 
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mechanical construction.” The historical school merely added “feeling” to rational 
method, and thus could not achieve any “vitality.” To be vital, history must be critique, 
not mere enumeration of instances. In this he argues against the “purely ocular 
determinations,” typical of those such as Ranke, in which history is construed as a 
spectacle—in Ranke’s case, of political events. (SZ 400). For Yorck, the character of 
history is not scientific observation, but rather the character of human existence itself. 
“That the entire psycho-physical condition is not...but rather lives, is the embryonic 
point of historicalness” (SZ 401). That is, the “psycho-physical condition,” the 
“fullness of my self,” is not an objective presence, but rather is existence; being-situate 
is historical. From this he draws the conclusion that philosophy must be done 
historically. “For that reason there is no longer any actual philosophizing which would 
not be historial [historisch]. The separation between systematic philosophy and 
historial presentation is incorrect according to its essence” (SZ 402).
For Heidegger, Yorck’s demand that “the generic difference between the 
ontical and the historial” be developed is not radical enough (SZ 403). It fails to 
recognize that both are areas of beings, and thus the question of being needs to be 
clarified first, so that these regional ontologies may be securely founded.
Theory, Skill and Insight
If we want to inquire into the human situation as the phenomenon it is, without 
objectifying it, a non-theoretical approach must be found. In articulating this approach, 
Heidegger draws upon Aristotle’s distinction in Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VI between 
theory, skill and insight as different ways of knowing (or “deconcealing”).60 Theory 
60. See, for example, PIA 128-137 and the “Introductory Part” of PS (especially pp. 15-113).
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through making or producing it. Insight concerns the kind of doing that has its end in 
itself, and thus is self-referential.
Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle
Another central aspect of Heidegger’s thinking in his phenomenological 
decade is his appropriation of Aristotle. Whilst this appropriation is a complex issue, 
one of the fundamental aspects is the relation of knowing, acting and being that 
Heidegger discerns in Aristotle’s discussion of the intellectual virtues. The difference 
between skill (te/xnh, techne) and insight (fro/nhsij, phronesis) that Heidegger 
focusses on has to do with how they are related to the end to be achieved (the principle 
or origin (a0rxh/, arche) of action). In skill, the end is an idea or ideal type (ei]doj, eidos) 
that is to be made or produced. As such, it is external to the skillful making and what is 
produced. The principle is grasped as an idea in a discursive manner, i.e., as something 
different from the work to be produced. Such discursiveness is assertoric, and involves 
diairesis and synthesis, i.e., setting apart what is asserted and what it is asserted of so as 
to connect the two (e.g., the predicate is separated from the subject, to be connected by 
way of predication) (PS pg. 99).
The principle of insight, however, does not involve this kind of discursiveness, 
because the end is not the production of something different from either the action or 
the principle, but rather action (or a way of being) that manifests the principle as its end. 
Insight is deliberative, but this means that what is to be done (the principle) is 
determined through the deliberation that constitutes the insight, rather than through a 
theoretical contemplation of the principle in the abstract. This relates to the idea of a 
principle as such: “[a]n a0rxh/ can only be grasped for itself and not as something else” 
(PS pg. 100). To grasp it as something else would mean that the a0rxh/ is not complete in 
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“Accordingly, fro/nhsij includes the possibility of a sheer grasp of the a0rxh/ as such, 
i.e., a mode of disclosure transcending lo/goj” (PS pg. 100).
Insight is not theoretical, because what it regards is not unchanging. Instead, 
the “regarding” or observation is part of the activity in which the what (the aim or end) 
comes about. To act with insight is to be insightful, which is the aim of such action. 
Insight does not “as such have in view the beings it discloses” (PS pg. 100), but rather is 
itself the disclosing of the beings that pertain to it, including itself (PS pg. 98).
Te/xnh has to do with things which first have to be made and which are not yet what 
they will be. Fro/nhsij makes the situation accessible; and the circumstances are 
always different in every action. (PS pg. 20)
The circumstances of the situation that insight discloses include (i) that of which it is an 
action, (ii) that which must be taken up as ways and means of accomplishing the action 
(the things involved), (iii) a determinate possibility of the use of such things, (iv) a 
determinate time for action, and (v) the others involved. Because insight is deliberative, 
i.e., involves clarification of the situation, it also involves being with others. Insightful 
action “is carried out vis-à-vis one or another definite person” (PS pg. 101). Because in 
action, “[t]he situation is in each case different” (PS pg. 101), insight cannot be 
theoretical. Nor can it be static in the sense of being oriented towards the unchanging 
substrate (u9pokei/menon, hypokeimenon) of that which moves or changes (PS pg. 410). 
The substantialist ontology that Heidegger seeks to destruct by showing that science 
and theory have their foundation in situational being (i.e., that these, too, are 
“existential” ways of knowing (cf. GBT 154)) has its origin in Aristotle’s discovery of 
the u9pokei/menon:
Aristotle was the first to discover the u9pokei/menon—in connection with his uncov-
ering of ki/nhsij, i.e., on the basis of the new foundation he gave to the question of 
Being, a foundation in ki/nhsij...Aristotle was thus the first to see in regard to the 
kinou/menon that there is something in movement that remains, that has sta/sij, that 
is already there from the very outset. (PS:410)
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it is the actualization of itself. The aim of insight is the practical activity (pra=cij, 
praxis) itself. “For an action is a being that in each case can be otherwise; 
correspondingly, fro/nhsij is co-present, such that it co-constitutes the pra=cij itself” 
(PS pg. 101).
In his analysis of acting, then Heidegger finds the distinction between skill and 
insight to lie in the relationship between origin and aim. Neither skill nor insight are 
theoretical, in the sense that they investigate the principles of action. Rather, they aim to 
realize the principle through action. With skill, however, the principle is separate from 
what is produced, whereas in insight, the principle is what is to be acted out.
Fro/nhsij is not a speculation about the a0rxh/ and the te/loj of acting as such; it is 
not an ethics and not a science...According to its proper sense, it is what it can be 
when it is a view of a concrete action and decision. (PS pg. 40)
Thus, insight involves its origin and end in itself, unlike the other forms of knowing. 
The origin of action is the anticipation of that action: “what is anticipated is nothing 
else than the action itself” (PS pg. 101). But equally, the end of action is action itself:
...in fro/nhsij the action itself is anticipated; and the te/loj of the action is nothing 
else than the action itself, to which fro/nhsij belongs as proai/resij [“anticipa-
tion” or “choice in advance”]. (PS pg. 101-2)
In the anticipation of action “the circumstances are characteristically not given, nor is 
that which belongs to the carrying out of the action...the concrete situation of the action 
is still...covered over” (PS pg. 102). This is what insight makes transparent, by 
disclosing “the human situation as acting now in the full situation within which it acts 
and in which it is in each case different” (PS pg. 100, trans. modified). This is the 
characteristic of insight: it appropriates the concrete situation of action in the way that 
the human situation itself is appropriated by the concrete situation. 
In every step of the action, fro/nhsij is co-constitutive. That means therefore that 
fro/nhsij must make the action transparent from its a0rxh/ up to its te/loj. For the 
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co-present, such that it co-constitutes the pra=cij itself. (PS:100)
This analysis of fro/nhsij, which Heidegger identifies with conscience 
[Gewissen], also provides the guideline for his reformulation of hermeneutics as a way 
of being, rather than as a scientific method (as found in Droysen and Dilthey, for 
instance).
In PS §8c, Heidegger discusses the difference between insight and skill in 
terms of the significance of failure. With skill, the possibility of failure is an advantage, 
because only through failure can the certitude of production be assured. Failure is the 
possibility of improving one’s skill (PS pg. 38). Only by risking failure, and having to 
start over again, do we acquire the ability to realize the principle in producing beings. In 
such failure, however, the principle itself is not affected. That is, the production is 
different from the work produced. In failure, the work is produced negatively, so to 
speak, in that it is produced inadequately, improperly, or incompletely. But through this 
failure, skill is enhanced. We can learn from our mistakes, and produce a better, more 
satisfactory product the next time.
With insight, however, the significance of failure is quite different, because the 
principle is also the aim. Failure to act in the appropriate way is a failure to have 
grasped the principle:
But in the case of fro/nhsij, on the contrary, where it is a matter of a deliberation 
whose theme is the proper being of being-situate, every mistake is a shortcoming. 
This shortcoming with regard to oneself is not a higher possibility...but precisely its 
corruption. Other than failure, the only possibility open to fro/nhsij is to genuinely 
hit the mark. Fro/nhsij is not oriented toward trial and error; in moral action I can-
not experiment with myself. (PS:38, translation altered)
When action is directed towards itself as its end, rather than towards something external 
to it, the failure to act in the correct or appropriate manner does not mean the possibility 
of better achievement next time, because the actor is and has to be the one who has 
failed to act correctly. This flaw or failure is constitutive of myself as the actor I am 
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the situation next arises, but this does not negate the previous failure. In the failed 
action, it was my insight that failed, and failed throughout that action. That is, it is a 
failure of self-understanding. It is not that I grasp the principle perfectly well, but yet 
somehow fail to bring it about. Rather, I do not grasp the situation at all.
Such grasping of the situation also involves a sense of time other than the 
chronological. In the clarification of the situation, it is grasped as “of its time” or in a 
timely fashion. That is, insight is kairological. “Our interpretation of fro/nhsij shows 
how these kinds of beings (actions) are constituted in it, namely, in terms of the kairo/j 
[kairos, timeliness, the moment]” (PIA 134). Insight concerns “those dealings that 
human life has with itself” (PIA 134). Practical actions have to do with how we go 
about our being, rather than what we produce. The insight is into the goal or “toward-
which” of the dealings which constitute living. “fro/nhsij is the illumination of 
dealings that co-temporalizes and unfolds life in its being” (PIA 134).
Heidegger explicitly identifies insight with conscience. “fro/nhsij is nothing 
other than conscience set into motion, making an action transparent” (PS pg. 39). As a 
way of knowing, insight is unlike theory. In the latter, what is learnt can also be 
forgotten, and thus can be learnt again. 
In the case of fro/nhsij things are different. This is manifest in the fact that I can 
experience, notice, and learn what has already been experienced, noted, and 
learned, whereas fro/nhsij is in each case new. (PS pg. 38)
This is not insight into situations as instances of existing, but rather the disclosure of the 
situation as temporally particular or “of its while” [jeweilig], i.e., as it is at the moment 
in its concreteness, and how this concreteness appropriates me (cf. GBT 225). Such 
insight illuminates the singularity of each situation, and thus illuminates my situation as 
mine in each case at each while.
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understood in terms of the modalities of necessity, actuality and possibility. Theory, in 
regarding that which cannot change or be otherwise, aims at the necessary. Skill aims at 
the actual that is to be produced and can be compared with the (necessary) ideal. In 
contrast to both, insight always involves the possibility of being in one way or another, 
not as something to be produced, but as hermeneutically constitutive of this way of 
being itself. This has implications for how history can be understood, because the 
historical is not actual. Instead, it must be made actual in coming back to it or in 
“repetition” [Wiederholung], since this is the only in this way that we can actually have 
the historical (cf. GBT 304). Being historical, then, or historicalness, is not the 
theoretical activity of the science of history, but a way of being towards that which is 
only actual in such being towards it.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined Heidegger’s appropriation of aspects of neo-
Kantianism, phenomenology, Dilthey and life-philosophy, and Aristotle, in his aim of 
expressing the immediacy of factic life experience and concrete individuality. 
Heidegger’s topical method of formal indication destructs the theoretical attitude that 
prevents the expression of this immediacy. In the next chapter, I turn to Heidegger’s 
presentation of this in Being and Time.
Chapter 5: Mortal Finitude and Meaning
in Being and TimeSince philosophizing is essentially an affair of finitude, 
every concretion of factical philosophy must in its turn 
fall victim to this facticity.
— Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic
Introduction
Being and Time (BT) presents Heidegger’s most complete articulation of the 
import of formal indication and the hermeneutics of facticity for grasping being-
historical as both immanence in, and transcendence of, the history that constitutes us.1 
Arguably, Heidegger’s central aim is to articulate subjectivity in a non-theoretical, non-
objectifying way, through a hermeneutic ontology of insightful doing that is contrasted 
with the objectification found in skillful making (or dealing with things) and the 
intersubjectivization of meaning that constitutes being-with-one-another. Here I 
examine aspects of Heidegger’s thinking in BT that suggest a way the subject of 
development can be approached to take into account the moment of subjectivity in the 
intersubjective constitution of the meaning of historical context.
Being-situate, existence, and being-in-the-world
The inquiry in BT is initially expressed in terms of “the question of the sense 
[Sinn] of being” (SZ 1), but this can only be investigated by inquiring into beings (SZ 
6). The preliminary question is, which beings should be so interrogated? Heidegger 
argues that to approach this question in a non-presuppositional way, the inquiry must 
1. Formal indication is largely recessive in this text (cf. GBT 152), and the hermeneutics of 
facticity is overshadowed by Heidegger’s adoption of existentialist terminology (cf. GBT 7, 
397).288
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Inquiring about the meaning of being is itself a way of being, and therefore is an 
“exemplary” being to inquire into (SZ 7). In other words, this inquiry is one that puts 
the questioner in question. Heidegger designates this being, “that we ourselves in each 
case are...terminologically as being-situate” (SZ 7). Being-situate is a formal indication 
of the being that each of us is, and thus expresses the enactment of the how of this 
being, i.e., how it is related to its own being. What is distinctive about being-situate, he 
argues, is that in being, it “goes about [geht um]” its being (SZ 12).2 That is, as the 
being [Seiende] we are, we do not simply “have” our being, but are directed towards, or 
concerned with, who and how we are. In such “going about”, we always already have 
some kind of understanding of being, whether this is explicit or not.
Existence [Existenz] and mineness [Jemeinigkeit] are the two formal 
indications in BT that characterize the human situation (SZ 42). First, existence 
formally indicates the being that being-situate goes about, which is also indicated as 
“(having)-to-be” [Zu-sein] (SZ 42).3 As such, it indicates both the obligatory or 
necessary sense that the human situation has to be its being, as well as the sense of 
possibility that it is able to be or can be it.4 Second, the being of the human situation is 
always mine. That is, as the concrete individual that being-situate formally indicates, it 
is always my being that I go about, am concerned with, or care about. But this is not 
individualistic in either an ontological or ethical sense. Rather, it is an ontological 
indication that only I can live my life, and that the only life I can live is my own. As a 
2. On the translation of geht um as “goes about”, see Theodore Kisiel, “The new translation of 
Sein and Zeit: A grammatological lexicographer’s commentary”, Man and World, vol. 30, 
1997, pp. 244, 247.
3. Zu-sein is the formal indication that Heidegger used in 1925-26 prior to writing BT, in 
which it is almost completely replaced with Existenz (GBT 397, 511).
4. The tension between necessity and possibility is fundamental to the analytic, as will be 
shown below.
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and constitutes, the human situation, and how it is mine, i.e., how it is lived. That is, the 
formal indication of mineness does not presuppose the concrete determination of these 
aspects of the human situation, but rather refers to them as issues or questions for us, 
which can only be approached by enacting the indication, i.e., by “re-living” and “pre-
living” life in the inquiry. What is prohibited, however, is the immediate identification 
of the human situation with some determinate content, such as particular facts about 
me, or with some formal sense, such as the self, personality, ego, etc. Such objective 
determinations are prohibited, because they occlude how the human situation is 
constituted by ways of being. Finally, “being-in-the-world” [In-der-Welt-sein] is a 
formal indication for “a fundamental structure of being-situate” (SZ 41; cf. OHF pg. 
62). Existence and mineness are based on, or grounded in, being-in-the-world (SZ 53). 
Through the analytic of this structure Heidegger aims to phenomenologically elucidate 
the meaning of being in terms of time.
Therefore, the analytic in BT does not aim to present “a complete ontology of 
being-situate” (SZ 17). Rather, it is oriented throughout towards elucidating the 
enactment-character or movedness of the human situation as concretely individual. This 
is the concrete timeliness of being-situate that Heidegger calls “historicalness” 
[Geschichtlichkeit], which, as a formal indication, must be kept distinct from the 
theoretical conception of history, as found for example in the science of history. 
Nevertheless, as Heidegger aims to show, the possibility of the science of history itself 
attests to historicalness as a fundamental way of being of the human situation. The 
destruction of the ontological tradition by which concrete individuality is to be 
disclosed as constitutive of the human situation therefore also involves a destruction of 
the object-historical, i.e., showing how historiography has its basis in an originary 
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the questioning about being that was indicated with respect to its ontic-ontological 
necessity is itself characterized by historicalness. The working out of the question 
of being must therefore, out of the most proper sense of being of the questioning 
itself as a historical questioning, receive the direction to inquire about its own his-
tory, i.e., to become historiographical [historisch], in order to bring itself, in the 
positive appropriation of the past, into the full possession of the most proper possi-
bilities of inquiry. The question about the sense of being is brought from itself to 
understand itself as historiographical, according to the manner of enactment that 
belongs to it, i.e., as the preliminary explication of being-situate in its timeliness 
and historicalness. (SZ 20-21)
Being-in-the-world
To elucidate concrete individuality, the analytic focuses on the “constitutive 
structural moments” of being-in-the-world, which Heidegger articulates as: (i) “in-the-
world”; (ii) “the being that in each case is in the way of being-in-the-world” or the 
“who”; and (iii) “being-in as such” (SZ 53). This focus, as argued above, is motivated 
by Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle, whereby the movedness of the human 
situation is to be elucidated in two respects. First, in terms of circumspective caretaking 
[umsichtige Besorgen] (or in the Aristotelian sense, skillful making) (SZ 76), being-in-
the-world is elucidated in terms of dealing with things. This elucidation discloses that 
things are encountered in a context of references, and that this referentiality is 
significant for the human situation. Furthermore, it discloses that things are encountered 
in a shared world, and indeed can only be so encountered, since the articulation of 
things as the things they are depends on discursive discrimination.
Second, the elucidation of skillful making shows that it is not sufficient in 
itself to characterize the way that being-situate goes about its being. This pertains to 
mineness. Skillful making elucidates several respects in which the human situation 
moves/is moved in taking care of things or matters, and in giving care to others. But 
such movedness cannot itself be understood in terms of things or others. That is, being-
in-the-world cannot be reduced to objective properties or intersubjective norms or 
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fundamental to the human situation, which cannot be constituted without a shared 
world (SZ 71). But this “other-directedness”, or 3rd-person perspective,5 cannot be 
originative of the movement of “going about being” per se, because this is always mine. 
To put this another way, the structural incompleteness that makes the human situation 
dependent on things and others—i.e., its finitude—cannot originate with those things 
and others. The attempt to locate such finitude in things (e.g., positivism) or from others 
(e.g., historicism) destroys finitude itself, by turning the incompleteness into an 
objectified completeness. The analysis of skillful making indicates that the 
incompleteness which makes meaningfulness possible originates in another aspect of 
the human situation, i.e., its directedness towards itself and the enactment (or 
movedness) of such directedness as originary timeliness or insightful doing.
World
Heidegger’s formally indicative concept of “world” indicates the context 
whereby beings are encountered. World itself is not a being, thing, or object, nor a 
category pertaining to objects, as with Descartes’ notion of extensio (SZ 89), but an 
ontological characteristic of being-situate.6 Heidegger calls such characteristics that 
pertain to existence existentials [Existentiale], to distinguish them from categories, 
which pertain to beings unlike being-situate (i.e., things) (SZ54). Thus, “world” is an 
existential rather than a being. However, since its ontic sense refers to something like 
the familiar surroundings in which we live, Heidegger uses the term “worldishness” 
[Weltlichkeit] for the existential (SZ 64-65). He refers to those beings unlike being-
5. Cf. Steven Galt Crowell, “Subjectivity: Locating the First-Person in Being and Time”, 
Inquiry, vol. 44, pp. 433-454.
6. World is the openness of being-situate to encounter. Heidegger sometimes makes this 
explicit. “World is what encounters” (OHF pg. 65). Cf. Sheehan, “A paradigm shift”, op. 
cit.
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The structure of being-in-the-world, then, formally indicates the context of 
being-situate as encounter with things, others, and self. Indeed, “world” is one of 
Heidegger’s early terms for this context. In his early lecture-courses, he uses the 
expressions “around-world” or environment [Umwelt], “with-world” or contemporaries 
[Mitwelt] and “self-world” [Selbstwelt] to indicate the specific characteristics that in BT 
he calls being near (things), being-with (others), and being-self (e.g., GA58 §§7c, 10). 
However, world is a unitary phenomenon, as is being-in-the-world. Thus, these three 
worlds have to be understood as equioriginary [gleichursprüngliche] moments of the 
context of being-situate, i.e., as I find myself and how I find myself.
Structural incompleteness and skillful making
Around-world and being near gear
The phenomenological elucidation of encountering things, or “being near” 
[Sein bei] them, aims to show the encountering itself, rather than the constitution of 
such “innerworldish” [innerweltliche] beings as objects. It aims to bring out the 
“worldishness of the world” [Weltlichkeit der Welt], as the context of such encountering 
in the double genitive sense, i.e., encountering in context and as that context. Heidegger 
formally indicates this as “significance” or “meaningfulness” [Bedeutsamkeit] 
(SZ 87).7
In the elucidation of the worldishness of the world, Heidegger’s aim is to show 
how the stuff or gear [Zeug] (SZ68) of use in everyday life always appears in a context 
7. In HCT, Heidegger states his lack of satisfaction with this term because of its association 
both with notions of value (as found in neo-Kantianism, for example) and notions of the 
meaning of words. “And I frankly admit that this expression is not the best, but for years I 
have found nothing better...” (HCT pg. 202).
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is encountered in the human situation in various ways: trying to get things done; dealing 
with obstacles; ignoring things that do not concern us; and so on. Such gear is not 
encountered as bare objects or things that are just there or “on hand”. Rather, they are 
things “with which one has to do, in caretaking dealings (pra=cij)” (SZ 68) and thus 
their way of being is “handiness” [Zuhandenheit] (SZ 69). They are to-hand in 
encountering them, as when we reach for a pen to jot down a note, a cup to sip coffee, 
and so on. Handiness does not mean “always useful”, however, since an empty pen or 
broken cup also shows this way of being, albeit privatively. Handy beings are 
encountered (as helpful, hindering, etc.) in taking care of circumstances. Heidegger 
indicates the way gear is encountered as “dealings” [Umgang] (SZ 66), whereas the 
movedness or activity of such encountering is indicated as “caretaking” [Besorgen] 
(SZ 57).
Furthermore, handy beings encounter in a way that involves references to one 
another, to others, and to the ‘I’ of the human situation. They encounter as already 
contextualized, i.e., as referential beings. They refer to other things that they fit together 
with, to those who made them, those who provided them for me, to the tasks to which 
they are suited and those to which they are not (my iBook makes a lousy hammer), and 
so on. All of these references together make up a referential context [Verweisungs-
zusammenhang], which appears as a totality (SZ 70). 
Reference
Different kinds of reference pertain to gear, such as what they are good for, 
what they consist of, and so on. Heidegger indicates such reference most formally as the 
“in order to” [das Um-zu] that relates one gear to another and to various tasks or things 
to be produced (SZ 63). For example, the kettle is in order to boil water, the teapot in 
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the referential context of making tea, which makes up a totality of reference. Heidegger 
calls this reference “appliance” [Bewandtnis] (SZ 84),8 which is a category. However, 
the referential context itself points beyond the “in order to” of gear. In skillful making, 
Heidegger argues, what is made (e.g., tea) is not made for its own sake.9 Being near 
gear is not an end in itself, but rather has a reference to some way of being of the human 
situation. For example, making tea refers to the need to stay alert. This kind of reference 
is quite different from appliance, because it involves ways of being that do not pertain 
to gear themselves.10 Although I may drink tea in order to help me work on my thesis, 
this is not the appliance of one gear (tea) to another (thesis). I have tea so that I can be 
alert, less thirsty, etc. But this is for the sake of my own way of being, not for some 
other gear. Heidegger calls this relation the “for-the-sake-of-which” [Worum-willen] 
(SZ 84).
Encountering “as”
Gear encounters as helpful, hindering, or as a matter of indifference. Such 
encountering is characterized by the “as”, which Heidegger calls the existential-
hermeneutical “as” (SZ 158).11 Gear is the gear it encounters as precisely in the way it 
is taken as, e.g., as helpful, as hindering, etc., or more concretely, as a hammer (e.g., in 
hammering a nail), as a text (in reading it), as a sandwich, and so on. Such “taking as” 
8. A term of Lask’s that Heidegger appropriates (cf. GBT 388-392). On the translation of 
Bewandtnis as “appliance”, see also Kisiel, “The new translation”, op. cit., pp. 245-249.
9. Heidegger later comes to recognize that the distinctive thing about art is precisely that it is 
made for its own sake, and thus differs from gear. Cf. “The Origin of the Work of Art”, in 
Off the Beaten Track, ed. and trans. J. Young and K. Haynes, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2002, pp. 1-56.
10. Again, this is a form of the ontological difference: gear is not handy for its own sake. Later, 
Heidegger will make the same point about language, i.e, that it doesn’t speak.
11. He distinguishes this from the apophantical “as” of the assertion, which communicatively 
points something out through predication (SZ 154-155, 158).
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subsequently given significance. In each case, Heidegger argues, gear is encountered as 
something, even if this is as an “I don’t know what it’s for” (cf. ZBP 71-72/60-61). 
Fundamental to Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics is the notion that 
experience is always already meaningful (cf. GBT 49). For example, in the discussion 
of exposition or interpretation [Auslegung] in BT §32, Heidegger argues that this does 
not determine meaning, but rather discloses it explicitly. Exposition, in other words, is 
pre-structured; with gear, this pre-structure of meaning is its appliance, i.e., how it 
belongs to its referential context:
[Exposition] does not, as it were, throw a “meaning” [Bedeutung] over the nakedly 
on hand and does not stick a value on it, but rather with the innerworldish encoun-
tering as such, in each case it already has a disclosed appliance in world-under-
standing, which is made explicit by the exposition. (SZ 150)
In KNS, Heidegger illustrates such significant encountering in terms of the 
encounter with the foreign (ZBP 71-72/60). In everydayness, we may suppose that the 
significance of gear comes about from familiarity with them, drawn from past 
experience. Whilst this might be the case for specific significations, it cannot be the 
case for significance per se. If it were, then encountering foreign or unfamiliar things 
would have a non-environmental or non-significant character. We would not take them 
as anything at all. But Heidegger argues that this cannot be the case. With the 
unfamiliar, we encounter it as unfamiliar. We do not know the referential context of 
such gear, but this does not mean that they are simply non-referential. Things are 
encountered as meaningful in the very encounter of them as strange.
The elucidation of skillful making shows that gear always encounters as 
relational. They are constituted as the gear they are by the relations they have to one 
another. However, the relational totality itself does not pertain to gear, but rather to 
being-situate. World is an existential that constitutes our way of being. This context of 
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“worldishness” [Weltlichkeit] of the world. Things in the world are relational, but their 
relational totality is an aspect of the being of being-situate. 
Genesis of the theoretical
The constitutive referentiality of innerworldish gear is how such beings are 
discovered [entdeckt] (SZ 69), i.e., how they show themselves. However, Heidegger 
argues that this does not entail an a priori referential context into which we “slot” 
beings that initially are on hand. Such a conception presupposes that gear is constituted 
“in itself” without such reference, and thus is conceived of as self-contained, i.e., 
substantialistically. Such substantialism, Heidegger argues, depends on the cognitive 
comportment of the theoretical attitude. Heidegger’s elucidation aims to show that this 
substantialist ontology fails to articulate how gear can be meaningful, and thus that the 
theoretical attitude itself cannot account for meaning. The theoretical attitude supposes 
that cognitive comportment is a kind of looking at objects, in which regard (!) 
meaningfulness needs a “location”, either in the object (positivism) or in 
intersubjectivity (historicism). 
Heidegger points out that gear encounter in use, in dealings, in caretaking, and 
so on. Primarily, such beings encounter “pragmatically” (SZ 68). For example, when I 
open the door, I do not first observe the doorknob, think about the referential context 
(inside the room/outside the room, openings in the wall, thresholds, movable barriers, 
ways of grasping and manipulating, etc.), and then conceive that the doorknob 
functions in such-and-such a way. Rather, I simply grasp the doorknob and open the 
door. I may not even be explicitly aware of the doorknob, perhaps because my concern 
is to find out who is knocking on the door. The appliance of the doorknob (to the door) 
and its significance (for the sake of answering) are mostly recessive in everyday 
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when a cloud indicates rain, or a red sky means that a storm is coming.
How does this theoretical attitude arise? In terms of skillful making, it involves 
abstraction from everyday dealings. Instead of caretakingly dealing with the pen in 
jotting down a note as an aide-mémoire (for the sake of remembering something), the 
pen is abstracted from its referential context (its “in-order to” write the note, etc.) and 
regarded in isolation from it. The theoretical attitude thus looks for properties in the pen 
that define it as a pen. It involves a “rigid staring at something purely on hand” (SZ 61) 
which becomes a “looking at” [Hinsehen], rather than the circumspection [Umsicht] 
involved in caretaking dealings with gear.12 In such looking, beings are encountered 
“solely in their purely outward appearance” (SZ 61), which is then taken to be how they 
are, in being found “just there” or on hand. The relation between knower and known, or 
subject and (on-hand) object, appears to be such that the subject “goes out” of her inner 
sphere to encounter an external thing. But this notion of inner and outer is a theoretical 
presupposition rather than a description of the phenomenon:
In directing itself toward . . . and grasping, being-situate does not first go out from 
its inner sphere, in which it is initially encapsulated, but rather it is, according to its 
primary way of being, always already “outside” near some encountering being of 
the world in each case already discovered. (SZ 62)
In experience, there is no “gap” between the supposedly external thing that is 
experienced and my supposed internal experiencing of it. Experiencing is itself 
experienced. There is a relational continuity or mutual implication in experience.
The disclosure of significance
In everyday caretaking of gear, the referential totality is mostly recessive. 
12. We should note here that the distinction Heidegger makes between theoretical seeing and 
circumspective seeing indicates that the “theoretical” and the “practical” are not 
distinguished from one another as seeing (or contemplating) and doing. Rather, it is a 
distinction between two kinds of seeing and doing, i.e., making and knowing.
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the task at hand. And because such dealings tend to absorb us, the referential totality 
remains recessive. Nevertheless, skillful making is possible only if the gear that 
encounters is already significant, i.e., is already taken as something prior to what it is 
taken as in caretaking (e.g., as a doorknob). How then does the referential context come 
to show itself? Heidegger illustrates two ways in which the referential/relational totality 
of gear becomes manifest. It can come to appear with the unhandiness of gear, such as 
when it breaks down, is unsuitable, or goes missing for the task at hand. When gear is 
unhandy, it no longer fits into its context. It is inappliant, and this makes appliance 
manifest. The gear shows its references to other gear, in a privative way. “Handiness 
shows itself yet again, and precisely hereby the world-accordance [Weltmäßigkeit] of 
the handy also shows itself” (SZ 74).
The referential totality is disrupted and thus “the reference becomes explicit” 
(SZ 74). The totality “lights up,” and in this way “world announces itself” (SZ 75). The 
reference becomes circumspectly seen in the light of the absence of handiness, which 
shows that world is always disclosed in circumspection, although not explicitly for 
circumspection. Such disclosedness makes the significance of gear possible, in 
circumspective encounter.
If, however, the world can light up in a certain way, it must be disclosed in general. 
With the accessibility of innerworldish handy beings for circumspective caretaking, 
world is in each case pre-disclosed. It is therefore something “wherein” the human 
situation as a being in each case already was, to which it can always return, in every 
somehow explicit getting to something. (SZ 76)
Thus, with breakdown in skillful making, the appliance and significance of 
gear becomes evident, such that gear is discovered as the gear it is. This involves the 
prior, implicit disclosedness of world. It also involves a prior “being in” or belonging to 
this pre-disclosed world on the part of the human situation. In this way, the appliance 
that characterizes handy beings is disclosed in skillful making by way of an a priori that 
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“freeing” [freigeben] of the handy to allow it to apply in the totality of appliance. This 
“in-each-case-to-have-let-apply” [Je-schon-haben-bewendenlassen] is thus “an a priori 
perfect that characterizes the way of being of the human situation” (SZ 85). 
Encountering the handy as appliant thus involves the “discoveredness” [Entdecktheit] 
of such beings as belonging to a totality of appliance. The significance of the gear that 
is freed for its appliance, however, is not itself a characteristic of the handy. Instead, it 
characterizes a way of being of the human situation, which Heidegger formally 
indicates as “understanding” [Verstehen] (SZ 85-86). In this way, then, Heidegger 
argues, skillful making shows that it is insufficient in itself, and depends on the human 
situation’s being towards itself, as was suggested by the “for the sake of which” of the 
referential totality.
The second way referentiality and world become disclosed is through signs. 
Signs are also handy beings, but are distinctive because their in-order-to is to explicitly 
direct us towards, or to orient us to, something that does not show itself. They make the 
inconspicuous conspicuous, and thus bring to light the referential context in which we 
encounter that which hides its reference.
Heidegger’s phenomenological description of this aspect of the human 
situation, then, shows that it is always related, in one way or another, to handy beings. 
The human situation is structurally incomplete, because such encountering constitutes 
it. Furthermore, useful things also refer to other beings that are unlike them, i.e., the 
others encountered in the human situation. The referential contexts of the useful things 
we encounter include others who we use them with (as with a telephone) or against (as 
with a handgun), others who made them, others we make things for, and so on. Others, 
too, are encountered in a variety of ways, which can even include encountering them as 
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purposes in the human situation. The standard example of this is slavery, but it can 
occur in many other ways as well, such as the way employees are treated as “human 
resources”, the way soldiers have been deployed as “cannon fodder”, and in everyday 
ways of manipulative behaviour.13 Nevertheless, these are privative ways of 
encountering others, because they disregard the ways such beings differ from things 
like hammers.
With-world and being-with
Encountering others shows another aspect of the structural incompleteness of 
the human situation, which is that it is always related to others and is constituted in this 
relatedness. In many ways, this aspect is primary, since it manifests itself in language. 
The human situation is linguistic, in the sense that it is characterized by discrimination 
between different beings, which gets expressed in different words for things. But such 
discrimination (the separating of things which at the same time gathers them together14) 
can only take place with others. This aspect of the human situation thus pertains to the 
way beings such as hammers and nails are encountered, because these are always 
discriminated from one another. Thus, to encounter anything like a hammer, there must 
also be encounter with others.
Who is in-the-world
The second constitutive structure of being-in-the-world is the being that is 
“doing” the being-in-the-world. Who exactly is it that is in-the-world? Or, as Heidegger 
also expresses this, “How does being-in-the-world appear?” (OHF 68). This question 
13. In English, this is often expressed by saying of someone that “he uses people”.
14. This is how Heidegger articulates lo/goj (PS pg. 99; SZ 159). Cf. Thomas Sheehan, “A 
paradigm shift”, op. cit., pp. 191-193.
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a presupposition of interpretation, which the formal indication of concrete individuality 
puts in question. Although existence is formally indicated as mine, this does not mean 
that this mineness appears in the world in the way that either the naive or theoretical 
attitude suggests. For this reason, the way that being-in-the-world appears—the 
“who”—is also in question.
The analysis of the “who” in BT is made more complex because Heidegger 
addresses two separate aspects of this. First, there is the question of being-with 
[Mitsein] with others, i.e., how being-situate is with others, and how others are there as 
being-situate-with [Mitda-sein]. Second, there is the issue of the distinction of being-
situate from others. With this second issue, Heidegger’s argument is that the human 
situation cannot be adequately or appropriately understood in terms of being an “other” 
or being Everyman [das Man], i.e., in terms of (“objective”) 3rd-person descriptions or 
intersubjectivity. Although the adequate or appropriate way of understanding the 
human situation—as the equioriginariness of objectivity, intersubjectivity and 
subjectivity—does not “add” content to the Everyman-self, it shows how being-a-self 
involves having and being had by the factical aspects that constitute us. That is, it 
shows how objectivity can be valid and intersubjective practises can be normative, but 
not what these are.
The analysis of the “who” seeks to elucidate this with respect to meaning, i.e., 
to show that significance or meaning—the sense of being-situate—is not appropriately 
characterized by reference to intersubjectivity. Although being-situate is formally 
indicated with a personal pronoun, what is at issue here is the sense or meaning of this 
as personal. “Speaking of being-situate must, in accordance with the character of 
mineness of this being, continually say with the personal pronoun: ‘I am,’ ‘you are’ ” 
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such as “this” or “that”. However, “I” is also an occasional expression, and thus for 
Heidegger is a formal indication:
Being-situate is a being which in each case I myself am, its being is in each case 
mine. This determination indicates an ontological constitution, but no more than 
that. At the same time, it contains an ontic indication—although rough— that in 
each case an I is this being and not others. (SZ 114)
Thus, what is indicated is not determinately given. The sense of this indication must be 
enacted, because the concrete individual is an enactment, not a discovered being. 
However, the question here is whether concrete individuality is intersubjectively 
constituted.15 This is addressed in the analysis of being-with [Mitsein] and being-self 
(or “selving”) [Selbstsein].16 The formal indication of mineness prohibits the usual 
sense of “I”, in order to allow its relating or enactment-sense to be brought into relief. 
Therefore, in the phenomenological elucidation of being-situate, there can be no 
presupposition regarding how this “I” appears:
The “I” must be understood only in the sense of a non-binding formal indication of 
something which perhaps reveals itself in the temporally particular [jeweilig] phe-
nomenal context of being as its “opposite.” Moreover, “not I” by no means signifies 
something like a being which essentially lacks “I-hood,” but means a determinate 
way of being of the “I” itself, for example, self-lostness. (SZ 116)
When we describe the phenomenon of being-in-the-world, then, we cannot 
presuppose that the characteristics explicated are constitutive of being-self. Rather, we 
must let the phenomenon show who this being is and how. How is it in being-with-one-
another? Is being-self differentiated from being-with, and if so, how? 
Being with others and being an other
The elucidation of the who first focusses on the “others” that are disclosed in 
being near gear and circumspectly taking care of handy things. This is usually 
15. Heidegger returns to this question in MFL pp. 187-188.
16. The sense of “self” in Heidegger’s analytic is adverbial or perhaps even prepositional, i.e., 
as a way of being or a direction (sense) of being, rather than nominal.
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indicative approach is intended to put into question what is presupposed by 
“intersubjectivity” or “sociality” to show that being-with-one-another and being-an-
Everyman-self do not by themselves determine the constitution of meaning, although 
they are equioriginary with it. The analysis of being-with with others does not concern a 
subsumptive relation between objects, e.g., “individual” and “social”. Heidegger avoids 
those terms precisely to prohibit such identification.17 The formal indications of “who”, 
“being-with”, “being-situate-with”, and “being-with-one-another” are intended to ward 
off content-senses such as “I”, “society”, “self”, etc., and refer us instead to how being-
situate enacts being-an-other. Heidegger’s aim is to show that being-an-other or being 
Everyman [das Man], in skillful making in the with-world, cannot elucidate being-in-
the-world. The apparent “completion” of the human situation in being-with-one-
another [Miteinandersein] also depends on the openness of encountering grounded in 
the structural incompleteness of the human situation.
However, being-an-other is not simply encountered in the human situation. It 
is also one of the ways being-situate encounters as. The human situation involves 
being-an-other for others, as well (i.e., being-with [Mitsein] their being-situate-with 
[Mitda-sein]). The analysis of the Everyman-self clarifies that the existentials ascribed 
to others, and thus to being-situate as an other (i.e., 3rd-person descriptions), are 
17. However, in the debate about the compatibility between Everyman and appropriately 
being-self (in II.I-III), this formally indicative prohibition is often missed. For example, in 
Edgar Boedeker’s contribution to the debate between Dreyfus and Olafson he makes the 
following claims: (i) “Heidegger’s term for the social horizon of human life is ‘das Man’ ” 
(pg. 64); (ii) “das Man has something to do with sociality and an individual’s conformity to 
social norms” (pg. 64); (iii) “Heidegger refers to human beings with an ordinary German 
term for existence, ‘Dasein’ ” (pg. 66); and (iv) “Heideggerian possibilities are thus much 
like what we might call someone’s capacities” (ibid.) (Edgar C. Boedeker, Jr., “Individual 
and Community in Early Heidegger”, Inquiry, vol. 44, 2001, pp. 63-100). Such 
interpretation not only “domesticates” Heidegger, it proceeds in a diametrically opposite 
direction. The same is true with Hubert Dreyfus, as with many other American interpreters 
of Heidegger. For a critique of Dreyfus’s “American” interpretation, see Carlton B. 
Christensen, “Getting Heidegger off the West Coast”, Inquiry, vol. 41, 1998, pp. 65-87.
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“domination” of being-situate by the “others”, this does not mean conformity to social 
norms (whether implicit or explicit). Rather, it suggests how being-with or being an 
other comes to be taken as determinative of the human situation.
The way in which we encounter gear has been shown to always include 
reference to others. I am at my iBook, which refers to those who made it, those who 
sold it, other Mac users, and others who might use my iBook. Just as other gear are 
given in encountering this particular gear through reference, so too are others. Being-
situate is never alone in the world, but always there with others. This is evident with 
public gear such as bus shelters and airports, which refer explicitly to users other than 
myself, or with the Botanic Gardens, where the path along the lakes refers to all those 
who walk along it. Just as encountering gear in the world is constitutive of being-in-the-
world, so is encountering others. A second aspect of the structural incompleteness of 
the human situation, then, is the “sharedness” of the world.
Being-with is the condition for encountering others. It is a priori to the others 
so encountered. It has nothing to do with physical proximity or the presence of others, 
but is an existential:
The phenomenological statement: being-situate is essentially being-with has an 
existential-ontological sense. It does not want to ontically ascertain that I am facti-
cally not just there alone, and rather that others of my kind also appear...Being-with 
existentially determines being-situate even when an other is not factically present 
and perceived. The being-alone of being-situate, too, is being-with in the world. 
The other can be lacking only in and for a being-with. (SZ 120).
Heidegger formally indicates the (transitive) way of being-with-one-another as 
“caregiving” [Fürsorge, “welfare” or, literally, “care-for”] (SZ 121). The enactment of 
being-with with others is in care for them. Others matter in terms of their own being-
situate, i.e., the way they go about their own being, although insofar as I fail to 
recognize this about myself, it is questionable whether I can recognize it in others. 
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dealing with gear. Such occupation involves others also, in the reference of gear and 
work. For example, in taking care of grocery shopping, the locality could be a 
supermarket, which is a public gear where others also take care of their shopping in a 
variety of dealings, such as walking the aisles, choosing products, searching for items, 
queueing for the cashier, paying the bill. This public gear refers to each of us equally as 
consumers or customers, and to our dealings in indifference to their mineness. In this 
way, the supermarket is a shared locality or gear. This sharedness is a priori for the 
concrete factical sharing that happens. That is, it is not through the factical sharing of 
caretaking in the supermarket that its sharedness arises; rather, a priori sharedness is 
what makes the sharing of caretaking possible.
The world is ontically shared in the way being-situate is being like the others, 
acting as they do, and so on, i.e., in being an other. Particular caretakings (e.g., grocery 
shopping) are not determinative of the individuality of the human situation. In such 
dealings, this is what Everyman [das Man] does (SZ 114). Being-situate is Everyman in 
engaging in this activity. Even the privative senses (acting unlike the others) remain 
determined by the others (e.g., going “back to the land” rather than grocery shopping). 
Heidegger’s point is that this is a case of being-self that is not individuated, but is 
being-self in terms of others (or being-an-other). Everyman is an existential, and is thus 
a constitutive moment of being-situate, but not determinative of it. Being-situate is for 
the most part being-Everyman-self, which is therefore not something that can be 
avoided.
The ontological characteristic of others is not determinative of being-situate, 
nor vice versa. Others belong to (or in) the human situation, but do not solely constitute 
it themselves. Furthermore, being an other is also a characteristic of being-situation. 
307However, being-situate is always mine. Therefore, others as others are not being-
situate. Their being is not mine. Rather, they are being-situate-with [Mitda-sein] for 
being-situate. Others are there not as the human situation that I am, but as human 
situations that are with me. As a happening, enactment, or event, then, happening is 
what is proper [eigen] to me. Others co-happen with my being-situate, but are not my 
happening. For example, playing a team sport such as football requires a team. As a 
member of the team, I play football along with my team-mates and opponents. They are 
there with my football playing, and indeed are co-constitutive of it. Were there no team, 
I could not play. Nevertheless, they are not my football playing, and neither am I theirs. 
In each case “I” am the one playing football, and “the others” are co-players with me.
Self-world and being-in
Being-self in an appropriate rather than inappropriate way involves the 
moment of the constitution of being-in-the-world that makes the sharedness of the 
world possible. What makes the shared world both possible and necessary is structural 
incompleteness. What holds the human situation open and incomplete, in the face of its 
constant tendency to be dispersed into absorption by things and “subservience” 
[Botmäßigkeit] to others, is the tension between facticity, that and how the human 
situation always already is, and existentiality, being-situate’s ability-to-be [Seinkönnen] 
itself. This co-constitutive element of our being-in-the-world is being-in [In-sein], the 
final structural moment of being-in-the-world.
Being-in does not indicate a spatial containment of this being by world. In-
ness [Inheit] has a non-spatial sense. If we look at the etymology of “in”, Heidegger 
argues, we find that it stems from innan- which means “to live, dwell”. Being-in, then, 
means “I dwell, I stay near . . . the world as the intimate in such and such a way” (SZ 
54). In-ness thus means the correlatedness of being-situate and world, neither of which 
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be, “there” in, with and toward what encounters. In-ness is the correlation of these that 
the human situation actively, transitively is, as discovering innerworldish beings in 
disclosedness. In-ness has nothing to do with the “interiority” of the subject in “inner 
consciousness”, nor with the subject’s enclosure by the surrounding world. “[I]n its 
primary kind of being” being-situate is “always ‘outside’ together with some being 
encountered in the world already discovered” (SZ 62).
With the analysis of being-in, Heidegger aims to elucidate how the human 
situation is the “there” [Da] that it has to be. Being the “there” is formally indicated as 
“disclosedness” or “opened-up-ness” [Erschlossenheit] (SZ 132-133). This is a 
fundamental way of being of the human situation, such that “[t]he human situation is its 
disclosedness” (SZ 133). This also means that “(having) to be its ‘there’ ” is the being 
that the human situation goes about, i.e., its existence (SZ 133). Heidegger elucidates 
the structure of being-in as having four constitutive moments: “the equioriginary 
constitutive ways to be the there” of disposedness [Befindlichkeit]18 and understanding 
[Verstehen] (SZ 133); these existentials are articulated through discourse [Rede], in 
which being-with-one-another reappears in its equioriginariness as constitutive for the 
expression of the human situation (SZ 161-162); and lapsing [Verfallen] as the 
disclosedness of the possibilities of Everyman, which manifest “an essential tendency 
of being of everydayness” (SZ 167).
18. Befindlichkeit is Heidegger’s nominalization of the verb befinden, which is used to inquire 
about the “state” of a person’s being. Wie befinden sie sich? (literally, “how do you find 
yourself?”) asks the same as “how are you?”. It asks about the mood or frame of mind 
someone is in, her disposition, hence “disposedness.” The reflexive verb sich befinden is in 
the middle voice (cf. Kisiel, GBT 378-9). Befindlichkeit is Heidegger’s translation for the 
Greek word dia/qesij (GBT pg. 293).
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Disposedness is associated with the facticity of the human situation, i.e., that 
there always belongs to it a way that it has become and continues to be. Disposedness 
formally indicates how the human situation is disclosed or opened up to itself as this 
“that it is”. The phenomenal or ontic aspect of this existential is temper [Stimmung] 
(SZ 134). Tempers disclose us to ourselves in particular ways, and equally disclose the 
world (e.g., as bored/boring, tired/tiring, fascinated/fascinating). Tempers are a way that 
the world “gets to me”, yet they also reveal that I (currently) am a certain way, and have 
to be it. We cannot choose our tempers, Heidegger points out. Rather, “[t]he temper 
befalls [überfällt]” (SZ 136). But nor do tempers come from “without” or “within”. 
Rather, they arise with being-in-the-world itself (SZ 136). Thus, we have to endure or 
withstand them. However, this is often occluded by absorption in caretaking and 
caregiving. Thus, the human situation always involves finding itself in a temper without 
it being disclosed whence this came and whither it goes (SZ 135). In this way, the 
disclosedness of the “that it is” is something the human situation is “thrown” into and 
“cast” [geworfene] as. It is a kind of movedness that is always (in the) there (SZ 135). 
Phenomenally, a temper discloses in a factical way, and thus discloses facticity, i.e., 
discloses disposedness to being-situate. In this way, tempers disclose being-in-the-
world as a whole, in disclosing the “there” (SZ 137).
Here Heidegger is clarifying the incompleteness of the human situation, i.e., 
how it always involves an opened-up-ness, not just to worldish encountering, but to 
itself as well. Such disclosedness to self means that the human situation is not complete 
“in itself”. Just as significance is only made evident in encountering the handy, and 
being-with in being-(with-one-an)-other, so too do I first encounter my self in being 
cast. As disclosed in disposedness, then, the human situation involves having to be [zu 
310sein] its there, i.e., as it in each case factically is (SZ 135). Thus, there is a necessity 
found in disposedness. With this necessity, however, comes an awareness of the ability 
to be, or possibility of being, that way, because how being-situate is cast is no other than 
it already is.
As disclosive, tempers make directedness towards innerworldish beings, to 
others, and to ourselves possible. “The temper has in each case already disclosed being-
in-the-world as a whole and first makes possible a to-be-directed-towards . . .” (SZ 
137). As an existential, then, disposedness is an “equioriginary disclosedness of world, 
being-situate-with, and existence, because this itself is essentially being-in-the-world” 
(SZ 137). 
Understanding
As disposed, being-situate is disclosed as the “that it is” that it has to be. In 
having-to-be it, however, what is also disclosed is that being-situate can be the “there”. 
The “there” is disclosed as what being-situate goes about, and thus is already familiar 
with as what it can be. This familiarity is formally indicated by “understanding” (SZ 
142).19 Thus, this disclosedness includes understanding, since this too belongs to the 
human situation as a fundamental way of being. However, understanding is also 
disclosive, and so discloses disposedness. Disposedness and understanding always go 
together (SZ 142-143). “Disposedness in each case has its understoodness 
[Verständnis], even if it only suppresses it. Understanding is always tempered” (SZ 
142). Whereas disposedness discloses being-in-the-world in terms of the necessity of 
19. “Understanding” can all too easily be taken to suggest some kind of cognition, which is not 
what Heidegger intends. The sense of this formal indication is the intimate familiarity of 
the human situation (or life) with itself, as Heidegger’s gloss on innan- indicates (SZ 54; 
GBT 377). Kisiel explicates this sense as a non-objectifying equiprimordiality of “having 
myself” and “having” the world (GBT 378), such that “I am” is taken as “I can” (GBT 380). 
Understanding thus means something like “being au fait with” (cf. SZ 143). On Verstehen, 
see also Schnädelbach, op. cit., ch. 4.
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transitively) being it. One gloss that Heidegger gives of understanding is “being able to 
be” (SZ 143). Ability-to-be thus points to possibility as constitutive of the being of the 
human situation. “The human situation...is primarily being-possible [Möglichsein]”, 
which means “what it can be and how it is its possibility” (SZ 143).
This has already been shown in the analysis of worldishness, in that the 
significance of the handy refers to the for-the-sake-of-which as some possible way for 
the human situation to be. The disclosedness of significance is at the same time the 
disclosedness of the for-the-sake-of-which, and therefore of being-in-the-world itself:
In the for-the-sake-of-which, existingly being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, 
which disclosedness is called understanding. In the understanding of the for-the-
sake-of-which, the significance grounded in it is co-disclosed. The disclosedness of 
the understanding, as the equioriginary [disclosedness] of the for-the-sake-of-which 
and significance, concerns the entirety of being-in-the-world. Significance is that 
towards-which-upon-which [woraufhin] world as such is disclosed. For-the-sake-
of-which and significance are disclosed in being-situate, means: being-situate is a 
being, which as being-in-the-world goes about itself. (SZ 143)
Without world there is no being-situate, and hence no going about my being. This is 
why significance is co-disclosed in understanding.
In understanding, then, disposedness is also disclosed as a way of being of the 
human situation. Whereas disposedness concerns the necessity of “having to be”, rather 
than simply the actuality of what the human situation is, understanding concerns the 
possibility of being. Understanding discloses being-situate as going about its being, i.e., 
as the possibilities of its existence. “Going about its being” is the enactment of the 
relation to the being it already is, disclosed in disposedness. That is, it means enacting 
possibilities. Understanding is the disclosedness of the how of such enactment, i.e., that 
I can be my possibilities, and therefore indicates the transitive transcendence of being-
self whereby being-situate is towards itself as itself, i.e., as the necessity of its factical 
constitution. But facticity is not completeness, because it must include being it as a way 
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as, and from, the being it already is.
Possibility is an existential, and thus is different from logical and contingent 
possibility (SZ 143). Facticity means that the human situation always has definite ways 
to be. Being-it thus means being (factical) possibilities. What I can be is the 
possibilities that factically constitute me at the particular while. This is the real 
innovation in Heidegger’s thinking: constitutive possibility, that is higher than 
actuality.20 Yet “having” possibilities is not fully determinative of the human situation, 
because there is also the how of their enactment. This is where the hermeneutics of 
human existence comes to the fore, because the taking as involved in being-possible is 
constitutive of being-situate, just as the possibilities disclosed in disposedness are. In 
contrast to usual views of human agency (particularly that on which the contemporary 
canon of economics is based), in which the actor is conceived as something different 
from the choices, decisions, and actions she or he enacts,21 Heidegger’s analytic of 
being-situate argues that the actor (or exister) is constituted as how she takes herself to 
be, which is likewise how she finds herself to be. I find myself with the energy and 
motivation to finish editing this chapter today, and thus I am constituted as this 
possibility in being it. The possibility is only “there” for me insofar as I take it as a 
possibility of my being, but conversely I can only take it as such insofar as I find it a 
way I can be. 
Ontically, this means disclosing a concrete possibility for my existence, such 
as the possibility of becoming a Ph.D. holder, a Spanish speaker, an accountant, etc. 
Ontologically, however, it means disclosing the very structure of being-in itself. 
20. Cf. Thomas Sheehan, “Geschichtlichkeit/Ereignis/Kehre”, Existentia (Meletai Sophias), 
vol. XI, no. 3-4, 2001, pp. 241-251.
21. As found in Sen’s analysis of capabilities, for example.
313Heidegger’s central claim is that being-in is this disclosed disclosiveness, and that this 
ontological constitution is disclosed in the being-situate of being-in-the-world. This is 
why the analytic of being-situate exhibits hermeneutic circularity. In the Introduction to 
BT, Heidegger characterizes the analytic as a “remarkable ‘backward- and forward-
relatedness’ of the asked about (being) upon/toward [auf] the asking as a mode of being 
of a being” (SZ 8). Being-possible as a way of being is not simply having logical 
possibilities. An object “has” logical possibilities, but cannot be them. Enacting 
possibilities of my self means being my possibilities.
Thus, understanding indicates “the being of such ability-to-be” (SZ 144). How 
is the ability-to-be enacted, i.e., what is the movedness found in understanding? 
Heidegger calls this “the frame” [der Entwurf], which is an “existential structure” of the 
understanding (SZ 145). Framing [entwerfen] discloses the there of being-in-the-world 
as ability-to-be. Whereas disposedness discloses the “there” as the “that it is and has to 
be (it)” of castness, understanding discloses that being-situate can be its “that it is” in 
framing its being as possibilities. Whereas disposedness indicates the modality of 
necessity—the factical a priori or the perfective aspect of our way of being—
understanding indicates the modality of possibility—the imperfective aspect of our way 
of being:
[Understanding] frames the being of being-situate as its for-the-sake-of-which, just 
as originarily as [it does] significance as the worldishness of its particular whilish 
world. The frame-character of understanding constitutes being-in-the-world with 
regard to the disclosedness of its there as the there of an ability-to-be. The frame is 
the existential constitution of being of the leeway [Spielraums] of the factical abil-
ity-to-be. And as cast [geworfenes], being-situate is cast in the way of being of 
framing [Entwerfens]. (SZ 145)
As with being near and being-with, a “sight” belongs to being-in as understanding, 
“transparentness” [Durchsichtigkeit], which indicates seeing “itself” in seeing being 
near and being-with as constitutive of being-in-the-world (SZ 146).
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Understanding can be further clarified by elucidating exposition [Auslegung] 
(SZ 148). Understanding is the implicit familiarity that being-situate has with itself, 
which is made explicit in exposition.22 As Heidegger clarifies in HCT, 
this means that exposition as such does not actually disclose, for that is what under-
standing or being-situate itself takes care of. Exposition always only takes care of 
bringing out what is disclosed as a cultivation of the possibilities inherent in an 
understanding. (HCT pg. 260, trans. altered)23
The elucidation of the human situation’s primary way of being as being-possible (in 
framing its being as possibilities) leads to a further clarification regarding exposition 
and assertion. Understanding discloses being-in-the-world (the structure of the human 
situation) as a whole. This means that it also discloses being towards possibilities itself 
as an ability-to-be (SZ 148). Being-possible is disclosive of being my possibilities. As 
such, then, being-possible can itself be made thematic. It can be made explicit through 
exposition, which is a concretion of the intimately familiar, and hence implicit, 
understanding.
In being near the handy, for example, caretaking circumspectly discovers the 
encountering handy being in terms of the appliance it can have, as the significance that 
is disclosed in “world-understanding”. Such discovery makes the handy explicit. 
“Circumspection discovers means the already understood world is expounded” 
(SZ 148). The in-order-to of the handy becomes explicit. As a response to the implicit 
question “what for?” that is directed towards the handy being, what is asked about is 
what this being is taken as. The explicitly understood has the structure of “something as 
something” (SZ 149). Such exposition is not assertoric, however. It does not ascribe an 
22. Much of Heidegger’s work in the years preceding BT is concerned with the elucidation of 
exposition (or interpretation) (cf. OHF, PIA, etc.). Understanding is only first thematized in 
SS1925 (cf. GBT 376, 507), as the prestructure of exposition.
23. In HCT, Heidegger’s use of “discoveredness” and “disclosedness” is the reverse of their use 
in BT (cf. HCT pg. 253 trans./ed. n. 1; GBT 494).
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understood in the encountering. The “as” constitutes the structure of explicitness, but 
this is a priori in understanding, which is always already expository (SZ 149). Nor is 
the “as” first given in an assertion, although this can present a certain “as”, i.e., the 
apophantic “as” that refers to beings on hand and that derives from the originary 
hermeneutical “as” (SZ 158). The apophantic “as” of the assertion, however, involves a 
transformation in the way that innerworldish beings are encountered, such that they are 
pointed out as on hand. In assertion, one thing is simply predicated of another in 
pointing something out. There is no longer a reference to the totality of appliance.
Heidegger further elucidates the relation between understanding and 
exposition in terms of the pre-structure [Vor-struktur] of exposition that lies in the 
understanding (SZ150-151). This consists of (i) a “pre-having” [Vorhabe] in which 
what is to be expounded is already implicitly understood, (ii) a “preview” [Vorsicht] in 
which this is seen as something, and as how it is to be expounded, and (iii) a “pre-
conception” of the concepts the exposition applies (SZ 150). This pre-structure is the a 
priori character of the hermeneutical “as”. Thus, understanding involves an a priori 
relation to the sense [Sinn] of the handy being understandingly encountered. Such sense 
is the upon-which-towards-which [das Woraufhin] of the frame in terms of which 
something becomes intelligible. The pre-structure is made explicit in, and as, 
exposition, which thus brings the pre-structure to light. This is precisely what BT itself 
consists in, i.e., bringing the pre-structure of understanding (of and in the human 
situation) to light through the exposition. For this reason, too, the inquiry of BT differs 
from the assertoric nature of philosophy when understood as concerning beings that are 
on hand, i.e., self-contained, isolated substances. In his review of Jaspers, Heidegger 
elucidates the “appropriate factor that comes to light” in phenomenological elucidation 
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...this appropriate factor itself is to be understood precisely as a kind of “prestruc-
tion” of one’s own existence. Such prestruction is in each case enacted in the current 
facticity of one’s life in the form of a self-appropriation. It discloses and holds open 
a concrete horizon of expectation characterized by worrying and is developed and 
worked out in each particular context of enacting it. (J 87, translation altered)
Being-in-the-world involves being in a world of always already articulated 
beings. It is implicit and pre-theoretical. Exposition makes the implicit explicit, by 
bringing what we already encounter to a kind of full determinateness. For example, I 
encounter Being and Time as a book, as written by Heidegger, as a difficult text, and so 
on, but in a way that is implicit in the encounter itself. I can subsequently make this 
explicit, say by bringing out the characteristics of books, and how Being and Time 
exhibits these, or by philological research into Heidegger, or by taking passages of the 
text and showing how hard they are to understand. All this is expository, which requires 
its own types of articulation that are different from those of encountering.
In the caretaking and caregiving encounter of innerworldish beings, they 
always encounter as something. They are never bare objects whose determinate 
characteristics must subsequently be theoretically ascertained. Rather, as we encounter 
them, they are always the particular, determinate beings they are. For example, in the 
kitchen, the knife encounters as sharp, as it is good for chopping, as it is serviceable, as 
it encounters in the enactment of the possibility of making dinner. It encounters as a 
knife in its referential context (it refers to chopping board, vegetables, sink, bowl, pot, 
etc.), in its appliance (it is serviceable for chopping), and in its significance (it will let 
me go about making dinner to keep me from being hungry). At school I encounter 
others as lecturers, as fellow graduate students, as my students, as librarians, and so on. 
This “taking as” is how these beings are disclosed to me in understanding them. I do not 
assign properties to them on the basis of having already encountered them as some 
indeterminate kind of beings.
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The existential of discourse [Rede] formally indicates that which makes 
language possible (i.e., it is not language itself), and involves the pretheoretical 
articulation of beings. Discourse sets beings apart from one another and “gathers” each 
into the being it is in its discoveredness.24 It belongs to being-in in the articulation of 
the factical existentiality of being-in-the-world that encounters beings. Discourse refers 
fundamentally to being-with-one-another:
Discoursing is the “signifying” articulating of the intelligibility of being-in-the-
world, to which being-with belongs, and that maintains itself in each case in a deter-
minate way of caretaking being-with-one-another. (SZ 161)
Because being-situate is not the interiority of a “self”, its disclosedness is 
always also co-disclosedness. I am only disclosed to myself as who I am in being-with 
with others. This is further demonstrated in the phenomenon of communication or 
imparting [Mitteilung]:
The phenomenon of imparting must...be understood in an ontologically broad 
sense...It enacts the “partition” of the co-disposedness and the understoodness of 
being-with. Imparting is never something like a transport of lived-through experi-
ences [Erlebnissen], for example, opinions and wishes, out of the interior of one 
subject into the interior of another. (SZ 162)
Being-with-one-another is articulated in communication, but this is not conveyance of 
internal experiences. Rather, it is the co-establishment and co-articulation of the 
meaning of our ways of being-in-the-world as being-with-one-another.
The tendency of theoretical objectification arises, Heidegger argues, out of our 
everyday dealings with things in the world. In theorizing about things, as in the natural 
sciences, for example, they are taken to be just there or on hand to be encountered. The 
theoretical attitude holds that in such encountering, the essential properties of such 
beings can then be determined. Heidegger argues that this overlooks the encountering 
itself. The theoretical attitude explains such encountering on the basis of what is 
24. This is the sense of lo/goj that Heidegger explicates in PS (pg. 99).
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of how consciousness is able to encounter anything at all. The “problem of knowledge” 
arises for the theoretical attitude because it fails to see the pretheoretical encountering 
on which (theoretical) knowledge depends. That is, as Heidegger says, knowing is a 
“founded mode” (SZ §13).
Lapsing
In §§35-38, Heidegger examines the phenomenon of lapsing [Verfallen]. 
Lapsing is a kind of “movement” in which being-situate gets entangled [verfängt] in 
caretaking and caregiving. In this movement, being-situate does not go about its being 
in an appropriate way, but rather in an inappropriate way. Existential facticity is 
occluded by everyday ways of being, such that being comes to be understood in terms 
of the beings encountered. Heidegger’s account of lapsing is an account of how the 
theoretical attitude comes to predominate in our understanding of the human situation. 
Because we lose sight of our ontological constitution in this entanglement, how we go 
about our being is no longer apparent to us. Instead, we come to take it in terms of 
taking care of things and giving care to others. Thus, we come to understand being-
possible as the possibilities that are available to us in everydayness.
The issue that now arises in the analytic is how being-situate can be a unitary 
phenomenon, i.e., how existentiality, facticity, discourse and lapsing belong together. 
Being-situate, Heidegger argues, is itself the equioriginary unity of these existentials; it 
is the way they constitute a totality. The unity in question is not an aggregation of these 
elements; what must be shown, then, is the mutual implication of existentiality and 
facticity, and how this makes lapsing possible. “Being-situate exists factically. What is 
asked about is the ontological unity of existentiality and facticity, or the essential 
belonging of the one to the other” (SZ 181). Being my possibilities as framing means 
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instant, i.e., for the sake of its castness, which is being-situate itself, as disclosed in 
disposedness.
On the basis of its essentially belonging disposedness, being-situate has a way of 
being in which it is brought before itself and is disclosed in its castness. But cast-
ness is the way of being of a being that in each case is its possibilities itself, such 
that it understands itself in and out of them (lays itself out as them). (SZ 181)
For the most part, however, the “itself” that is so understood is the 
inappropriate Everyman-self, which is constituted in lapsing into understanding the 
human situation in terms of others and framing its possibilities in a way which is not its 
own. In everydayness, possibilities are understood in terms of their content-sense and 
the relation to these contents. Understanding comes to take its ability-to-be so 
predominantly in terms of Everyman that it no longer “sees” the enactment of its 
relations to things and others. Thus, lapsing is an opposite kind of movedness to that of 
disclosedness, similar to the opposite movednesses of castness and framing. As with the 
relation of the latter, lapsing and disclosedness are a unitary phenomenon:
The self, however, is initially and mostly inappropriate, the Everyman-self. Being-
in-the-world is always already lapsing. The average everydayness of being-situate
can accordingly be determined as lapsing-disclosed, cast-laying-out being-in-the-
world, which in its being at the “world” and in being-with with others goes about 
its most proper ability-to-be itself. (SZ 181)
Lapsing, or absorption in the world that is caretaken and caregiven, can be 
thought of as an immanence in the world such that it “has” (or holds) being-situate. 
Being-situate is captivated by the contents discovered in the world, such that it no 
longer sees the enactment of the relation to them, i.e., being them. Disclosedness, on the 
other hand, is transcendence of the world such that world is “had” by being-situate. The 
“most proper ability-to-be-a-self” is thus the belonging together of immanence and 
transcendence.
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The movedness of lapsing is akin to a “total” absorption in the world. In 
entanglement with everyday ways of being, the structural incompleteness of the human 
situation gets covered up and thus it appears to be complete and self-contained. 
However, this “self-satisfaction” [Selbstgenügsamkeit] (GA58:41) can never be 
complete, because of our fundamental incompleteness. Since understanding and 
disposedness constitute the disclosedness of being-situate, just as there are 
understanding tempers that disclose innerworldish beings in certain ways (such as fear 
and the fearsome, or delight and the delightful), so should there be an understanding 
mode of disposedness that discloses this unified totality of care. Such modes are what 
Heidegger in BT calls “fundamental disposedness” [Grundbefindlichkeit].25 They do 
not concern beings that encounter, but the encountering itself, i.e., the disclosedness of 
being-in-the-world. Such modes of disposedness disclose being-in-the-world as such, 
but as it is cast. That is, the individuation is in terms of disposedness or facticity, not 
understanding or existentiality. It is the disclosedness of having-to-be-it, which includes 
ability-to-be but is not itself ability-to-be. In BT, the fundamental disposedness that 
Heidegger analyzes is dread [Angst].
Lapsing is “something like a flight [Flucht] of being-situate in the face of itself 
as the appropriate ability-to-be-itself” (SZ 184). Being-situate flees from this towards 
absorption in Everyman and the “world” it takes care of. It lapses from itself towards 
the innerworldish. This flight, then, does disclose being-situate to itself as disclosed, but 
in a privative way as how it is trying not to be. The characteristics of lapsing, such as 
trying not to be its disclosedness, turning away from it and so on, are ways of being 
25. In later texts, such as FCM and WiM, Heidegger refers to these as “fundamental tempers” 
[Grundstimmungen], and indicates that there are several (FCM pg. 59). These include 
homesickness, profound boredom and joy (FCM pp. 7, 77; WiM 8/87).
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itself as what it can be, being-situate thereby shows that this way to be is constitutive 
for it. Lapsing has to be understood here in existential-ontological terms, rather than as 
a value judgment. That is, lapsing is a kind of inattention or preoccupation that distracts 
us from the questionableness of the human situation.
Fundamental disposedness discloses the very disclosedness of being-in that 
makes lapsing itself possible. It is about the “completely indeterminate”, in which 
definite innerworldish beings are no longer “appliant” (SZ 186). Innerworldish beings 
become a kind of totality with which I am not involved. Far from being absorbed by 
them, I become “outside” of them, and they become insignificant. The character of 
insignificance itself, in which a fundamental disposedness is about “nothing and 
nowhere [Nichts und Nirgends]” (SZ 186), becomes significant. As insignificant, then, 
these beings are not what dread is about. Rather, it is about “being-in-the-world as 
such” (SZ 186). The world comes to obtrude in its worldishness. The “before-which 
[Wovor] of dread is the world as such” (SZ 187), but because world belongs to being-
situate, the before-which of dread is being-in-the-world itself. What I act towards and 
who I act with no longer absorb my possibilities as my ability-to-be. I am brought back 
to my appropriate ability-to-be, and in this sense I am individuated. 
[Dread] casts being-situate back upon that about which dreads, its appropriate abil-
ity-to-be-in-the-world. Dread individuates [vereinzelt] being-situate upon its most 
proper being-in-the-world, which understandingly lays itself out essentially as pos-
sibilities. With the about-which of dreading, therefore, dread discloses being-situate 
as being-possible and indeed as that which it can solely be of its own accord, as 
individuated in individuation. (SZ 187-188)
Thus, dread does not disclose the world in some way or other, but discloses the 
disclosing of world that is the human situation. This disclosedness is nothing that can be 
identified as an instance; it has no content that could be ascribed to others.
In such disclosing, being-situate is disclosed as “being-free for the freedom of 
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Dread discloses being-situate as being-possible. This is why there is a sense of strength 
or power that comes with a fundamental disposedness, which Heidegger calls “the quiet 
power of the possible” (SZ 394). It is the strength of being able to be my possibilities, 
or being able to frame my being as possibilities.
It is the coincidence of the two “vectors” of fundamental disposedness, the 
before-which and the about-which, on being-in-the-world that makes it distinctive, for 
it discloses in such a way that “being-in as individuated, pure, cast ability-to-be is 
disclosed” (SZ 188). In §12, being-in is characterized as dwelling in familiarity, or 
being at home. This is how we are in the world for the most part. Dread, however, is 
unhomely. It is a disposedness in which we are not at home, because we are pulled away 
from absorption in the world. “Everyday familiarity collapses. Being-situate is 
individuated, but as being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential ‘mode’ of 
not-at-home [Un-zuhause]” (SZ 189). Such individuation is not a separation of the 
human situation from its world, which is structurally impossible. Rather, it is the 
disclosedness of finitude or structural incompleteness, i.e., that the human situation is 
concretely individual only in relation to things and others that encounter, and that these 
only encounter for concrete individuality. It is the opposite of the movement of lapsing. 
Fundamental disposedness discloses the enactment of “self-relation”, whereby being-
situate takes itself as always having to be in the world, and as able to be in the world. In 
lapsing, the flight from not-being-at-home tries to become homely in the world but can 
never entirely escape its unhomeliness. This is why such a mode of disposedness can 
surface at any time.
Dread individuates and so discloses being-situate as a “solus ipse”. But this existen-
tial “solipsism” so little transposes an isolated subject-thing into the innocuous void 
of a worldless occurrence, that in an extreme sense it brings being-situate precisely 
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world. (SZ 188)
Thus, dread discloses that the concrete individuality of the human situation is 
its structural incompleteness. Being-situate is being-in-the-world as its appropriate 
factical ability-to-be. It would not be being-situate without world, and thus lapsing 
always belongs to it. In everydayness, we do not even “see” the lapsing, because we 
take being-possible in terms of the innerworldish. What fundamental disposedness 
shows is that lapsing is only possible insofar as we are always individuated cast ability-
to-be, i.e., existential-factical.
Care
We are finally in a position to grasp the structure of the being of being-situate 
as a totality, which Heidegger calls care [Sorge]. This is the final aspect of structural 
incompleteness that Heidegger articulates. Care is the way the human situation is 
towards what it “makes of” itself. In encountering useful things, they are dealt with or 
taken care of, in dealing with the matters at hand. In encountering others, they are given 
care (in both positive and negative, or privative, senses). The care for itself of the 
human situation encompasses caretaking and caregiving, but is not exhausted by them 
in being concerned with how it itself is and is “getting along”. As Heidegger reiterates 
throughout BT, “the human situation is a being that in its being goes about its being” 
(e.g., SZ 12, 42). The point of the analytic, then, is to get at how being-situate “has” 
access to its own being, in being it, and from this to work out the question of the 
meaning of being as phronetic, rather than technical, epistemic, or contemplative. This 
is possible because of the hermeneutic relation of philosophy to life. Up to this point, it 
has been a matter of framing the component parts of the being of being-situate in a way 
sufficient for fundamental ontology. Yet Heidegger’s aim is not to provide a complete 
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explication of the ways of being of being-situate that make being-in-the-world itself 
intelligible, rather than complete. What needs to be shown, then, is how this totality is a 
unified structure.
The analysis of dread elucidates the totality of being-situate as existing, 
factical and lapsing. Thus the structural whole of being-situate is constituted by these 
moments.
Dreading [Das Sichängsten] as disposedness is a way of being-in-the-world; the 
before-which of dread is cast being-in-the-world; the about-which of dread is abil-
ity-to-be-in-the-world. The complete phenomenon of dread thereby shows being-
situate as factically existing being-in-the-world. The fundamental ontological char-
acteristics of this being [Seienden] are existentiality, facticity, and to-be-lapsing 
[Verfallensein]. (SZ 191)
Dread discloses that existentiality, facticity and lapsing belong together as the unity of 
the being of the human situation. None of these existentials can be reduced to any of the 
others, nor can each be the existential it is without the others. They are co-dependent or 
equioriginary. There is no existentiality without factical lapsing. There is no lapsing 
without existential facticity.
The analysis of being-in shows how our situational immanence (the “facts” 
that constitute us) is our transcendence of the situation (in being-towards those very 
facts). As transcendent, I am always “beyond” or “ahead” of my factical immanence:
Being-situate in its being is ahead of [vorweg] itself in each case. Being-situate is 
always already “beyond itself,” not as a comportment towards other beings that it is 
not, but rather as being towards ability-to-be, which it itself is. We grasp this struc-
ture of being of the essential “it goes about” as the being-ahead-of-itself of being-
situate. (SZ 191-192)
“Being ahead of itself” is not a theoretical comportment towards the “empirical” self, 
for this would be a comportment towards a being that the theoretical comportment itself 
is not. Rather, it is a phronetic or insightful comportment that is self-referential or 
recursive. In being-possible, I am directed towards the possibilities of myself that 
constitute me as I already am. My ability-to-be discloses that and how I already am. 
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being-in-a-world” (SZ 192). Correlatively, however, my facticity—that and how I 
already am—makes existentiality possible. I can only exist—be directed towards my 
possibilities, in being some way or other. “Existing is always factical. Existentiality is 
essentially determined by facticity” (SZ 192). Being-ahead, then, indicates the 
movedness of the human situation in relation to, and as constitutive of, what it already 
is.
Care, as the being of being-situate, is articulated as: “ahead-of-itself-already-
being-in-(the-world) as being near (innerworldishly encountering beings)” (SZ 192). 
This is the “formal existential totality of the ontological structure of the human 
situation” that is the sense of care (SZ 192). Care is the movedness of being-in-the-
world, i.e., how it goes about its being. It articulates the structural incompleteness of the 
human situation, in terms of the skillful making involved in being the kind of being that 
encounters beings in the world, i.e., through the movedness of caretaking and 
caregiving.
Skillful making points to insightful doing
Despite this formal indication of the structure of the human situation, it is not 
evident how this is a unitary totality, i.e., how the equioriginary moments are cohesive. 
Such cohesion cannot be found in skillful making, i.e., in caretaking and caregiving, 
because in such cases the end is not a part of the movedness. Rather, they are 
“technical” in the sense that they refer to what is to be produced (i.e., a certain state of 
affairs). But caretaking and caregiving always refer to a way to be of the human 
situation itself. The cohesiveness of the human situation lies not in skillful making, but 
rather in insightful doing. The end or goal of insightful doing is part of the doing itself, 
and therefore always involves a dynamic incompleteness of the human situation as the 
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understanding towards being-in-the-world as such. That is, whereas understanding in 
everydayness concerns factical possibilities that are not individuating (e.g., finishing 
one’s thesis, getting one’s Ph.D.), understanding that corresponds to dread as 
fundamental disposedness does concern individuation. It concerns the possibility that 
radically individuates me, namely the possibility of death.
Dynamic incompleteness and insightful doing
The cohesion of the human situation in being towards death
With the being of the human situation phenomenologically elucidated as care, 
the cohesion of the human situation becomes problematic. As concretely individual, the 
human situation (that each of us is) is a totality. But the structure of its way to be, i.e., its 
movedness as care, has been elucidated as fundamentally incomplete, since it consists 
primarily in possibilities rather than actualities.
Care, which forms the totality of the structural whole of being-situate, evidently 
contradicts, according to its ontological sense, a possible being-a-whole of this 
being. (SZ 236)
How is the human situation to be grasped as a totality, if what is “ahead” is not actual? 
It seems that there is something that both constitutes being-situate yet is always 
“outstanding” (SZ 236). In each case, at each particular instant, being-situate is not 
complete. “In the essence of being-situate lies...a constant incompleteness [ständige 
Unabgeschlossenheit]” (SZ 236). Constant incompleteness, as the constant enactment 
of possibilities, characterizes the human situation. When being-situate can no longer 
enact possibilities of itself, it has ceased to exist (SZ 243). The resolution to this 
apparent contradiction lies in the (existential) understanding of death as pure possibility 
(which does not, of course, mean explicit cognition thereof).
327Death is not an “end” in the sense of completion or fulfilment. The human 
situation is not completed in death, but rather negated. Death as existential is a way of 
being. As “being towards the end” [Sein zum Ende] rather than “being-at-an-end” [Zu-
Ende-sein], death is always a possibility (SZ 246). In each particular while there is the 
possibility of not being. The existential analysis of death concerns this most extreme 
possibility. It pertains to dying [Sterben] as constitutive of being-situate, rather than 
death as an occurrence. Ontologically, dying is “the way of being in which being-situate 
is toward its death” (SZ 247), which is different from the end of life. Living things 
perish [Verenden], but only being-situate dies in an ontological sense (SZ 247).
Death is distinctive as a possibility because it is the possibility of impossibility. 
Enactment of this possibility means the end of all possibilities. It is “the possibility of 
the impossibility of existence in general” (SZ 262), which thus belongs to, and is 
constitutive of, existence. “Death is a way to be that being-situate takes over as soon as 
it is” (SZ 245). This is quite different from the everyday representation of death, i.e., 
that “one also dies sometime, but for the present not yet” (SZ 255). Such representation 
takes death as if it were not yet a possibility, and will only be so at some future time.
In the enactment of a factical possibility, such as reading a book, some other 
possibility becomes impossible, such as not reading that book. Nevertheless, there are 
other factical possibilities that still constitute being-situate. With death, however, there 
are no more possibilities. Furthermore, death is not a possibility that we might enact one 
day, but perhaps will never do so. Although indeterminate, death is ontologically 
certain. This is not the empirical certainty that being-situate has always been observed 
to die eventually, because there is no such empirical observation of being-situate. 
Being-situate is not an object, or an instance of something. Others are not being-situate, 
but rather being-situate-with. Therefore, the death of others cannot serve as a way to 
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existence, which is always mine. Others also die, which affects my possibilities, since I 
can no longer encounter them. But their death does not disclose to me the impossibility 
of my own existence.
In everydayness, Everyman says that death is certain. “Death is an undeniable 
‘fact of experience’ ” (SZ 257). Yet the death referred to by Everyman is not my death, 
but the death of others. “All human beings ‘die,’ so far as one knows” (SZ 257). This 
kind of certainty is not the ontological certainty of death as my death, which no one can 
take away from me by standing in for me, and which is therefore unsurpassable 
[unüberholbar]. If death is a possibility of being-situate, then it is a way of being which 
is in each case mine. And as the most extreme possibility, as the possibility of the 
impossibility of existence, in no way can it be surpassed or outstripped, i.e., got round 
or gone beyond. For being-situate, then, “being toward death [is] the most proper, 
nonrelational and unsurpassable ability-to-be” (SZ 255).
Death is distinctive in yet another way. Being toward possibilities as our 
ability-to-be concerns the enactment of the possible, in which the possibility is 
“annihilated” (SZ 259). However, if being toward death meant enacting death as a 
possibility, it would entail the annihilation of the ground of being toward death, i.e., the 
human situation itself. Thus, being toward death must be a way of being towards the 
possibility of death as pure possibility, not as the enactment of it. The way the human 
situation is its death is unlike the way it frames its being as possibilities it can enact. 
Rather, “the possibility must not be weakened, must be understood as possibility, must 
be cultivated as possibility, and must be endured as possibility in the comportment 
towards it” (SZ 261). Death is the pure possibility of being-situate, which discloses that, 
as the being it is, it is always being-possible.
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realization. The attitude or relation we have to these possibilities is to expect them in 
their actuality. For example, when I am considering the possibility of purchasing a new 
synthesizer next month, I do not dwell on the possibility as a possibility, but instead 
imagine the actuality of having the instrument, using it, how it will change the music I 
play with others, and so on. I look forward to it in the sense of it being real for me.
All expecting understands and “has” its possible things with regard to if and when 
and how it will be fully actually on hand. Expecting is not only occasionally a look-
ing away from the possible to its possible actualization, but rather is essentially a 
waiting for this. Even in expecting lies a leaping from the possible and gaining a 
footing in the actual, for which the expected is expected. (SZ 262)
However, death as a possibility cannot be expected as an actuality. The relation to death 
is not expecting, but “fore-running the possibility [Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit]” of it 
(SZ 262). In fore-running, death is held open in its possibility as possibility. Because 
there is no realization of death, we stand in relation to it as pure possibility, rather than 
to something possible which will one day be replaced by its actuality (or not). 
Expecting covers up the character of possibility itself, and thus how being-situate is 
being-possible. With the possibility of death, however, there are no “details” of its 
actualization to be had. Embracing this possibility brings us face-to-face with being-
possible.
According to its essence, this possibility offers no support for being intent on some-
thing, “depicting” its possible actuality and on that account forgetting the possibil-
ity. Being toward death as fore-running the possibility first and foremost makes this 
possibility possible and makes it free as such. (SZ 262)
Being-situate fore-runs because it has the structure of being-ahead-of-itself, 
i.e., being-possible, which both makes fore-running possible and is brought to light in 
fore-running.
Being toward death is fore-running an ability-to-be of that being whose way of 
being is itself fore-running. In the fore-run unveiling of this ability-to-be, being-sit-
uate discloses itself to itself with regard to its most extreme possibility. (SZ 262)
To fore-run the possibility of my death means to understand myself in and as my most 
330extreme possibility, which can only be mine. Although others die, no-one can do my 
dying for me. This ability-to-be discloses that the human situation can only go about its 
being as itself, i.e., as concretely individual. Thus, death as a possibility discloses “the 
possibility of appropriate existence [eigentlicher Existenz]” (SZ 263). In everydayness, 
possibilities are understood in terms of caretaking and caregiving, just as they are by 
others. Such possibilities and their enactment do not disclose that being-situate has to 
be them, nor that it can be them. Rather, they cover this up by concealing being-
possible.
Thus, the possibility of impossibility discloses being-situate as equioriginarily 
existential, factical and lapsing. The cohesion of the human situation lies in the 
nonrelational possibility of death, which discloses the “there”.
The nonrelationalness of death understood in fore-running individuates being-situ-
ate upon itself. This individuation is a way of the disclosing of the “there” for exist-
ence. (SZ 263)
Forerunning death, as a way of understanding, discloses how the human situation is 
individuated as being-possible, i.e., in existing. In such individuation, we are pulled out 
of absorption in everydayness and understanding possibilities in terms of Everyman. 
[Individuation] makes evident that every being at the caretaken and each being-with 
with others breaks down when going about the most proper ability-to-be. Being-sit-
uate can only be itself as appropriate, then, when it makes that possible for itself of 
its own accord. (SZ 263)
Individuation does not mean isolation from things taken care of and others given care. 
Rather, individuation discloses relatedness to things and others. It is the disclosedness 
of this incompleteness. Only as concretely individual is being-situate constituted as a 
cohesive incompleteness.
The break-down of caretaking and caregiving, however, in no way means a cutting 
off of these ways of being-situate from its appropriate being-self. As essential struc-
tures of the constitution of being-situate they are part of the condition of the possi-
bility for existence in general. Being-situate is itself as appropriate only insofar as it 
fore-casts itself as caretaking being near . . . and caregiving being with . . . primarily 
upon its most proper ability-to-be, rather than upon the possibility of the Everyman-
self. (SZ 263)
331Being towards death discloses this possibility of being-situate, that it can 
(actively, transitively) be its possibilities, which constitutes being-situate as being-a-
whole. The analysis of death is aimed at showing how being-situate discloses itself to 
itself as being-possible, rather than simply taking itself in terms of the factical 
possibilities which in each case it has. In this disclosedness, the human situation is 
“being free” for its possibilities (SZ 191, 193), in becoming free for them in being-
possible.
The fore-running becoming-free for one’s own death frees from lostness in the pos-
sibilities which push themselves forward by chance, so that it first lets the factical 
possibilities that lie before the unsurpassable possibility be appropriately under-
stood and chosen. (SZ 264)
So long as we exist in a way which occludes our being-possible, we are not free for 
possibilities. Although factical possibilities always constitute the human situation, what 
is in question is the way we have them, i.e., how we are our possibilities. With the 
occlusion of being-possible in everydayness, possibilities are had as not-yet actualities 
that pertain to Everyman. Such possibilities get taken as external, i.e., as already actual 
but just not yet, and therefore as something that does not constitute me. The difference 
between appropriate and inappropriate being-itself lies in how we are our possibilities:
Fore-running discloses to existence that its most extreme possibility is giving itself 
up, and shatters every insistence upon the existence attained in each case. Being-sit-
uate preserves itself, in fore-running, from falling back behind itself and its under-
stood ability-to-be, and from “becoming too old for its victories” (Nietzsche). (SZ 
264)
In lapsing, not only do I misunderstand myself, I also fail to recognize that 
others too are being their possibilities in being-situate-with with me, i.e., that others are 
also beings that go about their being in their ability-to-be. The freedom of the finitude 
of my existence is also being free for others in the freedom of their finitude. “As 
nonrelational possibility death individuates, but only, as unsurpassable, in order to 
make being-situate as being-with understanding of the ability-to-be of others” (SZ 264). 
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the how of being-situate that discloses it as its possibilities, rather than its actuality at 
the particular while. As mortal, we are disclosers. The ability-to-be the there as which 
we encounter things, others, and ourselves is our mortal finitude, in which concrete 
individuality arises.
Conscience and resolvedness
Being towards death is insight into being-possible. However, because death is 
the possibility of impossibility, it cannot be enacted as a possibility. What kind of 
movedness belongs to being towards death, then? That is, what is the enactment 
character of the annihilation of possibilities? Heidegger argues that this can be 
phenomenally shown by conscience, which is the phronetic insight into the enactment 
of possibilities as the movedness of the human situation, i.e., as care. Whereas the 
analysis of being toward death demonstrates the totality of being-situate as the unified 
structure of care (i.e., the ability-to-be-a-whole [Ganzseinkönnen]), the analysis of 
conscience aims to show how this is not a “fantastical demand” (SZ 266) or a 
construction, but something that we can be, i.e., that it is an appropriate ability-to-be. It 
aims to show that being-possible is something that we can enact. That is, conscience 
attests to the “existentiell modification of Everyman” (SZ 267) (the inappropriate way 
of being-self) to being myself as being-possible (the appropriate way of being-self). 
Conscience can also be understood as the discursive articulation of individuation.26
The call of conscience
Is there a phenomenal aspect of the human situation that shows how being-
situate can be a self in an appropriate way, rather than the inappropriate way of being-
26. Cf. Crowell, “Subjectivity”, op. cit., pp. 442-446.
333an-Everyman-self? That is, is there a phenomenal aspect that attests to “an appropriate 
ability-to-be-itself [Selbstseinkönnen]” (SZ 267)? Can this be brought to expression? 
That is, is there a discursive articulation of mortal finitude that the analytic can 
“repeat”? Mostly, being-situate is not “I myself” but the Everyman-self. “Self”, 
however, does not indicate an object on hand, the properties of which can be 
ascertained by just looking at it. Rather, the “selfhood [Selbstheit] of being-situate was 
formally determined as a way of existing” (SZ 267). What is at issue here is how being-
possible as a way of being can be elucidated. The Everyman-self showed how being-
possible becomes occluded:
Everyman has always removed the grasping of these possibilities-of-being from the 
human situation. Everyman conceals even the silently enacted disburdening from it, 
of the explicit choice of these possibilities. (SZ 268)
An appropriate ability-to-be-itself in explicitly choosing possibilities does not 
mean that all factical possibilities must be chosen, however, for this would mean that 
lapsing is not constitutive of the human situation. It would mean that being-situate 
could be complete in itself. And as has been discussed, constitutive possibility means 
that being-situate is always incomplete.
The phenomenon of conscience shows just such an appropriate ability-to-be, 
Heidegger argues. Heidegger’s elucidation of conscience draws upon his analysis of 
fro/nhsij (as discussed in ch. 4). Conscience discloses an ontological “fault” [Schuld] 
in being-situate, i.e., that it is not the ground of its castness. And because castness 
always also involves framing its being as possibilities, possibilities are therefore 
enacted on the basis of not being the ground for them. The determinateness of our 
worldish possibilities comes from our castness, i.e., I have the possibilities that I do in 
being cast as I am. But such castness is not something I can “produce” or enact, but is 
always how I already find myself to be. In lapsing, this indebtedness is occluded, 
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doing the laundry, writing a thesis), which arise in being open to them and so becoming 
absorbed by them.
Heidegger’s argument is that I can only be a self insofar as I can be my 
possibilities in an appropriate way, which means having to be the cast being I always 
already am, i.e., having to frame possibilities on the basis of the factical. In lapsing, this 
self-relation is covered up, because the possibilities I frame are given to me. The 
ontological basis of being-possible is that in being the there which discloses world I am 
my facticity, the “that it is and has to be (it)”. If I only take my possibilities as mine 
“circumstantially”, i.e., from the world, I do not grasp my individuality, but see myself 
as “just like the others”. Conscience is the counter-movement to such lapsing, and 
“manifests itself as the call of care” (SZ 277), or the insight that belongs to the 
movedness of being-situate as a whole. It brings me out of lapsing, in which I 
understand my possibilities as an Everyman-self, back to my facticity, which is not 
something that I can choose, yet have to be. Being my facticity means choosing it as 
what has not been chosen. It means “[t]o make up for a choice [Nachholen einer Wahl]” 
(SZ 268).
In this ontological sense, conscience is not a “court of judgement”, or a voice 
that reprimands and warns by providing information about past or future actions in an 
“interior dialogue” we have with ourselves. The call of conscience says nothing. It is a 
form of discourse in the mode of reticence or keeping silent, which silently calls back to 
facticity. The “that it is and has to be it” is something being-situate cannot ground by 
being it, because the “that it is” is a priori for all enactment. Having to be it, however, 
means that it is a possibility and can be framed as appropriate ability-to-be. It is 
existentiality that “hears” the silent call of conscience, and is brought back to facticity, 
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incompleteness of the human situation as the situation in which I always have to act. 
That is, it discloses what Heidegger formally indicates as “resolvedness” 
[Entschlossenheit], which is “a distinguished mode of the disclosedness of being-
situate” (SZ 297). Resolvedness is a gathering up of what is dis-closed [er-schlossen]. 
The transcendence of the resolvedness of conscience is the immanence of 
disclosedness.
Heidegger articulates resolvedness as “the reticent, ready for dread framing 
itself as the most proper being-faulty [Schuldigsein]” (SZ 297). Being-faulty involves 
two ways of being: (i) not being the ground of facticity, and (ii) being the ground for not 
choosing some possibilities by choosing others. These are fundamental forms of our 
essential incompleteness, i.e., that in each case we have to be as we are already cast, and 
that we lay ourselves out on this basis. This ontological fault, therefore, does not mean 
a lack of something or a failure to attain some ideal as a way of being that could be 
rectified (SZ 285). Rather, it is constitutive of the human situation. Only because of this 
“fault” is there an ability-to-be, because only as cast can we frame possibilities.
Resolvedness is constituted by “readiness for dread” because dread discloses 
“the uncanniness of [being-situate’s] individuation” in framing possibilities (SZ 295-
296). Resolvedness is “reticent” because the call of conscience does not give any 
determinate content about the possibilities to be enacted. That is, conscience does not 
supply possibilities for existence from some autonomous source. Conscience, 
understood ontologically, is formal. Ontologically, what is at issue is being-possible, 
not determinate, factical possibilities.
Resolvedness, then, is not decisionistic. It is rather the insight in which 
possibilities first become manifest as the possibilities they are, i.e., as determinate ways 
336of being in the particular situation.
It would be a complete misunderstanding of the phenomenon of resolvedness if one 
wanted to suppose that it were simply a receptive grasping of presented and recom-
mended possibilities. The resolution is precisely the disclosing framing and deter-
mining of the factical possibility of the particular while. Indeterminateness, which 
characterises each factical-cast ability-to-be of Da-sein, belongs necessarily to 
resolvedness. Resolvedness is sure of itself only as a resolution. But the existentiell
indeterminateness of resolvedness, that at any time first determines itself in the res-
olution, nevertheless has its existential determinateness. (SZ 298)
Resolvedness is how factical possibilities are seen as possibilities. In resolvedness the 
situation comes into “focus” in terms of framing our possibilities as a resolution. Only 
insofar as we frame disclosively are there factical possibilities. But only in being 
resolved are we our ability-to-be as cast framing. Resolvedness not only focuses the 
“external” situation, but also brings me into focus, to be the being that I am and have to 
be in being towards my possibilities.
Furthermore, resolvedness is the “sight” in which we see ourselves as the 
beings that we are. Understanding is the existential constituent of our being such that 
we take our being as possibilities. In understanding, we frame [entwerfen auf] our being 
in terms of the concrete possibilities we have. Resolvedness articulates disposed 
understanding itself. In making possibilities manifest, it makes manifest to me that: (i) I 
have to be these possibilities; (ii) I cannot choose not to have these possibilities; (iii) in 
choosing, I have to choose some possibilities and not others; and (iv) this is what 
constitutes my being. Phronetic insight into the human situation discloses the sense of 
the being of this being as it always already is. It does not disclose being-itself in terms 
of another set of possibilities hitherto concealed.
The counter-concept to resolvedness is unresolvedness [Unentschlossenheit], 
which “only expresses the phenomenon that was interpreted as being-surrendered to the 
prevailing expositedness of Everyman” (SZ 299), i.e., to everyday being-an-other. In 
the unresolvedness of the Everyman-self, no-one resolves, because possibilities are pre-
337given in a public way. Such possibilities are somehow always already decided (e.g., as 
“what is done” or “the done thing”). And we are always lapsing into unresolvedness in 
caretaking and caregiving. Resolvedness is not a permanent change in our way of being, 
like a technical achievement or product that can be actualized once and for all. The 
resolvedness of conscience is not the realization of a predetermined self, but rather the 
phronetic insight that we are always ever “selving”. “Being-situate is in each case 
already and soon perhaps again in unresolvedness” (SZ 299). Resolvedness is a way of 
being-itself in being the incompleteness of the human situation, which is for the most 
part covered up. Being unresolved, then, does not mean indecision or “a being-
burdened with inhibitions” (SZ 299).
As phronetic insight, resolvedness attests that the human situation can be a 
totality. Lapsing occludes the disclosedness of incompleteness, i.e., being the “there”, 
which is only possible as being-possible. Being-possible, in turn, is the way of being of 
finitude or incompleteness, which is constituted by the fault of having to be what we 
already are. This is the “situation” [Situation] resolvedness brings us into as “a 
distinctive mode of the disclosedness of being-situate” (SZ 297). “The situation is the 
there [Da], in each case disclosed in resolvedness, as which the existing being is there 
[da]” (SZ 299). That is, the situation is factical existence. Heidegger echoes Dilthey in 
arguing that we cannot “get behind” our facticity to make it something which we 
produce or cause.
Existingly [being-situate] never comes back behind its castness such that it could 
first release this “that it is and has to be” in each case expressly from its being-itself
and lead it into the there. (SZ 284)
In conclusion, what Heidegger wants to demonstrate with the analysis of 
conscience is that there is a way of being which shows that we can be our possibilities, 
that is, we can be as being-possible, and that being-possible manifests itself to us in an 
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than in the inappropriate understanding of our possibilities in terms of the caretaken and 
caregiven. This does not mean, however, that in the resolvedness which conscience 
occasions we are “interiorized” or separated in some way from the world. Being-situate 
is being-in-the-world, and thus to be this being is in each case also always to be 
caretaking and caregiving. What conscience attests to, rather, is that we are also 
appropriate selves. Appropriately being-itself does not mean finding a set of factical 
possibilities different from those we find as Everyman. Instead, it means grasping 
being-possible. This is what unifies the factical-existentially lapsing constitution of our 
being as care. Being resolved to have a conscience means being our ontological fault or 
incompleteness.
Being-itself as appropriately being-a-whole
Forerunning concerns ability-to-be-a-whole, whereas resolvedness concerns 
appropriate ability-to-be. It has not yet been clarified how and why these two are 
connected. “How should both phenomena be brought together?” (SZ 302). There seem 
to be two different senses of incompleteness at issue here. Simply putting the two 
together runs the risk of “an intolerable, completely unphenomenological construction” 
(SZ 302), i.e., one which has no phenomenal basis. What phenomenon shows that 
dynamic and structural incompleteness belong together?
With every ability-to-be of being-situate, death is also always a possibility. 
Therefore, being resolved for any factical possibility involves being resolved for this 
most proper possibility. This possibility “lies in the offing [vorgelagert ist] for every 
factical ability-to-be of being-situate and as such enters more or less undisguisedly into 
each factically seized ability-to-be of being-situate” (SZ 302). Factical possibilities 
always vary in enactment, and therefore do not themselves allow for the certainty of 
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certain of appropriateness. The “most proper, appropriate possibility” of resolvedness is 
to be found in “forerunning resolvedness” [vorlaufende Entschlossenheit] (SZ 302). 
Forerunning resolvedness, then, is the ontological sense of the “self-constancy” [Selbst-
ständigkeit] (SZ 322) of being-situate. Being-situate is not constant as a substance or an 
object, which is self-contained and thus (constantly) self-identical. The movedness of 
the human situation is to change its “identity” in the enactment of possibilities that then 
are how we are cast. Constancy thus arises in and from existing. In being resolved for 
the concrete situation of acting, I am also in each case implicitly resolved for the 
possibility of my impossibility. Being-possible in this way, which cannot be expected 
but has to be forerun, is how the human situation is a whole. Thus, being-itself is an 
appropriate ability-to-be-a-whole, which is what care fundamentally means. As a 
dynamically and structurally incomplete being, being-situate is a unified totality not as 
a substance, but in being-itself in the enactment of its mortal finitude. Being it, i.e., 
existing, unifies the structural moments of care. Mortal finitude is how being-situate 
can be related to things and others; being-itself discloses being-situate to what 
encounters.
Thus, what Heidegger elucidates in his phenomenological investigation is an 
inversion of the priority traditionally accorded to the self. The self is not the ground of 
the factical possibilities which pertain to me, but is grounded in them. Rather than 
grounding the constancy of the human situation, the self arises as the constancy of 
being-possible:
Care does not need a foundation in a self, but rather existentiality as constitutive of 
care gives the ontological constitution of the self-constancy of being-situate, to 
which, corresponding to the complete structural content of care, factical being-laps-
ing in unself-constancy belongs. (SZ 323)
The worldless I, self, or subject of the metaphysical tradition has no phenomenal basis, 
340i.e., it is not found in experience. As such, it is an ontologically inadequate 
construction. The lapsing constitutive of being-situate gives rise to this inadequate 
ontology, because it covers up the existential facticity that makes lapsing possible. And 
the genesis of the theoretical attitude lies in lapsing (SZ 356).
Sense
Although the being of the human situation has been elucidated as care, it is 
unclear what makes the totality of care possible. How are the equioriginary structural 
moments of care a whole? This question refers to the sense [Sinn] of care.
Sense signifies the upon-which-toward-which [das Woraufhin] of the primary 
frame, from out of which something, as that which it is, can be conceived in its pos-
sibility. (SZ 324)
Taking something as something means grasping it as its possibilities, e.g., what it is 
good for or what can be done with it (for handy things) and how someone is and how to 
be with her (for others). The sense of a handy thing is its significance, as the referential 
totality of its appliance for some sake of myself. For example, the sense of an egg is its 
referential totality (in the kitchen, say) in which it is appliant (to the frying pan) for the 
sake of my feeding myself. The upon-which-toward-which is my hunger, which 
discloses the egg in its possibility to feed me. The egg can be taken as what it is (a 
source of nourishment) because of its sense, which need not be explicit. Indeed, the 
sense of the handy is mostly recessive. That is, if I am hungry and decide to make an 
omelette, that which makes it possible for me to take the egg as “good for making 
omelettes” (i.e., its appliance) is not explicit. However, it is possible to inquire into the 
sense of this egg. This involves “[e]xposing the upon-which-toward-which of a frame”, 
which “means disclosing what makes the framed possible” (SZ 324).
The ontological sense of care, then, is what is framed upon and toward in the 
originary frame that is care. Sense is what makes care possible, both as the being of 
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Setting out the sense of care then says: following up the underlying and guiding 
frame [Entwurf] of the originary existential interpretation of being-situate so that its 
upon-which-toward-which becomes visible in what is framed. (SZ 324)
To expose the sense of care is to show what makes possible (or possibilizes) care as this 
existential interpretation of the being of the human situation:
The framed is the being of the human situation and is disclosed in what constitutes 
it as an appropriate ability-to-be-a-whole. The upon-which-toward-which of this 
frame, of this disclosed being [Sein] so constituted, is that which itself possibilizes 
this constitution of being as care itself. (SZ 324)
Timeliness as the ontological sense of care
If the self-constancy of care happens in forerunning resolvedness, what is the 
ontological sense of care? In the articulation of the equioriginary moments of 
disposedness, understanding and lapsing, the disclosedness that is being-situate was 
elucidated as already being-in-the-world in disposedness, and being ahead of itself in 
understanding. In lapsing, being-situate gets caught up in everyday caretaking and 
caregiving, in which things and others encounter in their presence. Being already, being 
ahead, and the presence of beings encountered, all of which are equioriginarily 
constitutive of being-in, indicate that the ontological sense of care has to do with time. 
Forerunning resolvedness discloses timeliness [Zeitlichkeit] as the sense of care. 
“Timeliness is experienced as phenomenally originary in the appropriate being-a-whole 
of being-situate, in the phenomenon of forerunning resolvedness” (SZ 304).
As the sense of care, timeliness “does not correspond to what is accessible to 
the vulgar understanding as ‘time’ ” (SZ 304), i.e., the linear sequence of nows dated as 
past (no longer now), present (now), and future (not yet now). Rather, originary 
timeliness is the way that being-situate happens or is itself actively and transitively. In 
the phenomenon of forerunning resolvedness, what is revealed is “a distinctive mode” 
of timeliness that is covered up in everydayness. In forerunning resolvedness, 
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“bring about”, zeitigen] itself in various possibilities and various ways” (SZ 304).
Timeliness is neither objective nor subjective. It is not something on hand that 
we encounter like an innerworldish being, nor is it a product or construct of an isolated 
self. Heidegger’s de-substantialization of the self means that the self is originated rather 
than originating. The focus is on being a self, rather than being a self. And, 
concomitantly, it is possibility, rather than actuality, which has ontological priority. The 
generative power of timeliness, then, has to be understood in terms of possibility. 
Timeliness possibilizes, and does so in the form of various possibilities of itself. These 
possibilities are the ontological ground for the possibilities of being-situate.
The sense of care, then, is what makes care possible as the movedness of 
being-situate. This is equally what makes “the originary existential interpretation of the 
human situation” possible (SZ 324). Insofar as this elucidation has expounded the 
human situation, the sense of this being is not something external to it, but is the 
understanding which belongs to the exposition itself. “The sense of being of the human 
situation is not a free-floating other and ‘outside’ of itself, but rather the self-
understanding human situation itself” (SZ 325).
Expounding the sense of the being of being-situate requires interpreting 
forerunning resolvedness in terms of what makes it possible. Forerunning resolvedness 
is “the being toward the most proper distinctive ability-to-be” (SZ 325), which is only 
possible in that “being-situate can approach itself at all in its most proper possibility 
and endure the possibility in this being-able-to-approach-itself [Sich-auf-sich-
zukommen-lassen] as possibility” (SZ 326), i.e., in that it “exists”. Forerunning in an 
appropriate way means at each particular while being toward myself as being this most 
proper possibility. I can never “rid” myself of this possibility, in the way that I can 
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As long as I exist, I have to endure the possibility of my death as a possibility, 
because this is the only way in which I can be towards death, no matter how imminent it 
is. Mortality is an approaching myself, rather than a coinciding with myself. Wholeness 
and self-constancy are constituted by this never-self-coincident approaching. Thus, in 
being able to approach myself, I am in each case ever towards the possibility that I 
simply have to endure. Approaching myself is enduring this possibility, and thus makes 
possible the ability-to-be. That is, ability-to-be does not have to do primarily with what 
I have achieved and thus already am, but with how I go about my being and thus keep 
on becoming what I am.27 Whatever my factical possibilities are, they are mine only 
insofar as I can approach myself, i.e., can be toward myself as being-possible. Being-
possible itself, however, does not have to do with what is factical (as what I have done, 
become, been, etc.), but with how I can enact my possibilities.
Heidegger formally indicates the sense of “being-able-to-approach-itself” (in 
enduring the possibility of death) as Zukunft and zukünftig (usually inadequately 
translated as “future” and “futural”), but originary timeliness and its moments have 
nothing to do with time as ordinarily understood. Zukunft means what makes possible 
being towards ourselves as the incompleteness that constitutes us, i.e., the modality of 
possibility rather than actuality. Being incomplete means being toward what I am not 
but can be, i.e., towards the dynamics of my own, ever ongoing transformation. This is 
the sense of “being-able-to-approach-myself”: becoming what I already am. Zu-kunft 
means the “coming to” that I ever am, i.e., it means “becoming.”28
27. Graeme Nicholson has explored this issue with great clarity. Cf. Illustrations of Being: 
Drawing upon Heidegger and Metaphysics, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, 1992, 
and “The constitution of our being”, American Philosophical Quarterly , vol. 36, no. 3, 
1999, pp. 165-187.
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nomenon of becoming [Zukunft]...“Future” [»Zukunft«] here does not mean a Now, 
that, not yet become “actual,” at one time first will be, but rather the coming [Kunft] 
in which being-situate approaches itself in its most proper ability-to-be. (SZ 325)
Zukunft, then, is not a state of affairs that is not yet actual, but rather the way in which 
being-situate approaches itself, i.e., the way it is toward itself as its ability-to-be. 
Ability-to-be means how the human situation goes about its being. Going about its 
being is not a state of affairs, but is rather the movedness of being-situate. It is the way 
that being-situate activates, enacts, or actualizes itself, out of and towards its factical 
possibilities. Such enacting is in each case a becoming, and it is only because being-
situate is becoming (i.e., is ever incomplete) that forerunning is a possibility. 
The “in front of” [»vor«] and “ahead of” [»vorweg«] indicates becoming, as what in 
general first makes it possible that being-situate can so be that it goes about its abil-
ity-to-be. The self-forecasting upon the “for the sake of itself” grounded in becom-
ing is an essential characteristic of existentiality. Its primary sense is becoming. (SZ 
327)
Yet forerunning “makes being-situate appropriately becoming” (SZ 235), since 
forerunning is the way of being toward that which it is ever becoming, i.e., death.
Resolvedness, as the complement of forerunning in the appropriate ability-to-
be-a-whole, indicates being-situate’s way of being towards its ontological fault, i.e., 
that it can never be the ground (or origin) of its facticity. The way that I factically ever 
am is not something I can determine, but rather how I find myself to be. It is sheerly 
how I find myself, how I am ever cast into being who I am and have to be. My castness 
is something I have to “take over” without being the ground of it (i.e., without being 
able to choose otherwise). “Taking over of castness” means “appropriately being the 
human situation as it in each case already was” (SZ 325). Yet being the human 
28. This has been argued in great detail by Thomas Sheehan in various essays. Cf. Thomas 
Sheehan, “Time and Being”, in C. Macann, ed., Heidegger: Critical Assessments, vol. 1, 
Routledge, London, 1992, pp. 29-67; “Heidegger’s New Aspect: On In-Sein, Zeitlichkeit, 
and The Genesis of Being and Time”, Research in Phenomenology, vol. 25, 1995, pp. 207-
225; “Das Gewesen”, in B. Babich, ed., From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and 
Desire, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1995, pp. 157-177; “Geschichtlichkeit/Ereignis/ Kehre”, 
Existentia (Meletai Sophias), vol. XI, no. 3-4, 2001, pp. 241-251.
345situation means approaching oneself, which means becoming. Approaching oneself “as 
it in each case already was” means being able to be one’s “been” [»Gewesen«] (SZ 
326). My “been” is how I already ever am, i.e., it is my “alreadiness” [Gewesenheit]. In 
order to take over my castness I have to be able to approach myself as cast, i.e., become 
my alreadiness.
The taking over of castness is only so possible, however, that the becoming being-
situate can be its most proper “as it in each case was,” that is, its “been” [»Gewe-
sen«]. Only provided that being-situate in general is as I am-already [bin-gewesen], 
can it becomingly so approach itself, so that it comes-back. Appropriately becom-
ing, being-situate is appropriately already [Gewesen]. Forerunning the most 
extreme and most proper possibility is the understandingly coming-back to the most 
proper alreadiness. Being-situate can only appropriately be already provided that it 
is becoming. Alreadiness arises in a certain way from becoming. (SZ 325-326)
Alreadiness arises from becoming, because it is something that I can only be in an 
appropriate way in approaching myself. Approaching myself means being my self in 
becoming it, i.e., as what I can and have to be. What I have to be is what I already am, 
i.e., my alreadiness. As becoming, I cannot avoid my alreadiness, as if it were “over and 
done with”. Nor do I simply carry it around with me, as something that I cannot do 
anything with (and might rather like to forget). It is who and how I ever am, although 
not as a determinative set of “facts” about me. In becoming, my alreadiness is dynamic, 
too.
Alreadiness-becoming that makes possible forerunning resolvedness is 
therefore what makes possible the disclosedness of “the situation of the there at the 
particular while” (SZ 326). The disclosedness of the there is the disclosedness of being-
situate as being-in-the-world, encountering the things it takes care of. We take care of 
things in the way we encounter them, i.e., as the things that they are. Caretaking is 
always characterized by significance, such that the things that encounter are 
encountered as the things they are in reference to a “for-the-sake-of”. As significant, 
handy things are related to my factical possibilities. I can become in this or that way 
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brings the handy things to encounter as the things they are. Heidegger calls this “a 
making present [Gegenwärtigen]” of handy beings (SZ 326). All caretaking is an 
encountering that makes present. “Only as the present [Gegenwart] in the sense of 
making present can resolvedness be what it is: the undisguised letting-encounter of that 
which it actingly grasps” (SZ 326).
The three components of originary timeliness, then, are alreadiness, becoming, 
and making present, which are the sense of the existentials of facticity, existentiality, 
and lapsing. Alreadiness and becoming are mutually implicated dimensions or 
“ecstasies” [Ekstasen] (SZ 329) of originary timeliness that make possible the 
encounter with innerworldish beings. These ecstasies are the sense of being the 
disclosedness of the there, as which innerworldish beings encounter or come-to-
presence [anwest]. The encountering of the innerworldish, then, is not the confrontation 
of the isolated subject by an isolated object as hitherto unrelated. Being-situate is the 
site or locale for encountering, and thus always already in relation to what encounters, 
even if this is in the form of “not knowing what to make of something”. Our originary 
timeliness, as self-relatedness in the back-and-forth of alreadiness-becoming, gives the 
possibility of encounter, in making present what encounters. And this is what 
resolvedness clarifies:
Becomingly coming back to itself, resolvedness brings itself making-presently into 
the situation. Alreadiness arises from becoming, such that becoming that is already 
(better, is being already) releases the present from itself. This phenomenon that is 
unitary in such a way as being-already-making-present becoming we call timeli-
ness. Only if being-situate is determined as timeliness does it make possible for 
itself the characterized appropriate ability-to-be-a-whole of forerunning resolved-
ness. Timeliness reveals itself as the sense of appropriate care. (SZ 326)
Timeliness is the unifying sense of the structure of care. That structure was 
articulated as ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as being near (innerworldishly 
encountering beings). The sense of this structure (i.e., what makes it possible) is the 
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of being near in making present. None of these indications have the meanings found in 
the ordinary understanding of time. “Ahead” does not mean “not-yet-now, but later,” 
and “already” does not mean “no-longer-now, but earlier” (SZ 327). Understood in this 
way, “care would then be conceived as a being that occurs and runs off ‘in time’,” 
which would mean that being-situate’s way of being would “turn into something on 
hand” (SZ 327). That is, the chronological or chronometrical sense of time refers to 
objects that are conceptualized as being “in” time.
The human situation is not an object, because in its being it goes about its 
being, i.e., goes about being its being. Being the human situation is relating to my 
being. It is this self-relation, formally indicated as “being-in”, that constitutes being the 
there. The sense of self-relation is quite different from the sense of on-handness, for it 
constitutes itself in becoming, or approaching itself as, how it already is. In approaching 
myself, I am not coming to myself “from the future” as the being which I am not yet, 
and the self which I approach is not “in the past,” as the being which I am no longer. 
These two moments of originary timeliness, i.e., becoming and alreadiness, are not 
separate moments “in time,” but are unitary. They are not tenses of our way of being, 
but aspects.
Timeliness and Aspect
As Heidegger indicates (SZ 85, 326, 349), “timeliness” does not refer to what 
is commonly understood by time at all.
The terminological use of this expression must firstly be kept away from [or 
“shielded from,” fernhalten] all meanings of “future,” “past,” and “present” that 
crowd in from the vulgar concept of time. (SZ 326)
Originary timeliness has nothing to do with the “before and after” or “earlier and later” 
of linear time. Rather, it pertains to the aprioricity inherent to being-situate. As 
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tense.29 “The in-each-case-already-having-let-apply that sets free for appliance is an 
apriori [present] perfect, that characterizes the manner of being of being-situate itself” 
(SZ 85). Heidegger further glosses this in a marginal note in which he refers to 
Aristotle’s “to\ ti/ h]n ei]nai, ‘that which already was—being’, ‘the ever already 
beforehand holding sway [Wesende]’, the been [Gewesen], the perfect” (SZ 85fn). This 
gloss indicates that being-situate’s way to be involves a perfective aspect, not the 
present perfect tense.30 The facticity of being-situate is not something completed in the 
past and lasting into the present, as the present perfect would indicate (and as Gewesen 
has usually been translated, i.e., as “having-been”). Rather, it is ever in a state of 
wholeness, so long as it is. That is, there may be a time before which being-situate was 
not, but there is no time when being-situate is, yet is not whole.31 This wholeness is 
what Heidegger indicates with the term “apriori perfect”. In each particular while I am 
already how I am, even though in going about my being I am also framing possibilities 
and thus becoming otherwise. The apriori perfect is not a static state, but a dynamic or 
kinetic wholeness. It is the wholeness or alreadiness which I am always, insofar as I 
exist, engaged in becoming.
The ordinary concept of time misleads us into conceiving timeliness in this 
tensed way, but this is simply to fail to grasp the phenomenon that Heidegger is laying 
bare. The ecstasies of originary timeliness have to be understood aspectually, for they 
refer to being-situate as it ever is. Alreadiness-becoming is the perfective-imperfective 
29. Cf. Sheehan, “Heidegger’s New Aspect”, pp. 216-221; GBT 392-393, 417. The new 
translation of Being and Time completely misses this element of Heidegger’s thinking at 
349/320, where the German word for aspect, Aktionsart, is translated as “kinds of action”.
30. As Sheehan points out, Greek has no perfect tense for “to be” [ei0mi/] (“Heidegger’s New 
Aspect”, pp. 217-218).
31. Kisiel discusses the proliferation in BT of suffixes that indicate this perfective aspect (e.g., 
-heit, -keit, -igkeit) in the terms for the different existentials (e.g., significantness 
[Bedeutsamkeit], timeliness [Zeitlichkeit], movedness [Bewegtheit]), GBT 413-414.
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the tension between the perfective and the imperfective that the there arises, such that 
being-situate can encounter innerworldish beings. The perfective aspect of being-
situate, its alreadiness, does not mean, then, how it has been (the present perfect tense), 
but rather how it is always its “beenness”. The present perfect is a location in linear 
time. But the “beenness” of being-situate is a perfect aspect which obtains at every 
instant so long as being-situate exists. Thus it is a priori for becoming and making 
present. Alreadiness is the a priori perfect of the being of being-situate. It is the factical 
a priori.
The “ahead” and “already” that featured in the delineation of the structural 
moments of care indicate the timely sense of existentiality and facticity as becoming 
and alreadiness. However, there is no such indication given for lapsing, the other 
constitutive moment of care. The “near” [bei] of being near innerworldishly 
encountering things taken care of does not clearly have a timely sense, because making 
present arises from the alreadiness-becoming of timeliness. In becoming, being-situate 
comes back to its alreadiness, such that it can be its alreadiness as the factical 
possibilities it can frame in its ability-to-be. Only as already, however, can being-situate 
become, for without factical possibilities there is nothing to be able to be. Even though 
becoming has priority, it does not generate itself without alreadiness. Nor does 
alreadiness generate itself apart from becoming.
The generative timeliness of alreadiness-becoming, which corresponds to the 
essential structure of being-in as being the there, does not generate in a vacuum. 
Because being-situate is in each case “in the world”, being-in, as the ontological-
existential structure of how being-situate is in the world, always refers to the world. It is 
through being-in that being-situate is in its world as the there in which the encounter of 
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yet there is no being-in without the world. Heidegger’s non-substantialist, kinetic 
conception of being-situate subverts the conception of the self as an isolated entity. 
Thus, the sense of being-in as timeliness, i.e., alreadiness-becoming, is not separate 
from the world and the encounter of innerworldish beings. Rather, it is what makes such 
encounter possible, in that being-situate goes about its being in the becoming that 
brings it to its alreadiness by way of the things that encounter. In order to enact 
possibilities of myself, I must have the “means” to do so, such as a computer on which 
to write my thesis, an internet connection to exchange emails and look up information, 
the books and articles to which I refer (Heidegger’s texts and secondary sources), and 
so on. But such innerworldish handy things are only encountered as the beings they are 
in this enacting, i.e., only in the becoming (writing that thesis, getting that Ph.D.) in 
which I approach or come to my alreadiness (having done this much research, not 
having fully understood §65 of BT, already in my fifth year as a Ph.D. student, and so 
on). Without the timeliness that makes possible cast framing, innerworldish beings 
cannot be encountered in such a way. Thus the third moment of timeliness, making 
present, does not generate itself in quite the same way as the other two. Instead, 
making present, in which lapsing into the caretaken handy and on hand is primarily
grounded, stays included [eingeschlossen] in becoming and alreadiness in the mode 
of originary timeliness (SZ 328).
Because making present is dependent on alreadiness and becoming, it can no 
longer have priority for the sense of being-situate’s being, and thus for the question of 
the sense of being in general. Against the philosophical tradition, Heidegger argues that 
the present is not the most fundamental temporal sense of being. Being cannot simply 
be understood as actuality, i.e., as what is present in the present, because what is present 
to us (innerworldishly encountering beings and being-situate itself) is neither self-
351coincident nor self-present. The things we encounter are only such as they are 
encountered, which means, they are significant only in the way they encounter.
It is this aspect of timeliness—alreadiness-becoming as what “encloses” 
making present—that situates us essentially as able to be absorbed by the things we take 
care of, on the one hand, and yet, on the other, “fetched back” from them so as “to have 
to be all the more appropriately ‘there’ for the disclosed situation in the ‘glance’ 
[Augenblick]” (SZ 328). Alreadiness-becoming makes present both handy and on hand 
things that we lapse into in caretaking and theorizing, and also makes possible the 
retrieval of ourselves from such absorption in things. Originary timeliness, which 
enables us to be ourselves (i.e., to be self-related), is also what occludes us from being 
ourselves (in making present those things we get absorbed by or lapse into). The very 
condition for appropriateness, i.e., originary timeliness, is the condition for 
inappropriateness as well. Or, in other words, our dynamic incompleteness occludes 
itself.
Timeliness and historicalness
In GA59, Heidegger argues that history is “the most obtrusive phenomenon... 
that endangers the apriori or the absolute validity that is the counterstance [Gegenstand] 
of philosophy” (GA59:44). History here does not mean historia rerum gestarum, i.e., 
history as determined by the methods of historiography, but rather the singularity of 
happening that challenges the universal apriori. This challenge manifests itself 
ontically, and it is the task of fundamental ontology to determine in what sense history 
and the apriori are opposed.
I cannot examine here Heidegger’s repetition in Div. II Ch. III of the analysis 
of everydayness in terms of timeliness. His purpose there is to show how timeliness 
generates itself in an inappropriate way in our preoccupation with the things we take 
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appropriate timeliness, since they are modifications of the latter. However, because they 
generate themselves in terms of what is taken care of, they pertain to our being at the 
caretaken, and how our ability-to-be comes to be taken in terms of the caretaken. Thus, 
we await the caretaken, rather than becoming it, we forget ourselves in caretaking, 
rather than coming back to our alreadiness, and we make it present rather than being the 
there in the glance.32 The timeliness of everydayness generates itself as a “forgetting-
making-present awaiting” [vergessend-gegenwärtigende Gewärtigen] (SZ 339), rather 
than alreadiness-becoming that discloses the there in the glance.
What is important for my purposes is the transition from the analysis of 
everyday timeliness to historicalness.33 It seems evident, Heidegger says, that 
everydayness has to do with timeliness, since it “means the manner of existing, in 
which the human situation holds itself ‘every day’ ” (SZ 370). But are we as yet clear 
about the “every day”? For it “does not signify the sum of the ‘days’ that are allotted to 
being-situate in its ‘lifetime’ ” (SZ 370). That is, everydayness does not refer to the 
duration of being-situate. Rather, it signifies a “how” of being-situate, i.e., the way that 
32. Oddly, Heidegger discusses the glance first in this chapter, rather than in the previous one. 
The discussion of the ecstasies of originary timeliness thus refers to the alreadiness-
becoming which makes present, which “maps” it onto the structure of care as facticity, 
existentiality and lapsing. In Div. II Ch. IV, however, the focus is on inappropriate 
timeliness, and as such the way in which it is distinct from originary timeliness needs to be 
made clear. Since the ecstasies generate equioriginally, Heidegger’s architectonic requires a 
different designation for the appropriate present. It is obvious from his characterization of 
the glance (SZ 338-339, 347), however, that it is the sense of the situation that conscience 
pertains to.
33. In Time and Narrative Vol. 3, Paul Ricoeur questions Heidegger’s reduction of everyday 
timeliness to originary timeliness, and suggests that these are constituted by “two 
irreconcilable determinations in principle”, i.e., movement and care (pg. 89). He argues that 
Heidegger “never tries to vie with contemporary science in its own debate over time”, 
simply assuming that the scientific concepts have all “been tacitly borrowed from 
metaphysics” (pg. 88). This leads Ricoeur to argue that mortal time, historical time and 
cosmic time are perhaps irreducible, and that the phenomenology of time and cosmological 
time always “surreptitiously” appeal to one another (pp. 94-96). (Paul Ricoeur, Time and 
Narrative Vol. 3, trans. K. Blamey and D. Pellauer, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1988.)
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What is missing, then, from the analysis of timeliness as presented so far is the sense of 
the duration of being-situate, “that being-situate, in living into its days, stretches itself 
out ‘timewise’ [“zeitlich”] in the sequence of its days” (SZ 371). Being-situate is not a 
point-phenomenon that can be characterized atemporally. The whole thrust of the 
analytic of being-situate is to elucidate our way of being as identity in change without 
locating this in a substance. That is, it is intended to show how it is that we can be 
historical, in the sense of undergoing changes of who and how we are in staying who 
we are. Although originary timeliness provides the basic frame for understanding this, 
in that it is only as becoming that we can be our alreadiness, there are lacunae in the 
account as it stands. In particular, given the priority of possibility, the issue of the 
historical involves the question of why the past has priority.
Heidegger’s aim in the analysis of historicalness [Geschichtlichkeit] is 
twofold. First, the interpretation of historicalness is “a more concrete working out of 
timeliness” (SZ 382) that will show how being historical—i.e., having a history in the 
sense of being “stretched out” between birth and death rather than being in an isolated 
now—is possible. Second, he aims to show how history [Geschichte] is not a 
chronology of past events that are the subject matter of a science (i.e., historiography or 
historiology [Historie]), but is our way of being-with-one-another. History is not what 
has happened and is now past or gone, but rather is our co-happening. It is how we live 
and work together, in the openness of being-with-one-another to the possibilities that 
we inherit from our traditions, and that are always there for us as the very issue of our 
being-with. History is the way in which we come to be who we are. The structure of 
alreadiness-becoming indicates the retrieval or repetition involved in being historical, 
such that we have to be what we already ever are. At each instant we are brought to our 
354castness in framing possibilities of ourselves, because these are how we are cast. 
Happening or “historical living” [Geschehen]34 involves a co-retrieval, whereby we 
become who we already are only in the co-becoming or co-happening of being-with-
one-another, in a way which always calls into question the “social” possibilities (the co-
possibilities) which have been handed down as tradition, and for which we can, in 
conjunction with others, free ourselves up for.
The stretching out of ourselves “between” birth and death that characterizes 
historicalness is how originary timeliness generates itself in being-with. Whereas I 
“come towards” my alreadiness in becoming, such that I can be situational, I cannot be 
towards my inherited possibilities as these belong to a tradition (e.g., of being a 
Canadian or a Briton, of being a native English speaker, or of being a Ph.D. student) 
without reference to the others whom I am with. Historicalness is not a way of being 
towards myself simpliciter, but is a way of being towards myself in terms of how I am 
with others.
How is the timeliness that generates itself in being-with-one-another different 
from everyday, inappropriate timeliness, i.e., the forgetting-awaiting that makes 
present? Heidegger argues that there is an inappropriate historicalness which is an 
aspect of everydayness (SZ 376). This has to do with the publicness of inner-timishness 
[Innerzeitigkeit] as this pertains to time-reckoning and the use of clocks, on the one 
hand, and to chronology and the use of calendars on the other (SZ 404, 418). Such 
“chronicity” is a modification of historicalness, which turns it into a way of 
“reckoning” with dates in which history gets taken as the linear sequence of events in 
the past. Such date-reckoning requires “public time,” i.e., the inappropriate time that is 
reckoned with in everyday being-with with others, because only in the public sharing of 
34. Sheehan, G/E/K, pg. 248. In later texts such as Contributions Heidegger calls this “being-
historical” [Seinsgeschichtlich] and “being-history” [Seinsgeschichte].
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situate is “publicly” towards its being-historical. This manifests itself, Heidegger 
argues, in the science of history.
In being-historical, or our “historical living” [Geschehen], we are always co-
historical. This is just as much the case in the inappropriate chronicity of chronicling 
and sequencing the past. At one level, we do this (as historians, say) by being-with with 
others who are no longer there, i.e., the others who constituted a world which has 
ceased to be there for us. At another level, we do this in the shared community of fellow 
historians, other scientists, and people in general. Chronicity is a way of being towards 
things and others, and as such, involves the articulatedness of discourse, which itself is 
made possible in our being-with and being-situate-with. Our shared world is what 
makes it possible to chronologize (just as it makes it possible to “technicize” our 
everyday being near things).
Heidegger’s analysis of historicalness aims to show not just that the analysis of 
originary timeliness per se does not account for how being-situate is “stretched out” in 
its being, but also that this stretching out is essentially a co-happening. Being historical 
does not mean being a chronologized being, in the sense that I can say of myself “I was 
born in 1963, moved to Canada in 1971, finished my B.A. in philosophy in 1989”, and 
so on. Such biographical chronologizing does belong to history, but it is not the way we 
are towards ourselves as historical beings. What Heidegger wants to show is how these 
“time-points” are connected in self-constancy. Originary timeliness showed that my 
alreadiness, which in some sense includes these temporally punctuated moments of my 
history, is only possible in that I go about my being in becoming, i.e., as coming 
towards myself as I already ever am. It is only in becoming that I can be my alreadiness, 
and thus can be as alreadiness. But this doesn’t show how my alreadiness is coherent, 
356i.e., how it unifies the apparently separate moments of my history. Alreadiness-
becoming generates the glance in which I am situational, that is, in which I can act in 
being the ontological fault inherent to every enactment of factical possibilities. But the 
glance does not unify the moments of my alreadiness. It only clarifies or resolves me 
for the situation.
What originary timeliness does show is how a non-substantial being can be 
self-constant, i.e., can be a self in its becoming or can remain constant in self-change. 
Concretely, self-constancy implies that timeliness does generate itself in such a way as 
to unify the moments of my being as a stretching out of myself. My alreadiness is not 
stretched out, because it is an apriori perfectiveness of my being, i.e., it is how I ever 
am, not how I have been. The “repetition” or “retrieval” [Wiederholung] of originary 
timeliness is not a retrieval of my “past” as my factical possibilities. Originary 
timeliness does not concern these concrete aspects of who I am. It is how we are 
generated as unified, self-constant beings in becoming, but does not refer to what we 
are becoming. Originary timeliness concerns the possibility that we are becoming, to 
show how this is possible in the ecstatic unity of alreadiness-becoming which makes 
ourselves present to ourselves in the glance.
It is with historicalness, then, that the factical possibilities—the concreteness 
of our alreadiness—come to the fore. The primacy of factical contents means that 
historicalness is concerned with the who of being-situate, rather than the how. The 
question of the who is a question about the self and its constancy, as we have seen, and 
thus what is of concern in historicalness is to make clear how being-situate is factically 
self-constant, i.e., how its factical possibilities are constituted in the generation of 
originary timeliness (SZ 375). The analysis of originary timeliness involved 
forerunning in being towards death, and thus interpreted being-situate as being toward 
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the other “end”, i.e., birth. Mortality implies natality. Thus, in grasping being-situate as 
a totality, what we want to bring to light is “the stretching out of being-situate between 
birth and death” (SZ 373). This stretching out is the “continuity [Zusammenhang] of 
life” (another Diltheyan notion that Heidegger appropriates), without which being-
situate cannot be a whole. But this continuity is usually understood (in everydayness 
and in the philosophical tradition) as “consist[ing] of a succession of lived experiences 
[Erlebnissen] ‘in time’ ” (SZ 373). This is problematic, Heidegger argues, because it 
implies that neither “past” experiences nor those “in the future” are actual. Only present 
experience is actual. Yet, if this is so, then the continuity that is aimed at falls apart into 
a sequence of nows that being-situate “jumps” through. Being-situate would only be in 
the now and through the lived experience belonging to the now. The non-actual 
experiences of the past and future would not be part of its being. Thus there could not 
be any stretchedness, for there would be nothing to stretch back to (birth, as a lived 
experience, is past and thus not actual) nor to stretch out towards (death as a future 
event is not actual).
Heidegger argues that, if we are asking after the continuity of being-situate in 
being between birth and death, because we are concerned with how it is self-constant 
and thus who the self is that is constant, then we cannot rest the analysis on a way of 
understanding being-situate that takes it to be something isolated in the present actuality 
of the now. Yet the interpretation of continuity as a sequence of lived experiences does 
precisely that. It entails that the only lived experience that is actual is the one I am 
having in the present. This is the experience of the “solitary now”. As such, it precludes 
the possibility of continuity. The problem with approaching the issue in this way is that 
it depends upon taking lived experiences as something that occur “in time”. But being-
358situate is not “in time”, because it is not something on hand. Rather, it is a way of being, 
and a way of being is not “in” time, but rather “of” time, or timely.
Therefore, the continuity that we are after cannot be understood as a 
connection of two “events” in time, birth and death, which themselves are both non-
actual but the connection of which somehow “passes through” the actuality of the 
present situation. Rather, this continuity has to be understood as a way that being-
situate is. In going about its being, being-situate is coming towards itself in being 
historical as it has been (not, as in the generation of originary timeliness, as it already 
is). In its being, it “stretches itself out in such a way that its own being is constituted in 
advance as stretching [Erstreckung]” (SZ 374). That is, it is not the “endpoints” of birth 
and death that determine the stretching itself out of being-situate, but the other way 
around. The “endpoints” of being-situate only are in the way that it is the “between” of 
these “endpoints”. “The ‘between’ relating to birth and death already lies in the being of 
being-situate” (SZ 374). To be being-situate is to be the between of birth and death, 
because these are constituted by factical existentiality. Just as death is not an event 
which has not yet happened, neither is birth an event which has already happened and is 
no longer.
Existentially understood, birth is not and never is a past thing [ein Vergangenes] in 
the sense of the no-longer-on-hand, as little as death has the manner of being of the 
outstanding debt that is not yet on hand, but is approaching. Factical being-situate 
exists as born, and born it also already dies in the sense of being towards death. 
Both “ends” and their “between” are, so long as being-situate factically exists, and 
they are in a way that is solely possible on the basis of the being of being-situate as 
care...As care, being-situate is the “between”. (SZ 374)
Both birth and death, then, are conditions of the possibility of factical 
existence. Whereas death is the most extreme or outermost possibility of being-situate 
that makes being its facticity possible, birth is, so to speak, the “innermost” fact of the 
human situation, the condition of everything factical. Birth, understood existentially, is 
not a possibility of being-situate, just as death can never be factical. “Bornly” dying is 
359rather the between of facticity and existentiality, the continuity of the movedness 
[Bewegtheit] of the human situation. Heidegger calls this “specific movedness of the 
stretched out stretching-itself-out” the “happening [Geschehen] of being-situate” 
(SZ 375).
Thus, understanding the being of historicalness means “[l]aying bare the 
structure of happening and its existential-timely conditions of possibility” (SZ 375). 
The “problem of history,” which in its contingency and singularity makes the a priori 
problematic, cannot be addressed from analyses within the science of history, because 
this mode of inquiry, as a way of being of being-situate (like all sciences), has its origin 
in being-situate. We do historiography because we are historical, although we can be 
historical without doing historiography at all, Heidegger argues (GA59:45-6; SZ 396). 
Thus, historicalness is the condition for the possibility of there being anything like a 
science of history. “How history [Geschichte] can become a possible object of 
historiography [Historie] can be gathered only from the manner of being of the 
historical, from historicalness and its deep rooting in timeliness” (SZ 375).
What guidelines for understanding historicalness can be found in “the vulgar 
interpretation of the history of being-situate”, as that which is conditioned by 
historicalness? Independently of the sense of “science of history”, Heidegger notes four 
meanings:
(I) History is what is past [Vergangenes] in the sense of “no longer on hand” or no 
longer effectual on the present (SZ 378). This meaning can be readily found underlying 
certain positions in international relations, such as the irrelevance of Saddam Hussein’s 
non-existent weapons of mass destruction to the legality of the war against Iraq, or the 
dismissal of colonialism as an issue of contemporary relevance. This attitude argues 
that that was then, this is now, events have moved on, we have to deal with the situation 
360in the present, etc. This meaning of history is also inherent to neoclassical economics, 
since for any economic situation, all that matters is the equilibrium, not the pathway to 
equilibrium.
(II) History is that which is past but is still effectual in the present, such as the 
significance of the Parthenon, Borobudur, or Stonehenge. Such monuments are 
historical because they continue to have an effect on us today as, say, tourist attractions. 
They are present now, but “a bit of the past” is present in them (SZ 378).35 In this sense, 
Heidegger argues, the past does not have particular priority, because what is significant 
is not something which is no longer just there, but the connection of events in the past, 
present and future, the rise and fall of epochs and cultures, and the like. The primary 
significance of history in this sense is how it connects events, such as the introduction 
of the Euro as specie, the end of apartheid in South Africa, or the forced resignation of 
Indonesia’s General Suharto (all “historic moments”). Such events are held to be of 
historic significance even as they occur. Thus, history has nothing to do with the past. 
“Herewith the past has no particular priority” (SZ 379).
(III) A third sense of history is the distinction drawn between nature and culture.36 
Although both are understood as changing “in time,” the way in which this occurs is 
different for each domain. Human historical change is meaningful and teleological, 
whereas natural historical change is meaningless and causal. This distinction serves to 
demarcate these two regions of beings.
(IV) Finally, history is understood as what is inherited from tradition, as that which is 
freed up [überliefert] for us, whether by the science of history or in a way which takes 
35. This view can be found in Droysen.
36. Rickert used this distinction to demarcate the different domains of the sciences (Heinrich 
Rickert, The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science, trans. G. Oakes, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1986, pp. 134-135).
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The central meaning of history as ordinarily understood, then, is
the specific happening of existing being-situate proceeding in time, such that the 
happening in being-with-one-another, as “past” and at the same time “freed up” and 
continually effecting is taken to be history in the sense emphasized. (SZ 379)
History is the happening of being-situate, yet in the ordinary understanding of 
happening, it is conceptualized as the occurrences being-situate experiences or 
undergoes. The phenomenological question is how being-situate can be its happening, 
since it is not a thing that is “in time”. Originary timeliness, Heidegger argues, gives 
rise to within-time-ness, and thus cannot itself be understood on the basis of within-
time-ness. Historicalness, therefore, cannot be understood on this basis either. The 
“circumstances, occurrences and destiny” that are taken to be constitutive of history are 
determined by the historicalness of being-situate, i.e., its happening, rather than the 
other way around. This raises the question of why the past has a “remarkable priority in 
the concept of history” (SZ 379). The past does not enter into originary timeliness at all. 
How then does it become predominant in historicalness?
The historial [historisch] objects with which the science of history concerns 
itself (such as antiquities, monuments, heirlooms, records, and the like) are not 
historical because they are the objects for such a science. Nor are they historical as that 
which is no longer there, i.e., which is past and gone. Such objects are historical 
precisely in the way that they continue to be present in the present.38 Even when such 
things are past and gone, such as the Bamiyan statues, the Colossus at Rhodes, or the 
original Library at Alexandria, they are still present in some way in the records and 
documents which refer to them. How is it that we can be near such things as historical, 
then? That is, how are these world-historical beings different from the iBook I am 
37. Heidegger gives further characterizations of history as ordinarily understood in GA59 §6.
38. A point that Droysen makes in his Outline of the Principles of History, op. cit..
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since they seem to encounter in the same way? The difference lies, Heidegger argues, 
not in the encountering of them, but in their significance, i.e., what we encounter them 
as. With my iBook or with recreated Bamiyan statues, we encounter them as 
innerworldish, and thus as having significance in the context of the world that gives rise 
to them. The world that is the context of their discoveredness is co-disclosed by those 
who created them. Their significance as discovered is the significance of the co-
disclosedness of the world that we are in as being-with-one-another, which involves the 
creators and users of such handy beings. However, the world which gave rise to the 
Parthenon or Chichen Itza is not one we co-disclose. Those who built and used such 
edifices are no longer there with us, and thus the significance is different. They are no 
longer co-disclosive in the sense of contesting the significance of these creations. A 
temple which has become just a tourist attraction no longer encounters as a temple, in 
which gods are propitiated, honours are given, and so on. The for-the-sake-of-which of 
such monuments no longer exists.
What is “past”? Nothing other than the world, within which, belonging to a context 
of useful things, they were encountered as handy and were used by a care-taking, 
being-in-the-world [in-der-Welt-seienden] being-situate. The world is no more. (SZ 
380)
Yet this seems extreme, for there are things that are world-historical which 
hardly seem to belong to a world that is no more. For example, the French franc was 
replaced as specie only three years ago, therefore surely that world cannot be said to be 
“no more”. The vast majority of those who were alive then are still co-disclosing the 
world, and so on. Nevertheless, despite the recency of its disappearance, that world has 
disappeared and is no more, because a French franc coin can no longer be used as 
payment. Although it may well have a different significance as a collector’s item or as a 
shim, such a coin is no longer money, for it cannot, generally, buy anything in France. 
363The world in which the French franc and the other eleven currencies unified into the 
Euro were significant as forms of payment indeed is no longer. Such handy beings 
cannot be significant as a means of payment. They cannot appear as such beings.
Heidegger’s point is that the historical character of things does not come from 
their datedness or temporal longevity. Rather, it is being-situate that is historical. The 
historical character of caretaken things is a derivative or secondary historicalness. Such 
things are historical in “belonging-to-the-world” (SZ 381). That is, they are world-
historical [Weltgeschichtliche]. In everydayness, it is this world-historical character 
which gives rise to the sense of “world history” [Welt-geschichte]. The concept of world 
history arises because we encounter such beings (the French franc, the Ford Model T) 
as belonging to a world that cannot be co-disclosed, not because such things are 
thematized and objectified by the science of history. However, we can only encounter 
beings in this way because we are historical. Indeed, it is only because we are historical 
that the science of history is possible at all. The science of history, like all other 
sciences, thematizes a region of beings that are encountered, unthematically, in 
advance. One need not be a historian to encounter beings as historical, and being a 
historian, Heidegger argues, can in fact cover up historicalness, as is evident with those 
historians, such as Ranke, who denied that the historian brings historicalness to what is 
interpreted historiographically.
How is being-situate historical, then? The argument so far has been that neither 
the ordinary understanding of history nor the scientific concept of history are 
fundamental to historicalness, although both are suggestive of it. Understanding how 
being-situate is historical involves showing how historicalness relates to originary 
timeliness. With originary timeliness, the issue was how being-situate can be its 
alreadiness. However, what is not shown with originary timeliness is how being-situate 
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generation of originary timeliness is directed towards the concrete individuality of the 
human situation, it is misunderstood when taken to be the way that being-situate “truly” 
happens. We are always happening in a world near things with others. Although this 
firstly and mostly takes place in everydayness, the modification of everydayness to 
appropriate existence is not a disseverance of my being from that of everyone else. The 
human situation is fundamentally incomplete, and therefore cannot be more appropriate 
in isolation from what it is open to, i.e., things and others. I am not “more appropriate” 
the more I reject the context of my being, in the way, for instance, that teenagers 
sometimes try to affirm their own existence by rebelling against everything they think 
their parents stand for. Appropriateness has nothing to do with being for or against 
others. Rather, it has to do with how we are individuated as happening, which is always 
a way of being that is inherently co-happening.
Factical being-situate has its “history” and can do so because it is essentially 
historical. Forerunning resolvedness allows me to be my possibilities, but where do 
they come from? They cannot come from death, since death is the limit-case of the 
impossibility of all possibilities. In resolvedness, being-situate takes over, from 
everydayness, its heritage [Erbe] as its own, i.e., as possibilities that it can be or can 
choose as its own. Forerunning resolvedness is the grasping of mortal finitude that 
enables the freeing up [überliefern] of the possibilities of tradition, such that they 
become appropriate possibilities. Heidegger indicates this as “fate” [Shicksal] (SZ 384), 
in which the human situation happens in the freeing up of being-towards-death that 
enables choosing inherited possibilities.39 Furthermore, as being-situate-with, being-
situate happens as co-happening, in which fate becomes “destiny” [Geschick] (SZ 384). 
39. Cf. Thomas Sheehan and Corinne Painter, “Choosing one’s fate: A re-reading of Sein und 
Zeit §74,” Research in Phenomenology, vol. XXVIII, 1999, pp. 63-83.
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the meaning of inherited possibilities. The full appropriate happening of being-situate is 
fateful destiny.
Inappropriate historicalness conceals the originary stretching along of fate. 
Whereas appropriate historicalness grasps alreadiness in terms of becoming, 
inappropriate historicalness grasps the past in terms of the present. “Unconstantly as the 
Everyman-self, being-situate makes present its ‘today’. Awaiting the next new thing it 
has already forgotten what is old” (SZ 391). Unable to repeat fatefully, the Everyman-
self only
...retains and receives the left-over ‘actual’ of the world-historical that has been, the 
remnants and the on hand information about them. Lost in the making present of the 
“today,” it understands the “past” in terms of the “present.” (SZ 391)
Appropriate historicalness works against the inappropriate in a “counter-presentation 
[Entgegenwärtigung] of the today and a weaning from the conventionalities of 
Everyman” (SZ 391). As appropriately historical, being-situate makes its heritage its 
own, whereas “inappropriate historical existence, burdened with the legacy of a ‘past’ 
that has become unrecognizable to itself, seeks the modern” (SZ 391).
The science of history has its existential origin in historicalness. Although 
every science has its history, the science of history depends on historicalness in a 
special way, because it thematizes the historical. It delimits its objects and 
methodologically predetermines how they are disclosed. For this science, its objects are 
“the past”, which implies that the past is already somehow disclosed. Because only 
being-situate is originarily historical, the objects thematized by the science of history 
must have the kind of being of the “was-situate being-situate [dagewesenem Da-sein]” 
(SZ 393), and so too must the world so disclosed. Artefacts that are still on hand, then, 
have this kind of being. They have an “innerworldishness” that makes them disclosive 
366of the was-situate because of the historicalness of the historian. The historicalness of 
the historian’s existence is interpretative “historical being towards” the was-situate. 
That is, taking something as an artefact involves a framing on the part of the historian, 
which is possible only because the historian exists historically. The historian “chooses 
the fate” of grasping the possibility to understand the was-situate. As such, the science 
of history must conform to appropriate repetition, i.e., understanding the was-situate in 
terms of its own appropriate possibilities of existence. In this way the science of history 
discloses the possibility of the “having-been-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-gewesensein]” 
(SZ 394).
This manifests the “universal” in the “once-only” [einmalig], the “happening 
only once,” or the unique. Thus the question whether the aim of the science of history is 
to articulate a series of unique, “individual” events or to determine historical “laws” is 
mistaken. It is neither (or both). “[T]he central theme of the science of history in each 
case is the possibility of was-situate existence [dagewesenen Existenz]” (SZ 395). 
Historiography is a freeing-up that has an interpretedness and a history of its own, i.e., 
its own traditions. Traditional history allows historiography to penetrate to the was-
situate itself.
However, although historiography attests to how we can be towards the history 
that we are, it does not in itself provide the meaning of the historical. History is neither 
an object on hand (although it can be investigated as such), nor is it simply a cultural 
inheritance that determines how we understand ourselves (although it is part of how we 
are constituted). Heidegger’s elucidation of historicalness shows that the historical, too, 
is determinately indeterminate, and is so because we are fundamentally constituted as 
incomplete.
367Transcendence and immanence
In being-historical, the human situation is one of transcendence and 
immanence. The radical innovation in Heidegger’s approach is to argue that such 
immanence is itself a transcendence. Being-historical indicates both the transitive and 
intransitive senses of being (the history we are; the history we are directed towards), 
formally indicated as “the upon-which-towards-which” [das Woraufhin] (PIA 112; SZ 
365). Heidegger argues that our facticity itself is the basis of our ability to be directed 
towards ourselves, and further, that this can only be understood as our happening in a 
world. But happening cannot be understood purely as the realization of present 
possibilities. That is, against historicism, life-philosophy (and present-day 
postmodernism), Heidegger argues that our way of being is not pure becoming. As the 
beings we are, we necessarily are the way that we have already become, i.e., our 
historical actuality or facticity. Facticity—the condition of being factical—necessarily 
constitutes our way of being. Yet against positivism and the claims of the natural and 
social sciences to provide explanations of our way of being, Heidegger argues that we 
are not purely determined by this necessity either.40 We are bound by, and to, our 
facticity, in terms of the possibilities this allows us to become. That is, we can only 
determine ourselves in light of who we already are. This is not simply a “backdrop” for 
who we are becoming, Heidegger argues, but is constitutive of becoming itself. Our 
facticity is necessity because we must appropriate it in being-possible. But we can only 
be our possibilities insofar as we are factical. Our historical actuality—our presence in 
the present situation—is the making-present that transpires in being our factical 
possibilities. 
40. Heidegger is arguing against historicism and positivism, not against the historical and 
natural sciences, which are entirely appropriate for investigating beings as they are 
encountered. 
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accorded by historicism to actuality in determining the human situation fails to 
recognise that actuality arises from the dynamic relation between necessity and 
possibility. With regard to positivism, on the other hand, it implies that the privilege 
accorded to necessity in the form of general laws fails to recognise that what is actual 
does not simply result from necessity, but rather is primarily determined by possibility. 
Thus both historicism and positivism are based on the relation between necessity and 
actuality, and both overlook the third modality of possibility. Thus, they both overlook 
the dynamic incompleteness of the human situation, because the theoretical attitude 
always tries to get a “total view” of what it inquires into. Without attention to inquiry 
itself as phenomenally attesting to incompleteness, the human situation gets taken as 
objectively or intersubjectively determined, and thus fully determinate in terms of what 
it is. In the theoretical attitude, these is no room for the radical incompleteness of mortal 
finitude, or for the moment of subjectivity that holds open objectivity and 
intersubjectivity as possibilities.
Chapter 6: Formal Indications to the Subject of 
Development
Out of the situation, towards the situationIntroduction
Heidegger’s analytic of the human situation, examined in chapter 5, suggests a 
number of questions that can be raised about positivist and historicist development. The 
questioning involved, however, must also put the questioner in question, if we hope to 
inquire about the relation between the human situation and conceptions of 
development. The most fundamental question has to do with meaning and development. 
Can development be articulated in terms of meaning? What would this involve?
Initially, it would seem to have to do with the relation between meaningfulness 
and the questions that appear in the critiques of positivist development (e.g., regarding 
transitivity, agency, process and end-state, history and progress, novelty and order, and 
so on). The primary question for a phenomenological hermeneutical inquiry, however, 
has to do with the relation between the standards or values of development and their 
history. Do these standards themselves develop, or are they timeless and universal? Is 
knowledge of such standards itself one of the standards? If so, how? In what way can 
ahistorical, acultural standards or values be valid or hold for historical contexts and the 
individuals who are historically contextualized? These questions lead to a number of 
others, such as: what is it that is supposed to develop? who does the developing? who 
ascertains whether development has occurred? 
These are not empirical questions, however, but philosophical, or formally 
indicative ones. In the way it pertains to the human situation, the subject of 
development cannot simply or immediately be taken as an object. How it can be taken 
is the question this chapter aims to explore.369
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might clarify the subject of development. I have used this phrase previously, without 
comment. Therefore, one of the tasks in this chapter will be to explicate this phrase, so 
as to show how it indicates the constellation of issues surrounding the question of 
whether development is in fact a phenomenon and, if so, how it shows itself. In order to 
do so, however, it will be useful to review the trajectory of the previous chapters.
Review
As was discussed in chapter 1, the 19th-century philosophical debate in 
Germany was concerned particularly with the question of historical knowledge: 
whether this was simply another form of empirical knowledge and thus subordinate to 
the same explanatory methods of inquiry and standards of objectivity (positivism); or 
whether history (or the historical), in its individuality and intendedness, required an 
interpretative or hermeneutic method, and therefore had to be measured by different, 
intersubjective standards (historicism). A central question, which many late 19th 
century and early 20th-century German philosophers sought to address, was about the 
essence or character of the subject of the science of history [Historie]. What sort of 
object was history? Was it an object at all? How could the historical be objective, and 
yet be unique? The neo-Kantian interpretation of the historical (or the cultural) was 
that, like nature, it was the subsumption of irrational reality under concepts particular to 
the values of the inquiry, and thus simply another kind of empirical object. Philosophy, 
the neo-Kantians argued, could assist the different sciences by bringing epistemological 
and especially methodological clarification to the debate, so as to show that both types 
of sciences were equally objective.
Dilthey, whom the neo-Kantians took to have helped in this clarification, 
agreed that history was an empirical discipline, as were the other human studies. 
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sciences (and, arguably, remain so), because of the need for interpretation or 
understanding in the human studies. In the study of society, unlike that of nature, 
Dilthey argued, 
the uniformities which can be established about society fall far short of the laws 
which can be established about nature based on the certainty of spatial relations and 
of the properties of motion.1
However, because we can know the socio-historical from the inside, in terms of how it 
constitutes us, and in terms of how we are a part of it and so constitute it, the human 
studies have an advantage over the study of nature.
...all of this is more than outweighed by the fact that I myself, who experience and 
know myself from within, am a constituent of this social body and that the other 
constituents are similar to me and are thus for me likewise comprehensible in their 
inner being. I understand the life of society.2 
Despite their lack of exactness, the human studies are not inferior to the natural 
sciences, but rather far outstrip them, because they study a “boundless” complex or 
nexus of interactions, in which we participate and thus come to know ourselves. The 
nexus of the individual is both participant and observer:
The individual is on the one hand an element in the interactions of society, a point of 
intersection of the various systems of these interactions, reacting to the influences 
of that society with conscious intentions and actions; but on the other hand he is an 
intellect contemplating and investigating all of this. Accordingly, the play of causes 
which operate blindly is replaced by the play of representations, feelings, and 
motives. The individuality and profusion of interactions that emerges here is bound-
less.3 
In my experience as a participant in the social world, I come to understand both myself 
and that world in the only way possible:
we can only know ourselves thoroughly through understanding; but we cannot 
understand ourselves and others except by projecting what we have actually experi-
enced into every expression of our own and others’ lives.4
1. Dilthey, Selected Writings Vol. I, op. cit., pg. 88.
2. Ibid., pg. 89.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., pg. 176.
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and also as social beings. Furthermore, the continuity between the individual and the 
social (or their mutual implication) is what allows for, and provides the structure of, the 
human studies. “A discipline only belongs to the human studies when we can approach 
its subject-matter through the connection between life, expression and understanding.”5
Dilthey’s notion of worldviews as different and incommensurable ways in 
which the totality of life is grasped and understood, as “a system in which questions 
about the meaning and significance of the world are answered in terms of a conception 
of the world”, appeared to Husserl simply as a historicization of consciousness that 
resulted in skeptical relativism. Husserl argued that philosophy concerns the objective 
in experience, which can be elucidated by phenomenological investigation of the 
invariant in intentionality. As such, however, the phenomenological method was not 
oriented towards the singular and unique, but towards the a priori. Only knowledge of 
the a priori, Husserl argued, could be grounded as strict or rigorous philosophical 
knowledge.
Thus, whereas Dilthey argued that it is only through experience, expression 
and understanding that we can study the historical world that constitutes us, Husserl 
denied that this was a legitimate task for philosophy. The question of historical 
development, then, was also not amenable to phenomenological inquiry. The 
individuality and uniqueness of the historical “threatens” the a priori, as Heidegger put 
it, and thus the very rigour of philosophy itself. For Husserl, philosophy had its own 
object-domain, and was not simply a handmaiden to the sciences, as the neo-Kantians 
seemed to suggest. But this object-domain—the structure and constitution of 
consciousness—excluded the very aspect of human existence that was the focus of the 
5. Ibid.
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consciousness cannot be the material of historical change.
In chapter 2, I examined the discipline of economics, to show how the conflict 
between positivist and historicist views of history and social existence manifested itself 
in the formal-deductive approach of political economy and its successors, and the 
interpretative, historically-oriented approach that was prevalent in Germany throughout 
the 19th century. My aim there was to clarify the way in which the formalism of 
positivist economics came to subordinate the historical and empirical, to such an extent 
that attempts have been made to subject history to testing so as to confirm 
contemporary economic theory. The significance of this trend in positivist economics is 
that it disconnects or dissevers economic inquiry from both the historical context that it 
arises in and the historical contexts that it studies. In naturalizing economic interaction 
it suggests that all economic systems can be explained by the same general laws, and 
thus are simply instances of an ideal or abstract form of “the” economy.
Historicist economists, in contrast, argued that economic interaction can only 
be understood in its historical context and, furthermore, must be understood as 
essentially creative. For these economists, economic inquiry itself was historically 
contextual, reflecting and contributing to the experience, expression and understanding 
of the economic aspects of contemporary life, which themselves were not analytically 
isolable from the totality of social life. Whatever development or change in economic 
interaction might occur was not simply the result of the ineluctable operation of general 
laws, but a matter of the meaning of social interactions, policy, politics, and so on.
The basic conflict between these two schools of thought was over whether 
economy ordered society, or whether it had to be understood in its socio-historical 
context. For intellectual and historical reasons, including the devastation of two major 
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influence in economics went into a decline. Present-day economics is thus dominated 
by a formalism that abstracts from all historical specificity, a trend that can be traced 
back to Adam Smith, who clearly argued that the economic history of Europe after the 
fall of the Western Roman empire was “unnatural” according to the formal analysis of 
economic behaviour. For Smith, as for positivist economics since his time, theory 
trumps history, and this allowed for the idea that society ought to be brought into 
harmony with the general laws of economic behaviour that economic theory claimed to 
have discovered. However, positivist economics has proved less than adequate in the 
positivist endeavour of prediction and control of economic behaviour, despite its 
influence in policy circles of government.
In chapter 3, I sought to show how the U.N.-era concept of development has its 
roots in the rise to prominence of positivist economics, and how this is evident in 
various theoretical attitudes oriented towards the explanation of poverty or surplus 
population. The objectification of the poor, and the attempt to determine what is 
required in order to bring about the economic development that has failed to occur, has 
its basis in positivist economics, as the World Bank clearly shows. The central problem 
of positivist development, as the postdevelopment critics argue, is that it abstracts from 
historical context, and therefore fails to take into account not only how the situation of 
today’s hard-working countries does not simply map onto the situation of the early 
developers, but also the way that the policy prescriptions of development agencies and 
experts are themselves part of the history of such countries. This problem cannot even 
be articulated in the conceptual edifice of positivist development, which presupposes 
the naturalization of development. Thus, every new approach, such as the World Bank’s 
Comprehensive Development Framework, is predicated on the notion that development 
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occurred, i.e., the self-development of the subjects of development.
The inherent contradiction in positivist development has as yet gone largely 
unrecognized by the institutions and agencies which embody it, for a variety of reasons, 
not least of which is that it puts in question the reason for their own existence. Cowen 
and Shenton’s analysis shows how the contradiction of positivist development arose in 
the 19th century, and has persisted to this day. Yet in their immanent critique, they pay 
insufficient attention to the historicist critique that also arose in the 19th century, and 
that has reappeared in postdevelopment. That critique seeks to historically 
contextualize positivist development itself, as do Cowen and Shenton, but unlike the 
latter, historicist development focusses on the socio-historical contextualization of 
meaning, and how it undermines the claim of positivist development to universality. 
However, just as with the 19th-century historicist approach to historical inquiry, 
postdevelopment encounters a difficulty in the relation between theory and practice, 
and correlatively, between the role of theorists and the culturally specific contexts they 
seek to articulate. That difficulty turns on the question of whether cultural meanings are 
incommensurable and, if so, how they can properly be the subject of theory at all. For 
this reason, postdevelopment all too often tends towards the type of suspicion and 
“unmasking” that has become prevalent in various “post-” movements or attitudes, 
which has the appearance of negativity and a refusal to recognize that their analyses 
also have positive import.
Chapters 4 and 5 turned from the examination of the conflict between 
positivism and historicism to present Heidegger’s approach to the human situation in 
terms of his appropriation of the philosophical tradition, and the analytic of the human 
situation found in Being and Time. In Heidegger, I argued, we find an attempt to 
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neither to an object that can be theoretically studied, nor to an intersubjective (or 
conventional) construction. Heidegger appropriates Dilthey’s investigations into how 
experience, expression and understanding belong together in the nexus of the individual 
and her context, but instead of approaching this through the descriptive psychology that 
Dilthey attempted to articulate, takes a phenomenological approach. However, unlike 
Husserl, Heidegger’s aim is to express concrete individuality, which therefore has to 
take into account the historical. Heidegger’s resolution of the conflict between the 
historical and the a priori is to approach this as an ontological question, rather than an 
epistemological one. He argues that what is most in question is not the objectivity of 
knowledge, but rather how our way of being includes our understanding of our way of 
being. Through a complex set of appropriations, from Dilthey, Rickert, Lask, Husserl, 
and Aristotle (among others!), he attempts to elucidate the human situation in its 
concreteness. 
Doing so, Heidegger recognizes, cannot be a matter of trying to completely 
express the concreteness of the human situation, because such expression would require 
the differentiation of my situation from everything that I am not. The human situation is 
heterothetical, he argues, appropriating this notion from Rickert. But if it were 
absolutely inexpressible, then how is it that I can be it? Furthermore, how is it that, in 
being it, I have an understanding of it—I understand myself, in some sense, as the 
concrete individual I am—yet cannot articulate this? Heidegger argues that the problem 
lies not in the inexpressibility of concrete individuality per se, but in what expression 
itself is supposed to be.6 This is a problem of theoreticism, he argues. The theoretical 
attitude supposes that expression or articulation means complete specification, or at 
6. A point he makes in his 1920 review of Jaspers’ Psychology of Worldviews (J pg. 100).
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that what is essential to the human situation is precisely what cannot properly be 
expressed, i.e., that it is incomplete. I cannot fully and completely express myself to 
you, because in doing so, who I am—what I am trying to express—is changing in the 
very act of expression. The essential aspect of the human situation, Heidegger argues, is 
that it is dynamically incomplete. It is always becoming something, and yet how it 
becomes is always part of how it is already.
In order to elucidate this, then, we cannot do so directly and completely. 
Rather, we can only do so indirectly. We can articulate it in a way which points us 
towards our concreteness, and thus shows us how it is that we are concrete. But we 
cannot ever properly express our concreteness. This is not a cause for worry, however, 
although it can be unsettling and make us feel “unhomely”. It is not a cause for worry 
because it is the very source of our freedom, and thus for how our lives can be 
meaningful to us. Being incomplete, or “on the way”, is how we are open to the 
meaningfulness that is involved in being human. But meaningfulness is not a purely 
subjective phenomenon. That is, our incompleteness does not itself provide meaning. 
Rather, it is the way that meaning is disclosed to us as the concrete individuals we are, 
in our heterothetical relation to everything that we encounter.
The theoretical attitude, which Windelband and Rickert argued enabled us to 
form the concepts that constitute natural science (the nomothetic or the homogeneous 
continuum) and historical science (the idiographic or the heterogeneous discretum) in 
terms of transcendental values, was “death” to philosophy, Heidegger argued, because it 
did not allow for the articulation of the being of the theoretical knower. In objectifying 
the world theoretically, it also objectified itself, as consciousness or the subject. Such an 
objectified world made it impossible to explain the way in which knower and known 
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versa. It did not allow for the co-constitution of self and other by their mutual 
encounter. In the transcendental value philosophy of the neo-Kantians, as in positivism 
and historicism, the ultimate recourse was to the ahistorical (i.e., transcendental values, 
causal necessity, or actuality, respectively), as the unchanging source of the possibility 
of knowledge about history. The theoretical isolation of the knowing subject from 
history makes the dynamic of history itself incomprehensible. Heidegger “synthesizes” 
these aporetic positions by way of a phenomenology directed towards grasping the 
dynamic happening of life as such, as the matter of concern for the inquiry itself.
The subject of development
We encounter an immediate difficulty once we turn from the analysis of 
positivist and historicist development thinking to ask about what these refer to. Here I 
indicate this as the “subject of development”, which as a formal indication tries to point 
to a nexus of problems that are evident in attempts to define development (as discussed 
previously). Although both positivist and historicist development thinkers take 
conceptions of development to give determinations about an aspect of the human 
situation, it is far from clear that they do so in a way that can be coherently understood. 
For example, not only is it unclear what development is supposed to consist in (is it 
GDP growth? reduction of poverty? reduction of inequality? improvement in 
quantifiable conditions? cultural self-expression? cultural coherence? some 
combination of these?), it is also unclear who it is that develops (is it only hard-working 
countries? or development experts? do leisured countries develop? if so, in the same 
way?), who it is that determines what counts as development, how this relates to 
history, where the standards by which development is determined come from, whether 
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and so on.
Whereas in development agencies, departments of development studies, NGOs 
and so forth, the meaning of development may be stipulatively defined (e.g., reduction 
of poverty) or ostensively defined (e.g., what needs to happen in poor countries), the 
question of how this can be meaningful is less often raised. Indeed, although the 
question of the meaning of development is usually considered briefly at the beginning 
of standard textbooks and agency or NGO reports, it is also usually answered by appeal 
to other concepts that are taken to be less problematic, such as poverty. As we have 
seen, however, such concepts are objectifying, and thus lead to the notion that 
development concerns some objects or other, and is a process which itself can be 
objectively ascertained (has it occurred? how is it measured? how can we bring it 
about?)
Even more rare is the question of how the development thinker stands in 
relation to the subject. Whether understood as expert or dominating knowledge, the 
relation is taken as given. Yet, if the subject of development is questionable, then this 
also asks about the relation of the questioner to what is questioned. If we raise this 
issue, we see that there is already a relation to some phenomena or other, which 
includes a relation to other people. In asking about the subject of development, then, we 
cannot simply presuppose that this is an object.
Development is not an object
A central point in understanding the subject of development is that it is not an 
object that we observe, about which we can gain knowledge, but something that 
belongs to our experience, and thus is constitutive of self-understanding. This is 
because the subject of development involves happening. It is a temporal phenomenon, 
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does not mean that it is a process, either, for it involves people and their ways of being, 
and these cannot be reduced to objective processes without occluding how it is that they 
belong to the subject of development. If we approach this as a possible phenomenon, 
then it must show itself in its concreteness, not as a theoretical abstraction.
The subject of development is therefore not about knowledge. It is not 
knowledge or awareness of development issues that determines how we make sense of 
who we are and our possible relation to the phenomenon. The subject of development is 
part of how the world is interpreted, which rests on understanding, or “taking as”, as a 
way of being rather than having knowledge about something. And such interpretation is 
articulate and thus occurs in “communication and contest” with others (SZ 385), that 
both preserves and transforms the world. It is preserved in that what is interpreted is the 
world as it already is, yet this is transformed by the interpreting itself. The world does 
not stand outside our interpretations of it, but is constituted in those interpretations. Yet 
our interpretations themselves belong to the world and, as such, are constituted by it. 
They are not “free-floating”, in the sense that we could simply decide to interpret the 
world differently if we so chose, because such choosing is an interpretative act itself 
that has its basis in how we are already, i.e., how the world has already become. The 
world is the context for all acting, and as such has an a priori character to such acting, 
but this is indeterminate, because it does not determine the possibilities that are 
actualized in acting.
Finding the subject of development
In order to explicate further what I mean by the “subject of development”, I 
recount here a story about the situation of development in the latter decades of the 20th 
century, and my own involvement in development as a volunteer (rather grandly called 
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subject of development cannot be simply thought of as an object for empirical 
investigation, or as the coherence of a worldview, but involves the co-disclosedness of 
meaning, and thus involves the question of the genesis of meaning.
Commenting in 1969 on what he had observed taking place in the previous 
decade, Dudley Seers questioned whether the meaning of development was properly 
understood:
I am alarmed at the phrase, a “second development decade.” Another “development 
decade” like the 1960’s, with unemployment rates and inequality rising by further 
large steps, would be politically and economically disastrous, whatever the pace of 
economic growth!7
Political and commercial interests had always been deeply implicated in foreign aid, 
affecting the activities of government and non-governmental aid agencies alike. 
Jonathan Falla has described the situation that aid workers often find themselves in:
Many workers know their position to be thoroughly ambivalent. The staff of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are often highly motivated, well educated and 
professionally skilled, inquisitive about, and sympathetic to, the cultures in which 
they find themselves. They would claim, almost without exception, to be advocates 
for the poor. But they admit that they are tools of diplomacy, international politics 
and commercial interests. They know, in other words, that aid is a function of what 
many would call neo-imperialism.8
The colonial trinity of missionaries, merchants and mercenaries has lasted into the post-
colonial, foreign aid era. At the World Bank, whose Articles of Agreement specify that 
political considerations must not enter into its lending decisions,9 the political and 
commercial interests of the developed countries are always a factor, because as the 
biggest contributing members, these countries dominate the Bank’s decision-making 
structure.10 Nor has the Bank ever clearly defined the meaning of “political” in its 
7. Dudley Seers, “The Meaning of Development”, International Development Review, vol. 2, 
[1969] 1977, pg. 7. See also Dudley Seers, “The Birth, Life and Death of Development 
Economics, Development and Change, vol. 10, 1979, pp. 707-719.
8. Jonathan Falla, “What do they think they are doing?”, Times Literary Supplement, July 18, 
1997, pg. 15.
9. UNITAR/DFM Online Course on Negotiation of Financial Transactions, Lesson 3, pg. 9.
10. Ibid., pg. 3.
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During the 1980s, a shift occurred in the attitude towards development and 
particularly to volunteers. The “softer” disciplines of the humanities were no longer 
welcome, although it was unclear whether this was in response to a change in demand 
from recipient countries, or because of a change of attitude in donor countries as to 
what needed to be supplied, or because of a need to justify aid financing by 
quantifiable, demonstrable results. This in itself raises questions about the meaning of 
development, because it would seem apparent that disciplines such as philosophy have 
great potential to foster transcultural understanding. After all, are philosohpers not 
trained to ask questions about assumptions, most of all our own? As well, the 
humanities are the disciplines that are centrally concerned with the issue of meaning, 
and if we do not understand the meaning of development, how can we possibly go 
about it? It may well be true that these disciplines have been deeply complicit in the 
way the non-Western and underdeveloped worlds have been, and still are, represented, 
as Edward Said argued:
the history of fields like comparative literature, English studies, cultural analysis, 
anthropology can be seen as affiliated with the empire and, in a manner of speaking, 
even contributing to its methods for maintaining Western ascendancy over non-
Western natives...12
Although there might be a need for a critical attitude and a “hermeneutics of suspicion” 
within these disciplines, this does not mean that they have no place in thinking about 
development. Their exclusion from mainstream development thinking and practice in 
favour of quantitative disciplines, particularly economics, suggests that the question as 
to the meaning of development has been eschewed, replaced instead with techniques of 
measurement and comparison, as if development were simply the process of attaining 
11. Ibid., pg. 10.
12.  Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, Vintage Books, New York, 1994, pp. 50-51. See 
also Said’s 
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what counts as development is to give up the struggle for historical meaning in favour 
of a positivistic conception of historical inquiry as causal explanation. Said saw the 
challenge clearly:
The central point in all this is, however, as Vico taught us, that human history is 
made by human beings. Since the struggle for control over territory is part of that 
history, so too is the struggle over historical and social meaning. The task for the 
critical scholar is not to separate one struggle from another, but to connect them, 
despite the contrast between the overpowering materiality of the former and the 
apparent otherworldly refinements of the latter.13
The exile of the humanities from development practice should raise questions 
about what the “developers” think they are doing and what this signifies about the way 
in which development is understood. Can it simply mean the transfer of technical 
knowledge, accompanied on occasion with less than generous financial aid? And if so, 
how can we be sure that this is really what is required? In other words, how can donor 
countries and organizations be sure that what they are willing to provide to hard-
working countries is in fact what is necessary for development? Might there not be a 
lack of coherence in asking people to go and share their knowledge with other, less 
fortunate folk, in order to help those people achieve their full potential? For how could 
“we” be in a position to know what their full potential (or, as it has become, their best 
interests) might be? Can the formal analyses of economic theory provide an answer to 
such questions? Or is the formal-deductive abstraction of “the” economy itself an 
obstacle to understanding development? 
Finding ourselves in Indonesia
We spent two years teaching English at a tertiary institute for Islamic 
education in Indonesia, which brought home to us the question that Falla asked. What 
did we think we were doing? We had a vague idea of why the Ministry of Religious 
13. “Afterword”, in Edward Said, Orientalism, Vintage Books, New York, [1979], 1994.
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wanted to “upgrade” the educational level of the lecturers at these institutes. Since 
English language proficiency was a requirement in some way (that we didn’t quite 
understand), they seemed to have thought that getting English teachers from Canada 
was a way forward. So we thought we had an idea of what was wanted, although we 
had no idea of what the expectations were. And given that we hadn’t set the goals, it 
seemed straightforward to us that we were just there to help them go about achieving 
goals that they had determined for themselves. As is often the case in such projects, 
however, those who had determined the goals were not exactly those participating in 
our project. Finding out what the latter’s goals and expectations from the project were 
was, we discovered, part of what constituted the meaning of what we were doing there, 
and the meaning of the project as a whole for all of us involved. That is, the meaning 
was determined in the doing, rather than given in advance. It was also determined as the 
doing.
As we began to realize this during the course of the project, it started to 
problematize how we understood our own roles in it, and indeed our own sense of who 
we were. Initially, we had been able to adopt the convenient (and arrogant) position that 
we were not there to tell them that they needed to learn English, but only to show them 
how to go about doing it. We had thought it irrelevant whether or not we thought they 
should learn English because “it is the international language” (which frankly did not 
seem like that good a reason, especially as this view tended to be accompanied by the 
deprecation of their own languages, both national and local). It wasn’t up to us, we 
thought, to determine their values for them (although we did deprecate English a fair 
amount, to try and compensate for what struck us as an overly elevated view of its 
importance).14
385But the situation was more complex, partly because of who we were and what 
we represented. Our understanding of who and how we were, prior to our arrival in 
Indonesia, was only one aspect of the situation, an aspect that was transformed (not 
without difficulty!) in being a part of the situation. How we appeared to them, how they 
appeared to us, the negotiations of the meaning of interactions and of the situation as a 
whole, our understanding of what we were doing and what they were doing, and their 
understanding of the same—all of these were constitutive of the situation. The situation 
of becoming who we already were—becoming our alreadiness, as Heidegger 
suggests—was not at our disposal to determine solely in our understanding of it. But 
neither was it at anyone else’s disposal so to determine. Although we had thought that 
we were going to Indonesia to find out about development work, about living in a 
foreign environment, and about the perceptions and reality outside of Canada, what we 
actually found out about was how it was to find out about ourselves. It was an 
experience of “homecoming through otherness”,15 in which the cultural distance from 
our colleagues, students, and friends and acquaintances made it impossible to lapse into 
everyday understanding of ourselves and of the meaning of events and situations. The 
situation of being in the foreign brought to our awareness that the human situation 
always involves making sense of the situation.
14. In this sense, it turns out that our approach was somewhat in line with Sen’s capabilities 
approach to development, in that we were trying to provide them with the capability to live 
the kind of life that they had “reason to value”, rather than to propose either reasons or 
values.
15. As Fred Dallmayr calls it (see “Homecoming through Otherness” in Fred Dallmayr, The 
Other Heidegger, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993, pp. 149-180). As Dallmayr 
argues, this is a theme that is strongly evident in Heidegger’s lecture courses and other texts 
on Hölderlin, but also one that can be found in various forms throughout Heidegger’s 
Denkweg (pg. 150).
386Making sense of development
Culture shock as fundamental disposedness
Culture shock has become a well-recognized phenomenon, and most 
organizations that send people overseas have some kind of pre-departure training to 
address the issue, because it has such a large impact on how effectively a person copes 
with a foreign world. And it is also recognized that people experience culture shock on 
“re-entry” back home, if they manage to adapt in some way to their foreign 
surroundings. The analyses of culture shock we were presented with couched it in 
psychological terms, with graphs showing the various “turning points” of emotional 
conditions as a function of time. Where the typical analysis of culture shock falls short, 
it seems to me, is in its psychological or egological focus. The “shock” is considered in 
terms of the individual’s emotional or psychological states; and coping with culture 
shock, it is argued, is partly or mostly a matter of recognizing its existence (i.e., why am 
I so depressed? why do I hate this place? why are people so stupid/strange/persistent/
interfering/etc.? and so on).
Less often, if ever, is culture shock interpreted as an ontological phenomenon, 
in which the very sense of the self—of who and how we are—becomes problematic. 
The psychological interpretation assumes the identity of the individual undergoing the 
experience, and the issue becomes how well she can deal with the emotional and 
psychological challenge. But there is a more fundamental aspect to culture shock, 
which is that it problematizes the very sense of the self that does the “dealing with”. In 
our average everydayness, Heidegger argues, we become used not only to the way we 
deal with things and the way we encounter others, but also with how we encounter 
ourselves. Since we firstly and mostly encounter ourselves in our encounters with 
things and others, the way we encounter ourselves gets its everyday significance from 
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others we encounter, insofar as we are constituted in such encountering. What we don’t 
usually encounter, however, is the encountering itself.
In BT, Heidegger analyzes the phenomenon of dread as a fundamental 
disposedness that brings encountering into relief. Indeed, it brings it into relief with 
such force or predominance that we are unable to escape the encounter with 
encountering. Even the very flight from dread manifests the originary sense of 
encountering. Arguably, the same phenomenon occurs in culture shock. What happens 
is not so much that we get worn down by trying to make sense of all the things that are 
different to such an extent that we are overtaken by frustration and a feeling that we 
cannot cope. Rather, we are made aware—perhaps for the first time—that making sense 
of things is our way of being. The concrete ways in which we make sense of our 
situation is our identity or what it means to be the selves that we are. Such making sense 
is not a purely subjective phenomenon, because it involves expression of the sense that 
is made, or the meaning to be disclosed. Yet the meaning is not had prior to, but rather 




The fundamental aspect of the human situation, Heidegger argues, is its 
indeterminate determinacy or, equally, its determinate indeterminacy. The peculiarity of 
the human situation is that our understanding of it is both constitutive of and constituted 
by it. The situation we find ourselves in is also the situation out of which we act. Thus, 
being-in the situation is always being-out towards it. Our situational immanence is 
equioriginarily our situational transcendence. We are only in the situation insofar as we 
388are directed towards it, yet this directedness-towards the situation is only possible 
insofar as we are in it. Against positivism, which argues that there is no transcendence 
of the empirical, and thus that self-understanding could be reduced to knowledge of the 
causal laws that determine behaviour, Heidegger agrees with the historicists that such 
knowledge itself is at any given time transcendent of its “link” in the causal chain. On 
the other hand, against historicism, which argues that there is no transcendence of the 
historical, because every historical era is immanent in its history, Heidegger agrees with 
the positivists that the historical can only be understood because we transcend it. 
However, in collapsing transcendence and immanence in this way, he also collapses the 
distinctions on which positivism and historicism depend, namely, their reliance on the 
theoretical attitude. 
Positivist aporias
Positivist theory and progress
For positivists, knowledge of the causal laws of history is made possible by 
those laws themselves, as they have determined history. Such knowledge itself is 
therefore a manifestation of the inevitability of progress. The extension of scientific 
empirical method to history and society is the result of a necessary sequence of events. 
Our ability to scientifically analyse and explain this necessary sequence is our fortune, 
but not our doing. What positivism could not properly account for, however, was why 
such knowledge itself would not affect progress. Why should progress come to an end 
with the “positive stage of knowledge”, as Comte argued? Why does the arrival of this 
stage mean that the only task for humanity is to reconcile social order with the causal 
laws that have been discovered to govern society? Why is such knowledge itself not a 
link in the causal chain of progress? For positivists, the reason is that theory does not 
affect what it is about, but rather only reflects it. The theoretical knowledge of social 
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by these laws. The theoretical itself does not properly belong to such reality, although 
such reality is what makes it possible. The positivist theorist, qua theorist, stands 
outside of the very progress he theorizes about, even though it constitutes his ability to 
theorize. Just as theories in the natural sciences are considered to be about natural 
objects, but not to be constitutive of them, so are the theories of social behaviour 
thought to be about the social, but not constitutive of it.
Positivism and scientific progress
Yet the progressive view found in positivist development is that freedom is the 
possibility of change against the constraints of the past. Whatever is traditional, 
historical, etc., must be striven against in order to progress. The freedom of progress is 
thus identified with possibilities that have not yet been determined, but in the 
assimilation of progress to scientific and intellectual progress, the mode or method by 
which possibilities are to be determined becomes pregiven or presupposed. As Franco 
Ferrarotti argues, “science is the new instrument of social consensus, the new source of 
legitimacy that is to supplant tradition, the authority of the eternal yesterday”.16 That is, 
scientific objectivity itself becomes a constraint on possibilities, in that it serves to 
predetermine standards of what counts as a possibility (what is valuable, what is 
meaningful) and thus purports to determine possibility itself. Science becomes a form 
of tradition, i.e., a domain of necessity that constrains freedom. Ferrarotti describes 
positivism in just these terms:
Free thought, however...will have no meaning after the coming of the positive era in 
the reorganization of society, just as it has no meaning in all the other sciences that 
have entered the positive period, wherein the only thought of value is that of the 
competent person.17
16. Franco Ferrarotti, “The Social Character of Science: The Lessons of Positivism”, 
International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, vol. 12, no. 4, 1999, pg. 537.
390Modernity and Development
An aporia of positivist development shows itself in the differentiation of the 
origin of the process from its result, i.e., history from individualistic self-understanding. 
This is the conception of modernity, in which knowledge of self-transformation (e.g., 
scientific progress) is given priority over historical inheritance of tradition. This serves 
to immunize the modern from questionableness. The paradox of modernity is that the 
claim that history is transcended and therefore no longer determines meaning is 
supported precisely by reference to history and how it has determined meaning. This is 
the point of Goethe’s Faust, according to Marshall Berman,18 a point Cowen and 
Shenton reiterate: development involves the destruction of the old that gives it purpose, 
therefore it can only be the sheer negativity of willing (DoD 376-377).19 The movement 
of Faust’s self-development is from (pure) subjectivity to (pure) objectivity, by way of 
intersubjectivity, stages that Berman characterizes as Faust the Dreamer, the Lover, and 
the Developer (ASMA 40-41). As the Dreamer, Faust is locked inside his own 
consciousness. This trajectory, Berman argues, is one of change in both the scope of 
involvement and the mode of involvement: “He [Faust] expands the horizon of his 
being from private to public life, from intimacy to activism, from communism to 
organization” (ASMA 61). That is, Faust goes from theoretical knowing, to knowing 
through doing (loving), to knowing through making. 
17. Ibid., pg. 538
18. Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1988, ch. I 
(hereafter ASMA followed by page number).
19. Therefore the question that development raises is, how do we retain the past in the 
transformation of the present? Transformation without the past is the nihilism of the will; 
retention without the future is the nihilism of the eternal. The paradox is that transformation 
needs a past to transform; retention needs a future in which retaining can occur. The 
difficulty is in how to think these together; i.e., it is the “together” that is so hard to think 
and to remain open to. This “together”, Heidegger argues, is what characterizes the human 
situation and its “uncanniness”. That is, it is a “together” that is a “between”.
391His culture has developed by detaching itself from the totality of life...Contempla-
tive vision, whether mystical or mathematical (or both), keeps the visionary in his 
place, the place of a passive spectator. (ASMA 42) 
The development ideal that Faust embodies is an ideal of production, both in resource 
utilization and as self-creation. Yet as Heidegger points out, self-understanding is 
inappropriately understood if assimilated to making or production, because this cannot 
properly account for the relation between the actuality and ideality of the self it 
presupposes. In ontologising phronesis, Heidegger argues that the ideal is the actual 
self, as the upon-which and towards-which of all enactment.20 Without some such 
connection, the ideal of action becomes the nihilism of the will
In the third stage, Faust as Developer, it is the sheer facticity of nature that 
becomes what must be overcome: its meaningless, purposeless activity. Berman argues 
that in this transformation
Two radically different historical movements are converging and beginning to flow 
together...The romantic quest for self-development...is working itself out through a 
new form of romance, through the titanic work of economic development. (ASMA 
62)
This, of course, is the intention to develop being brought to bear on the immanent 
process of development. For Berman, this is the imperative of development is such that
under the pressures of the modern world economy the process of development must 
itself go through perpetual development...Even in the most highly developed parts 
of the world, all individuals, groups and communities are under constant relentless 
pressure to reconstruct themselves; if they stop to rest, to be what they are, they will 
be swept away. (ASMA 78)
This is valorized as modernity and/or modernization (depending on where it is 
supposed to occur), and purports to represent a disruption of history, whereby ways of 
becoming no longer make reference to how we already are. However, as Cowen and 
Shenton argue, it involves a commitment to values themselves posited as timeless and 
universal, such as increase in productive forces, expansion of capabilities, and so on, 
20. Thus, contrary to Cowen and Shenton, it is not a mind-body problem, but a problem of the 
a priori (cf. DoD 79).
392which are quantitative, causally related, and operationalizable. Yet the provenance of 
these values is occluded in the presuppositions of development. This is further 
complicated by the narrowing of the scope of this “Eurocentric” term to refer either to 
subnational areas in the leisured countries or to the hard-working countries as a whole. 
What Berman refers to as the “tragedy of development” is really a form of nihilism, 
“the spirit that negates all!” (as Mephisto refers to himself) in the name of absolute 
values. The conception of positivist development denies that such values can be 
justified by appeal to tradition, because this conflicts with the ideal of self-creation, or 
the freedom to determine our own development. Yet this very claim is made on the 
basis of a tradition, only one that denies its history in the name of rationality. That is, 
positivist development discovers the projected future in the past, but can no longer 
articulate how these belong together.
Historicist development makes an analogous point. The values or meanings 
that constitute positivist development are traditional, i.e., they belong to the tradition of 
modernity. But the historicist solution is the denial of the spirit of negation—the 
projection of universal possibilities—in the name of indigenous, authentic social or 
cultural change. Thus, historicism denies the very basis of such change itself, i.e., that 
tradition is understood as possibilities and not as actualities to be preserved. Berman 
points out the paradox of the historicist rejection of “Faustian man” in terms of “the 
intellectual vacuum that appears when Faust is removed from the scene”. Advocacy of 
the rejection of large-scale technologies, projects, etc., implies “the most radical 
redistribution of economic and political power”, that “would only be a prelude to the 
most extensive and staggeringly complex reorganization of the whole fabric of 
everyday life” (ASMA 83).
393The problem of positivist development
The positivist objectification of development depends on the notion that the 
meaning of development is univocal and universal, and thus denies a constitutive role in 
the determination of meaning not only to those who have not (yet) developed and those 
who already have, but to the development experts who are held to ascertain what 
development consists in. The historicalness and concrete individuality of those 
concerned cannot enter into the conception of development. Development thus takes on 
the appearance of a mechanical system that unfolds itself according to the laws 
governing social interactions (particularly economic interactions). Yet this is posted as 
manifesting itself in the achievement of certain predefined conditions, for instance in 
the measurement of improvement in indicators such as infant mortality, life expectancy, 
percent growth in GNP, literacy rate, and so on.21 This suggests that the meaning of 
development is the end-state, and not how this is brought about. 
Such meaning is determined from the conditions found in the developed or 
“advanced” countries, i.e., those that score highly on the various indicators. But the way 
that these countries themselves developed is not the way that development is now 
understood. That is, these countries developed indigenously, in the absence of 
development experts and agencies. They might have done so by emulating Britain as 
the first mover, or in different ways, but in either case their development was something 
that they undertook for themselves in response to the conditions that confronted them.22 
21. Tables of such indicators can be found in the UNDP’s Human Development Reports (for 
countries) and the World Bank’s World Development Reports (for economies). The 
UNDP’s Human Development Index attempts to rank countries, whereas the Bank presents 
the data alphabetized by country.
22. This is not to say that there weren’t people who undertook to study the phenomenon and to 
give advice on it, such as Friedrich List. But such people were not development experts. 
Nor were there agencies whose function was to provide expert advice. Although colonial 
offices were charged with the development of the colonies, particularly in Britain, there 
function was not to advise, but to administer (DoD 274-276, 294-296).
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the developed countries, elides this distinction by abstracting from history.
Historicist aporias
With historicism, the theoretical attitude is equally operative, but directed 
towards understanding the historical meaning of past and present eras. Historicists 
argue that such understanding is constitutive of the present, and indeed, of every era. 
But in supposing that it allows us to understand the past as it is for us, i.e., as it is in the 
present, the question arises as to what it is that is being understood. How is it possible to 
speak of “past eras” at all, if the only reality of the past is its presence in the present? In 
what sense is such understanding about the past, rather than simply an interpretation of 
the present? If there is no immanence because there is only immanence, in what sense is 
it possible to speak of history at all? Only if we can maintain the distinction between 
past and present can we properly speak of history, which seems to be what historicism 
denies.
The historicist explanation is that, even though our understanding of the past 
comes about only insofar as the past is in the present, we are able to distinguish between 
the two because of the difference of the cultural coherence of past eras from that of the 
present, as the historical remains, source materials, and so on reveal. We can understand 
the past in a way that is not simply the present projected onto those historical remains, 
because they display a coherence of cultural-historical form at odds with that of the 
present. Such remains are recalcitrant to our understanding, and therefore do not simply 
fit with the present. Historicism thus argues for the possibility of a theoretical attitude 
towards history in terms of the interpretation of cultural coherence. Such an attitude is 
possible because of the very foreignness of the historical artifacts. And it is possible to 
understand the present, as well, through the same theoretical attitude. Yet this 
395theoretical attitude and the typological comparison of historical eras it results in do not 
make it possible to understand how such understanding itself belongs to history as event 
or happening, and not as an object or as intersubjective meanings or values that 
predetermined history, thereby foreclosing on its dynamism. There are two orders of 
understanding at work here: the understanding of the historical, and the historical 
understanding (captured in the ambiguity of “historical consciousness”). As with 
positivism, historicism is unable to give an account of how historical understanding and 
history belong together, and thus how history happens. The typology of historical eras 
turns them into static objects, rather than taking them in a dynamic way as dynamic 
events. Whereas positivism determines humanity in the necessity of causal laws, 
historicism binds humanity to the actuality of the present.
Historicism and worldview
Historicism depends on the notion that the coherence of my particular 
worldview, combined with the incommensurate meanings encountered in other 
cultures, can reveal that coherence as internal to it and for it. But this fails to address the 
problem of the coherence of a world-view as a world-view. That is, the coherence 
cannot simply arise in opposition to others. In some respect, the world-view must bind 
us because of its coherence. Yet such binding requires commitment. The positivist 
argues that the commitment comes from rationality itself, determined as the principle of 
non-contradiction through the empirical observation that a thing cannot be both itself 
and not itself. Without such a commitment, we could have no knowledge at all. Yet the 
positivist argument does not resolve the difficulty, but merely relocates it. For empirical 
observation always shows that each and every thing we encounter is in the process of 
becoming what it is not, i.e., undergoing change through time. Positivism argues that 
the only proper way of explaining the world, and thus establishing the commitment to 
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i.e., non-temporally, whether by subsumption under general concepts (species and 
genus) or by subordination to general laws. But so stated, positivist universalism can no 
longer account for experience, which is always dynamic or flowing.
For historicism, culturally determined meaning is not disclosive. Rather, 
meaning is discovered intersubjectively. This seems to lead to an instability of meaning. 
If meaning is culturally determined and thus varies with cultural change, how can I be 
sure that my current understanding of myself or my culture is appropriate? And yet, 
how else can I understand it except appropriately, given that understanding is 
determined by culture? A further difficulty pertains to the idea that different cultures 
can be understood as constituted by incommensurable coherent contexts of meaning, 
for it is not clear how this could be ascertained. On what basis can I understand another 
culture as meaningfully coherent, if I cannot understand those meanings themselves? 
Finally, what is the relationship of meaning to cultural change? How is there continuity 
of meaning throughout such change? The historicist argument is that such change 
involves cultural individuality becoming more explicit and objectively expressed.23 
This is seen in institutions such as law, politics and commerce, art forms such as music, 
painting, sculpture and architecture, and most of all in language and literature. In 
respect to the past, this seems unobjectionable. It is its relation to the present that is 
problematic. Because the historicist conception also involves the notion of change in 
values, standards or meanings that determine what counts as development, the latter is 
23. As Dilthey put it, the concept of development “means that the subject becomes clearer and 
more differentiated” (Wilhelm Dilthey, “Construction of the Historical World” in Selected 
Writings, ed. H.P. Rickman, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, pg. 244). 
Dilthey argues that development was one of the “[t]wo great principles...introduced 
successively” in 18th century historiography: “With Winkelmann, Justus Möser and Herder 
a second principle was added—that of development. This attributes a new fundamental 
characteristic to the historical system of interactions, namely that it traverses, according to 
its inner nature, a series of changes each of which is only possible on the basis of the 
previous one.” (ibid., pg. 205)
397volatilized. This, then, also forecloses on the genesis of meaning, because it supposes 
that what is actual (whether or patent or latent) is completely determinative of self-
understanding, which is determined by inherited traditions, cultural forms, and the 
history that informs these.
The problem of historicist development
Historicism argues that meaning is always culturally/historically contextual, 
and thus that the positivist ascription of a univocal meaning to development can only be 
a self-interpretation of the present by those who are developed, according to objectified 
standards determined in the sciences of society that themselves arose with the 
development of the leisured countries. No matter how coherent, such an interpretation 
cannot in principle exclude other interpretations, without begging the question as to 
what grounds self-interpretation. The where, when and by whom are integral to the 
determination of meaning, and thus it cannot be objectively ascertained by recourse to 
objective measurements or indicators, because these cannot take such specificity into 
account. Culturally determined meaningfulness is dependent on belonging to the 
culture, which involves having “grown up” in it (in some sense), and having contributed 
to it in interactions with other members. In order to understand such meanings, then, I 
have to be a part of the culture, and it has to be a part of me. 
When development experts come to implement a project or to give advice, 
they do so as foreigners, i.e., as those outside the culture. This status can also attach to 
those who are originally from the culture but have become development experts, 
because such expertise is already a theorization of culture. The historicist argument is 
that development cannot have the same meaning for us as for them, because we belong 
to different cultural and historical contexts. Meanings are not universal, but contextual, 
and although the development experts may claim that the way they understand this 
398project is in terms of its real or proper meaning, their understanding too is 
contextualized, by their own culture.
The Problem of Meaning
History and meaning
The question that needs to be raised with respect to the subject of development 
is about how meaning arises in the human situation. In positing universal and absolute 
meanings of history and development, positivist development occludes the essential 
incompleteness of the human situation that makes meaning possible.24 In effect, it 
denies meaningfulness in the name of universal meaning, which is an aspect of what 
Heidegger refers to as lapsing. It presupposes that meaning is already “there” to be 
empirically determined, and that failure to recognize this itself attests to a lack of 
development (or, more accurately, progress). This conception of development rests on 
the 17th and 18th century idea of progress, in which we become ever more complete (or 
perfect) as human beings.25 Intellectual progress becomes “ontological progress”, in 
which we overcome or transcend our imperfections, i.e., our lack of knowledge. The 
comparative method purports to show that some societies are more complete or perfect 
than others. In linearizing history this way, the meaning of history itself becomes 
negated, because it can never be disclosed (in new and unforeseen ways) in a way that 
24. “Making meaning possible” does not, of course, mean producing meaning.
25. The notion of progress that is infinite and limitless necessarily entails the death of God, of 
nature, and of death itself, i.e., of all those ways of being that limit the human situation. The 
notion of progress is thus nihilistic in terms of its ultimate ends. However, it is also 
nihilistic in another sense, which could be called the “Faustian” sense, and is what the early 
historicists objected to, namely, that the conception of progress devalues its own status and 
ideals as well. The values and meaning of the present are simply instrumental to a future 
that is more perfect, and thus lose their absolute character. Paradoxically, then, the ideal of 
progress cannot sustain itself against itself. As Berman argues, “once this developer has 
destroyed the pre-modern world, he has destroyed his whole reason for being in the 
world...Goethe shows us how the category of obsolete persons, so central to modernity, 
swallows up the man who gave it life and power” (ASMA 70).
399is historical itself. The meaning of history has already been discovered. The laws of 
history or social evolution are taken to dictate progress. They have already been 
discovered (such discovery is identified with progress), and any dispute about the 
meaning of history is simply evidence of lack of knowledge (i.e., lack of development, 
or “backwardness”).
The historicist critique of this position is that the absolute or universal meaning 
it ascribes to history is a result of, and abstraction from, the particular history of the 
leisured countries, which serves as a self-justification for the command they enjoy over 
the world’s resources. The historicization of history and humanity entails that the 
meaning of history cannot be determined by reference to some ahistorical or supra-
historical values or standards, and therefore different societies or countries cannot be 
determined as instances of such values or standards. The consequence of this in 
positivist development is a destructive engagement with other cultures so as to 
subordinate them to this ideal. A key factor in this has been the promulgation of notions 
of deficiency, lack, incompleteness, backwardness, etc., a message that has colonised 
the minds of others to such an extent that they have come to understand themselves in 
such terms. For historicists, all cultures are “immediate to God”, i.e., are equally 
(in)complete and (in)coherently constituted. The problems of the hard-working 
countries are not due to deficiency or backwardness, but to the destructive effect of the 
attempted universalization of the particular histories of the leisured countries, which 
cannot be universalized because they are, in fact, particular.26
Yet the historicist critique is open to the problem that all forms of relativism 
face. The argument requires a standpoint that can take an overview of all cultures. But if 
all standpoints are culturally determined, how is it even possible to articulate the notion 
26. As Cowen and Shenton point out, this is the notion of “corruption” or “false development” 
found in Newman, as the counterpoint to development (DoD 59).
400of different standpoints, without that notion, too, being culturally determined? The 
historicist response is that it does not claim that there are no standards by which to 
judge and compare cultures, but rather that such standards themselves are always 
historically determined and therefore particular. That is, culturally or historically 
contextual meaning necessarily includes such standards as an aspect of the constitution 
of cultural meaning itself. The universalist argument not only denies that there can be 
historically determined meaning; it denies that there can be historical individuality.
The problem of meaning in both positivist and historicist development arises 
in the way they dissever what is understood from the understanding thereof. Positivism 
argues that meaning is given, regardless of whether or not it is explained, because there 
is only one way in which it can be determined, i.e., through empirical observation 
leading to the comprehension of general laws. We may not have knowledge of this at 
the present, but through further investigation it can be discovered. Therefore, the 
enactment of understanding does not play a constitutive role in the genesis of meaning. 
This is the positivist justification for the view that the meaning of development can be 
determined in an objective sense. As so determined, then, it can be provided for those 
unable to determine it for themselves so that they can come to understand themselves 
and their situation. For positivist development, such self-understanding need not 
involve any inquiry, because acknowledgement is sufficient.
Historicism argues that the meaning of the historical is its understanding by 
those who share this history. The genesis of meaning takes place in the sharing of 
history, or in its inheritance. Thus, only those who are involved in this genesis (i.e., by 
growing up in and sharing a culture, by inheriting traditions, etc.) can properly 
understand it. The cultural “content” that can be transmitted to others does not properly 
constitute its meaningfulness. No matter how much I may study a culture from outside, 
401as in ethnography, this cannot disclose how it is meaningful to those concerned. 
Antithetically to the positivist conception, then, historicism holds that historical 
meaning can never properly be transmitted, but only experienced.
The problem of meaning
The problems encountered with positivist development thinking are not due to 
malevolence or ill-will based on fully understanding the subject of development, but on 
the contrary are due to an inadequate understanding of it. This also involves an 
inadequate self-understanding, which is usually accompanied by a great deal of good-
will and benevolent intentions. In development thinking, this takes the forms of how 
history can be investigated to show the laws or causal mechanisms governing 
development, or how it can itself be understood as developmental. In both cases, there 
is a presupposition that development has occurred and therefore that it can either be 
explained or understood. The difficulty arises in trying to relate the meaning of 
development to those who are supposed to understand this meaning.
In positivist development, the meaning of development is posited as objective, 
i.e., discoverable through the investigation of history, predominantly the history of the 
developed or leisured countries. But such inquiry is only possible because of the 
scientific progress that has occurred in such countries and thus is part of how they 
understand themselves. The self-understanding of the leisured involves the very notion 
of objectivity that is supposed to provide the meaning of development. Positivist 
development, then, depends on the subordination of history to the notion of objectivity 
that has arisen in history. What remains unclarified, then, is exactly how the leisured 
countries are supposed to be historical. Inherent to the concept of positivist 
development is the idea of scientific progress as liberation from history (usually 
formulated in terms of “modern” vs. “traditional” societies). However, this notion of 
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self-understanding as developed. Leisured individuals, too, are historical, but the 
positivist conception of development cannot take this into account. Thus, the way we 
have our history—or the way we are historical—cannot enter into the conceptuality of 
positivist development, and thus cannot enter into the meaning of development. 
Development becomes understood in purely objective terms, as necessary processes 
that result in the attainment of certain conditions. The development expert’s relation to 
this object becomes that of a theoretical inquirer and a technical implementer. But 
neither inquiry nor implementation are taken to affect the meaning of development, and 
thus neither can play a role in what it means to be developed. What gets occluded in this 
conception of development is the co-disclosedness of meaning. Such co-disclosedness 
cannot figure because the moment of subjectivity, i.e., of being our history, is elided.
In historicist development, the meaning of development, as cultural change, is 
taken to be intersubjectively constituted and expressed in the traditions and institutions 
of each particular culture. Meaning is explicitly historicized. However, because such 
traditions and institutions are also understood to determine what subjectivity means—
i.e., what it means to be a member of the culture, and what that culture means to its 
members—subjectivity is subordinated to intersubjectivity. History becomes 
understood as determining how we are and how we understand ourselves. What 
becomes problematic, then, is how we have our history, i.e., how we have the necessary 
distance from it such that we can understand it as our history. Without some account of 
this, there is no way to determine the relationship of events to cultural identity. What 
gets occluded in historicist development, then, is also the moment of subjectivity.
In the transformative approach of formal indication, what is clarified is the co-
constitution of meaning, i.e., what it means to be human. Meaning is neither objective 
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reification of meaning. What needs to be grasped, Heidegger argues, is that meaning 
arises in being-possible. The meaning of my own life is the factical possibilities that I 
take myself to be, or understand myself as. In each particular while, I am in some 
definite way or other, which I cannot “get behind” so as to determine or choose it from 
some non-factical or ideal standpoint. Furthermore, taking my being as possibilities is 
not something that happens in the interiority of the ego, consciousness, self, etc. Rather, 
it is my way of being and has to be expressed in being it. Such articulation always binds 
us to the shared world, as being-with-one-another. ‘I’ am heterothetically constituted as 
‘not-you’, which cannot be a production or representation of my ‘I’ itself. That is, my 
‘I’ is constituted by the recalcitrant ‘you’, to which I must be ever open in order to be 
the ‘I’ I am. Being myself means being my possibilities, but in order to be these, i.e., in 
order for them to be existential possibilities and not merely logical possibilities, I must 
express them, which requires a shared world in which such expression can be 
meaningful.
Meaningfulness is neither objective, conventional, or subjective, Heidegger 
argues. Rather, it arises in the “between”, i.e., in co-happening in an environment or 
milieu. It is not discovered, agreed upon, or created, but rather co-disclosed. This 
suggests that meaning is neither fixed nor floating (cf. SZ 87-88). Rather, at each 
particular while meaning is stable but always in a provisional way. Things and 
conditions have the meanings they do in the way they currently are, but they may be 
retrieved as having other meanings, and thus their meaning cannot be determined in 
advance for once and for all. This does not entail the volatization of all meaning, 
because there is only meaningfulness insofar as there are definite meanings. But such 
definiteness is only possible insofar as these meanings are provisional, that is, insofar as 
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things are currently understood will turn out to be otherwise, despite our current 
certainty about the meaning of something. We can only find this out through our co-
disclosedness; we cannot have it determinately in advance.
Because we are constituted as finite, the human situation is one of being ever 
open to encountering, i.e., understanding something as something. Encountering is not 
the confrontation of the isolated subject with an isolated object, but is essentially 
communicative, and in such communication we come to understand ourselves 
differently, because communication always involves interpretation. As finite beings, we 
are not transparent to ourselves. Rather, we are disclosed to ourselves in being-with-
one-another, being engaged in activities with others, encountering things in such 
activities, and so on. Such disclosedness always involves moments of transparency, in 
which I come to understand myself in a way that I hitherto have not, because what I 
understand myself to be communicating to others about myself is always subject to 
what they understand me to be communicating. I have no authority over how I am 
understood by others, and thus I am disclosed to myself through their understanding of 
me. But likewise, others have no authority over my understanding of what they 
communicate. Meaning is always negotiated or contested, but can only be so because 
we always already share meanings. The world is always already in a certain way for us, 
because this is what makes it possible for us to contest or negotiate meanings. Thus, 
what is fundamentally determinative for meaning is not what is actual, nor what is 
necessary, but is rather what is possible. Meaningfulness is possibility.
Development and knowledge
The general point is that the formal indication of the human situation questions 
the ground on which the concept of development is based, i.e., the notion that 
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development, this means acquiring the methods by which to inquire about development 
and thereby obtain knowledge about it, which, as knowledge, is objective and hence 
universal and univocal. On this presupposed ground, it follows necessarily that to 
develop means to come to recognize the meaning of development, e.g., to recognize the 
necessary stages every society must pass through. And this is where the contradiction 
lies, because the subjective moment of self-discovery is eliminated. Inquiry and 
discovery by the hard-working is held to be neither possible nor necessary, since the 
knowledge that they require in order to develop is either beyond their capacity to 
discover, or has already been discovered (or can be) by development experts and 
agencies. At the same time, however, research and discovery are considered to be 
crucial for the latter.27 Knowledge is thus taken to represent one thing for the hard-
working (i.e., a body of information that has been acquired and can be disseminated by 
experts and agencies) and another for the leisured (i.e., including the activity of 
discovery through research). In this way, a separation is introduced between knowing 
and what is known, which allows for the positivist conception that development can be 
technically implemented for the hard-working, once the goal (i.e., the meaning of 
development) has been discovered by the leisured. 
Historicism appears to consider knower and known as a continuity in the 
historicization of history and human being. The gap is bridged by regarding 
consciousness as continuous with its object, i.e., history. We can understand history, the 
historicists argue, because we are a result of it. That is, history is intelligible because it 
has given rise to us. In this historicization, however, the problem that faces positivism 
27. This attitude is clearly expressed in the documents surrounding the World Bank’s intention 
to become the “Knowledge Bank”. Cf. James D. Wolfensohn, “People and Development”, 
World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings Address, 1 October 1996 and WDR98, entitled 
Knowledge for Development.
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the historian or theorist to this process becomes problematic. If we simply are the 
results of history, and thus embody it, why is history in need of investigation and 
interpretation? Why is it not simply transparent and immediate to us? How does it 
become distant from, and thus foreign to, us? If the answer to this is “cultural change”, 
then we need to ask why cultural change does not retain all that has previously been 
expressed. It is evident that cultures have arisen and have ceased to be what they were, 
such that they have become difficult for us to understand. How is cultural genesis 
possible, if humanity is never acultural? That is, if, as Dilthey argued, we can never 
“find man as he is apart from interactions with society—man as prior to society, as it 
were” (GSI:30/82), then how is it that societies are alien to us?
Formally indicating the subject of development
Heidegger’s approach is to elucidate how objectivity, intersubjectivity, and 
subjectivity are equioriginary and mutually implicated in the human situation. But the 
moment of subjectivity is not a set of properties of a substance, as the philosophy of 
consciousness presupposes. This view is simply an object-ontology reformulated, and 
phenomenological elucidation already problematizes the notion of an “object”. This 
form of subjectivity is really a disguised objectivity, i.e., it objectifies the idea of the 
subject, and is therefore unable to give an appropriate account of the self-world or how 
it is that there is anything like a self.
What formal indication allows for and, indeed, consists in is the very thing the 
concept of development occludes, and which the historicist and immanent critiques of 
development lead up to without being able to articulate: a way to grasp how future and 
past are discontinuous in the enactment of the continuity of history. This discontinuity 
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never completes itself, but is always out for completion (i.e., is always “ecstatic”). The 
very condition of this finite, situated openness or incompleteness means that it can 
never be properly specified, since such specification encloses or closes it up as a 
determinate object. Through the “improper” specification of the human situation, the 
inadequacy or inappropriateness of the concept of development can be brought out. 
Formal indication, then, is a way of getting at how the world gets at me, i.e., the 
belonging together or coherence of the human situation. It allows us to enter into an 
engagement with our own ways of belonging, precisely because the approach itself 
requires that we do so as the being that in each case we are.
A phenomenological approach to the subject of development allows us to 
understand this more appropriately than the concept of development. The concept of 
development is an objectification both of history and of historicalness. It seeks to 
provide an explanation for both history and what it means. This is the positivistic aspect 
of mainstream development. To put this conception in question is not merely to offer a 
critique of its “results”, but to ask whether such conceptualization is appropriate to the 
phenomenon. To do so, however, requires some description of the phenomenon that 
does not presuppose (either positively or negatively) the conceptualization in question. 
That is, it requires a formality that directs us towards the phenomenon without 
predetermining it. If the fundamental problem of development is the closure of 
historical meaning, then a way of inquiry is needed that does not close off the 
possibilities of meaningfulness by predetermining them.
Development thinking, I have argued, is problematic in terms of the 
meaningfulness of the human situation, because it entails that meanings are 
determinately given, whether as universal and absolute (positivism) or as historical and 
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to understand the genesis of historical meaning, not as something that we discover by 
the theoretical analysis of causal laws or the traditions that constitutes us, but as active 
co-disclosedness. As discussed in chapter 5, Heidegger’s aim in BT is to argue that 
“objectivity”, “intersubjectivity” and “subjectivity” are equioriginary, i.e., they are 
irreducibly co-constitutive aspects of the meaningfulness of the human situation. The 
formal indication of co-disclosedness prohibits the positivist conception of 
development as an objective process, the meaning of which can be determined in the 
abstract, or in isolation from others, particularly those whom it involves.28
However, this is not an attempt to propose a new “paradigm” of development, 
as found, for example, in Sen’s notion of “development as freedom” or in Latouche’s 
notion of the “informal”. Paradigms involve a determinateness that is antithetical to the 
human situation. The aim is rather to keep the inquiry open to the co-determining that 
always constitutes us, and in particular to the co-determining that comes about in and as 
co-happening. This can only be indeterminately expressed, if we are not to foreclose on 
the framing of possibilities we understand ourselves as. This does not mean that the 
approach has no content, only that its “content” is really a directive suggestion as to 
how to pay attention to the way the problem-situation is meaningful and how meaning 
arises in, and for, such a situation.
28. Positivist development trades on the distinction between those who are development’s 
“subjects”, and those whom it concerns (often regarded as mutually exclusive groups). 
Historicist development accepts the differentiation of peoples or cultures, but maintains that 
those concerned have to be identified primarily with the “subjects”, and not with 
development experts. In either case, however, given that what is at issue is a transformation 
of such “subjects”, the underlying category is the one that Berman finds appearing in 
literature for the first time in Goethe’s Faust: “people who are in the way—in the way of 
history, of progress, of development; people who are classified, and disposed of, as 
obsolete” (Berman, op. cit., pg. 67). Phenomenologically, however, such classification can 
no longer be determinative, since co-happening and co-disclosedness is not a category, but 
a questioning comportment. That is, it doesn’t give a determinate content for “what” co-
happening “is” and whom it concerns, but raises it as a question about the enactment of the 
relation to such content.
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accord with Cowen and Shenton’s view that “free development” cannot be specified. 
For Cowen and Shenton, the notion of free development is problematized by the 
positivist requirement of trusteeship to bridge the gap between the ideal to be produced 
and the actual as it exists. They argue that trusteeship is essentially “a truly corrupted 
vision of the future” which perpetually recreates the past (DoD 476). Trusteeship 
forestalls free development because it has already determined possibilities in advance, 
with reference to the conditions of the past. The past gives the ideals of development 
(whether as meanings or values) in such a way that they can never be taken over and 
enacted in a way different from the past. Every vision of the future in positivist 
development is thus already infected by the past to the extent that such visions are all 
that is considered to be development. The identification of agency (the state, the Bank, 
the NGO—someone who “knows better” and “does better”) with knowledge (analysis 
of the immanent process; construction of the development ideal) thus binds the future to 
the past from the outset.29
It is no surprise that Cowen and Shenton’s immanent critique does not suggest 
any notion of what free development might be, save for an end to the most basic of 
material wants.30 The illusion of positivist and historicist development is to think that 
specification of the future is the specification of freedom to come. But Cowen and 
Shenton do not give us much idea of how free development might be understood. The 
29. This is another respect in which Cowen and Shenton’s analysis differs from 
postdevelopment. The latter associates knowledge with power. For this reason, 
postdevelopment often appears simply to involve practices of “unmasking” the 
deployments of discursive power. But once again, there is a repetition of the problem: 
where do the “unmaskers” (i.e., the postdevelopment thinkers) stand in relation to those 
who are discursively dominated? And how is it that they are endowed with such agency, 
whereas others (particularly the hard-working) are not?
30. Cowen and Shenton quote from Adorno: “...that none shall go hungry anymore” (DoD 
476).
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differently from development thinking. If the only way to think of free development is 
through the renunciation of trusteeship, then trusteeship remains the determining 
concept, although in a negative sense.31
The formally indicative approach to the human situation aims to keep open to 
question the unrest or restlessness, i.e., the genesis of meaning that lies at its core, by a 
repetitive restlessness of questioning that opens up the human situation to its own 
dynamic incompleteness, thereby prohibiting the static determination of meaning found 
in theory and worldview, as well as the complacency of everydayness and inherited, 
socially accepted meaning. What formal indication suggests, then, is a way of thinking 
tragic situatedness and its tensions, which not only keeps unrest alive—i.e., prohibits 
the ready reference to values or meanings that would be accepted if only development 
would take place (or be abandoned)—but also transforms the lapsing tendency towards 
self-certainty and the self-satisfaction of having found (or inherited) “the truth”. It 
involves a fundamental openness of the human situation to its co-disclosedness, in 
which our self-understanding becomes a provisional proposal to others, not about how 
they should understand themselves, but as an invitation to correct our self-
understanding by telling us what we do not, and cannot, see.32 But this does not mean 
the achievement of the self-certainty of dialectic synthesis: the new self-understanding 
is as provisional as the last.
Thus, formal indication makes it possible to see how the human situation is 
plurally constituted: there is no being had by history without having it (contra 
historicism); there is no having history without being had by it (contra positivism). And 
31. It also risks becoming pathological, if every attempt to articulate something about the 
subject of development gets taken to be a resurrection of trusteeship.
32. Cf. Scharff, “What postmodernists don’t get”.
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articulation, which means, in relation to and with one another, in a way that leaves open 
how the other (person/culture/society), in being itself, i.e., seeking to understand itself, 
reflects us back to ourselves.
Philosophy, possibility, development
Possibilities and being-possible
The pivotal aspect of Heidegger’s analytic is the argument that we have to 
understand possibility as the central modality of the human situation. Only as being-
possible, Heidegger argues, are we able to be historical, i.e., to have our history in such 
a way that it constitutes us. In ontologising freedom, Heidegger seeks to elucidate how 
it is that the naturalization of history and the historicization of nature belong together.33 
Another way of understanding the relation between possibility and concrete 
individuality is in terms of subjectivity as opposed to objectivity and intersubjectivity. 
Positivism presupposes that objectivity (determined as the invariance of empirical 
experience) can explain our way of being, including why we ask “why?” and the 
historicalness of our being (naturalizing history). Historicism argues that explanation in 
terms of invariance or positivist objectivity cannot hope to give an appropriate account 
of the historical, for this is constituted in meaning and not in empirically observed 
invariance. However, the constitution of meaning is an intersubjective event, and thus 
historicism attempts to assimilate objectivity to intersubjectivity (historicizing nature). 
Heidegger argues that neither is sufficient to appropriately account for the genesis of 
meaning or the meaning of historical individuality, because neither can give an account 
of how meaning is normative or binding. Heidegger argues that possibility is the 
33. Cf. Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics, pg. 137.
412moment of freedom, by which I am bound to my world as the naturally historical and 
historically natural being that I am. My history is binding because it is the fons et origo 
of the factical possibilities that constitute me. But conversely, my history is only so 
binding in that I take myself as my possibilities, and such “taking myself” is not itself a 
factical possibility.
...the human situation...on the basis of being-in-the-world, is always in its very pos-
sibility already beyond all beings. And in this being-beyond it does not come up 
against absolute nothingness. Rather, on the contrary, in this very being-beyond the 
human situation holds before itself the binding commitment as world and in this 
counter-hold first can and even must hold itself to beings. (MFL pp. 196-197, trans-
lation altered)
Question and questioner
How does the individual stand in relation to the subject of development, and 
how can this be incorporated into the question of development, its analysis and 
critique? The formal indication of the subject of development suggests an approach that 
is predicated on the question itself. For analysis to even begin, there must be a factically 
prior encountering of the phenomenon in question, which is thus constitutive of the 
questioner. That is, the questioner is always already in relation to what is inquired 
about. Formal indication aims to bring into relief this pretheoretical encountering, so as 
to show how it is involved in the genesis of meaning.
The formally indicative approach to the subject of development aims to show 
how I, as the inquirer, am already part of this subject. It is not an object that I stand 
outside, but a phenomenon that constitutes me because I encounter it. Development and 
its technical implementation are not “natural” objects and processes that can be studied 
theoretically, because they are part of what constitutes my lifeworld or my being-
situate, and thus, whether I like it or not, they constitute me. I may not be particularly 
aware of what goes on under the emblem of development, but cognition does not 
determine how I am constituted. What is decisive is the world that I am always in, and 
413is recalcitrant to the will to either dominate or ignore it. That is, I cannot make the 
world mean what I want it to mean, no matter how convinced I am that this is the case, 
because I am immanent to the world or, more saliently, immanent to history. I may wish 
that my history did not include the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, but I cannot make it 
otherwise. At the same time, the meaning of this occurrence itself is not simply given, 
because it always has to be retrieved, and is so retrieved in terms of other occurrences 
that have followed. Insofar as events constitute me as the history that I am, I understand 
myself in relation to them. They do not simply exist “out there” in the world, such that I 
can be who I am regardless of whether or not they occurred, even though this attitude, 
too, is always constitutive of the human situation. But I cannot forget that which I have 
not encountered in some way.
If conceptions of development are put in question, then what is at issue is the 
meaning of history and our relation to it. This is the interstitial point where Heidegger’s 
notion of formal indication becomes significant. Phenomenological hermeneutical 
inquiry neither aims to give a complete description of the human situation nor to 
prescribe to us how the human situation must be understood. Instead, it gives an 
indication of the way we go about understanding what it means to be ourselves, how 
this can be made explicit, and what this can tell us about how this can be done 
appropriately, or rather, what doing so appropriately involves. It is indicative, in that it 
points out something about concrete individuality and being-historical; it is formal 
because what it points us to is not, in fact, a “what” at all, but rather a how of being, 
which is the formal indicating constitutive of the human situation itself.34 In this way, it 
puts into question the issue of how the development expert or critic stands in relation to 
that which he or she investigates or criticizes, an issue already predetermined in 
development thinking.
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predetermined by the concepts and approaches of development thinking themselves, as 
characteristic of our own historical context? How can we think outside of development, 
when this is what allows us to think in the first place, whether this is understood as 
conformity to the norms of “rationality” (or science) or as the historico-cultural context 
that makes meaning possible?
Questioning meaning
The phenomenological approach does not ask about what development is, but 
rather about what conceptions of it involve, as determinations of the meaning of history 
in terms of material well-being, agency, and so on, that close off the disclosedness of 
meaning as itself constitutive in to the subject of development. That is, these 
conceptions deny that meaning is always co-determined, and thus that meaningfulness 
involves co-disclosedness.
Questioning meaning is constitutive of the human situation, Heidegger 
suggests, but the provision of determinate meanings always occludes such constitutive 
questioning, whether this is given in everyday lapsing into the obviousness of what is 
“commonly” meant, or by theoretical abstraction. The latter, in fact, is more pernicious, 
because it also supplies a “court of judgment” for keeping questionableness at bay, i.e., 
systems and doctrines of thought that adjudicate what can be said and thought on the 
grounds of rationality. This excludes questioning of the genesis of meaning itself, 
which cannot be theorized because it is the non-theoretical basis for all theory. Theory 
34. Lest this be regarded as too much “bootstrapping”, it can be pointed out that this is no more 
objectionable than the self-grounding notion of what counts for truth in the natural sciences 
(for example). What counts as true or valid is what can be observed and can be duplicated 
by other observers, i.e., is objective. These criteria determine what is true or objective 
because nature is recalcitrant, i.e., it stand over against us in its sheer facticity, which we 
simply have to acknowledge. However, acknowledging such sheer facticity is part of what 
counts as “objectivity”. The facticity of the natural is presupposed as that which makes it 
objective.
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condition for all understanding. The inability of theory to address facticity makes 
meaning unquestionable, which destroys meaningfulness because it can no longer arise 
as fundamentally constitutive of who I am in questioning.
What is argued for here, then, is a twofold significance to formal indication, 
corresponding to its two functions. First, thinking the human situation in this way 
suggests how we can understand the genesis of meaning in a way that does not 
predetermine it theoretically by dissevering facticity and existentiality. Second, it 
suggests a way to rethink the phenomenon itself, neither as linear, univocal progress, 
nor as self-contained cultural development, but as both together, i.e., in the dynamic 
tension between them.
Formally indicative questions
To present the results of this inquiry in a series of assertions about 
development would be to close off the provisional incompleteness that the formally 
indicative approach requires, and thus would be antithetical to the inquiry. By way of 
conclusion, then, I suggest instead some questions that the concept of development 
raises, and which therefore constitute it as a way of being, but are occluded in that way 
of being.
Is there such a thing as a “development expert”? A “development agency”?
If development is neither object nor (transitive) activity, but rather a way of 
being or a comportment, can there be any claim to development expertise? Can there 
properly be agencies whose raison d’être is to study development and operationalize it? 
If the analysis of economic and political behaviour is coherently constituted as an 
approach to an object-domain, then it is plausible to hold that there can be expertise in 
416this approach, just as much as there can be expertise in the natural sciences. But can this 
be equated to “expertise” in co-happening? What becomes questionable with the 
recognition of coevalness and co-constitution is that any claim to “expertise” involves 
the denial that others are equally, and necessarily, involved in the determination of 
possibilities. What the question seeks to hold open is whether this can be considered to 
be expertise about what is objectified as development. What such experts do is to study 
and advise about ways to change institutions, to engage in technical activities, etc.
The fundamental problem that formal indication adverts to is that 
objectification as “development” entails that the comportment or self-understanding of 
the development expert cannot be called into question by the subject of development. 
That is, how does the subject of development include development thinking? Yet 
development is not an object, but a co-happening. Thus, there cannot be “expertise” in 
it, because this would entail expertise in how others understand us, which presupposes 
that I can have such understanding independently of others.
Formal indication highlights the provisionality of being human, i.e., that we 
are never fully transparent to ourselves. Since I can neither be the creator of the context 
I find myself in, nor the creator of the understanding of that context, I cannot have 
certainty about how I understand myself. The objectivity of knowledge in the positive 
disciplines (particularly in social sciences such as economics, where theoretical 
analysis is taken to be more objective than self-understanding, as for example in 
Marshall), is ultimately grounded in ways we take ourselves to be. But if development 
thinking presupposes that the self-understanding of “developed” people represents an 
ideal or end for others who do not and cannot take themselves to be that way, ex 
hypothesi, then the relation between the two is problematic. If developedness is the 
ideal for both, then we are all engaged in the same project of trying to work out who we 
417are in relation to one another and what it means to be so related. On the other hand, the 
distinction between developed and underdeveloped implies a difference in self-
understanding, which makes the relevance of the self-understanding of the developed to 
the underdeveloped questionable.
A formally indicative alternative
The positivist conception depends on the notion that history is an object that 
can be analyzed in terms of general laws, whether or not such knowledge is available to 
those subject to such laws. In this conception, individuals are alienated from their 
history, because the posited meaning of history does not include how they understand it. 
Instead, historical meaning can only be determined by those who have the expertise and 
analytical tools to do so. Thus, development experts are the only ones in a position to 
pronounce on what development means, and so to act as “advisors” to those who are 
incapable of understanding it, so as to instruct them in how to become developed. The 
positivist conception of development entails that there is a difference between the 
development expert (who, because of such expertise, is already developed) and the 
subject of development. This difference has to do with a relation to history. The 
development expert “has” history, in being able to objectify it, scientifically analyze it, 
determine its meaning, and so on. The underdeveloped people, however, being unable 
to do this (because the ability to do so is what constitutes being developed) are simply 
“had” by their history.
The historicists take issue with this, arguing that if development (or cultural 
change) has to do with meaning, then this has to concern those who belong to the 
culture. However, because historicism maintains that meaning is culturally determined, 
it also implies that cultural change is not a matter for individuals, but only for a culture 
as a whole, in expressing its cultural individuality. This equally problematizes the 
418relation of the human situation and history, since it suggests that there is no way for an 
individual to “stand outside” of her culture or history so as to be actively involved in 
cultural change. Cultural change “happens”, but no-one is the agent. Unlike positivism, 
the historicist conception argues that no-one “has” their history, because we are all 
determined by our culture and the meaning that our cultural inheritance determines for 
us. Instead, it is a question of which histories we are “had” by, i.e., that determine who 
and how we are.
Phenomenologically, neither conception is adequate, because in order to 
“have” our history, we must be “had” by it, and in order to be “had” by it, we must 
“have” it. History is neither a possession we have nor a context that constitutes us, but 
is both, or rather, these are one and the same. The facticity of being human does not 
simply mean a complete immersion or immanence in our historical context, but always 
also involves the transcendence of it in understanding ourselves. But similarly, the 
transcendence of understanding our history is only possible because it refers to facticity, 
i.e., being historically constituted. History is thus neither simply an object nor a set of 
shared practices, but is always also a way of being an individual, or of being 
individuated. Objectivity, intersubjectivity and subjectivity are irreducible. They belong 
together in the human situation, and indeed, are what equioriginarily constitute it. What 
is difficult to grasp is this equioriginariness itself.
Positivist development, on the basis of abstraction from history, aims to 
determine courses of action to be implemented concretely. Yet the concrete cannot be 
derived from the abstract. The operationalization of positivist development is always an 
attempt to apply abstract principles to concrete contexts, which themselves are not the 
contexts from which the principles are abstracted. This is once again an example of how 
the scientific analysis of society is inadequate for the task it sets itself, and in fact 
419conduces to a misunderstanding of the phenomenon. In implementing a development 
project to construct infrastructure, advise on policy, reform institutions, etc., the 
abstract principles must be made concrete. Rather than an abstract power station, it 
concerns this power station, located in this region, to built by these people, operated by 
those others, and paid for by these citizens of this particular country. Furthermore, it is 
being co-funded by these international organizations who have sent those advisors, and 
so on. In each case, the meaning of the endeavour depends on all of these contextual 
factors together, which also includes those who advise on and recommend the project. 
They, too, are as much a part of the meaning of the project as any of the other factors. 
However, the positivistic presupposition is that the concrete project has the same 
meaning as the abstract project, and therefore its meaning does not depend on those 
involved. In particular, it does not depend on the development experts, who are thus 
always absolved of responsibility if the project is a failure (by their own standards).
The inquirer and the subject
In order for inquiry into the subject of development to be unprejudiced by the 
theoretical attitude, the preliminary question that needs to be raised concerns the 
relation between inquirer and subject. How does the development expert or 
development critic stand in relation to the subject of development? Is this relation and 
its enactment part of the inquiry, or is it simply presupposed, taken as a correlation 
given along with the subject matter and expertise about it? Neither positivist nor 
historicist development raises this question. 
420Formally indicating development
Referring-prohibitive function
How might the formal indication of co-happening function with regard to the 
theoretical analyses encountered in positivist and historicist development? One aspect 
is to prohibit the notion that communication and cooperation between different societies 
can be understood in terms of knowledge and expertise. The theoretical attitude of 
positivist development occludes the situatedness of both development expert and hard-
working person, although in opposite ways. The situatedness of the development expert 
is occluded in the presupposition that knowledge of the situation of others equates to 
transcendence of one’s own situation. A development expert’s knowledge about the 
pastoralists of Tunisia, for example, is taken to represent an ability to transcend her own 
situation as a Texan, say, and this is reinforced by the inability of the Tunisian to 
transcend her own situation through expert knowledge of Texas. Indeed, the asymmetry 
in positivist development regarding situatedness runs deeper than this, since expert 
knowledge about Texas (for example, its oil industry) does not count as development 
expertise, since Texas is (by definition) not developing. As opposed to this, the lack of 
ability to understand her own situation ascribed to the hard-working person occludes 
situatedness because it implies complete immanence in the situation. There is no 
possibility of the transcendence that constitutes situatedness. In being completely “had” 
by my situation, I thus do not “have” it at all. This is the converse of the first case, in 
which the development expert, in “having” the situation of the hard-working person, is 
no longer “had” by her own situation.
This view of their situational transcendence is not necessarily explicitly 
articulated by development experts,35 but it is implied in the conception of development 
35. Although the World Bank’s attempt to style itself as the Knowledge Bank could be 
understood in just this light.
421itself, which eliminates recognition that the lived-situations of development expert and 
hard-working “developee” are equally constitutive of the subject of development. 
Expertise cannot take this into account, because being-situate is not an object about 
which there can be expertise. The development expert does not, and cannot, live the 
situation of the hard-working people about whom she is an expert.36 The formal 
indication of co-happening prohibits this presupposition about expert knowledge. If the 
phenomenon is one in which different countries, societies, or even individuals co-
happen, then it cannot be understood as one that only happens to some, and is only 
understood by some.
The formal indication of co-happening points to the co-determination of 
meaning as part of the co-constituting of who we are. Co-determination and co-
constitution always involve inherited traditions that constitute us. These inherited 
traditions are meaningful in terms of the possibilities they are understood as freeing us 
for. This is how they are co-determined, since such possibilities are disclosed in 
communication and contention. Traditions, however, are not objects but ways of being, 
and thus always have to be retrieved and repeated. They cannot be determined by 
empirical observation, nor are they simply had as shared practices. Communication and 
contention is how they are constituted as traditions. Furthermore, the intrinsic 
incompleteness of the human situation means that we only have traditions in being-
with-one-another. Traditions are therefore not self-contained. We inherit them both by 
36. The asymmetries involved in the presupposition of expert knowledge can also be detected 
in the presupposition that development refers to aid or assistance from developed countries 
to underdeveloped countries. The equation of development with aid, as expressed, for 
example, on the CIDA website, follows from the combination of the idea of “international 
development” and the categorization of countries as “developed”, “developing” and 
“underdeveloped”. This categorization implies that there are countries that do not 
(intransitively) develop. Thus, the only involvement they can have in international 
development is to (transitively) develop others, i.e., to assist or aid the developing/
underdeveloped. The formal indication of co-happening prohibits this presupposition too, 
since leisured people co-happen just as much as hard-working people. 
422growing up in them, and in the retrieval of them as they become distant to us. This 
happens both in “generational” co-happening and in the interaction between different 
traditions, for instance, with migration. Traditions are not self-contained isolates, but 
nor are they simply “options”.
Co-happening formally indicates this structural incompleteness by prohibiting 
the identification of cultures, societies or countries as complete in themselves, i.e., as 
atomistic entities that are self-contained and self-constituted. Both positivist and 
historicist development presuppose such self-containment in the way they identify the 
meaning of development. That is, both approaches take societies or cultures as 
particular instances, for positivist development instances of a stage in the linear 
sequence that constitutes progress, for historicist development instances of coeval and 
equal sociocultural formations.
The possibility of development
Positivist possibilities
For positivist development, the question of the possibilities of development 
and how these are had is determined in advance from the actuality of the leisured 
countries, which provide the understanding of the development problematic and how 
this is to be addressed. In positivism, such actualities are taken to demonstrate necessity 
in the form of the general laws or causal regularities responsible for developedness. 
Development is conceptualized in terms of the necessity of the laws governing it, which 
are demonstrated by the leisured countries. The (present) actuality of the hard-working 
countries is conceptualized as the necessity of “past stages” of the development the 
leisured have experienced. That is, the coevalness of leisured and hard-working is 
reconfigured in terms of different “historical stages”. The ascription of necessity to the 
unilinear sequence of development stages does not entail that development is 
423inevitable, however. Hard-working countries may continue working hard (or 
“stagnating”). Rather, if development does occur, it will follow the necessary stages 
determined from the actuality of the leisured countries. The positivist “problem of 
development” is therefore how change from one stage to another is to be brought about. 
Here we find another presupposition of positivist development: the leisured countries 
are considered to be “self-moving”.
This problematic, as shown in chapter 2, has three aspects, namely, surplus 
population (or poverty), quantification, and mechanistic social change. The problem of 
development becomes codified as the problem of poverty. The way to address this 
problem is by assisting societies on to the path achieved by the leisured countries of 
economic growth and increasing wealth. The technical recommendations are justified 
by the identification of past stages of the leisured countries with the present of the hard-
working. In this conceptualization, then, the possibilities of the hard-working countries 
are predetermined for them, not by them.The experience of the leisured countries shows 
how to solve the development problem. As such, the possibility that the hard-working 
countries can determine their own possibilities is denied, and is assigned to those whose 
experience transcends the immanence of the development problem. In this way, being-
possible is denied of the hard-working countries themselves. Because they have not 
experienced the various transformations that development signifies, they cannot be in a 
position to determine their own development. They cannot determine the possibilities 
that constitute them as who they are. They lack the ability to make such determinations, 
which is what underdevelopment means. For positivist development, the process of 
development is already determined. This denies the notion that possibility is 
constitutive of being the society, country, etc., that it is. It denies that being-possible is 
what constitutes the human situation.
424Historicist possibility
For historicist development, possibilities are seen as indigenously determined, 
and thus both particular to, and latent in, each particular society. Positivist development 
and its operationalization on a global scale is seen as suppressing such latent 
possibilities, imposing instead a universal determination of possibilities. Such 
possibilities are viewed by historicist development as an illegitimate generalization 
from the particular conditions of the developed. Despite such hegemonic imposition, 
however, indigenous possibilities are not completely destroyed. Indeed, historicist 
development argues that the very failure of positivist development is testimony to both 
its particularity and its impotence. In drawing attention to “real, existing development”, 
as Serge Latouche calls it,37 historicist development argues that the actuality of 
development shows that the possibilities determined by positivist development are 
neither universal nor necessary. Thus, historicist development accords priority to the 
modality of actuality over both necessity and possibility. It therefore denies that 
development means being or becoming what the developed countries actually are.
The possibility of co-happening
In formally indicating the phenomenon as co-happening, attention is drawn to 
the way that possibilities are determined in communication and contention about 
meaning. Communication and contention are also possibilities we take ourselves as, 
and thus attest that the basis for co-happening is always already there. The possibilities 
that are determined in co-happening cannot, however, be given in advance, because this 
would simply generalize one particular self-understanding. Rather, they arise out of, 
and are oriented towards, the contested retrieval of both hard-working and leisured 
37. Serge Latouche, The Westernization of the World, op. cit., pg. xiv.
425countries’ traditions. But this does not mean that co-happening is a tendency towards 
convergence, whether through subordination or hybridization. Although the 
possibilities of all countries are transformatively retrieved in co-happening, these 
possibilities, and the understanding of them, are still constitutive of individuation 
because in their enactment they come to constitute the alreadiness of a country as the 
country it is, i.e., its history. That is, although the meaning and understanding of 
possibilities are communicated and contested in co-happening such that one tradition 
can reveal the possibilities of another to that other itself, this does not entail that these 
become possibilities for both traditions.
The philosophy of possibility
Although Heidegger’s analytic is difficult to grasp, it is difficult because it 
tries to express the lived situation that each of us is, not because it claims access to an 
object that is only available to those adept in certain techniques of inquiry. That is, 
formally indicating the human situation may strike us as odd and incomprehensible, but 
this is because it aims to show what gets occluded both in everydayness and in 
theoretical inquiry. Formal indication does not provide us with an account of how we 
must understand ourselves and our situatedness. Rather, it indicates how it is that we 
express that situatedness. It does not determine in advance where we might end up in 
enacting this for ourselves.
The problematic of the subject of development is also the problematic 
motivating Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics: the relation of history and the 
a priori. On the one hand, who we are and how we understand this is historically 
contextual. On the other hand, the possibility of expressing the notion of historical 
context seems to require ahistorical concepts. In purely formal terms, the idea of 
difference necessarily involves the idea of the same, i.e., it is heterothetical.
426Heidegger’s notion of equioriginariness—i.e., the heterothetical irreducibility 
of I and other—is a reformulation of Dilthey’s notion of the socio-historical context of 
individuality (GSI:28-31/80-83), to contest the opposition between self and other, or 
individual and social collective, as inappropriately reductionistic. Given that this is the 
locus of Heidegger’s inquiry, and that his aim is to show that the genesis of meaning 
lies neither in object, intersubject, nor subject, but rather “between” them all in 
disclosedness (cf. SZ 132), which ultimately involves being-possible, the question of 
interest here is how this pertains to development thinking.
The possibility of free development
As has been shown previously, the concept of development involves the 
determination of possibilities, whether in terms of the objective conditions whereby 
development can occur, or as the intersubjectively determined sharing of cultural 
identity. In inquiring about the possibility of free development, the question then is how 
freedom relates to such possibilities, for if they are given, they seem to stand over 
against us as constraints.
For historicist development, development and freedom are connected in the 
flowering or maturation of latent possibilities identified as culturally individual. 
Freedom means the development of cultural expression, i.e., cultural change that 
deepens and solidifies cultural identity.
The finitude of the human situation suggests that we are fundamentally 
constituted by being-possible, because our way of being is to take beings as beings. The 
moment of subjectivity in the human situation is understanding ourselves as our factical 
possibilities. But this can never be properly expressed, because in the very attempt to 
express this, the factical possibilities that constitute me change. The constitution of our 
being, Heidegger argues, is such that we can only express our concrete individuality 
427improperly, i.e., we can only formally indicate it. It is never completely transparent to 
us, but is how we are always finding ourselves to be, in encountering things in our 
shared world. Thus, meaning is always provisional. This provisionality of meaning, 
however, gets occluded in the attempt to specify things properly or determinately. 
Proper or determinate specification excludes possibility. Recognizing possibility as 
constitutive of our way of being means that we can only express this indeterminately.
This is precisely the situation of development. In the attempt to determine the 
meaning of development in the reiteration of history, it takes on the characteristic of 
necessity. In positivist development, this is effected by abstraction from history by 
quantification and mechanistic regularization. Development becomes conceptualized as 
a necessary future, rather than a way in which the future is co-disclosed as possibility. 
As such, we can no longer be involved in, or even capable of, co-determining the future, 
because it cannot be a possibility for us. Positivist development denies being-possible. 
However, this applies just as much to the leisured as to the hard-working. And this 
means that it applies to the development expert herself. Despite the apparent distinction 
between “traditional” and “modern” peoples or societies, in understanding themselves 
as creators of their own conditions, positivist development in effect denies that this can 
be a distinction at all. In substituting for progress and for possibility, development 
becomes a worldview that reifies and freezes history exactly where it is, because it is 
only through abstraction from history that the meaning of development can be 
determined. Despite all its programmatic aspects and the operationalization of social 
change, as a guiding concept development, it is incapable of taking into account the 
possibility of the new and unforeseen. That is, it conceptually occludes the 
understanding that constitutes the human situation.
428Historicist development similarly forecloses on possibility, because it seeks to 
counterpose intersubjectivity to the objectivity of positivist development. By making 
recourse to what is actual in a culture as the shared meanings determined by its history, 
it thereby occludes the possibility involved in inheriting tradition. Thus, it occludes the 
moment of subjectivity whereby history and tradition are constituted.
In both cases, the freeing up of possibility as the indeterminately active power 
of appropriation is available, as long as this is recognized by the theorists themselves. 
That is, by bringing this approach “home” to theorists and critics of development alike, 
there is the possibility (!) of a reorientation in thinking. The central aim of the formal 
indication to the subject of development is to call to the attention of those who claim to 
be able to speak about development how the theoretical approach to development itself 
fails to take into account the dynamic finitude of the theorists that makes such 
theorizing possible. That is, formally indicating the subject of development is aimed at 
showing how the concept of development itself occludes the self-understanding of 
development theorists. The theoretical objectification of historicalness as development 
entails that it can be understood without reference to subjectivity, i.e., that the meaning 
of development can be articulated in terms of objectivity or intersubjectivity. But this 
involves the denial that the subjectivity of the development expert or critic is 
constitutive in this endeavour. Given that the concept of development or cultural change 
means something other than imposing conditions upon hard-working people, if it 
cannot take into account the concrete individuality of the development expert or critic 
herself, it is unclear how it can be oriented towards grasping that this is constitutive of 
the human situation.
An appropriate account of the phenomenon has to include the enactment of 
meaning as co-disclosedness, but this shows that development cannot be an object. 
429Thus, a different way of approaching the subject is needed. The “improper” approach of 
formal indication involves giving an account of the subject of development that 
includes the possibility of giving such an account, as part of what it gives an account of. 
That is, it includes the inquirer in the account, not concretely, but formally-indicatively. 
It thus suggests how each inquirer needs to take herself into account in the inquiry. 
Unlike the concept of development, then, the formally indicative approach does not 
presuppose that what is inquired about—the subject of development—remains 
unchanged in the inquiry. Indeed, the very point of such an inquiry is to alter what is 
inquired into.
What can be shown is that possibility is more central to the subject of 
development than the concept of development allows for. The predominance of the 
necessary and the actual in development thinking makes it hard to grasp that what the 
subject of development really concerns is possibility, i.e., the possibility of being 
otherwise. In representing the future as the implementation of possibilities that have 
been determined from the history of the leisured countries, positivist development 
occludes the appropriation of such possibilities by hard-working countries (whether 
positively or negatively) whereby they are taken to be meaningful in ways that the 
development expert does not, and indeed cannot, recognize in advance. Only if the 
development expert herself remains open to the possibility that what she understands by 
these possibilities is not, and cannot be, how they are understood by others, can she 
begin to recognize what might be happening, and how she herself is involved in this 
happening.
In representing the future as a retrieval or regeneration of the traditions and 
history of an individual culture, historicist development occludes the way in which 
these come to have different meanings in their retrieval and regeneration, which the 
430historicist development critic does not, and indeed cannot, recognize in advance. Only 
if the historicist critic himself remains open to the possibility that what he understands 
these traditions to mean is not, and cannot be, how they are understood by others, can 
he begin to recognize what might be happening, and how he himself is involved in this 
happening.
The formal indication of the subject of development suggests further that the 
appropriation of possibilities presented by the positivist development expert always 
already involves the retrieval and regeneration of historical traditions, because 
appropriation can only happen from out of a historical situation. Similarly, it suggests 
that the retrieval and regeneration of historical traditions suggested by the historicist 
critic always already involves the appropriation of objective possibilities, because this 
is how we have our historical traditions. The theoretical disseverance of objectivity and 
intersubjectivity in terms of abstract scientific inquiry and historical contextualization is 
always held together in being a coeval, co-disclosing culture, because this involves co-
disclosing meaning. The concept of development is compromised in its different 
articulations by the way it attempts to privilege sameness or difference, rather than 
recognizing that these always already belong together, and that the intellectual and 
practical challenge lies in grasping how it is that these belong together. This, it seems to 
me, is how we make our history at the same time as we are made by it, how we have it 
and are had by it, and how we transcend our historical situation through our immanence 
in it. Heidegger’s phenomenological elucidations of the human situation indicate one 
way of trying to think this, a way that can help clarify how we find ourselves in our 
situation. In the final analysis, it seems to me that the possibilities for a country, culture, 
or society can only be determined in its co-evalness with others. The role that other 
people might play in this is not to instruct or inform about what to do, but to ask about 
431how they understand what they are doing, and in trying to understand this, to be an 
opportunity for them to understand themselves. Such interaction is, of course, 
reciprocal. Arguably, it would be helpful if we were to come to understand this as the 
situation out of which our inquiries come, and towards which they are oriented.
Conclusion
Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics of the human situation suggests 
that development is too central to the human condition to be the exclusive concern of 
expert developers or of any positive discipline(s). Co-happening is constitutive of 
understanding, and as such co-constitutes self-understanding. Because being-with-one-
another is constitutive of being human in its disclosed disclosiveness, the subject of 
development belongs to the problematic of human being. Above all, co-happening 
suggests that positivist development thinking needs to be understood as belonging to 
the phenomenon, rather than being able to determine it theoretically from an external 
standpoint, and thus is co-determined by the very situation it theorizes. On the other 
hand, co-happening suggests that historicist development thinking needs to be 
understood as predicated itself on a situational transcendence that is only made possible 
by the communication and contest of meaning through the interactions that it eschews.
Discontinuation
Nearness and distance
The relation of distance and nearness to what we are distant from or near to as 
a way of being means that it is more originary than what is so related, i.e., self and thing 
or self and other. In BT, Heidegger argues that distance is ontological:
432The human situation is of course ontically not only near or even the nearest—we 
are actually it ourselves in each case. Despite this, or precisely for this reason, it is 
ontologically the farthest. (SZ 15)
Indeed, the “ontological difference” between beings and their being is, in the human 
situation, an ontological distance between disposedness and understanding, or facticity 
and existentiality, the ontological sense of which is to be found in the structure of 
originary timeliness as alreadiness-becoming. This last structure can be deformalized to 
give a phenomenological elucidation of being-historical, which does not have to do 
with “the past”, but rather with the happening and co-happening of the “stretch” 
between birth and death in their ontological senses. That is, historicalness does not 
concern just the past or even alreadiness, but the belonging together of alreadiness and 
becoming, as the movedness of the human situation in belonging together at things and 
with others in caretaking and caregiving. Distance and nearness are also, of course, 
transcendence and immanence.
Heidegger’s phenomenological inquiry does not so much conclude as break off 
with a series of questions that leave us right where we started, wondering, amidst beings 
as a whole, what it means “to be”. 
Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, proceeding from the herme-
neutics of the human situation, which all philosophical questioning, as the analytic 
of existence, has fastened the end of the guideline there from where it arises and to 
where it returns. (SZ 38, 436)
In one sense, Heidegger’s very approach enjoins against doing otherwise. Any attempt 
to conclude a formally indicative inquiry is an attempt to complete it, in which case it 
would turn out to have been theoretical all along. 
For these reasons, to try to provide a conclusion here would be antithetical to 
the very endeavour. Like the inquiry that is the human situation itself, it cannot 
conclude, but can only be discontinued. I give the last word to Heidegger:
The human being is a creature of distance! And only by way of the real primordial 
distance that the human in his transcendence establishes toward all beings does the 
433true nearness to things begin to grow in him. And only the capacity to hear into the 
distance summons forth the awakening of the answer of those humans who should 
be near. (MFL, “Supplement”)
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Appendix I: Terminology and Lexicon
About the terminology used in this text
Economics
The original Greek sense of “economics” is verbal and refers to an activity or 
an art, i.e., household or estate management. In English, into the 19th century, 
“economy” and its cognates referred to a mode of behaviour or a way of being, rather 
than to an object. It is only towards the end of the 19th century that “economy” acquires 
its contemporary meaning of an object comprising all the exchange interactions 
between individuals, consumers and producers, government, etc., as when we talk 
about “the economy”. It is all too easy to read this nominal or substantialized sense 
back into earlier texts. In doing so, however, misunderstandings can occur. For 
example, when Adam Smith uses the term “economy”, he is referring to a mode of 
behaviour, and not to a hypostasized object. A phrase such as “the English economy” 
refers to the way the English behave, and not to the sum total of exchange interactions 
in England.
In this text, therefore, I have tried to avoid using “economy” in its 
hypostasized sense (except where the context requires it). Instead, I use “economic 
behaviour”, “economic activity”, or other such phrases. Although this can sometimes 
be ungainly, it has the merit, I believe, of drawing attention to the sense of activity that 




The terminological difficulties encountered in discussing “international 
development” are legion, and are explored in some detail in Chapter 3. In particular, the 
distinction between the verbal and nominal senses of “development” are problematic, 
but using it is unavoidable. The same is not true of some of its cognates, however, such 
as “underdeveloped”, “developed”, and “developing”. One tendency in critiques of 
development is to use these terms in quotation marks, to indicate the critical distance 
that the author wishes to establish between her own understanding of what is referred to 
and the dominant or mainstream understanding. Such orthography soon becomes 
tedious. Instead, I have used the terms “hard-working country” and “leisure country” to 
distinguish, in what I hope is a less contentious way, those that development is thought 
to address from those who are thought of as doing the addressing. My justification for 
using these terms is that they are, at least to some extent, more neutrally descriptive 
than other possibilities, such as “low-income” and “high-income” (as used by the World 
Bank, for example). As with “underdeveloped” and “developed”, the meanings of such 
terms tends to presuppose values whose origin is (predominantly) in the latter countries 
(or societies).
Heidegger
Translating Heidegger is notoriously difficult, not just because his texts are 
replete with neologisms that only resonate in German or because he nominalizes 
adverbs and verbalizes nouns. Rather, it is that the language he uses is formally 
indicative. His concepts do not refer to objects with determinate properties, but to ways 
of being whose indeterminacy is to be made determinate in following in the direction 
which those concepts point. Heidegger’s language is itself aimed at drawing our 
attention to the expressing of what it tries to express, rather than to what is expressed. 
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The difficulty this presents makes it tempting to transpose Heidegger’s terms into 
concepts that are familiar. For example, it is tempting to translate Miteinandersein 
(being-with-one-another) as “sociality” or some other cognate. Similarly, it is tempting 
to translate Da-sein as “human being”. To do so is to misunderstand Heidegger’s aim 
from the start. His language and concepts specifically aim to prohibit or direct us away 
from our usual object-thinking, so as to refer us to the enactment of relating of what is 
usually thought of as subject and object. 
Miteinandersein, for example, prohibits the identification with “sociality” or 
“the social” as it is usually conceived, in order to refer us to the way in which we appear 
in the world as always being-with-one-another. This is a happening or taking place in 
which, and as which, each of us is constituted. It is a kinetic co-constituting that is 
completely specific as to its context and content. The “social”, on the other hand, 
presupposes a static, objective relation between subjects, egos, personalities, etc. It also 
abstracts from the singular sense of my being-with-one-another. The point of 
Heidegger’s terms, then, is in fact to point us away from such presuppositions, so as to 
get us to recognize and understand the concretely singular kinetics of the human 
situation. My hope is that this aspect of Heidegger’s thinking has become clearer in the 
course of this thesis.
Here, I discuss a few of the more idiosyncratic translations I have attempted. 
First, I use “being-situate” to translate Da-sein. I agree with Thomas Sheehan that 
leaving this word untranslated has had a deleterious effect on Heidegger interpretation. 
However, Sheehan’s own suggestion (“openness-for-being” or “openness”, for short) 
fails to express both the verbal sense (as indicated by his later hyphenation of the word) 
and the middle-voiced sense that Heidegger intends, as a happening whereby we are 
both take our place in the world and are placed in it. Kisiel’s suggestion of the “human 
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situation” also fails to express this verbal sense. “Human situating” might work, but 
strikes me as awkward. I experimented with “taking-place”, but this overlaps too much 
with “happening” [Geschehen]. I have settled on “being-situate” for now.
Second, the use of “project” to translate entwerfen and “projection” for 
Entwurf has always struck me as highly misleading, since it lends itself all too easily to 
the decisionist reading of BT that one still occasionally encounters. Although they do 
have the sense of “throw” found in the root word werfen, the prefix “pro-” implies a 
subject that intentionally does the “throwing”. There is no satisfactory word in English 
to express this. I have tried the cognates “lay out” and “layout”. For somewhat similar 
reasons I have used “cast” and “castness” of geworfen and Geworfenheit.
Finally, the use of “(in)authentic(ally)” for (un)eigentlich is also misleading. In 
ordinary German, eigentlich often means “proper(ly)” or “appropriate(ly)”. The latter, it 
seems to me, makes better sense of those passages where Heidegger juxtaposes 
uneigentlich with echt (“genuine”) (e.g., SZ 146, 148, 326). It seems peculiar, at least in 
contemporary English, to refer to something as both genuine and inauthentic, whereas 
to refer to something as genuine yet inappropriate is not. (For example, we recognize 
certain expressions of emotion or sentiment as being quite genuine, although we may 
find them inappropriate to a particular situation.) The nominalized form of 
“(in)appropriateness”, for (Un)Eigentlichkeit, is somewhat cumbersome. However, 
these cognates work better, it seems to me, than Kisiel’s suggestion of “(dis)owned(ly)” 
and “(dis)ownedness”.
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Da-sein being-situate; the human situation




















innerweltlich(e) innerworldish (a.), innerworldishly (adv.)
je in each case
Jemeinigkeit mineness











Seinsart manner of being



















vorhanden on hand; just there (S)
Vorhandenheit on-handness; just-there-ness (S)









K = Kisiel; S = Sheehan
